The Technology of Teamwork

Scenario One The enemy motorized rifle regiment (MRR) attacked with over 100 armored vehicles at dawn. On the valley floor were two company teams; to the north, a mechanized infantry-heavy team; to the south, a tank-heavy team. The mech team began the fight with long-range artillery fires, and then hit the MRR with very effective tank and Dragon fires. The MRR continued to roll, despite losses to both tank fire and Dragons, and became embroiled in close combat with the mech infantry-heavy team. During this close fight, a mortar section dismounted, their mortars having been overrun, and attacked the enemy tanks with Vipers, destroying several. The mech team was effectively destroyed, but destroyed some 40 tanks and BMPs. The only tank in the team killed 25 tanks and BMPs before it was destroyed. Across the valley, at a range of 2,500 meters, a tank-heavy team fired into the flanks of the MRR and destroyed another 60 armored vehicles. The remnants of the MRR continued into the task force defensive sector, and its destruction was completed by effective TOW fires from the antitank company, Dragon, small arms fires from a dug-in mechanized infantry company, and a counterattack into the MRR rear launched by the tank-heavy team from the valley floor. The tank-heavy team began the fight with 10 tanks and ended the fight with 11. A tank down for maintenance had come forward during the counterattack and joined in the fight. by Captain Peter J. Schifferle Scenario Two The task force began its movement to contact with only the briefest of plans. The mech-pure team "... Tank commanders was to clear a particularly troublesome ridge; then the mech-heavy team would lead on the north and and gunners were the the tank-heavy team would follow to the south. The enemy forces consisted of a motorized rifle company in a defensive position. Within 15 members of the crew who Performance..." determined that crew's minutes after the initial enemy contact, the task force was destroyed, Enemy losses: two vehicles. Teamwork Teamwork is the critical factor that separates these two scenarios. This teamwork is not only that which comes from company commanders talking to each other on the task force command net, but it is also the teamwork of the individual infantry squad, tank crew, mortar squad, and the other small teams that make a task force a fighting body. This is the conclusion of a study of tank crew effectiveness at the National Training Center (NTC) conducted by the 5th Battalion, 33d Armor, 194th Armored Brigade. The study was based on a comparative analysis of factors affecting crew performance during exercise PROUD LEGIONS '85 at the NTC in January 1985. Seven factors were analyzed: age, grade, civilian eduction level, SQT, GT, and CO test results, and time as a stable tank crew. Fourteen crews were analyzed under this study, and while this is a n admittedly small and probably statistically insigni- - ficant sample, some ideas very important to the chain of command at platoon, company, and battalion levels arose. Six of the crews were considered killer crews because of their superior performance at the NTC. Four crews were thought to represent the norm of performance, and four crews were killed crews, those crews that usually died during an operation without accomplishing the mission. These crews were from both the 5th Bn, 33d Armor Task Force, and 4th Bn, 54th Infantry Task Force. After collecting information on the crewmen, it quickly became obvious that the tank commanders and gunners were the members of the crew who determined that crew's performance. The data collected for the loaders and drivers were similar for all fourteen crews, with very few statistically significant differences. The data collected for the tank commanders and the gunners, on the other hand, showed some very interesting differences. 10 novem.ber-december 1985

Table 1 Data for Tank Commanders and Gunners Killer Average Age (yead 26.9 26.9 Pay grade 5.6 4.3 Education 12.9* 12.3** 81.9 79.6 101.1 105.0

