The Training Revol it ion

Over a desade ago the army initiated comprehensive plans to revamp training. Under the leadership of General William E. DePuy, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) set in motion changes that were to revolutionize training throughout the army. Although the origins of the revolution predate General DePuy’s arrival at TRADOC, his leadership brought the revolution to each company, battery, and troop in the Army. General DePuy played an important role in marketing and imple menting the ideas associated with the new training methods that were initially known as systems engineering of instruction and were made mandatory in 1968 by CONARC Regulation 350-10(11. The revolution employed the analytical tools of the systems engineer as well as the lateat educational techniques from the civilian educational community in order to improve institutional and unit training. Earlier methods of army training were simpler, built upon years of experience, and consisted of techniques of the trade passed from generation to generation through example in a manner best described as militaryart. The yardsticks formerly used to measure unit performance as well as the equipment our soldiers carried into battle were relatively simple. Army training consisted of techniques practiced for generations in basic training (BT), advanced individual training (AIT), the Army Training Program (ATP), and unit tests known as Operational Readiness Tests. As more complex weapons systems began to enter the Army’s inventom it became apparent that the army was on the threshold of a period of prcl found change. The advanced tools of the system analyst and of civilian educators offered better ways to master tasks, skills, and missions. The DePuy initiatives came at a time when the need for modernization was long overdue. The Army had brought to a close a decade of involvement in revolutionary (insurgency) warfare. Preoccupation with revolutionary warfare had overshadowed preparation for conventional warfare and deferred procurement of new weapons systems needed in order to dominate modern battlefields. Faced with a massive challenge to achieve combat readiness and to preserve peace through deterrence in a more dangerous world, it was apparent that the army would need to modernize rapidly through the acquisition of a vast array of new equipment, as well as to scientis.caUy engineer our methods of training in order to ensure maximum return on the nation’s investment in modernization. New words entered the vocabulary of army trainem A hierarchy of individual training tasks composed of five skill levels was developed for each MOS. The skill qualification test (SQT) was inaugurated in order to provide a yardstick to assess soldier proficiency at each skill level. Detailed analysis based upon a comprehensive field assessment identified the individual tasks performed within each MOS at each skill level. Designated the “frontend analysis,” these field assessments were designed to ensure the training was focused upon the actual tasks and skills required by the soldier in order for him to perform effectively at each successive skill level. Unit mission training was redesignated collective training in order to iden@ group tasks which were oriented on performance of combat missions. Assessment tools to evaluate unit performance-the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) -were designed that recognized both the individual tasks and the collective tasks necessary to achieve full unit proficiency. Training developers employed the tools of the systems analyst to design instructional materials through a logical sequence of perfor-manceoriented training to ensure mastery of skills and knowledge. Criterion-referenced instruction composed of tasks, conditions, and standards became the norm to enable trainers to ensure that training amm-plished its intended purpose and to clearly establish the efficacy of training performance. Mastery of the new training systems posed an awesome challenge for the Army. It entailed the training of personnel involved in design and development of training materials, as well as the retraining of trainers throughout the Army. Moreover, modernization necessitated the simultaneous integration of new equipment and weapon systems into the army training system. The need for a system of professional schools for our noncommissioned officers was also recognized. F’ront-end analysis enabled training developers to clearly define thresholds of proficiency and critical skills needed by small unit leaders and first line supervisors at each skill level. The systems engineering of courses such as basic and advanced NCO courses through the Instructional Systems Development (ISD) process is gradually transforming our noncommissioned officer corps into the most proficient body of small-unit troop leaders in the world. In the years that have followed the introduction of the new training system, comprehensive change has been at work within the TRADOC institutional training base and within army units in the field. Assessment of the effectiveness of the new training tools is important so that we can understand the profound change that has taken place throughout the Army, as well as the great potential of a training system that is raising soldier skills to performance levels unheard of in the past. These changes have been complemented by the enhanced attractiveness of the military profession, vis-a-vis the civilian job market. Consequently, the Army has been able to recruit and retain highly qualified individuals to complement the enhanced effectiveness of army training. The combination of tougher training and volunteers with the abilities to master more difficult training standards have enabled trainers to achieve a si@cant increase in soldier performance. The Hierarchy of Army Training Functions The complexity of the new training system and its comprehensive scope have necessitated new approaches to updating trainers throughout the Army. The Battalion Training Management System (BTMS) and the Commander’s Training Management System (CTMS) have been introduced to assist trainers throughout the Army in understanding the new system and to effectively employ the training management tools developed by TRADOC. Figure 1 shows the hierarchy of training management functions within the new training system. Each of the training tools is relatively simply to employ. &ginning at the lowest level at which initial entry individual training is executed through the performance of collective tasks at the unit level, the system is composed of a logical progression of task building blocks to ensure complete mastery of the unit mission. Each higher level 43

Write Doctrine Design Training llSD Pmceu) Collective Training Auossment Conduct Collective Task Training Assessment of Individual Task Proficiency Conduct Training for Individual Task rxampia A V I V 'reparation of Army rraining 1990 Study -.

