Armored Infantry - The Real One

Armored Infantry - The Introduction The APC is in trouble; deep trouble. If you do not believe this, you have not ridden one into combat on the modern battlefield. Those who have, on both sides of the line in the ’82 war in Lebanon, for example, will attest to the fact that while an APC does provide reasonable protection against shell burst fragments or sporadic small arms fire, it cannot withstand a direct attack by any hollow charge weapon, an aimed heavy caliber machine gun, or small caliber cannon fire. Curiously enough, in contrast to Mark Twain’s famous remark about the weather, in our case the subject is not even discussed. Partially, this is due to reluctance on the part of vested interests, manufacturers and the clients; partially, it may be due to the fact that up to now no suitable solution to the problem has been found. Historically, such an attitude is not new. During the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5, when the effect of the entrenched machine gun against infantry in the open was revealed, everybody clucked their tongues and nodded sagely; but when 1914 came along, only the French had any suggestion for a solution - “ELAN”! As far as the APC is concerned, the situation is getting to be very similar, with the top-mounted light cannon replacing Elan, and we are getting the same results.

The problems of the armored infantry are really more complicated than the mere question of protection during the mounted phase of combat. In this article we will try to present some new technological so-by Dr. Azriel K. Lorber lutions to the classical woes of the infantry. We will start by trying to analyze the role of infantry on the modern battlefield, and by looking at some aspects in the evolution of the APC.

Historical Notes The original concept of the APC, developed by the Germans prior to WWII, was nothing more than an armored truck which was supposed to enable their infantry to stay with their panzers. The armor was supposed to provide the shock and the cutting edge of the assault, but the real work was to be done by the infantry, after dismounting. High mobility was necessary so that armor and infantry did not get separated if things went well, as was the case too often with the Russians, for example. There was some capability of fire from the vehicle, but with bolt-action rifles, or the occasional machine gun on a make-shift pedestal, this was not taken too seriously. The U. S. Army copied this concept, and not until the “Kangaroo” (a modified Sherman tank of 1944), was there any departure from this way of thinking. We should stop here and visualize (or remember, as the case may be) the combat atmosphere of those days, which spawned the original APC. An army -even the German, French or American - consisted mostly of infantry. Admittedly there were also artillery and armor and even aircraft, but most of the soldiers were typified by the foot-slogging doughboy with the rifle and the bayonet.

Real One The average WWII infantry squad had a BAR, an MG-34, or a Bren gun for fire support. Antitank weapons were comprised of a battery or two of 37- or 57-mm (in the battalion), with an effective range of 500-800 meters. Only towards the end of WWII did the PIAT, the Panzerfaust, and the Bazooka (2.36-inch) appear. Mass-employed guided weapons were a gleam in the designers’ eyes. Actually they were about 15 to 20 years in the future. This environment, it should be added, prevailed from about 1937 until the end of the Korean War. After some false starts came the M-113 APC. This was the epitome of the armored bus. The infantry, or most of them, were not required to contribute anything to the fighting until dismounting. But beginning in the 19609, they found themselves in an entirely new ball game. Between the light automatic weapons that now predominate on the battlefield, the heavier automatic guns, the mortars, and the various antitank weapons (all of these in steadily growing numbers) the chances of the infantryman going in against prepared positions, or fighting in open terrain even when riding in an APC, are very slim. The prophets of doom were many, but the infantry is still with us. The real question, however, is not whether the infantry remains with us, but how many of them will remain after the battle. In the years after WWII and Korea, in fighting in the Middle East and in Vietnam, modem armies experimented with equipment and doctrine simultaneously. The Israel Defense Force (IDF), flushed with the success of ‘67, relegated the infantry (except for elite units) to secondary roles on the assumption that casualties would be minimized. Along came 1973 and the Yom Kippur War. The IDF learned its lessons the hard way, and the “combined arms team” came back to the battlefield, but without any real improvement in its equipment. This was not because of lack of funds, or because of problems with quartermaster corps; there simply were no new answers.

Role of the Mechanized Infantry Although it sounds trivial, we believe it is worthwhile to reiterate why the infantry is necessary on the battlefield. On the face of it, it may sound funny. The tank, it may be remembered, was invented to extricate the infantry from the mess it had gotten itself into in WWI, and here we are with a steel monster, weighing forty to sixty tons, with a very accurate big gun and various other weapons. And this wonder of modern technology needs the help of the puny infantry?

Well, the truth is that under certain conditions, the firepower and visibility of the tank are severely limited, especially at short ranges. In built-up or wooded areas, it may have difficulty in traversing its gun, and sometimes it can’t provide enough elevation or depression of the gun. In addition, in certain types of terrain it may have mobility problems. And in spite of all its protection, it is extremely vulnerable to certain specialized types of attack. Finally, the workload of the crew is becoming heavier and heavier and if the trend of reducing the crew to three goes on, this workload will only get worse. All these are essentially technical problems, and it seems that additional improvements barely keep pace with increases in tank size and complexity.

This is where the infantry comes in: armor and the infantry will work as a team. The armor protects the infantry by keeping enemy armor off their backs, and by providing “heavy” fire when needed. The infantry shields the armor from threats it can’t take care of, especially tank hunters.

The trouble is that there is too great a discrepancy in the individual protection given to the tank crewman, with his several inches of steel, and the foot soldier with his shirt or even body armor. This discrepancy quickly manifests itself in performance, performance that deteriorates as we add heavier weapons and body armor to the soldier’s load.

So the question remains, how do we introduce the infantry into the modern battlefield without it being ground to mincemeat in the process? As mentioned before, the IDF, ever so mindful of casualties, tried an extreme which did not work. So, what will?

The sad fact is that in the last hundred years or so, the infantry has not directly benefited from the advances in modern technology. True, we gave him lighter shoes and a better rifle, but apart from these, the infantryman of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), for example, is indistinguishable from Bismarck’s finest, except in the mobility provided by the APC. Let us concentrate for a moment on the various features of the APC. If we examine the various APCs fielded in the last 30 or 40 years, we will see that their most prominent features, and most desirable ones, are their mobility, and to some extent the armor. We will remind the reader that “mobility” may be interpreted in many ways. Preventing exhaustion, for example, even when moving at a slow pace, may be no less important than high-speed movement. So we should try to retain the better features of these vehicles and minimize the other, less desirable ones; like crowding. Some attempts were made recently to design alight combat vehicle, lightly armed and without any armor, which may partially bridge the gap between the walking and running infantryman and the one riding in the APC. This is not anew idea: Two examples readily come to mind. During WWII, there were “Popsky’s Raiders”; (Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir “Popsky” Penia-koff was a maverick British army officer who commanded a sort of a commando unit in the Western Desert and later in Italy). Later, there were “Samson’s Foxes” in the Israeli army during the War of Independence of ’48. Both units were equipped with jeeps, each carrying two machine guns, and both units fulfilled similar roles. The idea was later discarded, (except for very special cases), probably because of too many opposing automatic weapons. However, such departures from the old way of thinking do Doint the way to a possible solution. The Individual AICV Ideally, what is needed is an “Armored Individual Vehicle” (AICV)

- a suit of armor, or a similar contrivance - which will carry and move the individual soldier and his weapons; provide reasonable protection; retain the foot soldier’s agility in all kinds of terrain, and do all this within the present technological state of the art. Such a vehicle can be designed. But before going into preliminary description of the concept, let us try to write a set of very general specifications for it.

It will be a single-seater capable of moving on flat terrain at speeds approaching those of conventional motorized vehicles, say forty to fifty kms per hour. It should be able to move over any terrain which is passable to infantry, including broken terrain, with the same speed and agility as a soldier on foot. Specific speed has no meaning in this context, so we will not specify one, and assume that anything from one to five km/hour will be acceptable. It should carry a basic infantry weapon, preferably two, with an extended load of ammunition. Finally, it should have a reasonable armor, capable of stopping at least all types of small arms fire at short range, and provide good protection against shell fragments.

The infantryman riding this vehicle should be able to fulfill all the functions of his foot-borne colleague, namely moving and fighting in the open or in built up (and destroyed) areas, including the ability to squeeze (literally speaking) into tight corners, taking cover and even digging-in while vehicle-borne. It should be emphasized that the soldier will stay in this vehicle during all phases of combat and leave it only when disabled or when fulfilling other duties.

This will be a small, wheeled vehicle, probably with a set of six hydrostatically-powered wheels. However, to enable this vehicle to be a true cross-country vehicle, it will be equipped with two or three pairs of legs. While this sounds like something out of “Star Wars,” we suggest that this is not anew idea, but was originally tried back in the fifties, but proved to be somewhat uncontrollable. The main reason for the problems encountered at that time was very simple: it takes about two years to learn to walk, using only two legs. The human operator, using mechanical controls and with practically no feedback, had no chance of mastering those mechanical legs and the project was dropped. With the emergence of computers and microprocessors as powerful tools, the idea was revived and there are now several experimental vehicles using this kind of locomotion. The inclusion of these legs will also explain the preference for the hydrostatic drive mentioned earlier.