GT co 111.6 111.0 Stabilization 12.5 2.8 Killed 26.1 4.5 11.9 76.0 103.4 106.8 3.3 * One tank commander had 19 years, all others 12 years. ** One tank commander had 12 years, all others at least 13. 1 These data support several basic concepts about effective tank crews: for example, older, more experienced, and more proficient (better SQT scores) soldiers make better tank crewmen. Most important, however, is the direct correlation between the GT and CO scores and performance. All of the tank commanders and gunners averaged above 100 on their GT, a clear indication that intelligent crewmen are needed for a combat-ready force. Of value for future selection of tank crewmen is the clear relationship between CO scores and improved performance. For the members of the armor force responsible for the training of the tank crews and not for the recruiting of new soldiers, the data that is most significant is the superior NTC performance of the stabilized tank crews. Without altering the education level, the age, or grade structure, or the SQT, GT, or CO test proficiency of our soldiers, Table 3 Crew Stabilization in Months Killer Average Killed A12- 9 A14 - 6 A23-2 A34 - 17 A32 - 3 A65 - 2 B34- O* B11- 1 B12 - 2 B65 - 18 B23 - 1 C13 - 6 c21- 7 C23 - 27 Average 12.5 2.8 3.3 * “his crew consisted of an E-6 tank commander and an E-6 gunner who had been the tank commander of another tank down for maintenance. The two staff sergeants had worked together in the same platoon for nearly 18 months before the NTC rotation, thereby resulting in a high degree of teamwork in the crew. I Table 2 Comparison of CO Scores Killer Average Killed Tank Commander 107.8 116.7 109.0 Gunner 112.6 94.0 104.7 Total Crew 109.3 104.9 100.9 TC & Gunner 111.6 111.0 106.8 I we can dramatically increase their combat effectiveness if we stabilize our tank crews. The conclusions from the study of this admittedly small population are supported by some of the most respected writings on soldiers in combat and by the 194th Armored Brigade’s most recent experience at the NTC. The clearest reference to the teamwork displayed by soldiers is in S. L. A. Marshall’s Men Against Fire. In this book, Marshall states that soldiers fight not for a higher goal but to save the lives of friends and to keep their small group of closest comrades safe. The need to appear strong and competent when surrounded by your friends and comrades is also mentioned by Marshall. This sense of teamwork, a desire to protect your comrades and do well in their eyes, is essential to an effective military organization.’ Teamwork is what makes the tank commander able to overcome more numerous enemy tanks, heavy enemy artillery, and the use of chemical agents and make his tank a killer on the battlefield. He will come forward out of the smoke to bring the battle to the enemy; he will move quickly to save another tank from destruction, and he will maneuver within his battle position to bring his firepower to bear on the enemy force. The tank commander with a crew he has trained with. lived with. and sharedhis meager creature comforts with, will be much more effective than the tank commander who does not know the crew he commands. The NTC experience of the 194th Armored Brigade provides two excellent examples of the power of teamwork on the battlefield. The first is the case of tank B65 and its defense of a battle position overrun by an entire MRR. In this battle, the tank commander - with a gunner he had worked with for 18 months and a loader and driver he had worked with for more than 8 months - fought a hopeless fight, killing some twenty-five or thirty enemy vehicles before his tank was destroyed. When asked why they had fought so well, the driver replied, “When you have a tank commander like we do, you just think about satisfying the commander.” A clearer instance of the power of teamwork and the desire to please one’s comrades would be hard to find. The second example is the killer tank A12. While defending a battle position, this tank - crewed by a tank commander-gunner combination that had trained together for over nine months, and with a driver and loader together for at least four months - fought against two battalions of a MRR and destroyed twenty-five enemy tanks and BMPs. Again, the effectiveness of the crew was due to the developed teamwork, the knowledge of what the commander wanted done, and the 1 1