Responsibility Refomncos. _.. -mining F u n c t i o n - TRADOC and Proponent S FM 25-1; Threat Assess- S ments. Combat Develop-hanagement of 1 lraining and Doctrine 1 - ments, and AR 350-1 F - t and Proponent Schools Managers Course Combat Developments Directorate of Doctrine TRADOC Senior Military History. MAA, and - - - - ^ ^ -.. _ - _ - 'reparation of How o Fight Manuals Schools ind Collective Training/ rest Materials hnnual or Semi-annual IARTEP) External Evaluation Jnit Training: Finel As-mult 'mining: Combat lowment:ombat Movement Tmin- i g of Individual Soldmr ommandant for Educa-mal Technology, imctory of Training avelopments, and 'oponent School _:-_A_ __ __--...- ---. ander, 53, and Opere- 3ns Sergeant ompany Commander id First Sergeant,igade and Battalion Dmmonders and Subordi-ites mpany Commander, atoon Leader, Platoon irgeant mt Sergeant, Platoon argeant. Squad lander, id Vehicle Commander rill Sergeant, Platoon argeant. Squad Leader, id Vehicle Commander Skill DevelOpmOnt tTAFF, TRADOC HAUUL; senior lanagera Course I A U O L; neguiation 360-7. How to Fight Literature, and ISD Handbook PI.." '...'I."... V'.".. 1 Btigaos or Donmiion born- C I m P Lviiy-r-iig- I rmining rians t i c Program Training for Produce Training Schedule CI E the Unit bwl 01 P - - -- -- -- -- 1 BI B ( CI I Cc A I PI A SI A 1 SI I. I C D D ii SI BI Figure 1. The Hierarchy of Army 1 I na -- - -- -- I -I -- a1 'These references pertain to training in Armor or Cavalry Units and CMF 19 Initial Entry Training TMS. BTMS, and roponent School FM 25-4

ARTEP 17-65, and FM 17-95,OC. OBC. and

NOC and BNCOC

SQT. FM 7-7, FM 25-3.

rill Instructors School. NCOC. and PLC

I FM 21-3, and FM 17-19E 1/2 I 'raining Functions aggregates more advanced individual and collective tasks. Through BTMS workshops, trainers gain practical experience in the organization of unit training programs and assessment of unit training effectiveness. In view of the fact that the logical progression of functions becomes more abstract at the higher levels within the hierarchy, it has been necessary to focus upon the specific functions of the trainer in BTMS workshops. BTMS workshops allow trainem at every level of the organization to understand their role in the development of their individual skills, as well as their responsibilities as trainers to develop the full range of individual and collective tasks within the organization. Appreciation of the full range of management responsibilities and training tasks is essential so that units design their training programs in harmony with concomitant training programs being conducted at Basic and Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Courses (BNCOC) (ANCOC), and Initial Entry Training (IET), as well as at higher echelons within the tactical organization. The beauty of the system rests upon the hard logic made possible through the systems engineering approach as well as the significant increase in soldier proficiency currently being achieved in the institutional training base. Credit for the great changes in levels of soldier performance, which we have observed since the DePuy initiatives were implemented, must go to the far-sighted architects of the system, who were bold enough to borrow advanced training techniques from the civilian sector and apply them to army training. Suffice it to say that our soldiers today are achieving levels of proficiency on the MI tank that we had not dreamed possible on older and simpler weapons systems. Let us examine some of these changes as they apply to Career Management Field (CMF) 19 in the training base. Systems Engineered Armor IET In the summer of 1980, General Donn A. Starry directed that the Armor Center revise its program of instruction in order to eliminate sea+ specisc training that produced a separate MOS for the tank driver. Moreover, General Starry directed the Armor Center to system engineer all courses of instruction, including CMF 19K (Ml) as well as existing IET courses. The Deputy Commanding General of the Armor Center charged the commander of the 1st Training Brigade with the responsibility to act as course manager for IET in CMF 19 and to initiate ISD of the new courses in cooperation with the Directmate of Training Developments. A task force composed of officers and noncommissioned officers with firsthand experience in conducting of IET was formed within the 1st Brigade. The task force operated directly under brigade S3 and augmented the efforts of the training developers of the new courses of instruction. The Deputy Assistant Commandant for Educational Technology provided advice to 44 the course manager, and members of the task force attended the Staff and Faculty Development Course to prepare for their new responsibilities in the development of course materials. The objectives of the training development effort were to transform the courses of instruction using criterion-referenced instruction that was performance oriented as well as interactive, a technique that forces the student to demonstrate mastery of skills and knowledge during the block of instruction. These educational techniques demand that the soldier pre vide undivided attention throughout each block of instruction and they require him to perform the task at the completion of the training. This serves to assess the effectiveness of the trainer as well as soldier performance during training. Inswtence upon performanceorient-ed training meant elimination of the former lecture techniques and required that each student be allowed the opportunity to demonstrate his performance of the task being taught. Consequently, the task force recognized that the new programs of instruction would entail higher start up costs in terms of instruction sup port equipment. In order to compensate for the anticipated higher costs, the develop ers simultaneously worked to identify cost-saving approaches whenever possible in the developmental effort. Specific approaches employed to reduce costs included selection of local training areas and closein training facilities whenever possible to hold down fuel costa as well as the wear and tear on equipment in the movement to distant training locations. Numerous subjects that were formerly taught were identified as being unnecessary because they did not contribute to a speafic task identified in the h n t e n d analysis. Convoy driving, training with the M16, and firing Table VIIC were expensive to conduct and contributed no skill required by individual tankers at Skill Level 1. Consequently, major savings were achieved by the elimination of training activities that did not contribute to the skills required to prepare the soldier to achieve MOS mastery. This decision caused some misgivings because trainers had achieved considerable skill in conducting the excluded classes. Additional approaches to achieve cost savings through the employment of simulation devices were identified during the developmental process. Inasmuch as the new systems were coming on line during a period in which simulation technology was available through simultaneous d e velopment efforts at the Army Training Support Center (ATSC) and Mate riel Development and Readiness Command, @ARCOM), the training developers at the Armor Center i n k grated plans for acquisition of driving and conduchf-tire simulation devices, and improved driving courses to achieve increased opportunities for operator performance and the capacity to expand training si@cantly during mobilization. The sequence of individual instrue tion was designed to ensure that basic skills were mastered before progressing to more complex individual skills and crew duties. Test plans and test instruments were produced before individual lesson plans were prepared to ensure the methodology of instruction was consistent with expectations of soldier performance during testing. Classes were piloted with small groups before commencing trial instructional cycles to identify weaknesses and to perfect each block of instruction. The new courses of instruction for 19K, 19E, and 19D are now being taught. Advantages identified by the trainers include harmony between SQT requirements and ET. Trainers now teach each block of instruction in accordance with evaluation test requirements for end-ofcourse comprehensive tests, which reduces the demands upon the drill sergeants to conduct reinforcement training. Soldiers receive comprehensive instruction that is designed to prepare the individual to master each of the crew duties associated with each position in the tank. Television tapes have been produced that allow an increase in standardization of instruction and ensure that interactive techniques are effectively presented to the soldier. Further incrmes in soldier performance and cost savings are anticipated as simulation devices now in production become available to reinforce the training programs, Finally, the production of a systematically designed program of instruction allows us to anticipate resource requirements and harness our instructional efforts to the resources allocation programs of the Army that are not geared to support programs that have not been developed by ISD. The Army Modernization Information Memorandum (AMIM), Modernization Resource Information Submission (MRIS) and TRADOC Review of Manpower (TRM) processes constitute little burden in additional staff work once the ISD tools have been employed. On the contrary, these Army resource allocation tools are designed to program recognized requirements that have been approved in the rmurce annexes of the TRfiDOC course of instruction. The greatest return for our investment in training development, however, cannot be measured in dollars and cents. Soldiers who are subjected to “hurry up and wait” as well as instruction that cannot be clearly justified in terms of eventual jobsite performance become cynical and question the direction of the “green machine.” Conversely, soldiers who are worked hard to master meaningful requirements that challenge them mentally and physically at each block of instruction gain a profound respect for the order and disciplined environment in which they are trained. Upon my arrival in June 1980 in the 1st Training Brigade, 28 percent of our soldiers in training posseased a high school diploma. Today 90 percent of our active component soldiers are high school graduates. We hear no complaints today from soldiers regardless of their level of civilian education. Each man works hard and is required to master tough training that is rele vant to effective MOS performance. A by-product of the rationalization of CMF 19 instruction is a marked increase in the level of soldier discipline. The individual soldier accepts his instruction and is prepared to perform in accordance with the standards demanded. In the operation of complex weapons systems such as the MI tank, it is vitally important’ that soldiers faithfully perform their sequential checks for putting the equipment into operation in order to preclude damage to the equipment. In the past we have experienced great difficulty with the operation of systems such as the M60A2 tank, the M551 reconnaissance vehicle, and even simpler equip ment such as the M151 %-ton truck, because soldiers were not sufficiently disciplined to operate the equipment in accordance with directed startup and shutdown procedures. The indiscipline of the operators resulted in burned-out radios and destroyed electrical components. The disciplined approach to training, which the ISD approach provides, has resulted in a much higher level of soldier confidence and discipline that has drastically reduced equipment failures. Trainers and testers at the Armor Center also recognize the magnitude of the change that has taken place in JET. They are enthusiastic about the changes because they mgnize the consistency and discipline which has been achieved. Moreover, these instrue tors are acquiring afar more sophisticated mastery of items of equipment upon which they work as a result of the detailed instructional materials provided for their use in training. Comments from the field concerning the quality of our recent graduates attests to the validity of the new training methodology.