The exact weapon load is not a critical factor and could be mission-adapted, but a good general choice will be some combination of a machine gun and an automatic grenade launcher, or some medium range, fire-and-forget, antitank weapon. These weapons, or a similar combination, will be mounted on the right and left of a rotatable bubble canopy and controlled in slew and elevation by helmet mounted sights, and including designating equipment and night vision devices. Driving and firing controls will be similar in configuration to aircraft controls, either of the conventional type or side mounted. Sights will be computer adjusted, according to weapon type. Switching from one type of locomotion to the other (wheels to legs) can be accomplished manually or automatically.

A vehicle as described, and including the proper power plant, either a diesel or a gas turbine, will weigh in, empty, at about 700-800 kgs depending on choice and configuration of armor. Fully combat loaded, it will probably weigh approximately 1,100 kgs. Estimated approximate dimensions will be: Length - 85 inches, Height - 44 inches, and width - 40 inches. These may sound like a lot for a single infantryman, but we will return to a brief analysis of the cost effectiveness of such a weapon later. Let us discuss for a moment one more interesting possibility.

One of the biggest problems of any fighting force is its mobility in really poor terrain. Infantry, in particular, suffers from this, especially in terms of speed, and several attempts were made to alleviate this problem, notably the “jet belts” and various other personal vehicles. While the above proposed vehicle has the advantage of combining both mobility and “fightability”, it still lacks one feature which really may round off the capabilities of such a device, and this is the ability to jump. Since a fairly advanced stability and control system has to be incorporated anyway, for use with the legs, then for a relatively small weight penalty the ability to jump may be incorporated too. This is to be done by a small, liquid fueled, rocket motor. A preliminary calculation has shown that about 100 kgs will suffice for a motor and enough fuel for 10 to 15 jumps of about 10 meters height, up or down. While this may not seem to be much, it should be remembered that this additional capability is not intended as the primary mode of travel, but only as an emergency measure under specific tactical conditions.

Another interesting aspect of the problem is the quality of the required manpower. Some form of “Right Stuff’ will be needed. While we do not believe that these infantrymen need to be jet pilots, they will need to be highly trained, intelligent, and capable of individual initiative.

No discussion of anew weapon system, whether actual or futuristic, will ever be complete without some discussion of the financial question, and of course of the more subtle criteria of cost effectiveness. Any attempt, at this stage, to estimate the price of such a vehicle is, of course, completely without merit or justification. Suffice it to say that at various informal discussions, price tags of $500,000 to $1,000,000 were mentioned. This in itself is useless as a measure of cost effectiveness, since at this stage it will be hard to calculate the usefulness of such a vehicle on the battlefield.

We may, however, compare it to the average tank. Put in simplistic terms, we may say that a price tag of more than $2 million is attached to avehicle which carries a big gun, a couple of machine guns and four crewmen to serve them, and which still requires additional means to be really functional on the battlefield. Breaking this unit into four subunits (because, after all, the crew is the deciding factor) will make for a more adaptable fighting force with all its inherent advantages. While admittedly without the tank’s big gun, thecombination of numbers and agility will more than make up for it, even when fighting conventional tanks. While not exactly analogous, we may remind the reader that a similar trend started about twenty-five years ago in the world’s navies, when the big battleship was completely abandoned in favor of smaller units armed with missiles.

We have tried to analyze the difficulties of the infantry on the modern battlefield, particularly in view of the modern weapons in use. The conclusion is that up-to-date modern technology was not used to redress the imbalance between the infantryman and the weapon systems he has to face. What was done has proven either too cumbersome or not really effective in addressing the real problems of the infantry. These, in essence, may be said to be trying to achieve better results with less casualties by employing the right combination of mobility, firepower, and protection, while trying to maximize all.

While admittedly the proposed vehicle and its occupant are not “infantry” (in the classical sense) anymore, we still use the term because this “armored infantry” can fulfill almost all the roles of present day infantry, and in particular the one of supporting and aiding the srmor.

DR. AZRIEL K. LORBER is employed by an Israeli high-technology firm and is a reserve major in the Israeli Armored Corps. He is the author of over 40 technical articles and papers, most of them concerned with military technology. He holds a BS degree in mechanical engineering from the University of Pittsburgh, an MS in aerospace engineering from Virginia Polytechnic Institute, and a PhD in aerospace and Ocean engineering from VPI.

-Fixing Something Y That Ain‘t Broke The U. S. Army is once again thinking about “fixing something that ain’t broke.” Fiery-eyed reformers are advancing the thesis that artillery battalions could be made more responsive if they were assigned or attached to divisional maneuver brigades. To adopt such an approach would, in fact, violate the cardinal tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine, cause artillery units to be less responsive to the total combined arms force, and create needless turmoil and confusion in an already much confused and frustrated Army.

The Background History makes clear that the innovative use of field artillery is essential to achieving tactical and operational success in combat. Our AirLand Battle doctrine demands that all maneuver commanders -especially those at the echelons above corps, and at corps and division levels - attempt to see deep into the enemy’s “fllow-on units or his defensive formations, and then preempt the employment of those forces by striking with artillery, air power, and ground forces. Each of these friendly commanders must also ensure that sufficient combat power supports the forces conducting the close-in fight and the rear battle.

Of course, operatingin such depth is a tall order, but nobody ever said that war was going to be easy! At the division level, the principal means of realizing many AirLand Battle objectives is through the wise and prudent use of the field artillery organizations and, to a much lesser extent, offensive air support. The artillery has long been the most flexible and destructive force on the battlefield. Today, shifting combat power across the front and well beyond the forward line of own troops (FLOT), or into rear areas, requires a simple call for fires by the leader in need. Technically speaking, virtually all divisional artillery weapons are “on call” to the commander who needs them most. The characteristics of the field artillery which provide this very attractive feature are the inherent range of the weapons and the manner in which the artillery and maneuver communities assign tactical missions to fire support units. Support of the combined arms team usually involves the assignment of one of four standard missions to divisional artillery battalions.

Direct Support - When assigned this mission afield artillery unit answers calls first from the supported unit, then from its own observers, and finally from the higher field artillery headquarters. Reinforcing - This mission requires the unit to answer calls for fire first from the field artillery unit that it is reinforcing, then its own observers, and finally from the force field artillery headquarters. General Support Reinforcing - Units with this mission answer calls for fire in priority from the force field artillery headquarters, then the reinforced unit, and finally its own observers. General Support - This artillery unit answers calls in turn first from the force field artillery headquarters and then from its own observers.

(For a more detailed explanation of each of the above standard artillery missions see pages 1-12 of FM 6-20, Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations.)

These standard field artillery missions stand in stark contrast to the “command relationships” under which maneuver leaders operate, relationships which can be permanent or semi-permanent.

Organic - A unit designated as organic is apart of the parent organization by tables or modified tables of organization and equipment. It is an integral part of the parent organization.

Assigned - A unit assigned becomes apart of the parent organization on a rather permanent basis, and its command and control arrangements are the same as.organic units. The parent unit is totally responsible for administration, logistics, and training support.

Attached -A unit designated attached is placed in the parent organization on a semi-permanent basis. The receiving command is

- responsiblsfor administrative and logistic support. The command and control arrangements are the same as for organic and assigned. Operational Control (OPCON) - This relationship is normally temporary. The gaining command is simply in control of the OPCON unit for operational purposes, but it has no responsibility for administration, logistics, or training.

The Analysis Afield artillery battalion given the mission in direct support of a maneuver brigade is as responsive to the supported unit as afield artillery unit that is organic, assigned, attached, or OPCON to a maneuver force. One doesn’t need a lot of field experience to reach that conclusion. A direct support artillery battalion provides a full complement of fire support teams down to company and platoon level, not to mention fire support coordinators at the battalion and brigade headquarters. What’s more, these dedicated teams normally stay with the supported unit, without regard to subsequent tactical missions that might be given to their parent artillery battalion. The character of support provided by direct support artillery is complete and unequivocal.

In actual practice, many artillery battalions habitually receiving a direct support mission to a particular maneuver brigade feel as much apart of the supported brigade as an assigned unit. Many division commanders today recognize the wisdom of fostering this habitual, rather than command, relationship. They require various fire support teams to live, work, and train in their habitually supported maneuver battalion areas; but they leave artillery units under the watchful, highly capable eye of the division artillery commander.

