How Is the UCOFT Working Out? So far, UCOFT Crews Seem to Be Faster Getting First-Round Hits

The Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer (UCOFT) is reaching the field in increasing numbers and is proving to be a real asset to tank gunnery training. In order to assess the impact and to gain insight into the best strategy for its use, the TRADOC Analysis Command (TRAC) and the Armor Center conducted a UCOFT Post Fielding Training Effectiveness Analysis (PFTEA). The study is complete, the results compiled and analyzed. The study showed the UCOFT to be a significant factor in improving and sustaining tank crews in gunnery performance. Crews trained on UCOFT tended to be faster with no loss in accuracy than those who trained only with!he standard devices, and they carried that edge over to the sustainment of those skills. The year-long study, a cooperative effort between Fort Knox and the Grafenwoehr Field Office of TRAC-White Sands Missile Range, required a detailed examination of the tank gunnery programs of six Table 1. USAREUR M1 tank battalions. Five of the participating battalions had the UCOFT, and the sixth was a baseline unit without the UCOFT. Unit officers, NCOs, and civilians gathered training data throughout the study, but three major events for each battalion were the key drivers of the effort. The first major event was one week of UCOFT testing, interviews, and questionnaires administered to each UCOFT-equipped battalion in the study. This took place approximately 30 days before the unit’s qualification gunnery density. Two UCOFT instructor/operalors Corn arison of Tank Table Wll Resutts for &OFT and Non-UCOFT Groups Test Group Number Total Robability Opening Times of Crew Score of lsl Round Hit Offensive+ Defensive+ Overall* NonUCOFT Bn 56 763 78 7.3 4.1 5.7 UCOFT Bns 291 792 77 5.9 3.4 4.7 SaUsUcdly aignilicml differsme. P-z.01. T-Test from the USAARMS Weapons Department administered a UCOFT test to all tank commanders and gunncrs. This test consisted of 11 engagements, four of which closely resembled corresponding tasks on Tank Table VIII. The TRAC analysts administered questionnaires to the same group and conducted interviews with key personnel in the battalion. The non- battalion received a shorter visit in which questionnaires and interviews were done in the same manner. The second event was the battalion’s scheduled qualification tank gunnery density, in which the crews fired Tank Table VI11 (‘IT VIII), the tank crew qualification exercise. The range operation was the standard TT VI11 conducted by the 7th Army Training Command at Grafenwoehr Training Area (Range 117). The last event was a return by 15 ARMOR - 9

Relationship Between Change in lTVlll Scores And UCOFT Matrix Status at Special TTVlll >than100ptdrop tthan100pointdrop tthan100poMgain >than100pointgain SIGNIFICANT CORRELATION FOR NON-UCOFT GROUP p.05 5 0 - 4 0 - 30- 2 0 - 10 - 0 41 Table 2 45 29 29 29

Rmcu AIM GROUP (N=14) 1-2 (N=42) 3-7 (N=31) crews from each hattalion to Grafenwoehr to fire TT VI11 again. This event took place approximately three months after their qualification gunnery, in order to examine the sustainment of the gunnery training. Six M1 tanks came from war reserve stocks and moved to GTA for the firing. Each crew fired the accuracy screening test immediately before the day run; no preliminary tables were allowed. Seventh ATC operated the range following standard procedures and scoring. The test had six ohjectives. These were distilled from the original questions posed by the undersecrctary of the Army. The first objective was to dcter-mine how effective the UCOFT was in predicting crew performance on TT VIII. We made an engagement-by-engagement comparison of four selected tasks fired on the UCOFT test with lour corresponding ones fired on TT V111. The results indicated that there was no correlation

UCOFr

Calibration 2 Bns 1 Bn Table VI & VI1 Calibration 2 Bns X Table VI1 Only Table 3 between performance on a task fired on the UCOFT test with its corresponding task fired on? T VIII. However, when a crcw’s progress on the UCOFT matrix is compared to overall performance on TT VIIJ, there is a significant relationship. The farther a crew advanced in the matrix, the better its score and opening times on TT VI11 tcnded to be. On the 1,000-point scale of the table, UCOFT-trained crews in the upper part of the matrix fired an average of 50 points higher than the non-UCOFT crews, and did it with an opening time that was nearly 1.2 seconds fastcr (Table 1). Another objective was to determine the contribution that the U C O R made to sustainment training. A comparison between the first and second qualification tables provided the measures of effectiveness for this issue. Again, matrix position achievement was the key factor. While the non-UCOfl group was evenly spread between gaining and losing points on the second TT VIII, the interesting trend was established when the UCOFf crews in the lower part of the matrix and those in the uppcr part of the matrix were examined. More than 60 percent of the crews in the lower position lost points from one TT VI11 to the next. Near- 70 ARMOR - November-December 7987