COLONEL ANDREW P.

QMEARA, JR, was commissioned in Armor in 1959 from USMA. He has served in various capacities in Vietnam, Germany and CONUS and commanded the 147th Armor, Fort Hood, TX. He is a graduate of the U. S. Army War College and from 1980 to 1983 was commander, 1st AIT/ OSUT Brigade at Fort Knox, KY. He is currently assigned as president of the U. S. Army Training Board, Fort Eustis. VA. novernber-decernber 1983 45

Dunn-Kempf Is Still a Valuable Tmining Aid One of the most versatile, and overlooked training aids available to the armor unit leadertoday is the Dunn-Kempf wargame. It was invented by two army officers interested in using military miniatures to improve training skills. The Dunn-Kempf wargame employs realistic U. S. and Threat miniature vehicles on representative terrain to simulate armored combat between a Threat reinforced tank battalion and a U. S. tanvmechanized team (or armored cavalry troop). There are many advan-to this type of simulation. TheonlyresourcesrequiredtouseDunn-Kempfarethetime of the personnel involved and the space to lay out the game, approximately 10 feet by 15 feet. The game itself can be set up anywhere from a unit day room to a general purpose medium tent. Leaders are given the opportunity to make tactical decisions while confronted with realistically portrayed and sized Threat units. Good decisions are reinforced by success (attrition of the enemy). Incorrect ones are underscored by the destruction of fiendly forces. Combined arms training is emphasized and leaders can enhance their map association skills. The only limiting factors are the imagination and innovative skills of the armor leader. As with all forms of training, proper prior planning, vigorous execution, and reflective critique are essential elements for success. The following ideas are designed to supplement the instructional manual provided as well as the initiative of the players themselves. In determining what scenario to play, examine the wartime mission of your unit (if you are stationed o v m ) and/or a recent Army Training Evaluation Program (ARTEP) to determine what missions require additional emphasis. Armored cavalry units would probably choose some variation of the covering force battle, while armor units might decide to emphasize defensive actions at the company team level. If this is the first time your unit has used Dunn-Kempf, it is best to keep the mission uncomplicated. Once the scenario is determined, decide who will participate. Physical space around the playing board will pmba-bly limit participation to the unit commander, executive officer (XO), platoon leader, platoon sergeants and section sergeants, and the mortar section leader. If your unit habitr ually crowattaches with the same infantry unit, invite thosemechanized platoon leaders and platoon sergeants to take part. Other worthwhile participants might include a fire support team and an engineer squad leader if you are assigned one. The f h t few sessions with Dunn-Kempf should “train the trainer.” Now that you know who will play the U. S. side, it’s time to visit your battalion or squadron S2 and get him involved as the Threat player. Realism will be enhanced by using radio comunications. Establish a communication net by using any PRC-77 radios borrowed from cavalry scouts or the combat support company commander, and equip everyone with combat vehicle crewman helmets, or the H-l61/ U headsets used for tank gunnery training. One communication net should be established for each platoon, one for fire support, and one for the troop or company command net. To give participants a feel for the problems inherent in monitoring a platoon net as well as a unit command net, position an AN/GRA39 remote unit centrally located for use as the unit command net. muire your troop or company command post (CP) to set up in the motor pool complete with maps, and monitor the battle by radio. The XO can either play as the acting unit commander in the CP (using the “fall+ut one” concept), or can serve as your battle deputy in a location near the terrain board. If you require players to render spot reports to the unit CP, and connect the CP by radio to a participating battalion or sqaudron S2 cell located nearby, you can verify the accuracy of the tactical picture painted by your unit’s spot reports and passed on by your CP to the next higher headquarters. This simple procedure will graphically illustrate whether or not your unit provides the battalion or squadron commander with information he needs to fight his unit. Before conducting the game, gather your subordinates around the playing board and check their terrain association skills. Can 0 They associate map graphics to the playing board and locate phase lines, target reference pointa, lines of departure, etc.? 0 They determine the maximum effective ranges of their weapons systems and relate them to the board? 0 Leaders correctly draw section or platoon fire plans? Once players have examined the rules, demonstrate on the terrain board how to move and engage targets. Ensure they can recognize terrain advantage5 and are familiar with any special rules you want to employ, such as how to conduct armored ambushes or simulate vehicle hide positions. And to make life particularly interesting, consider playing all or part of a game in chemical protective clothing. The loss of efficiency displayed by all players will be revealing. Before you begin, don’t miss the chance to practice troop leading procedures. Issue a warning order to your subordinates before you give the detailed operations order (OPORD), then give them time to conduct a leader’s reconnaissance of the battlefield as well as issue their OPORD to their soldiers. This will allow you to evaluate their proficiency as leaders as well as the thoroughness of your own