If one carefully compares the standard tactical mission of direct support to any one of the command relationships discussed above, one realizes that the maneuver command gains absolutely nothing in terms of responsiveness as a result of designating an artillery unit as organic, assigned, attached, or OPCON. Yet, when one gives even passing thought to the additional burdens that a permanent and semi-permanent relationship would thrust upon the maneuver brigade, such options loom as unworkable, and cumbersome. Let’s consider just a few of the disadvantages. Support - A maneuver brigade receiving an artillery battalion designated as organic, assigned, or attached, is responsible for the total administrative, logistics, and training support of that artillery unit. Neither the heavy maneuver brigade nor its light counterpart is equipped, trained, or inclined to assume the tasks of supporting a 155- or 105-mm artillery battalion. Consider the ramifications of a 155-mm self-propelled battalion operating in your brigade area. The SP battalion not only has 18 or 24 howitzers, but also more than 70 other track-laying and wheeled vehicles; 570 officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men; a vast amount of communications gear; and literally thousands of other end items. The unit has an enormous appetite for ammunition, fuel, oil, lubricants, spare parts, food, and water. Its requirements for training and administration are gargantuan. Not so obvious, perhaps, is the need for the Field Artillery community, in the form of the division artillery headquarters, to be responsible for that training and support. The true expertise for getting “steel-on-the-target” in an accurate and timely fashion and supporting afield artillery unit in the field resides at the division artillery headquarters. Maneuver commanders who believe themselves capable of fulfilling such roles simply haven’t grasped the complex nature of today’s fire support system. Span of Control - A divisional maneuver brigade commander may control up to five maneuver battalions as well as various aviation, engineer, signal, military police, and other combat and combat support slices. The brigade commander and staff are already hard-pressed to command and control this organization, accepting additions training, support, and employment responsibilities that accompany the various command relationships. Flexibility - A fundamental principle of fire support is the retention of flexibility. Artillery is now - and will remain for the foreseeable future - a very limited battlefield commodity. That all divisional artillery be centrally controlled by one artillery headquarters is imperative. Only that arrangement guarantees true flexibility of fires. Only that approach allows the division and brigade commanders to “maneuver fires” by rapidly shifting huge volumes of combat power. The last thing that a maneuver leader wants to experience in the heat of battle is a debate over to whom the various artillery tubes and launchers “belong.” On the contemporary battlefield, every maneuver commander is going to believe that his fight is the most critical part of the battle. He’s unlikely to be forthcoming about his attached artillery, but that’s exactly what he must be if the whole combined arms force is going to win.

Doctrinal Insta bility -Our Army must quit changing doctrine when it is unnecessary! One doesn’t have to look far to see many examples of manuals that are obsolete before the ink dries, or of service school instructors using handouts still warm from the copier. Doctrine, tactics, techniques, drills, and procedures are a language with which all military practitioners must have total familiarity. But gaining such familiarity takes time. In fact, it requires years of careful study and months of application in exercises for doctrine to really sink in. We are paying a high price in today’s Army for changing “the way we do business” when change is really unwarranted. The price is in poor communication, longer orders and plans, longer radio transmissions, confused sister services, and quizzical looks, if not downright befuddlement, among our Allies. Our present artillery doctrine allows for semi-permanent command relationships when unusual situations make them necessary. Most of the Army’s operational and tactical leaders understand that when maneuver brigades or separate task force-sized elements engage in independent operations - such as deep attack maneuvers, exploitation, pursuit, or a covering operation - that they should consider attaching or “OPCONing” field artillery units to the maneuver force. They take such extraordinary steps in full light of practical considerations about the range of the guns and launchers, support, communi- - -cations, and command and control. But such an esoteric approach would prove disastrous if adopted at the beginning of every battle.

The US.

Army should perfect its present artillery doctrine. After all, it’s a doctrine which has stood the test of time. We ought not be too quick to advocate changes based solely on isolated examples of poor execution or personality clashes. Preparing for the next war is too serious a business. Let’s not “fix something that ain’t broke.” JIM HOLLIS

LTC, Armor (Ret.)

Lawton, OK (Mr. Hollis is a recently retired Armor officer whose Army career included assignments as doctrine writer and maneuver tactics instructor at the U. S. Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill. Oklahoma, and the Command and General Staff College. He is now a systems analyst with LB&M Associates in Lawton, Oklahoma.

Make It Happen!

The Catchy Phrase Masks an Abdication of Leadership “Make it happen!”

I will never forget the first time I received that direct order. I had been a platoon leader for about three months, so I had some idea of what was and was not possible, but I had not yet learned how to conjure miracles out of thin air. I was in the troop commander’s office and he had just given me one of his typically reasonable orders like: “Have a dozen circus elephants on the parade-field not later than 0430 hrs tomorrow.”

As might be expected from the junior platoon leader in the squadron, I was making ignorant objections like: “Where am I supposed to get a dozen circus elephants this time of night;” or “USAREUR supplement No. 7, dated 12 November 1981 to AR 725-10 says ‘woe unto he who brings circus elephants onto the parade-field for he shall be drawn and quartered on said parade-field’.’’

In response to these irrelevant concerns, my commander bellowed, “make it happen, Lieutenant!”..

Being an exceptionally bright lieutenant, I figured out - all by myself -that I was not supposed to say anything else. It took me only another thirty seconds or so to realize that, since I was not supposed to say anything and my commander was not saying anything, maybe I should leave. So I saluted, sounded-off with the unit motto, and left. As I stepped into the hallway I was puzzling over whether or not “make it happen” was grammatically correct, but as I got farther down the hallway, it gradually dawned on me what “make it happen” meant.

“Make it happen” meant “real officers can accomplish this mission with ease.” Thus I could not win, because mission accomplishment was not considered an achieve ment, but I could certainly lose, because mission failure indicates gross incompetence.

“Make it happen” also means “don’t even think about asking for help.” By the time I reached the CQ desk I knew that I had been given a pointless and impossible task, and that I could not hope for any assistance or any rewards for success -but I faced severe punishment for failure.

What were the results of this order? As I recall, I was severely chastised because I only produced eleven circus elephants and one of them developed serious digestive troubles. More important than the extent to which this particular mission was accomplished was the effect of this leadership technique on developing lieutenants. Some succeeded, and having consistently accomplished seemingly impossible missions without guidance, support, or assistance, they developed enormous self-confidence and independence. Some failed too often and became insecure and ineffective. The one thing they all shared was the conviction that they were much better off without their commander because he gave neither rewards nor assistance, merely punishments and bizarre taskings. As the platoon leaders came to despise their commander more each day, the strong ones led their platoons off on their own, ignoring the commander as much as possible, and the weaker ones simply sat in stunned silence, no longer responding to punishment.

So why did this captain resort to the “make it happen” leadership technique? Did he want to alienate his lieutenants? What was he thinking when he said “make it happen”? Part of the explanation is that we all love to hear “Yes, sir,” and we all hate to hear “But, sir.” “Make it happen” instantly turns “But, sir” into “Yes, sir,” and the commander need not give the task any further thought, other than to inspect and judge the final result. With those three words, the captain washed his hands of any responsibility for those difficult questions, “why” and OW." The natural result of this attitude was that, when the troop failed, this same commander fumed, “it’s all my platoon leaders’ fault.” He had succeeded in his own mind, in delegating all of his responsibility and none of his authority. But what he had really done was abdicate his position as leader and act merely as a message center between the squadron headquarters and several independent platoons.

I have seen too many “make it happen” leaders to underestimate the seductiveness of delegating responsibility and giving taskings, rather than guidance and assistance, but all of us in leadership positions must try to resist these temptations. Remember that “make it happen” is not a sign of forceful, results-oriented leadership, but rather a cowardly avoidance of thought and responsibility. CPT Thomas R. Searle Fort Knox. KY Professional Thoughts Helpful Hints To a Good Boresight A Piece of Tape and a Pinhole May Provide a Winning Edge Tank gunnery is continually becoming more and more of an exercise in precision adjustment. The exercise of precision applies to both the tank crew and the tank’s fire-control system.

Precision enters into the three prerequisites for successful gunnery qualification: maintenance, crew drill, and boresighting. If any one of these three qualifiers is in error, the crew will not qualify. Conversely, if all three are met, the crew will qualify - and the crew that is most precise will qualify highest.

Through continuous fine-tuning, we’ve developed an even more precise method of using our boresighting equipment, a method that has led to improvement in qualification scores.

The procedure slightly modifies the use of the Pye Watson In-Bore Boresighting Device, a device that has already tremendously improved the accuracy of tank fire-control systems. But like many technical components, the Pye Watson can also be improved.

Because of the precision needed in the boresighting process, it is extremely important to eliminate any possibility of error in using the device. One source of possible error is the presence of parallax in the right-angle eyepiece which projects the precision aiming dot on the 1,200-meter target selected. Crew members who use this device are often unsure of the precise lay of the aiming dot because of the parallax problem.