-._ desire to be competent in front of nle most imDortant criteria for tank the 1st Armor Training Brigade’s the other crew members who had trained together over the months. Lessons For Armor This study has limited value for persomiel acquisition in the Armor community because of the limited nature of the surveyed population. However, it may serve as anew point of departure for further studies into the personal characteristics of the killer tank crew of the future. For the members of the chain of command in the tank battalions and cavalry squadrons of today’s Army, this study should be significant. Implications for both crew stabilization and the training of crew members are obvious. Past articles and studies into the desirable characteristics of tankers have relied on data from tank gunnery tables, notably gunnery tables in use before the introduction of the current series of tactical tables and the use of MILES and multiple range scenarios. These studies are based on a crew performance in an environment that - while it is admittedly high stress - is not always combat realistic. With the new tables used as a data base for crew studies, it is possible that a result closer to the NTC experience, and realistic combat simulations, would be possible. Some current research at the Armor School is proceeding with this type of data. Studies at the Weapons Department and at the Army Research Institute are in progress using both the NTC and the new tactical tables as the source for data on effective tank crews. This should be valuable research, for only with the study of crews in realistic combat situations can any forecasts for future combat effectiveness be made.2 An example of the earlier type of research is the article in Parameters - “Killers, Fillers, and Fodder” by Colonel Thomas A. Horner. This article emphasized the need for intelligence above all other characteristics for the modem tanker. Colonel Homer’s data was drawn from a series of articles and studies of fighter aircraft pilots and tankers on gunnery ranges. His conclusions from the fighter pilot study - that most enemy losses are caused by a minority of pilots - is supported by the NTC experience; his conclusion from the gunnery studies, that intelligence is the sin- 12 novembet-december 1985 commande; selection, was not supported by the small sample in this study. While intelligence is extremely important, it may well be not the single most important factor in determining the effectiveness of a tank crew. This study points out that more important to the effectiveness of the crew is the teamwork developed by a stable crew and their desire to work together to destroy the enemy. At the NTC, and in combat, the man who has comrades and a developed sense of teamwork will be the killer of the enemy.3 The need for crew stabilization has recently fallen from favor in the armor community. The NTC experience shows that this - a key factor in developing killer crews - needs much more attention from every level of the chain of command. The most important level of control for developing teamwork through stabilization is the company commander-first sergeant team. These two men should develop their manning and training plans with the constant thought of keeping as many crews as possible as stable as possible. In the 194th Armored Brigade, a brigade policy has been drafted to maximize stabilization. The policy states that the tank commander and his gunner will stay together whenever the tank commander moves within the unit. This includes movement within a company or outside the company, as long as the tank commander will continue to be a tank commander in his next assignment. To minimize turbulence in the units due to promotion of gunners to fill vacant tank commander slots, each unit will maintain an order of merit list for all gunner designees. The list will be based on an analysis by the company chain of command of the selectees’ duty performance, SQT scores, TCGST results and the scores achieved on a battalion-executed gunner’s selection test. Anew gunner must be chosen from the order of merit list in sequence unless a n exception is approved by the battalion commander. Another part of the policy is that an order of merit list be maintained at company level for all tank commanders, with the weakest tank commander listed first. This list will be used to select attendees at Tank Commanders Course. In this way, both Stabilization and training are established as the basic building blocks for crew efficiency in the 194th Armored Brigade. The key personnel in executing this policy are company commanders and first sergeants, for without their active support, and their desire to minimize turbulence in their units, such a program will be doomed to fail. Unfortunately, another reason this policy might fail in many Army units will be the high rate of personnel turbulence, especially in CONUS battalions. Department of the Army should implement a policy of stabilization of 19E/Kperson-nel, to include increasing the length of tour for all personnel, especially for the junior noncommissioned officers. Without this policy, it will be very difficult to enforce stabilization, much less convince a soldier that the Army and his chain of command believe stabilization is important. Tactical Lessons From Killer Crews The crews compared for this study were also given a short survey on tactics. This survey was based on the tactical principles stated by Lieutenant Colonel James Crowley in “Killer Tank Crews.” (See ARMOR Magazine, September-October 1984). The crew members agreed with most of Lieutenant Colonel Crowley’s comments, but some of the killer crews had a different emphasis than the killed crews.4 The killer crews valued rehearsals of all operations higher than the killed crews, as well as the need to rapidly move out of enemy engagement areas and the need for gunners to work with the wingman tanks for the rapid engagement of enemy vehicles. The killer crews also stressed the need for deliberate movement, with controlled aggression, where t h e killed crews stressed the need to move as rapidly as possible. The killers also desired to dig in, to spend more time selecting their primary positions, and to use turret stabilization more than the killed crews. Unfortunately, since the survey was distributed upon return from the NTC and after the crews of all tanks in the battalion had attended numerous after-action reviews at the NTC, it is difficult to determine if the crews were only repeating the tactical lessons they had learned, rather than the tactical techniques they used at the NTC. At any rate, all three levels of crews, killer, au-erage, and killed, agreed to a surprising degree on many of the tactical techniques addressed by LTC Crowley. This agreement on tactical lessons enhances the importance of teamwork as the key factor in crew effectiveness. It appears that training, in general, although it is very important, is not the great discriminator in performance that it is normally considered. Training together as a stabilized crew is. This may be overstating the case, however, as every crew in the battalion had been trained using a rigorous series of STXs, FCXs, LCXs, and FTXs, including critiques by the Armor School, and had passed a series of tests by battalion evaluators prior to deployment to the NTC. Therefore, every crew in the battalion had reached at least a certain degree of tactical proficiency before deployment to the NTC. However, among crews trained to similar levels, the stabilization or turbulence among the crews was the single most important factor. Stabilized crews were better able to take advantage of the intensive, stimulating, and arduous training to develop their teamwork to higher levels; the new crews were not able to do this. Conclusions Although this study was based on a very small population, it has significance for the armor community because it is the first, to my knowledge, based on the NTC experience. If the NTC is the closest to war that the peacetime Army can achieve, further study of the effectiveness of tank crews based on data from the NTC is needed. Studies should be concerned with all of the characteristics necessary for the killer tank crews of the future. This will be critically important to that part of the armor community concerned with the acquisition and training of new soldiers, and for tankers in the field concerned with the selection of the most qualified tank commanders and gunners in the M60A3 and M1 tanks. For the present, this study has shown that crew stabilization is the critical factor in crew performance troop commander and their first after a standard in training has sergeants can drastically improve been achieved. This is important the combat readiness of their units. for the chain of command in that all armor battalions and armored cavalry squadrons can influence their crew stabilization today - and through crew stabilization, their readiness for combat - without the expenditure of either training time or funds. For the trainer in the tank units, this study has shown that a certain plateau of training must be achieved for the tank crew to be effective. Currently, a very useful standard for training to this level exists in the Armor School manuals in print, especially the tank platoon and company/team STX manuals. With the proper use of these manuals and the principles they contain, and with stabilization of tank crews, especially the tank commander and gunner combinations, the tank company and cavalry Footnotes ‘Marshall. S. L. A., Men Against Fire, Gloucester, Mass., Peter Smith, 1978. 2Conversation with Major Giles F. Bnnn, of the USA Armor School Weapons Department on 18 April 1985. 3crowley. LTC James, “Killer Tank Crews,” ARMOR, September-Odober 1984, pp. 21-23. ‘Homer, COL Thomas A., “Killers, Fillers, and Fodder,” Parameters, Vol XII, No. 3, pp. 27-34.

FERLE was commissioned in Armorasa distinguished mili-tarygraduate of Canisius College in 1976. He served as an armored cavalry platoon leader and tank company executive officer with the 3d ACR, as battalion S4 of 5th Battalion, 33d Armor, and for the past two years as commander of B Company, 5th Banalion, 33d Armor, 194th Armored Brigade. He participated in two NTC rotations, most recently as commander of across-attached tank company to Task Force 4-54 Infantry (Mech) and is currently assigned as an instructor in the Department of History, 13