OPORD.

If your local Training Aids Support Center is the energetic and cooperative type, you can enlist their help in producing terrain boards that represent your local maneuver areas or general defense plan positions. Conducting the simulation on representative terrain boards before you expend fuel and blank ammunition is a tremendous way to maximize training value from field maneuvers. The best role for the troop or company commander to assume is that of umpire and trainer. As the senior leader present, he is best suited to arbitrate conflicts and keep a handle on the natural competitive spirit that might scuttle the training value if not controlled. If play gets out of hand, he can stop the action, redirect the scenario and continue the war. (A slight digression: Many people are frightened by the size of the Dunn-Kempf rule book. The CO, as umpire, can simplify or modify the rules, as required. Remember, simulation rules are a guide, not an absolute law.) Finally, he can keep play moving swiftly, halting only to reinforce a 46 lint re 01 mwwutxu 4 t hers. The possib resourcefulness situations are e by turning off SI warfare can IXX chemical clothh talions from unt to the test. (Insie not U. S. tactics. onstrated, will 1 lessly advances tothosetactics-Play should commander an( the spot report: compare what 1 reports, with wl As stated earl events or subtli value. Did iiier prematurely en1 battalion, or dic kill zone? Was were too many cles? can sub smoke to isolate 1UuUW-OIl IILIZLX

H W UIC: u m b h battle? The teaching points are endless. Successful tae tics and good initiative are reinforced by the destruction of enemy vehicles; the opposite can be illustrated by iiiendly casualties. Once the din of battle has subsided it is time for constructive criticism. A tremendous benefit can be obtained from a thorough critique. The final question to be asked is whether or not the unit accomplished its mission. In examining that question, each platoon leader should explain his concept of the operation gleaned from the unit OPORD and relate it to what

.zL w-11116.

au-wuI.- Y'6Lc-c"" needed for some outstanding and interesting training is some old-fashioned armor leader ingenuity. The overall benefit will be to better prepare the unit to execute its mission during ARTEP exercises in the intense and realistic environment of the National Training Center, or in the ultimate test of combat.

HENRYS.

Captain, Armor Headquartem, USAREUR Five-Point Platoon Training Program The new lieutenant graduating from his branch basic course and arriving in his new company finds all too often the platoon he has been assigned is not proficient in the basic fundamentals necessary to perform its combat mission. And while many fadors go into preparing a platoon for combat, the basic resour-, especially equipment and men, necessary for developing an efficient, well-trained, unit are present. It is the lieutenant's responsibility, as the leader and a8 a trainer, to ensure his platoon is prepared to perform its mission in a capable manner. To properly train his men is a difficult task for the platoon leader for, in many cas-, little scheduled training time is allotted to him solely for his use to train specific tasks. Add to this the distractions of maintenance, post support activities, taskings from higher headquarters, details for the first sergeant, and equipment and personnel shortages, and the result is a severe restriction on time, equipment and men. Thus, it becomes evident the platoon leader must carefully plan his training to take advantage of the resources he has available and to make maximum use of every opportunity for training. A platoon leader should use a fivepoint training plan to maximize his efficiency as follows: Standardize To begin, the platoon leader should attempt to s e d ize as many procedures and actions as possible. Standing operating procedures (SOPS) reduce confusion and hesitation thereby allowing the platoon to react quickly and effectively to changing requirements. By reducing the platoon's response time and assisting in coordinating ita actions, SOPs enhance the combat power of the unit.