This problem can be eliminated by covering the eyepiece of the Pye Watson with apiece of dark-colored adhesive tape. A small hole -about the size of a pencil lead -must be punched in the center of the tape.

We have discovered that, with this change, the observer can maintain a steady and confident observation of the aiming dot and boresight target. The procedure eliminates both the parallax problem and the excessive ambient light in the sight picture.

With the technology available today, this improvement could probably be made at the factory with something more appropriate than apiece of tape.

Co C, 1st Bn, 33d Armor FRG

Recognition Quiz Answers 1- RPG-7

RocketLauncher (USSR).

Caliber (projectile) 85mm; weight (grenade) 2.25 kg (4.96 Ibs); muzzle velocity, 300 meterslsec.; range (moving target), 300 meters, (stationary target), 500 meters; range to self-destruct, 920 meters; penetration. 320mm. (Shown with American crew.)

2. GAINFUL (USSR). Surface-to-air; guidance, ground command and semi-active radar; propulsion. integral rocket-ramjet; warhead. HE 40 kg (88 Ib.9; launch weight, 550 kg (1 2 1 2 Ibs); range (high altitude). 60 km. (low altitude), 30 km; speed, Mach 2.8.

3. CHAPARRAL (U. S.). Surface-to-air; guidance, optical aiming, infra-red homing; propulsion, solid propellant rocket motor; warhead, HE; launch weight, 84 kg(185 Ibs); speed, supersonic.

4. MLRS (U. S.). Crew, 3; loaded weight, 24,564 kg (54,163 Ibs); maximum road speed, 64 km/hr; maximum road range, 483 km; number of rockets per load, 12; warhead, 644 M77 dual-purpose, shaped-charge bomblets per rocket; armor penetration, 1 OOmm; range, 30+ km

5. M1977ARV (USSR). Crew.3-4;weight. 36,000 kg (79,380 Ibs); length, 6.4 m; height, 3,438 m; width, 3,352 m; maximum road speed, 50 km/hr; maximum road range, 500 km; engine, V-12 water-cooled 580-hp diesel.

6. VISMOD (OPFOR U. S.) Simulated T-72 MBT; crew, 4; M551 Sheridan chassis; false front decking, false main gun and lights. Armor‘s Heritage BG Samuel D. Rockenbach The “Great-Grandfather” of the Armored Force was a man of many talents, chiefly administrative. He also owned awry sense of humor. When General Pershing led the Punitive Expedition into Mexico in 1916, it was Major Rockenbach, quartermaster, who commanded the first motorized supply train used in a military force. But he did not accept the job without complaint and said to a friend that his job “suspends me from rank and command, sentences me to hard labor, and forces me to pay an annual fine of $2,000.” (In those days, quartermaster officers had to post a surety bond to hold their jobs.) Rockenbach was born in Lynchburg, Virginia, on 27 January 1869. His mother was a descendant of Colonial Virginians, and his father had served as an officer in the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. Young Sam Rockenbach grew up in a military atmosphere and entered Virginia Military Institute in 1885. In 1889, he stood third in his class and was an honor graduate with a degree in civil engineering. He was commandant of the Kemper Military School in Missouri and was appointed captain in the Missouri militia. In June 1891, he passed the competitive exam for a commission and was appointed second lieutenant of cavalry and was assigned to the 10th Cavalry Regiment, the Buffalo Soldiers. In 1894, he attended the Cavalry Troop Officers School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and that same year returned to VMI to become commandant of cadets and professor of applied mathematics. He was asked to resign from the Army in order to remain at VMI, but refused and rejoined his regiment. It was during the campaign against the Cree Indians that he met and formed a lasting friendship with John J. Pershing. He served in Cuba and Puerto Rico during the Spanish-American War and rejoined his regiment in 1898 as adjutant and quartermaster.

In 1904, he was ordered to the Philippines and was promoted to captain during his tour there. On his return trip to the U. S. in 1911, Rockenbach traveled through Siberia, Russia, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and England, studying the organization of these nations’ armies. He attended the Army War College and was assigned to the 11th Cavalry in Colorado. When WW I broke out, Rockenbach was assigned as an observer with the German Army, a position he held until 1915, when diplomatic relations prompted his return to the U. S. There, he was promoted to major, detailed to the Quartermaster Corps, and assigned to Pershing’s staff. Rockenbach organized and prepared Base Section 1, in France, prior to the arrival of the first American combat troops. In 1917, General Pershing was seeking a qualified officer to head the newly-organized American Tank Corps, and he chose Rockenbach because of his administrative talents, his ability to improvise, his ability to cooperate with the Allies, and his experience with the motorized supply column of the Punitive Expedition.

Because Rockenbach was tied up with the administrative work of his new command, he selected Major George S. Patton, Jr., to train the men of the Tank Corps’ 20 light tank battalions. In addition to his other duties, Rockenbach was the U. S. representative to the Inter-Allied Tank Committee and was Pershing’s personal advisor on tanks. In August 1918, he was named Chief of the Tank Corps, First American Army.

Rockenbach’s tanks fought in the battles of St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne, winning the praise and admiration of many senior Allied officers. On 20 February 1919, General Pershing wrote to BG Rockenbach as follows:...... I desire to express to you, and through you to the officers and “ enlisted men of the Tank Corps, my appreciation of the work that the Corps has accomplish ed..... From the beginning its history has been a consistent uphill fight for accomplishment against almost insurmountable difficulties in the way of obtaining tanks for training or for fighting.... Its history in active operation, though short, is a bright and glorious one... It gives me great pleasure to thank all officers and enlisted men of the Tank Corps and, in the name of their comrades of the American Expeditionary Forces, to convey our appreciation and admiration of their splendid work and gallant record.” General Rockenbach returned to the U. S. in June 1919 and reverted to his permanent rank of colonel. He retained his position as chief of the Tank Corps until June 1920, when Congress merged the tanks with the infantry. Rockenbach transferred to the infantry and assumed command of the Tank School, Fort Meade, Maryland. He was promoted to brigadier general in January 1924.

General Rockenbach commanded the Military District of Washington from 1924 until July 1927 when he was transferred to command of the 2d Cavalry Brigade. A year later, he assumed command of the 2d Artillery Brigade at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and held that post until his retirement in 1933. General Rockenbach died on 26 May 1952 at Washington, D. C. A visionary of some stature, General Rockenbach returned to the US. after WW I, hoping that the Tank Corps would remain a separate branch of the Army. He worked hard to achieve that end, but Army tradition, the national economy, and the National Defense Act of 1920 all were against him. In his final report as chief of the Tank Corps he wrote: “the successful development and value of the arm (tanks) in the future depends upon the sympathy and support it is given.”

General Rockenbach’s dream was finally fulfilled in 1940 when the Armored Force was created. He is revered today as the first commander of a U. S. Army tank force - “The Great-Grandfather” of the Armored Force. Driver's Seat (Continued) Ensuring That Your New Leaders Can Really Lead For example: A tank commander is on orders to your unit, and a sponsorship letter is sent to the NCO. Contained in the letter is an outline of the upcoming evaluation, listing the references on which the evaluation is based. Upon the tank commander's arrival, the platoon sergeant assigns an evaluation date (make sure it does not interfere with in-processing). The tank commander reports to the training site and takes the test under the direct supervision of the platoon sergeant (do not substitute someone else for the platoon sergeant or first-line supervisor).

If the tank commander is successful - and generally he is - then he reports to his assigned vehicle competent and ready. You have stopped the age-old notion that everyone who reports to anew unit is incompetent.

The problem comes when you have a n incompetent leader on your hands. In such cases, there are definite steps I would recommend. First, counsel the tank commander and identify the weak areas to him. Then assign another tank commander to assist him during other-than-prime training time, and give him new test data for reevaluation. Remember that the time between evaluations will depend on the degree of failure. Make sure you document everything on a counseling statement and remember to brief the 1SG.

For the reevaluation, ensure all stations are tested by the same tester, the platoon sergeant. If the tank commander is successful, then assign him to a vehicle. If the tank commander fails again, conduct follow-up counseling procedures and continue training. Should the tank commander fail to reach proficiency level within a reasonable time (60 days), introduce the records to the commander for board action for reduction for inefficiency, reclassification into another MOS, or elimination from the service. Do not assign the nonproficient NCO to a leadership position!

Practically speaking, there are few, if any NCOs against whom you will ever have to take action. Probably the most notable advantages of this procedure are: The NCO knows where he stands right from the start. Bad-mouthing of competent NCOs is eliminated.

A solid foundation between the crew and its leader is established. The situation of good soldiers serving with incompetent leaders is eliminated.

The leader's capability of evaluating and training is also evaluated.

