Establishing Disengagement Criteria

Task force defensive missions conducted against the OPFOR motorized rifle regiment at the National Training Center have repeatedly shown that in order to stop the regiment’s attack and maintain sufficient combat power to be able to engage the next echelon regiment, a maneuver defense must be fought. Since Soviet doctrine stresses a continuous buildup of combat power at the point of least resistance, a static, position-oriented defense is quickly overwhelmed at its weakest point. Once penetrated, the surviving elements of the task force are attacked from the flank or rear, or completely bypassed, while the regiment conducts a high-speed exploitation through the less densely defended rear areas. A maneuver-oriented defense forces the attacking regiment to deploy earlier than it had planned to, reduces the speed of its attack, provides for its continuous attrition, and makes it difficult for the enemy to focus on the decisive defeat of a portion of the defending force. It provides a constantly changing situation that repeatedly frustrates the top-down planning and centralized control necessary to make the regiment function effectively. Detailed defensive planning is necessary to ensure that a sufficient force ratio can be maintained throughout the battle, and precise execution of the plan is required for success and survi-. Val. Such a defense, however, can become a command and control nightmare, for the Soviet attack will include a significant electronic warfare effort or even a nuclear EMP which will disrupt all electronic communications. Tremendous indirect fire support and smoke will be employed and a highspeed attack will be mounted which significantly decreases the reaction time available to the defender. Since much of our capacity to fight depends heavily on a flexibility made possible through an extensive command and control system, the Soviet assault on this system can prove devastating unless a means for decentralized and virtually automatic execution is provided for in every operation. Repeatedly at the NTC, the loss of command and control results in forward defensive elements being overrun before they can reposition to subsequent battle positions. The most common cause for such unfavorable outcomes has been the failure of the forward elements to receive permission to withdraw, either because communications have been completely disrupted, or because a lack of information, or inaccurate information, caused the commander to fail to issue the order in time to have it successfully executed. This invariably results in a piecemealing of defensive forces that allows the OPFOR to generate a tremendous force ratio, sometimes as much as 10 to 1, against indivdual company-teams and to defeat the task force one team at a time. For these reasons, the defensive concept must be based on the assumption that command and control at task force level is going to be extremely difficult, if at all possible. But this inability to communicate with traditional means can be partially, and usually successfully, offset if the task force commander in his order clearly establishes specific disengagement criteria for his elements that both allows them to complete an achievable forward mission and to survive intact for subsequent and perhaps more decisive actions deeper in the defensive sector. When this criteria is met, the unit automatically displaces with no further permission necessary. All other elements of the task force and the commander are aware of why and when this movement will happen, and the withdrawal of one element can actually be used to key subsequent events for other elements. In establishing this disengagement criteria, the commander must first determine exactly what he wants the forward element to accomplish and at what degree of risk. Deploying a portion of his main defensive force forward is inherently risky because at the beginning of the battle the mass of the task force is dispersed and the force is more vulnerable to piecemeal engagement by superior massed enemy formations. Forces lost in the forward battle area are not available for battle deeper in the sector, and forward defensive actions must usually be considered necessary preliminaries to decisive battle, and not as decisive actions in themselves. Planning begins at the point the commander feels will be most decisive. Based on a METT analysis of the situation, he must compute how many weapons systems he will need to totally 12

‘:.. Determination of the exact location of this trigger line requires a considerable amount of battlefield arithmetic... 9 ) destroy the enemy in the primary engagement area. Total destruction of the enemy is a necessary rule of thumb when computing force ratios. Although the enemy will be combat ineffective when 30-40 percent of his force remains, the defending commander must assume that his own force will be proportionally attrited. When the battlefield arithmetic shows that the time, space, and relative force ratios will not allow for total destruction of the enemy here, then a forward engagement by a portion of the defending force - either to change the force ratio by attriting the enemy forward of the time and space factor by slowing his movement -becomes necessary. The planned force ratio at the decisive point of the battle thus dictates the risk assigned to the elements with forward defensive missions. The lowest risk forward mission requires the unit to force the enemy to deploy, but allows the element to withdraw when the enemy begins to penetrate a pre-established line - a trigger line - usually at the point where the defender’s stand-off advantage begins to deteriorate. This criteria results in little actual damage to the enemy in terms of casualties, but allows for virtually no losses to the defender. Its chief purpose is to buy time for the main defensive force to reposition to meet the enemy’s threat as he commits himself to an identifiable scheme of maneuver. Determination of the exact location of this trigger line requires a considerable amount of battlefield arithmetic. First, the commander must determine exactly how much time the forward element needs in order to break contact, vacate its position, move to its subsequent position and begin firing, all the while remaining outside the maximum effective range of the assaulting ene- 1500 m M-6