novemberdecember 1983 47

When formulating platoon SOPS, it is imperative that they be clear and concise to ensure understanding by all members of the platoon. Wherever possible, emphasis should be placed on making the majority of the unit’s actions repetitive for each SOP rather than having a spe cialized plan for every scenario. Platoon SOPs should be developed as a group in order to draw on the experience of the noncommissioned officers. They possess much broader backgrounds and sources of knowledge than the young lieutenant. This expertise needs to be incorporated into every platoon plan. During this, and all other training, consult the platoon sergeant and listen to his advice. Additionally, ensure that platoon plans and procedures conform to higher level SOPs and required reporta to ease reporting procedures. This will allow section leaders to know when reports are due to the platoon leader/sergeant and what information is required. Since reports will a u b matically be compiled and forwarded up the chain of command, valuable time will be saved which might otherwise be wasted in collecting needed information. Once the draft SOPS are hished, conduct a terrain board exercise with the platoon, or use sand tables to teat these plans. During this phase, modify SOPs as necessary and develop any new ones as needed. Finally, compile all SOPs into a booklet to be carried by all members of the platoon. Periodically review and update these plans and ensure all new members of the platoon b m e familiar with them. Practice Crew Teamwork Next, the platoon needs to practice crew drills by using SOPs that are deaigned for specific actions that crews may be forced to undertake during combat situations. Abandoning a tank, engaging targets, and decontaminating a vehicle are examples of actions requiring the crew to act in a coordinated effort. Many are everyday eventa or are practiced during speciiic training. Others may be practiced in the motor pool or any time the crew is on the vehicle. These drills need to be done on a recurring basis to maintain crew proficiency as individuals change positions and new members join the platoon. Use skill qualification test (SBT) results and job books on individuals along with leadership observations of the mew to idenhfy crew weaknesses and plan your trainingto strengthen them. Getting personnel to work together as a crew is the key building block in the process of developing the platoon. Develop Subordinates Concurrent with practicing individual and crew tasb, the platoon leader must develop his subordinate leaders. The platoon leader cannot run the entire platoon himself and must use his noncommissioned officers to achieve maximum efficiency. The designated chain of command needs to be exercised and made to work within the platoon. Many leaders are hesitant to let their Subordinates run the platoon field exercises due to pressure h m above to perform well. The platoon, however, must be able to function in the absence of the platoon leader or platoon sergeant. With the introduction of Multiple Integrated h e r Engagement System (MILES), the possibility of the platoon leader being removed from the play of a problem b m e s much more likely. Therefore, subordinate leaders have to be allowed to practice running the unit in afield situation where they can gain experience and be critiqued In line with having an established chain of command, the platoon leader must train subordinates to beproficient in kadership tasks. Among these should be spot reports, map reading, basic tactics, radio procedures and use of communications-electronics operation instructions (CEOI), and the use of artillery. The platoon leader must add any further skills depending on the unit’s mission and the level of experience. These sldus may be taught during NCO development classes and then built upon during field training. Additionally, encourage junior noncommissioned officers to enroll in army correspondence coursea that have been prepared to help them teach themselves leadership tasks. This will enhance their knowledge and proficiency while also earning them promotion points. Thus, subordinate leaders will possess the basic skills necessary to continue the platoon mission in the event the platoon leader becomes a casualty. Ex-the Platoon The next step in the training process is mastering selected platoon-level ARmP tasks. These actions require the platoon to function in a coordinated effort. Prime examples would be tactical movement, night refueVreload operations, distribution of fires, and breaching a minefield. SOPs, crew drills, and well-trained noncommissioned officers are merged together to provide the basis for effective platoon operations. An illustration would be a tank platoon’s occupation of an assembly area. The platoon should cross the release point in a traveling formation and pick up the platoon ground guide of the advance party without stopping. Certain actions should automatically occur while moving into individual vehicle positions. SOPs must provide vehicle order and identification signals thus allowing the ground guide to easily pick out his platoon. Also, tank commanders must know the general area their vehicle should be located in relation to the platoon leader’s tank. Vehicle sectors of responsibility should be provided to allow 360 degreea of observation and fire. Again, SOPs and crew drills must dictate actions once the vehicle is in position. Which crew member collecta camouflage, which member does basic vehicle main& nance, who monitors the radio and provides local security from the tank cupola and who runs communication wire to adjacent positions are basic items that must be decided. Further considerations are what reports need to be sent to the platoon leader/sergean% where the platoon leader will be locaw how the platoon will shut down all the engines at one time; how soon range cards must be made; and which vehicle crewmen will be used for dismounted securiw. The list goes on, but the idea is clear. Actions must automatically occur in a consistent pattern under the supervision of the platoon’s noncommissioned officers. The platoon occupiea the assembly area in a rapid, smooth fashion. The platoon leader is fke to look after his own vehicle, and coordinate with adjacent platoons and the company commander. He is able to react quickly to any mission changes. Platoon-level training is generally conducted durjng field training exercisea (nxs) or during combined arms livefire exercises (CALFEXs). FlXs provide the platoon leader the opportunity to identify platoon weaknesses. The platoon trains as a complete unit in a tactical environment and mistakes can be pointed out as they occur. This allows 48 novern ber-decernber 1983 the junior leaders to make immediate c o d o m. When a major teaching point needs to be made, such as maintaining vehicle dispersion, stop the platoon momentarily and use the radio to point out the problem. This tends to highlight a deficiency and reinforces the corredive action taken. Also, battle drills need to be practiced. Battle drills are specilic platoon actions that occur when enemy contact is made and the platoon must react immediately with a minimum of communication. An example of this type of drill would be platoon actions during an ambush. CALFEXs take platoon-level tasks a step further from the simulation provided by an FIX by incorporating actual firepower. Along with expanding the tasks a platoon may practice, CALFEXs are an excellent morale builder. Calls for fie, distribution of platoon fires, and coordinated activity with air support can be realistically practiced. Crews gain a better understanding of the total capabilities of their vehicle and the entire platoon. Along with this, weapon system limitations and the problems of operating in a livefire environment are made evident. Review the Results Unfortunately, many platoons immediately return to garrison aRer being in the field and do not conduct an after-action review of the lessons learned during the exercise. The platoon needs to regroup as soon as possible in a classroom environment and discuss the field training conducted. This is the time to refine SOPS, develop plans for improving crew and platoon weaknesses, and analyze the platoon tasks practiced. This prevents mistakes E-m recurring and contributes to the development of all members of the platoon. Ultimately, the platoon should evolve into an eflicient, smooth running organization The new lieutenant has a hard job preparing his Unit to perform properly. Many obstacles will hinder his efforts. However, he can draw upon the experience of his noncommissioned officers and other officers assigned to hie unit. Also, he has his own abilities and determination to complete the job. So, even while faced with a difficult task, training the platoon up to realistic standards is possible. And that is a major step in the ultimate mission of preparing the platoon to fight and survive in combat.