These procedures are simple, cost effective, and impact greatly on the proficiency of the unit. I would recommend the same procedures for those officers who have to fight from the vehicle.

Required Man ua Is Leaders Every Armor/Cavalry leader hascertain official publications he must read and study to train for combat. The Directorate of Training and Doctrine. USAARMS, Fort Knox. has compiled a list of these publications. They include Field Circulars. Field Manuals and others and are presented as required at the various command levels.

BattaliodBrigade Commander FC 71-3 (Coordinating Draft). The Armor and Mech-FM 71-2J (Coordinating Draft), Tank and Mechanized FC 71-1J (Coordinating Draft). The Tank and Mecha-anized Infantry Brigade, Oct 85. Infantry Battalion/Task Force. Dec 84. nized Infantry ComDanv Team. Dec 85. FC 17-102 (Coordinating Draft), Reconnaissance Squad-FC 17-102-1 (Coordinating Draft). Reconnaissance Squadron(LI0)ARTEP Mission Training Plan. Sep85. FC 71-3 (Coordinating Draft). The Armor and Mechanized Infantry Brigade. Oct 85. FM 71-2J (Coordinating Draft). Tank and Mechanized for Armor/ Cava I ry ron (LID). M 85. Infantry Battalion/Taik Force. Dec 84. 84.

May 86.

FC 71 -6 (Prelmmary Draft). CommandandControl. May FC 71 -1 0. Movement and Coordination Exercise (MCX). Company Commander FC 71-1J (Coordinating Draft), The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Companv Team. Dec 85. FM 17-12-1 (Approved Final Draft), Tank Combat Ta-FM 17-12-2 (ADDroved Final Draft). Tank Combat Tables. M1, Dec 84.

FM 17-12-1 (Approved Final Draft). Tank Combat Tables, Ml, Dec 84.

FM 17-12-2 (ADDrOVed Final Draft). Tank Combat Tables. M48A5IM60A1. Apr 85. bles, M60A3. Feb 85.

FM 17-12-3 (Approved Final Draft), Tank Combat Ta-FC 71 -1 1, The Armor Task Force Training Plan. Apr 84. FC 71-4. Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise (CALFEX). Jul 85.

ARTEP 71-2, Army Training and Evaluation Program for Infantry/TankTask Force, 23 Nov 81, w/Cl. FC 71 -6 (Preliminary Draft). Command and Control. May 84.

FC 71 -10. Movement andCoordination Exercise (MCX), May 86.

Squadron/Regiment Commander FM 17-95. Cavalry Operations. Feb 86: bles. M48A5/M60Al, Apr 85. '-bles, M60A3. Feb 85.

Training Plan, May 84.

FM 17-12-3 (Approved Final Draft), Tank Combat Ta-FC 17-16-1, Div86Tank HeavyCo/TmARTEPMission FC 71-5, Fire Coordmatlon Exercise. Jan 85. FC 71 -7. Situational Training Exercise (STX) for Loges-tics. Apr 84.

*FM 17.1 5 (TEST). Tank Platoon Div 86, 0184:

FC 17-15-1. TankPlatoonARTEPMissionTrainingPlan. Division 86 Tank Company SOP. May 83 (will be FC 71 -6(PreliminaryDraft), CommandandControl. May Troop Commander FC 71-5. Fire Coordination Exercise, Jan 85. FC 71 -7, Situational Training Exercise (STX) for Logis-FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations. Feb 86. FC 17-101 (Coordinating Draft), Light Cavalry Troop, Jan 84. published as FC 71 -1-3 in Mar 87). 84. tin. Apr 84.

Sep 85.

FC 17-101-1 (Coordinating Draft). Light Cavalry Troop ARTEP Mission Training Plan, Sep 85. FC 17-97. The Regimental Armored Cavalry Troop, Mar 86.

FC 71-6, (Preliminary Draft). Command and Control, May 84.

Tank Platoon Leader/Platoon Sergeant FC 17-15-1. TankPlatoon ARTEP MissionTraining Plan. FC 17-1 5-2. Tank Platoon Leader's Notebook, Jan 84. FC 17-1 5-3, Tank Platoon SOP, May 85. FC 71-1J (Coordinating Draft). The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, Dec 85. FM 17-1 2-1 (Approved Final Draft), Tank Combat Tables, M l, Dec 84.

FM 17-1 2-2 (Approved Final Draft). Tank Combat Tables. M48A5/M60Al. Apr 85. FM 17-1 2-3 (Approved Final Draft). Tank Combat Tables. M60A3. Feb 85.

Scout Platoon Leader/Platoon Sergeant 'FM 17-98 (Approved Final Draft), Army 86 Scout Pla-FC 17-98-2. Scout Platoon Leader's Notebook. Apr 85. FC 17-98-3. Scout Platoon SOP. Apr 85. *FM 17-1 5 (TEST), Tank Platoon Div 86, Oct 84.' Jan 84. toon. Nov 85: All commanders and leaders should have SOPS and references for echelons one level above and one level below themselves.

Those publicationsdenoted with an asterisk(*)areOA printed and must be secured from AG Publications Center, Baltimore. MD. All other manuals are available in limited quantities from the Armor Center and can be ordered by calling The Army Wide Training Support Branch. Non-Resident Training Division, ai AUTOVON 464-2914 (commercial) (502)624-2914 or by writing: Commander. US. Army Armor Center, ATTN: ATZK-OPT-NRT-AMs. Fort Knox. KY 401 21-5200. Inquiries abut publication of future manuals should be directed 10 the Armor Hot Line. AUTOVON 464-TANK (commercial) (502)624-TANK. Texas ANG Tankers Qualify 75% With M60s The 2d Battalion, 1 12th Armor, 49th Armored Division, TXARNG, qualified 75 percent of its tank crews on Tank Table Vlll recently at Trapnell Multiuse Range, Fort Hood, using M60 tanks. Captain James B. Phipps, commander of D Company, said that "It's the crew that makes the difference, not necessarily the weapon syste,m." The crews fired their excellent scores during Annual Training '86 and, in addition to shooting well, the unit came out on top in the supply management area, said Captain Phipps.

Blackhorse News The 1 lth Armored Cavalry Museum is searching for items of historical interest that are connected to the history of the Blackhorse Regiment. These items will become part of the Blackhorse Museum located with the Regimental Headquarters at Fulda FRG. The museum is interested in any relevant items such as battle maps, guidons, photographs, etc.

For more information, contact MAJ Glynn Pope, Regiment Adjutant, 11 th Armored Cavalry Regiment, APO New York 091 46. By the way, MAJ Pope reports that only about 75 of the Blackhorse beltbuckles remain available for purchase from the Regiment. After these are gone, there will be no more.

NCO Records Check Proposed For Master GunnerIANCOC Students at Ft. Knox The 2d Armor Training Brigade, Fort Knox, KY, has proposed a record check and update service for all NCOs attending the Master Gunner and ANCOC courses here that will save the Army and the NCOs time and money and ensure that records are current in all respects. The proposal would bring a two-man team of personnel specialists from the Enlisted Records Branch at Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN, to Fort Knox for three-day periods during each course instead of sending NCOs from Fort Knox to Fort Benjamin Harrison for two-three days. All NCOs attending the Master Gunner and ANCOC courses should bring with them the supporting documents that they desire to be included in their official MPRS during the review at Fort Knox. Alma Mater Honors MG Harmon Major General Ernest N. Harmon, commander of the 1 st and 2d Armored Divisions during WW II, and past president of Norwich University, CT, has been memorialized at that institution with a granite bas-relief sculpture set near Webb Hall and White Chapel. The backdrop for the sculpture will be a memorial wall upon which the names of deceased Norwich alumni will be listed. Members of the 1 st and 2d AD associations, as well as Norwich alumni, are asked to contribute to the memorial that commemorates General Harmon's tenure as a student (Class of '1 7) and as President of Norwich University from 1950 to his retirement in 1965. Checks may be mailedto: Mr. David Whaley '76, Director, Alumni Affairs, Norwich University, Northfield, VT 05663. Cavalry Christens the M I A I The 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment marked the beginning of crew training on the MlAl Abrams Tank with a christening ceremony on 5 September at Fort Bliss, TX. As the first unit in the Army to field the new tank, the squadron marked the occasion with appropriate Cavatry panache. Tothe strainsof Tchaikovsky's"l812 Overture''-with the smoke of salute cannon wafting in front of the assembled spectators -the H Company command tank sprang from its "hide position" in a motor pool bay. LTG Crosbie Saint, the Ill Corps Commander; Mrs. Donald Infante, wife of the Fort Bliss commanding general; and CPT John Suprin, commander of Heavy Company, cracked a bottle of champagneon the tank's front glacis and christened it "Hunter." General James H. Polk, Honorary Colonel of the Regiment, and Mrs. James M. Lyle, wife of the 61st Colonel, were on hand to christen "Hammer," the second of H Company's fourteen M1 A1 s. The 2d Squadron will complete M1 A1 New Equipment training by mid-December, with the other squadrons following immediately thereafter. By the summer of 1987, when fielding is complete, the Regiment will have 123 trained M1 A1 crews.

st of the 1 st of the 1 st Wins Flynn Cup Six months of excellence in every facet of its border surveillance operations won for the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, 1 st Armored Division, the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment's prestigious Flynn Cup. It marked the second time in two years that a cavalry unit assigned to the 1 st Armored Division has won the cup. The Flynn Cup is awarded on the basis of six-month running inspections by 2d ACR of all border units under its control: its own three squadrons; 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry from 1 st Armored Division; and 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry from 3d Infantry Division. Competition is based on the best border camps, the best border surveillance along the Czechoslovak-West German border, and the best overall operations.