I650 m / / G

M+11 IO00 m 3000 M +14 M +14!500 m 2500

I 500 ma \ M + 1 7 I

FIGURE 1.

my’s weapons. Next, he needs to compute the speed of the enemy’s movement and the distance he can cover in the time it will take the forward element to reestablish itself in combat posture in the subsequent position. He must also factor in the relative ranges of both his and the enemy’s weapons and the amount of time the enemy will be exposed to his forward element’s stand-off fires without being able to return effective fire. An example of this process is illustrated in figure 1. In this situation the commander of a three company-team task force is defending in a sector with two motorized-rifle battalion avenues of approach. The commander has determined that it will take two teams to defeat the enemy’s main attack while novernber-december 1984 13

“... The next step requires the commander to assess what damage the forward element can realistical& expect to inflict... 9 9 one company team will be sufficient to hold the other avenue of approach against the enemy’s supporting attack. The problem he faces is having enough time to determine which axis is the main attack and to position forces in sufficient time to defeat the enemy’s high speed advance. Initially, the commander has placed one team in the best defensive position in the sector (BP R). He has elected to keep his second company team (Team C ) in reserve with the mission to defend on order a battle position on either axis. From its initial position, Team C will require ten minutes to move to and occupy either battle position. The commander has determined that without forcing early deployment of the regiment, he will have insufficient time to determine the enemy’s main attack, order the move of Team C, and allow it to occupy its fighting position in time to engage the enemy at the decisive point. To force early deployment and to buy additional reaction time, the commander has assigned Team A a battle position approximately 2,500 meters forward of the task force main defensive positions. His intent is to use the long range direct fires of Team A to force the enemy from the column on high speed routes to a combat formation requiring cross-country movement with a reduction in the speed of his advance from 300 meters per minute to 150. Assuming that the depth of the forward engagement area will be out to the maximum range of the TOWS, 3,000 meters, it will now take the enemy 20 minutes to traverse the engagement area under fire rather than 10 minutes, the time he could cross it in if left unmolested. The additional 10 minutes offsets the time it will take Team C to reach its final fighting position. But since the full participation of Team Ain the decisive battle is necessary for the successful execution of the overall task force plan, a trigger line which allows Team A to disengage before receiving significant losses must be established. A rehearsal of the move from the forward to the subsequent battle position indicates the team requires four minutes to break contact, thirteen minutes to move on prepared routes to BP E and four additional minutes to occupy the position and be prepared to fight. The same move by the enemy will take 17 minutes, deployed and cross-country. Additional rehearsals, if possible, may further decrease the time required for repositioning and buy additional precious minutes. Next, the commander must determine the standoff advantage he must maintain to guarantee the survival of Team A. This determination is always situational, based on terrain and weather, and must be confirmed by an actual rehearsal of the enemy’s advance toward the defensive positions from the attacker’s perspective. In this case, the commander determined that these factors and the relative advantages of thermal imagers and stable, hull-down firing positions with pre-planned engagement areas placed the standoff advantage at 1,500 meters. This determination means that the forward element must at all times keep at least 1,500 meters between itself and the enemy until it reaches BP E and is prepared to fight. The battlefield arithmetic necessary to determine the disengagement criteria begins at the point in time that Team A must leave BP D. This time is minute M. At M + 4 the team will have completed its withdrawal and will be enroute to the subsequent position. At M + 17 it will have reached BP E and at M + 21 will be prepared to engage the enemy. At M + 21, then, the enemy will have reached the 1,500 meter line and is now being engaged by all the defending force elements. The commander must then compute backwards to determine where the enemy was at minute M, and this will become the trigger line for Team A’s withdrawal from BP

D. Figuring 21 minutes times a deployed speed of 150 meters per minute, the enemy can cover 3,150 meters, which places him 4,650 meters from the main defensive positions. Since the forward battle position was 2,500 meters out, the trigger line should be marked at 2,150 meters forward of BP D. The next step requires the commander to assess what damage the forward element can realistically expect to inflict on the enemy. In this case, using 14 a planning range of 3,000 meters for TOW and 2,400 meters for tank fires, the commander determined that the enemy will be in the forward engagement area for six minutes for TOW fire and two minutes for tank fire. By then, factoring in the number of systems on the position, their demonstrated rate of frre in the battle environment, and their proven probability of hit/kill, he can determine what the forward element can actually accomplish before it must begin its withdrawal. In some situations, the overall defensive concept may require more killing of the enemy in the forward engagement area than the forward element can accomplish with its assets. The commander then must consider other options to increase the amount of destruction possible: He can increase the number of systems he commits to the forward element. 0 He can attempt to keep the enemy in the standoff kill zone longer by emplacing obstacles which must be breached under fire, or He can establish an engagement criteria which requires greater risk for the forward element by increasing its time of stay in the forward defensive position. By modifying his task organization and increasing the number of systems forward, the commander can expect to increase the number of enemy kills forward in the same proportion that he increases the size of the forward force. For example, if his experience indicates that his ITV crews can average 1.5 rounds per minute with a probability of kill of 70 percent, by adding an additional TOW section to the forward element, in the six minutes the enemy is in the TOW fan of the engagement area, he can expect to achieve another 6 x 1.5 x.70 x 2 kills or about 12 more enemy systems destroyed. However, every time a combat system is added to the forward battle, it must be subtracted from the number of systems that can be totally relied upon in the decisive defensive battle in the primary engagement area. Every forward element runs the risk of either becoming an early casualty, suffering automotive failure, or of being misoriented in the