F’irst Lieutenant, h o r. FortStewart,GA Is AirLand Battle a Paper Tiger? The U. S. AirLand Battle doctrine depends on the ability to strike Warsaw Pact (WP) forces throughout the depth of the battlefield-E-m the line of contact rearward to their second echelon. This doctrine emphasizes a nonlinear defense because penetration is now possible through sophisticated weaponry and mobility, including nuclear and chemical weapons. The new doctrine expeds not only to blunt the initial momentum of WP spearheads, but at the same time to strike their follow-on forces with air and ground weapons. There is merit in the A i r h d Battle doctrine-if it can be curried out. WP soldiers are trained to stick to a battle plan and, admittedly, they have not yet proven to be very good at improvisation if that plan is disrupted. They depend largely upon their mass and momentum to overcome an opponent. Therefore, the probability exists that if US. forces can disrupt and fragment the first echelon of WP forces and if they can strike the follow-on forces with telling effect, they could win the battle. There are, however, holes in the A i r h d Battle plan. These holes and possible WP counters raise the following questions and considerations: 0 Can US. forces disrupt and fragment the WP k t echelon attack in order to provide the time and space for a “deep strike” into their follow-on forces? To do so will require reserves, a particular resource of which the US. forces in Europe are in short supply. In fact, if the WP forces intensify their firstechelon effort, thereby lessening the time and space between echelons, US. forces may have to use their “deep strike” force just to prevent the destruction of their main force in the main battle area (MBA).

Can the U. S. commander in Europe position a “deep strike” force to hit the WP second echelon? To do 80, the “deep strike” force must be extremely fast and capable of violent, destructive combat to counter elements that it cannot bypass. The “deep strike’’ force must have reliable communications, must cover long distances and arrive at the WP secondechelon area in a strong enough condition to perform its mission of destruction. It must never be forgotten that WP follow-on forces will be moving continuously, like a relentless tide, which will complicate the US. “deep strike” force’s targeting and intelligence collecting efforts. The second echelon will not be stationary and can hinder the “deep strike” forces progress with conventional weapons, and with nuclear and chemical weapons if required. Additionally, the WP second echelon forces can create physical obstacles in the path of the US. “deep strike” force and with ita excellent electronic counter measure capabilities can disrupt the “deep trike” force’s vening WP formations can make the “deep strike” force expend large amounts of fuel and ammunition by forcing it to fight every meter of the way to the secondechelon environment. These same forces can block the resupply of the “deep strike” force so that it quickly b m e s a toothless tiger. WP leaders are admittedly sometimes slow to learn, but what they do learn they learn well-and they never forget. They know all about intelligence gathering and they will know exactly where the US. “deep strike” force is at any given time and what it is doing. WP agents, ground and an reconnaissance, and space surveillance satellites will tell them. Moreover, they may well adopt the US. policy of “aggressive delay” in countering “deep strike” forces. Among these delay tactics will undoubtedly be special armored soyedineniye (light., mobile and essentially antiarmor task forces) to nibble away at the flanks of the “deep strike” force, much as the Cossacks of old harassed the flanks of Napoleon’s armies. Masses of WP artillery will hit at the “deep strike” force and WP commanders may well designate special rear area combat soyedine-command, control, and communications (C 3 ). Also, internovember-december 1983 49 myes (armored forces) to slug it out, t,oet-h, with the unsupported “deep strike” force. These measures will ensure that the “deep strike” force will not be able to divert the WP’s second echelon from its task of moving through its firstechelon forces and rolling over the MBA. Can the US. deliver a successful deep attack by other than ground forces? WP forces hold no monopoly on air tactics, and some air and missile attacks will get through. No one can maintain continuous or 100 percent air superiority and knock down every plane and missile, but WP planners continue to emphasize the destruction of US. air fields and nuclear delivery means to degrade that capability. Even so, US. air and missile strikes can destroy large concentrated forces and fixed combat service support (CSS) facilities. Therefore, WP planners will not present such large targets. Combat forces above battalion level will be dispersed, and CSS facilities will be dispersed and kept in motion as much as possible. Can such a “deep strike” force be resupplied? Aa stated, it will be incumbent upon the WP forces to make that “deep strike” force expend its combat supplies on its way to the WP second echelon. Conventional and unconventional resources will be used to destroy or disrupt US. support activities in its own rear areas or in transit to the forward elements. The US. commander may well find it extremely difficult to resupply his “deep strike’’ force, let alone his MBA forces, because of the tonnage involved and the ubiquity of the in-depth WP air defense systems. The toal U. S. force CSS structure may be considered a shaky leg upon which to stand because much of it will consist of reserve components who must be fuuy operational in Europe within days or even hours after the opening shots have been fired. WP planners have undoubtedly taken all this into consideration and, even if the Reserve Component CSS forces arrive in Europe unscathed, they must still face formidable challenges. Even though some of their units periodically deploy and train at their wartime operational sites, most are not sufficiently familiar with their operational areas in Europe, not with the personnel with whom they must work under wartime conditions to be fully effective for some time after arrival. Can the US. even sustain its already deployed force in Europe in the face of ground attacks direded against our CSS facilities? Western military forces will face a formidable threat in the form of Soviet Operational Maneuver Groups (OMG) that operate much as do the U. S. “deep strike” force. WP planners have used these OM& from battalion to corps level in their maneuvers. Such forces will advance on multiple routes and will seek to destroy or render ineffective the US. nuclear weapons and facilities, command and control points, communications centers, and CSS assets, some of which in Western Europe are conveniently sited for such attacks. If the WP version of the “deep strike” is successful, the US. support of the MBA will be tenuous, for not only will the OMGs attack US. support forces and facilities, they will sow confusion, disorder and panic in our rear areas. WP political leaders believe that in view of world opinion and its propaganda value, the US. forces should be the first to use NBC weapons if they are employed. With nuclear parity, there is no clear theater strategic advantage to WP “first use” given their numerical superiority in conventional forces. That would put the onus for “first use” squarely on the shoulders of the US. commanders. However, WP forces are better trained and otherwise pre pared to use NBC weapons. WF’ attacks then, will be vie lent, launched with surprise, and pushed forward rapidly with the first echelons closing so fast that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would endanger U. S. forces as much as WP forces. Since US. planners visualize a nonlinear battlefield in which opposing forces will be intermingled, the use of NBC weapons can only be to the advantage of the numerically superior force. An American officer laid out the tasks of the American corps commanders in the AirLand Battle. He says that the commander must: Provide subordinate force commanders the forces to accomplish their missions in the covering force and MBA. 0 Prevent or delay the employment of enemy follow-on forces sufficiently to allow fiendly forces in contact to maintain the forward defense. 0 Unhinge or disrupt the integrity of the enemy’s operational scheme sufficiently to seize the initative, go on the offensive, and force the enemy to ground, or destroy him. The officer’s ideas are basically sound. In question, however, is the ability of the US. forces to execute those ideas. There should have been a fourth task listed in the officer’s article-that of fighting the rear area battle. US. military and paramilitary publications estimate that there are some 20,000 pnSoviet agents and provocateurs in Western Europe. Add to that the WPs OMGs and it is easy to see the US. rear areas will be subject to constant enemy attack. Support echelon troops will be so busy protecting themselves they will be barely able to perform their primary missions. Indeed the main focus of enemy efforts may well be located deep in the U. S. rear area. Therefore, can the US. realistically conduct the AirLand Battle? Can we make good our “shield of blows?” Can a hive of bees keep the bear out of the honey? The fast, mobile bee, even in swarms, rarely does so. The bear usually wins.