Comparison of Table VI1 Performance of Test Groups Number Table Vlll UCOFT Matrix Status of Crews Scores Non-UCOFT Bn. 56 762.7 Tables VI & VI1 UCOFT Bn. 1 74 784.3 Table VI1 Only UCOFT Bn. 117 802.6 Tables VI & VI1 *Statistically Significant Difference. P.01 TABLE Vlll RESULTS of 1st Rd. Hit Time* (secs.) Probability Opening 80.4 5.72 78.6 4.86 79.0 4.37 ly 75 percent of the crews in the upper position gained points from restricted the amounts of ammunition allowed in thc preparatory tank Table 4. one iteration to the next, despite firing no preparatory tables before the second IT VI11 (Table 2). This indicated the UC'OFT to be an aid to sustaining and improving crew proficiency. To answer the next ohjcctive, three of the UCOFT battalions had tahles fired before the first TT VIII. This was done by restricting those units from firing IT VI, the main gun stationary table. No restrictions were estahlished for TT VI1 or for the other units. Again, the major difference bctween groups occurred in opening times. As Table 4 shows, Relationship of Rounds Fired Before TTVIII and T T Vlll Qualification Status 30 - 9% of CREWS 20 - 10 - - 28% 27%

35% 34% pg

(N = 162) (N= 185) the more a crew fired in both the UCOFT and on the range, the faster it was, with no loss in accuracy. The differences are particularly startling when comparing offensive tasks, with a nearly two-second average difference between the non-UCOFT battalion and the unit that used the UCOFT and fired the complete preparatory tables. As an adjunct to this ob.jective, we examined the rclationship between the number or main gun rounds lired in the preparatory tables and the qualification rate. The general policy among all the battalions was that more ammunition went to the weaker crews in order to get them qualified. The test data found in Tnhlc 5 supports this. The additional rounds put a siglificant number of crews into the qualified or superior areas, although it appears as though it was not enough to put more crews into the distinguished range. Table 5. ARMOR - 17 I

".... The UCOFT Post Fielding Test showed that UCOFT is a valuable training device that will enable our tankers to fire more quickly with no loss in accuracy..." them to get the most out of the The next objective was to determine the effects of turhulence. The c good news is that the UCOFT alleviated about 50 percent of the effects of turhulence in tank gunnery. The caveat to that is that turbulence accounted for only about 1 to 2 percent of difference in results between crews. This confirms what most tankers have always suspected: we can execute a crash program for tank gunnery with the troops we have available, regardless of crew integrity. Crew and unit cohesion is a combat factor, hut is not necessarily a tank range problem. The study was also intended IO determine the perceptions that the crew and their leadership have of the UCOW. The tcst found that the guys on the ground were ovcr-whelmingly positive about the device - they use it and have found it to be a valuable training tool. There are modilications the crews want to see, some of which have already led to implemented changes, hut the device was accepted as a very effective one. The last study area was the units' use of the UCOFT. At the time of the questionnaire and interview administration, there were restrictions on the amount of time a UCOFT could he used in a given wcck. The use rate at that time was about two hours pcr session, with each crew averaging one session per month. With modification of the maintenance agreement with the manufacturer, which increased the number o l hours from 2,600 to 3,500 pcr year (with greater flexibility), the overall use ratc has jumped considerably and continues lo climb. The UCOFT Post-Fielding Test completed its work in October 1986, and the Defense Department and major commands received briefings on the results from February through April J987. The test determined four major findings: 0 The UCOW substantially improves the quality of tank crew gunnery training. 0 More UCOFT training typically results in improvcd gunnery pcrfor-mance. 0 The UCOFT cannot be used as an absolute predictor of TT VI11 performance. 0 UCOFT users feel that the UCOm substantially improves their home-station tank crew gunnery training. The UCOFT Post-Fielding Test showed that the UCOFT is a valuable training device that will enable our tankers to fire more quickly, with no loss in accuracy. Recent Armor School UCOFT training strategy provides an effective guide to commanders that will enable device. To be faster on the draw, while maintaining or improving accuracy, is a goal for which all titnkers constantly strive and seck better ways to attain. The UCOFT gives the Armor Force a first-rate training device that helps in working toward that objective. AUTHOR'S NOTE: The printan, soiirces for this article are the wrtilts briefing arid test report uvitteri by Mr. Walt Biitler arid nk. C1iarIe.s Hiiglies of tlte Grafeiiuveltr Field OJ3icc of TRAC-WSMR who were tlie lead arta!ysts for tlie test. Dr. Bnice Stirling arid hfr. Swede Berglririd of tlie same ofice were also rtiajor con-tribiitors to tlte stud\' arid tlie report. Major Mark C. Thomson was the Armor Center project officer for the UCOFT PFTEA. He was commissioned into the Field Artillery in 1975. He served in howitzer batteries and, after a branch transfer to Armor, in a tank company of the 3d ACR, with subsequent assignments in USAREUR as BMO, tank company commander, and S3 in 1-35 Armor. He is currently assigned as an ORSA analyst at the U. S. Army Armor and Engineer Board. He received his BBA from Texas Christian University and from Boston University. He is a graduate of the FAOBC and the AOAC. I 72 ARMOR - November-December 7987