“... The placement f obstacles in the forward engagement area can also hold the enemy in the killing zone for additional time... P9 force for successive missions as important as his initial forward assignment. The criticality of the forward element’s remaining a combat effective force with a subsequent role in the decisive battle must be considered whenever the mission statement for a forward element is developed. A high-risk forward defensive mission for a sub-element is sometimes expressed in terms of a specific number inflicted on the enemy before the sub-element can withdraw. An example is a defensive situation in which defensive positions in the sector are limited because of terrain or boundary restrictions. In this case, the task force may not be able to mass sufficient combat power to destroy the enemy in the primary engagement area unless the enemy has been sufficiently attrited forward to allow for his defeat at the decisive point. In this case, the forward element must be prepared to accept decisive engagement if necessary and be prepared to withdraw under pressure to its next position, or even to retain the forward position until relieved by the task force counterattack element. If withdrawal is possible, a logical subsequent mission for the forward force in this situation might be to provide the task force counterattack force. Figure 2 illustrates this situation. Here, a four-team task force is in a defensive sector which does not allow the massing of more than the fire of two teams in the decisive engagement area. The commander has determined that the maximum enemy force that can be defeated in engagement areas Scorpion and Snake is two motorized rifle battalions. In order to retain the decisive terrain of battle positions 40 and 20, the equivalent of at least one MRB of the attacking regiment must be rendered combat ineffective forward, before the enemy reaches the decisive engagement area. The commander’s defensive concept places Team A forward, reinforced with sufficient combat power to destroy an MRB, with the mission of retaining BP 10 and destroying at least 40 enemy combat systems in engagement area Lizard. Priority of the task force engineers’ blade effort will go to the prep- 1 5

Precise planning and coordination are necessary if a force is to fight a maneuver defense. Here, umpires assess the success of a mission during Reforger ‘84. aration of survivability positions at BP

10. The task force commander believes that the logical enemy objective of the day is the decisive terrain at BPs 40 and 20, and that the enemy will attempt to bypass BP 10 and to focus his combat power on his objective of the day. If bypassed by the first echelon, Team A will continue to fire into EA Lizard to destroy or slow the regiment’s second echelon MRB to deny the enemy commander the ability to mass his combat forces in his attack on BPs 40 and 20. As soon as the enemy is halted in EAs Scorpion and Snake, Team D will counterattack along direction of attack Sidewinder to restore contact with Team A so that consolidation, resupply, and evacuation of wounded can take place and BP 10 can be prepared, if necessary, to engage a second echelon regiment. Under no circumstances is a forward element ever given.a mission that accepts its destruction because of the overall impact on the total force. The defensive concept must always provide for continuous action based on a plan for the survival of the force. The concept may require a forward element to be bypassed at some point in the battle, but then a counterattack to restore contact is mandatory as soon as possible. In summary, the task forces which have defended successfully against the onslaught of the OPFOR motorized rifle regiment have been those that have executed a precisely planned maneuver defense which has incorporated the following points: 0 Early engagement of the enemy from the far edge of the defensive sector. 0 Continuous engagement of the enemy to slow and attrite him and to force him into the primary engagement area where a decisive force ratio can be achieved by massing sufficient combat power to guarantee his destruction. 0 Development of a plan which provides for automatic execution under conditions of the loss of direct command and control. 0 A willingness to accept a reasonable risk which carefully balances the advantages gained by inflicting early damage on the enemy and the chances of survival of the forward force. MAJOR DAVID OZOLEK is currently a student at t h e Armed Forces Staff College. He received his BA and MA from John Carroll University. H i s previous assignments include mechanized infantry platoon leader and company commander and assistant professor of English, U S M A. Prior to attending AFSC, h e served at the NTC as an S3 observer-controller, mechanized infantry battalion S3, and S3 of the NTC’s OPFOR motorized rifle regiment. 16 A??-