ROBERT T. SAUNDERS, JR.

Fort Lee, VA. RecognRlon Quiz Answers

1. Bn-60 (USSR). This 8x8-wheeled APC is armed with a 14.5-mm heavy machinegun and a 7.62-mrn Coaxial machinegun. It has a 2-man crew and carries 8 passengers. Its maximum road speed is 80 kdhrand its maximum road range is 500 km.

2. BRDM-2 (USSR). This 4xCwheeled amphibious reconnaissance vehicle is manned by a crew of 4. It is armed with a 14.5-mm heavy machinegun and a 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun. Variants include the SA-9, the AT-5, the AT-3 and 2 and the Rkh models.

3. Gm-69 (USSR). This4xCwheeled half-ton truck is as a prime mover for small antitank guns, rocket launchers and for personnel. Its maximum road speed is 90 km/hr and it has a road range of 530 km.

4. UAZ-4696 (USSR) This 4x4-wheeled half-ton truck is the replacement for the GAZ-69. It was introduced in 1973 and has a maximum road speed of 100 km/hr and a maximum road range of 700 km.

5. YP-408 (Neth). This APC was introduced in 1964 and is armed only with a 12.7-mm machinegun. It has a Cman crew and carries 10 passengers. Its maximum road speed is 45 km/hr and its maximum road range is 230 km.

(CZECH). n i s 14.3 ton 8x&wheeld has a 2-man crew and carries 15 passengers. It is armed with a 14.5-mm heavy machinegun and a 7.62-mm coaxial machi-nWJn. It has a maximum road speed Qf 94.4 km/hr and a Prepared by Threat Branch, DCD, USAARMC, ft. Knox, KY. road range Of 710 km. 50 november-december 1983

The followii Varch-April 1s 3ut almost 98?a1 and A RMC ’mental activil Fradition. As u ‘mental Manni!heir activities 9th (

Lieutenant 1 regiment and relieving Lieui assumed comr

P. Stearns, wi ision as Chief Lieutenant the regiment 2 sium on St. Pa The Regime the Post Tour fighting in the light heavyweight class has won three bouts out of three by the knockout route. The season for Baseball is at hand and the familiar sounds of cracking bats and popping gloves are all around. We look forward to a splendid team and a successful season. First Segeant Charles E. Pearson, Headquarters and Service Troop, having completed the course of instruction prescribed for the Noncommissioned Officers’ Course, The Cavalry School, for the year 1937-38, was graduated February 24th. Due to Sergeant Pearson’s ability as a horseman he was selected to remain in the Noncommissioned Officers’ Advanced Equitation Class. From the progress being made in the remodeling of 3ur barracks, all indications point to a set of modern barracks by summer. a.

fifty points. P..

632d Armor First To Be Realigned in 4th ID “Thunderbolt” troops from the 6th Battalion, 32nd Armor will be the first 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) unit to be realigned under the Division ’86 plan with the creation of a fourth line company, said a recent article in THE MOUNTAINEER, the Fort Carson, CO newspaper. Under the realignment, the combat support company lost its scout and mortar platoons to headquarters and headquarters company. The number of M60 tanks in the three companies will be reduced to 13, and the spare tanks will go to the new D company. Town North Lions Club Honors Armor The Town North Lions Club, Dallas, TX, under the direction of its President, Ralph W. Widener, Jr., featured a salute to Armor on 17 October 1983 as part of its ongoing program of recognition of the contributions made by the many 8 “.,.a I I V V V I Y”yuY” \...’..”., Fort Knox. KY 2-70th Armor Faces Soviet A m rat Fort Stewart Men of Company A, 2-70th Armor Battalion, were impressed with their first sight of genuine Soviet armor vehicles during recent exercises at Ft. Stewart. “At first they didn’t know what it was. Then, when they recognized the Soviet armor, they’d go wild,” said First Lieutenant Cliff D. Stiles, battalion S-3 (Air) and chief controller of the exercise. “One thing the men pointed out to us after the exercise,” he said, ”was that we need to work more on vehicle identification. It‘s one thing to see a vehicle on the cards, and it’s another to actually see it, especially when it’s coming right at you.” Postal Registration

1. Date of Filing: 13 October 1983.

2. Title of Publication: ARMOR Magazine.

3. Frequency of Publication: Bimonthly,

4. Location of Known Office of Publication: U. S. Army Armor School, Bldg 2369, ATTN: ATSB-DOTD-MAG, Fort Knox, KY 40121.