The Flynn Cup is steeped in Cavalry tradition - it first appeared in 191 3 as an award for troop-sized units that excelled in operations on horseback. "It was redesignated in 1980 as an award for squadron-sized units that excelled in border operations," said Sergeant First Class Kenneth E. Morrison, HQ, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment. Author Seeks Cav, Infantry, Airborne Help Keith W. Nolan, author of three books on Vietnam, is engaged in research for a fourth votume on that war. Specifically, he needs information on the actions of 29 March - 1 April 1930. when 2/7 Cavwas attacked in their U, 2/8 Cav was overrun at li! Illingworth, and the CG, 199th Inf Bde was killed. Also, he is researching the 1 May - 30 June 1970 incursion into Cambodia by elements of the 4th. 9th. and 25th IDS, 1 st Air Cav Div, 101 st Abn Div, 1 1 th Armd Cav Regt, and the 199th Inf Bde. Veterans who were involved in these actions are requested to write or call anytime to arrange an interview: Mr. Keith W. Nolan, 220 Kingsville Court, Webster Groves, MO 631 19. Phone (31 4)961-7577. Ex-Motorcycle Development Officers Sought Bruce Palmer, 111, author of numerous articles and a restorer of antique Harley-Davidson motorcycles, is researching anew volume on the venerable two-wheeler once used by the Army. He asks that any former officers who served with either HQ, Armored Force Center, or with the Requirements Division, Army Ground Forces, between 1943 and 1945 and who have personal knowledge of the shaft-driven motorcycle standardization program of that era, please contact him at: P. O. Box 2063, Seffner, FL 33584.

I The Bustle Rap Anniston Depot Hot Line Ready Soldiers and units with maintenance problems on combat vehicles, small arms, and missile guidance and control systems may now call the Anniston Army Depot in Alabama for speedy solutions on a 24-hour, 7-day a week telephone hotline.

Colonel William R. Crawford, Director of Maintenance at the Anniston Depot, said the hotline is answered by on-duty personnel from 7 a.m. until 3:30 p.m., Central Standard Time, with an answering device recording messages during off-duty hours. Some missile guidance and control systems problems that can be handled include Land Combat Support Systems, ground TOW, TOW Cobra, TOW 2, Dragon, Lance, and Shillelagh.

When calling, provide name, Autovon number, unit identification and location, and a complete description of the maintenance or operational problem. The Hotline number is: AUTOVON: 694-6582 or commercial (205)235-6582.

Armor Branch Notes Tour Extensions Apart from voluntary tour extensions mandated under the recent DCSPER PCS initiatives, Armor Branch is dealing with an increasing number of extension requests. Commanders must consider extension requests based on the needs of the command as well as the long-term professional development of the individual officer. Tour extensions can have a negative impact on such things as timing of CGSC attendance (if selected), functional area development, fully-funded advanced civil schooling, troop time during years as a Major and service in joint or combined staff assignments. Commanders and officers must "map out" -year by year -a career plan that takes into account the impact of an extension. The bottom line is that a tour extension now must be evaluated in terms of the officer's long-term career development. Violations of Officership Armor Branch has noticed a growing number of what may be termed as violations of officership among Armor fellow officers. Each month.a false official statement, signature, or ammunition turn-in problem.affects one of our officers. A review of such cases often reveals a degree of misguided mission accomplishment or loyalty playing in the justification. Our professional ethics and standards of conduct need to be reemphasized at the unit level. 1987 ROTC Requirements Assistant PMS openings for the academic year beginning in July 1987 have been announced by HQ, Cadet Command. Armor Branch has a large group of positions which require officers with masters degrees. These schools include: Captains University of Connecticut Boston University University of Georgia Providence College Wofford College Arizona State University University of Alaska University of Southern California Los Angeles Goldminer Team University of Hawaii University of Illinois-Chicago University of Illinois-Champaign Michigan State University Ohio University University of Utah Norwich University Bucknell University Siena College Florida State University John Carroll University Los Angeles Goldminer Team Officers interested in serving in these ROTC positions should contact their branch assignment officer at AY 221 -9696/9658/6340/6341 or write to Armor Branch indicating preference and providing graduate transcripts.

Majors

ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare An Encyclopedic Book on the German Tiger British Book Is Based On Wartime Research TIGER! The Tiger Tank: A British View, edited by David Fletcher. Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, England. 264 pages. $45.00.

It has been said that few legends survive unscathed. Time and again a heroic tale has been shown to have been woven of whole cloth.. with little to substantiate the legend's theme. There are always exceptions, and one of the most notable of all is the continuing legend of the Panzerkampfwagen VI -The Tiger Tank.

The legend of this armored behemoth was born in battle and has survived un-dimmed through four decades. Not even studied efforts to disparage the Tiger's-physical limitations (for it did have limitations), have succeeded in dimming its war-born image. The Tiger tank stands as the most famous of all armored fighting vehicles to emerge from WW 11, including the U. S. Sherman, the British Churchill. and the Russian T-34.

TIGER! is the first definitive volume in English on this most famous of all tanks. The result of a number of years of research and.documentation. TIGER! is the professional armor soldier's mine of. information and the layman's source of heretofore unavailable facts and data. The Tiger appeared in 1942 and the intervening 44 years. have provided an almost inexhaustable source of information on the tank and its derivatives, several of which, including the Sturm Tiger with its 15-inch mortar, are briefly covered.

This is the complete technical evaluation of the Tiger tank, an evaluation con: ducted on a captured model and halted only at the war'send. The evaluations were made by the School of Tank Tech-nologyandthe Military Collegeof Science in Britain and later were extended to determine which of the: Tiger's many technical asets should be incorporated into future British tank production. The book is divided into four sections: a brief introduction; a section on Allied messages, signals, etc., showing Allied forces' reactions to this monster of the battlefields;.a complete copy of the thoroughly detailed evaluation reports made by the above twoorganizations;and ancillary battlefield reports on the Tiger's internal arrangements and some post-war evaluations. The Sturm Tiger is briefly covered at the end.

To those who can recall the deep-throated cough of theTiger's engine starting up in the early morning, TIGER! will evoke a lot of memories, few of them pleasant. Those who have survived the 88-mmAPshotoftheTigerwi11 haveeven fewer pleasant memories. To everytanker who faced the Tiger, the gut feeling remains-therewasa tankto berespected. Four or five Shermans to one Tiger was the ruleof thumbwhen facing that 56-ton behemoth that dominated battlefields from Russia to North Africa to Northwest Europe -the Tiger tank.

Armor Staff RULES FOR LEADERSHIP Improving Unit Performance, LTC Jon W. Blades, USA, National Defense University Press, Washington, D. C. 11 2 pages.

Students and practitioners of leadership will find this a.valuable book. The author presents ten original rulesfor leadership that an officer can apply to determine the best style to use when in command. The interrelationship of unit-member motivation, leader competence, unit-member skill, etc., is explained and proven mathematically. The author uses the scientific method and. supporting data to present concepts, or rules, for leadership. Equally important, this mathematical presentation is easily understandable, being presented in. tabular form. The major topicsdiscussed are leader actions, group skills, group initiative, and group bonding. The style a leader chooses should be based upon the ability, enthusiasm, and motivation of a group. Colonel Blades, using data gathered from actual units, demonstrates that both the directive and non-directive leadership styles can produce excellent performance. Neither style is stronger -indeed, there are situations in which both have no effect upon a group. To be.effective, a directive leadership style requires the leader to be talented and enthusiastic about his duty. An unskilled leader practicing the directive style is very ineffective.