5. Location of the Headquarters of the Publication:

U. S. Army Armor School, Bldg 2369, Fort Knox, KY 401 21

6. Publisher and Editor: Major Charles R. Steiner, Jr.,

U. S. Army Armor School, Bldg 4401, Fort Knox, KY 401 21.

BASIC MANUAL by C. L. Farrar and

D. W. Leeming. Pergamon Press, Inc., Elmsford. NY. $17.50. This is volume 10 in Brassey’s Battlefield Weapons Systems and Technology series and provides an overview of ballistics including interior, intermediate, exterior, terminal and wound ballistics. It provides the professional soldier with a background sufficient for good comprehension of the processes and problems involved in ballistics of all types. It is written in textbook fashion with self-test questions and answers. It is an excellent introduction to military ballistics. It is not a designer’s handbook but is highly recommended for soldiers and weapons designers.

Battelle Columbus Laboratories Columbus, OH

ERS DURING WORLD WAR II by Charles M. Baily. Arachon Books, the Shoestring Press, Hamden CT. 196 pages. $24.00. The story of the ill-fated tank destroyer force provides fascinating juxtapositions of personalities, doctrine, technology, and combat experience and Charles Baily brings them all together in this volume in a manner to please the historian, the armor buff, or the general reader. Tank destroying guns were first looked on as towed weapons, but combat proved the need for self-propelled guns that could maneuver to get flank shots at the heavy German tanks (Panthers and Tigers) met during the war‘s closing months. The book covers the bureaucratic battles that culminated in the demise of the tank destroyer concept in favor of the proponents of the main battle tank. Recommended for both professional and lay readers. ARMOR Staff Fort Knox. KY

CUSTER by George J. W. Urwin. Fair-leigh Dickinson Press. 1983. 308 pages. $27.50. Mr. Urwin’s book is based on the premise that a clue to Custer’s performance and death in the Indian Wars can be gleaned from his performance in the Civil War. The idea is great. The book is a total fai I ure. Documentation is impressive at first glance but is terribly flawed. Over 62 percent of all citations are from eulogies and other biased items collected by ME. Custer from 1876 to 1906. These items were originally and solely intended to glorify the deeds of her Beau Sabreur. The remaining citations are similarly flawed, or manipula-tively selected. This documentation problem leads to Mr. Urwin’s claims that Custer “beat“ General Robert E. Lee; that Custer did more than anyone else to win the Civil War; and that Custer “won” the battles of Gettysburg, The Wilderness, Cedar Creek, Five Forks and Appornattox. Of course, the Custer letters and Times told Mr. Urwin that this was so. Custer Victorious has no sense of scope. A supposed biography, most of it rehashes the campaigns where Custer was present. The author presents no analysis of Custer’s actions and Custer appears almost a passenger in a book out of control. Other flaws and errors abound. The message is simple... ignore this book.

Major. Armor USMA, West Point, NY COCKNEY, by Robert W. McCormick. Cottonwood Publishing Co., Worthington. OH. 219 pages, $22 ($15 paperback). ____ Cockney was the code name for the 696th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm SP howitzers on M-7 chassis), and this book is that unit’s history in W It. Dr. McCormick was a medic with the 696th and is now a professor emeritus at Ohio State University. The 696th was an independent battalion attached to a number of divisions, including the 4th Armored Division in the Saar offensive and later in the Ardennes. It was also attached to the 2d Armored Division in the advance to the Rhine River and finally to the Elbe River. The 696th derived from the New Jersey National Guard and was inducted into Federal service in 1941 as the 2d Battalion. 112th Field Artillery Regiment and became the 696th Field Artillery Battalion in 1943. Currently it is listed as the 4th Battalion, 112th Field Artillery, 50th Armored Division, NJARNG. The unit was originally horsedrawn and later truck-towed and in 1943 was reorganized as armored field artillery and was eventually mounted on the M-7 chassis. While these chassis, with their limited traverse, often called for frequent vehicle displacement to change fire direction, they provided the required mobility and only SP guns could maintain the momentum of armored warfare and the frequent changes of firing positions. Studying the operations of such armored artillery units is valuable in understanding the principles of the combined arms team that is today’s armor forces.

Associate Professor of History Ohio State University

1916 by David A. Armstrong. Greenwood Press, Westport, CT. 1983. 239 pages, illustrated $27.50. This small, well-written and researched volume examines the role of the machine gun in the U. S. Army from 1861 to 1916. Like so many revolutionary weapons, the machinegun was a victim of bureaucracy during its infancy and only the insistence of President Lincoln led to its use in the Union Armies during the Civil War. Neither artillery nor infantry nor cavalry officers could, or would, see a use for the new weapon in their ranks. Lincoln said it was “worth the attention of the government.” The book details use of the Gatling and other early versions of the machinegun during the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection and the attempts of Lieutenant John Henry Parker to gain military acceptance for the sophisticated weapon. Parker claimed that the machine gun represented “A massed fire in reserve,” and promulgated that theory to the Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth as early as 1897. Armstrong’s book also provides an informative discussion on the landmark reform program for the modernization of the American military system as initiated by Elihu Root, Secretary of War following the Spanish-American War. This volume, then, represents a thoroughly comprehensive study of the relationship of early military technology to the bureaucratic process and is an important work in understanding the development of one of the Army’s major infantry weapons systems.

Captain, Infantry Fort Shafter, HI 52 november-december 1983