Success in usingthe non-directive style of leadership depends upon the skill and motivation of the unit members. If unit members are unskilled or incompetent, the non-directive leader will be ineffective. The leader's style also has a great effect upon group cohesion. Group cohesion, defined by the author as the extent that unit members.display teamwork and cooperative support, is related to member motivation and group performance. Cohesion is assisted when the members have confidence in their individual and group strengths. Efforts are focused toward mission accomplishment. The leader who has the opportunity to command a COHORT unit will find that he can increase cohesion by doing his own job well, assigning meaningful tasks, enforcing high standards of performance, and taking an interest in member opinions on how to accomplish a mission. Group cohesion, then, is dependent upon the leader and the unit members. When reading this book one will think that he is reading nothing new. All of the rules for leadership feel as if they are intuitive, yet have never been addressed in print. Most importantly, these rulesare supported by survey data. This book is an important addition t o the field of leadership research. Leaders are indeed made, and an apptication of these rules will make good leaders and good units. KEVIN C. M. BENSON

Captain, Armor NOMENKLATURA: THE SOVIET RULING CLASS, by Michael Voslensky. Doubleday and Co., Inc., Garden City, NY, 1985.445 pages. $1 9.95. Evolution of U. S. Military Presented in Clear, Readable Style He is a fanatic for power, which does not mean that he is indifferent to everything else. By nature he is not ascetic. He likes drink, in large quantities and of good quality, Armenian brandy in particular. He also Iikesfood-caviar,sturgeon,saImon -all of which are available in the Kremlin restaurant and at the Central Committee buffet. His hobby is the one that is "in" at the moment among his fellows; once it was football or hockey; recently it was fishing; now it is hunting. He orders Finnish furniture for his apartment and buys books that are unobtainable on the market, through the Central Committee book department -books that are officially accepted, of course. But his real passion is sitting at his desk, with the government telephone (the vertushka)within his reach,vetting Central Committee draft resolutions that may affect the lives of millions.... He is subject to neither election nor rejection by the people but decides their fate and lays down their political line.

Thus Michael Voslensky, a prominent Soviet historian and director of the Institute of Contemporary Soviet Research in Munich, West Germany, describes a typical member of the nomenklatura, the privileged class that runs the Soviet Union. Numbering 750,000 (three million when wives and children are included), its members lead lives of insulated luxury while extolling the People's State. While the average Soviet worker earns a meager 181 rubles a month, his counterpart in the nomenklatura may earn eight times as much, although the salary of the numen-klatura is top secret.

As a member of the elite class, the nomenklaturist is entitled to thirty days of paid vacation a year, plus traveling time to and from a vacation resort where he will stay free of charge. In comparison, the average worker is authorized two weeks of leave each year. The nomenklaturist receives free coupons which can be redeemed for luxury food items not normally available totheaverage worker, and which may be worth an additional 300 rubles a month. He is allowed additional allowances based on the number of languages he speaks. Based on his position within the nomenklatura hierarchy, he may be provided with free transportation, servants. and a summer home. He wears western clothes and shops at special shopsto which only the membersof his class have access. It is no surprise that Voslensky describes it as "the invisible aristocracy whose reign is more oppressive than that of the czars." Voslensky's book examines the face of Soviet power and reveals the rhetorical masquerade of Soviet propaganda. It exposes the corruption and intrigue that are an integral part of the system. GILBERT0 WLLAHERMOSA

Captain, Armor HQ, XVlll Airborne Corps AGAINST ALL ENEMIES, ed. by Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts. Greenwood Press, CT. 373 pages. $1 8.50 paperback.

It is always a welcome surprise to come upon a book that seriously addresses those other facets of the military than tactics, strategy, campaigns, equipment, or personalities. Against AI1 Enemies is one such volume, and its style, content, and presentation make it a candidate for the personal library of every seriously professional military person. Eighteen essays cover the evolution of the U. S. military services from pre-Revolutionary militia to today's vast land, sea, and air forces. Each author, an authority in his or her own sphere of military specialization, presents an interpretation of American military history in anon-doctoral style that is easily assimilated. The editors have accomplished a great deal in the arrangement of the essays and their content. The chapter notes, and the lists of suggested additional reading that accompany each essay, leave the reader with a mine of information to be explored. From "Armed Force in Colonial North America: New Spain, New France, and Anglo-America," to "The Army After Vietnam," this volume is highly informative and, what's more, is readable. Only one real sour note imposed itself upon this reviewer's senses. Ms. June I.. Gow, a member of the faculty of the History Department of the University of British Columbia at Vancouver, Canada, wrongly defends in her essay, "The Old Army and the Confederacy 1861 -1865." those U. S. officers who denigrated their commissioning oaths to "defend the Constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic" (emptiasis mine) and resigned their commissions to take up arms against the document and country they had sworn to defend.

The essays make serious note of such typically American military-civilian concerns as the citizen-soldier, civilian control of the military, the blending of standing forces and reserves in wartime, and how national priorities have affected the rise and fall of the military status. These writings are not meant solely for the military professional who seeks a more lucid understanding of the background of the services in order to serve more fully today, but also for his intelligent and concerned civilian counterpart who desires to give a more knowledgeable support to our nation's armed forces. There are enlightening glimpses into the minds, characters, actions, and reactions of such military luminaries as Washington, Scott, Grant, MacArthur, Eisenhower, Marshall, andarmor’sown Creighton Abrams. These provide a leavening of insight into the whys and wherefores of these men.

Hindsight, of course, is the historian's greatest asset, and the authors of these essays have applied that valuable adjunct with a perception not often found in the recounting of the U. S. military's varigated history.

ARMOR Staff UP FRONT KOREA: An Autobiography, by Allen Bryon Wilkinson. Pilot Books, New York, NY. 1984. 440 pages. $3.95 (paperback). Up FrontKorea istheautobiographyof a combat infantryman serving a tour of duty with the Second Infantry Division during that division's first year in Korea. The author vividly describes his experiences as an infantry private and later a corporal in an open and candid account. This is not to say that Private Wilkinson was an ideal soldier. By his own admission, he was a problem soldier in constant conflict with Army discipline and involved in infractions of regulations. Of most interest is the author's account of his tour with Company L, 3rd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment. This period covered mobilization, movement to Korea, the Naktong River Line defense, the pursuit to near the Yalu, the November Chinese Communist Counteroffensive, the Battle of Chip-yong-ni, where the 23rd Infantry was surrounded, and the hill fights as the line stabilized. Do not expect a discussion of small unit tactics a la S. L. A. Marshall's works, or Gugeler's Combat Actions in Korea. Wilkinson's account of infantry combat is on the personal level, involving members of his squad and platoon without any detailed analysis. The narrative is of brutal, bloody fighting, with high casualty rates, in difficult and trying conditions. While it is not the author's intention, the reader receives a direct view of the importance of the buddy system, small unit cohesion, and unit esprit, and how it functioned in his unit.

Like some combat veterans, Wilkinson had difficulties in readjustment to civilian life. The conclusion ends with his own experiences with the mid-1950s counter-culture, and his time on "skid row" before he reentered general society. This book will appeal to readers interested in soldier's experiences of combat in Vietnam and Korea. I would not recommend it for those seeking a technical or professional work on infantry combat in Korea. It is a needed addition to the sparse literature on combat infantrymen in Korea.

Hershey, PA

CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA, The

Waffen SS on the Eastern Front, by Leon Degrelle. Institute for Historical Review, P. O. Box 1306, Torrance, CA 90505.353 pages. $1 7.95. Leon Degrelle rose from private to colonel in the Waffen SS based on his combat exploits and his brave survival on the Eastern Front during WWII. This is a soldier's story with all the color and gore of the battlefield mixed extremely yell. Although you will have trouble following the unit movements because of a lack of maps, you can live the intimate details of close combat fought by brave men. The anti-communist theme is the driving force behind this patriot's story. He wears rose-colored glasses in regards to the Nazis and Hitter from start to finish. Politics aside, this story tells about a legion of Belgian volunteers who fought bravely with Germany to the bitter end of WW II. The Wallonian Legion of volunteers, from all writings, had a sense of duty and a sense of humor in equal amounts. Based on the extraordinary losses suffered in combat, you cannot doubt their idealism. (Wallonian is a dialect spoken in most of the French-speaking parts of Belgium.)

This story covers 76 months of combat on the Eastern Front by Belgian volunteers. Thousands of Belgians enlisted in the German Army according to their languages - in a Flemish legion and a Wallonian legion. At first, two battalions; then, in 1943, two brigades; lastly, in 1944, two divisions, the Wallonian Division and the Flemish Langemarck Division.

An excellent example of Degrelle's graphic writing can be found in thefollow-ing excerpt, describing escape from the Cherkassy cauldron. Eleven German divisions were encircled in the Cherkassy zone in January 1944: "We had a moment's respite while the Soviet tanks, bottlenecked in the pass, tried to untangle themselves from the tangle of the hundreds of broken carts under their treads. We skirted a wood, a beautiful russet and violet wood, and reached a little valley.

"We were scarcely starting up the slope when, turning back, we saw hundreds of cavalry racing down a hill to the southeast. We thought at first that it was German Uhlans. Looking through my binoculars, I could clearly make out the uniform of the cavalry. They were Cossacks. I recognized their nervous little brown horses. They were rushing up behind us. swarming in every direction..'We were stupified. The Soviet infantry was machine-gunning us. The Soviet tanks were following us. a And now the Cossacks were storming in for the kill.

"When? When would the German Panzers coming to meet us from the southwest show themselves? "We had already gone at least ten kilometers and seen nothing. We would have to go forward still faster.

"Like many of the wounded, I couldn't take any more. The fever was sapping my strength. But the race had to be run at all costs. With my Walloons I hurried to the head of the column to urge our comrades "The hillside was steep. At our left an enormous crevasse opened, four meters wide, fifteen meters deep. We got almost to the top of the hill. "Then we saw three tanks drive toward us at high speed. We had a second of unspeakable joy. 'It's them! Finally! The German Panzers are here!' But a volley of shells swooped down on us and mowed down our ranks. They were Soviet tanks. on.

"The enemy tanks were on our heels. The foot soldiers were killing us on the flanks. Their Cossacks were driving into our ranks. And now instead of salvation, other Soviet tanks were surging up in front of us. We couldn't wait any longer. Caught napping on this naked slope, we were going to be swept away in a few seconds."

"I looked at the ravine and cried out to my companions. 'Do as I do!' Then I let myself fall from fifteen meters high.

"There was a meter of very compressed snow at the bottom of the crevasse. I buried myself in it like a torpedo. All my comrades tumbled in one after the other."

The pace of the writing is fast; the action is graphic, and a warrior can learn things from reading this book. I recommend its reading by students of the art of war. It is well worth the price.

Brigadier General, USA Norfolk, VA 109th Armor Unit History (Continued from back cover) Campaign Participation Credit World War I Somme offensive Ypres-Lys Flanders 191 8 World War I/ Normandy Northern France Rhineland Ardennes- Alsace Central Europe New Guinea Leyte Luzon Southern Philippines Company C. 4th Battalion (Milan), additionally entitled to: Korean War First UN counteroffensive.

CCF spring offensive UN summer-fall offensive Second Korean winter Korea. summer-fall 1952 Third Korean winter Korea, summer 1953 Decorations Company C. 4th Battalion (Milan). entitled to: Meritorious Unit Commendation, Streamer embroidered KOREA (2998th Engineer Company cited; DA GO 95. 1953) Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered KOREA 1950-1 952 (2998th Engineer Cornpanycited: DA GO 33,1950, asamended by DA GO 41,1955)

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered KOREA 1951 -1954 (2998th Engineer Company cited; DA GO 82.1954) ANNEX 2

Constituted 19 December 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 1 14th Coast Artillery Battalion. Activated 10 February 1943 at Fort Bliss. Texas. Redesignated 28 June 1943 as the 11 4th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion. Inactivated 9 July 1946 in France. Allotted 1 July 1951 to the Tennessee National Guard. Organized and Federally recognized 23 August 1951 in eastern Tennessee with Headquarters at Knoxville. Redesignated 1 October 1953 as the 11 4th Antiaircraft Artillerv Battalion. Symbolism The colors yellow and green are those associated with armor; blue, representing water, symbolizes service overseas. The green areas allude to the green fields of Europe and, with the fleur-de-lis, represent service in France during World Wars I and 11.

The yellow areas and the Philippine sun refer to combat service in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater during World War II.

Distinctive Insignia The distinctive insignia is the shield, slightly modified, and the motto of the coat of arms.

109th Armor Unleashed Lightning Lineage and Honors Y Constituted 30 June 191 6 and allotted to the Tennessee National Guard as a Squadron of Cavalry. Organized in May 191 7 as the 1 st Separate Squadron of Cavalry from the following c' troops: Troop A (organized 16 May 1917at Nashville); Troop B (organized 4 October 1901 at Chattanooga); Troop C (organized 10 August 191 6 at Athens); Troop D (organized 27August (I 191 6 at Knoxville). (Troops B, C, and D mustered into Federal service July-October 191 6 for service on the Mexican border; mustered out 14-19 March 1917.) Squadron called into Federal service 25 July 191 7; drafted into Federal service 5 August 191 7. Converted and redesignated 14 September 191 7 as the 1 14th Machine Gun Battalion and assigned to the 30th Division. Demobilized 10 April 191 9 at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia. Reorganized during 1920-1 921 as the Tennessee Cavalry Squadron. Reorganized and Federally recognized 30 June 1920 - 6 September 1923 as the 109th Cavalry (less elements), an element of the 23d Cavalry Division. (All elements of regiment allotted 26 February 1938 to the Tennessee National Guard.)

Converted and redesignated 1 October 1940 as the 181 st Field Artillery and relieved from assignment to the 23d Cavalry Division. Inducted into Federal service 24 February 1941 at home stations. Regiment broken up 1 March 1943 and its elements reorganized and I redesignated as follows: Headquarters and Headquarters Battery as Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 181st Field Artillery Group; 2d Battalion as the 947th Field Artillery 1 Battalion (1st Battalion as the 181 st Field Artillery Battalion - hereafter separate lineage). After 1 March 1943. the above units underwent changes as follows: Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 181 st Field Artillery Group, reorganized and redesignated 15 March 1944 as Headquarters and Headquarters Battery. 34th Field Artillery Brigade. Inactivated 16 November 1945 at Camp Patrick Henry, Virginia. Headquarters, 34th Field Artillery Brigade. converted and redesignated 31 July 1946 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company. 173d Armored Group (Headquarters Battery redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 30th Division Artillery [Tennessee part] - hereafter separate lineage). Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 173d ' Armored Group, organized and Federally recognized 1 August 1947 at Jackson. 947th Field Artillery Battalion inactivated 1 January 1946 at Camp Stoneman. California. Converted, reorganized, redesignated, and Federally recognized 1 August 1947 in central Tennessee as the 775th Tank Battalion with Headquarters at Nashville. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 173d Armored Group, and the 775th Tank Battalion consolidated 15 September 1949 with the 183d Tank Battalion (organized in 1947 in central Tennessee with Heaquarters at Murfreesboro) and the 765th Tank Battalion (see Annex 1 ) to form the 173d Armored Cavalry.

Regiment broken up 27 October 1954 and its elements reorganized and redesignated as elements of the 30th Armored Division as follows: Headquarters and the 1 st Battalion as the 173d Tank Battalion; 2d Battalion as the 175th Tank Battalion; 3d Battalion as the 230th Reconnaissance Battalion (Headquarters Company as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 30th Armored Division Trains - hereafter separate lineage). 173d and 175th Tank Battalions, the 230th Reconnaissance Battalion, the 174th Tank Battalion (organized in 1947 in western Tennessee as the 2d Battalion, 11 7th Infantry. with Headquarters at Trenton; converted and redesignated 27 October 1954 as the 174th Tank Battalion), and the 1 14th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (see Annex 2) consolidated, reorganized, and redesignated 1 March 1959 as the 109th Armor, a parent regiment under the Combat Arms Regimental System, to consist of the 1 st Reconnaissance Squadron and the 2d. 3d. 4th. and 5th Medium Tank Battalions, elements of the 30th Armored Division. Reorganized 1 April 1963 to consist of the 1 st, 2d. 3d. 4th. and 5th Battalions, elements of the 30th Armored Division (1 st Reconnaissance Squadron concurrently reorganized and redesignated as the 1 st Squadron, 230th Cavalry - hereafter separate lineage; new 1 st Battalion, 109th Armor, organized). Reorganized 1 February 1968 to consist of the 4th and 5th Battalions, elements of the 30th Armored Division.

Constituted 3 December 1941 in the Army of the United States as the 775th Tank Destroyer Battalion. Activated 16 December 1941 at Camp Forrest, Tennessee. Allotted 21 February 1942 to the Tennessee National Guard. Converted and redesignated 15 April 1944 as the 728th Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Inactivated 15 December 1945 on Luzon, Philippine Islands. Converted and redesignated 31 July 1946 as the 765th Tank Battalion. Reorganized and Federally recognized 6 February 1947 in central Tennessee with Headquarters at Cookeville.

Constituted 19 December 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 114th Coast Artillery Battalion. Activated 10 February 1943 at Fort Bliss, Texas. Redesignated 28 June 1943 as the 11 4th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion. Inactivated 9 July 1946 in France. Allotted 1 July 1951 to the Tennessee National Guard. Organized and Federally recognized 23 August 1951 in eastern Tennessee with Headquarters at Knoxville. Redesignated 1 October 1953 as the 11 4th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion.