Counterattack Planning

Counterattack Planning by Lieutenant Colonel Shewood E. Ash The new FM 1W5, Operations, is soon to be published. This manual emphasizes audacity and offensive action in defensive operations. Two up and one back-counterattack. Those old concepts are now (again) in vogue. But just how does a commander go about planning and conducting a counterattack? To find the answer you have to look in the obsolete FMs. But to save you the time fmm researching the old “bibles,” and to ease the transition to the “new” defensive doc trine, this article discusses counteratr tack rationale and planning techniques. First, let us look at some background on the counterattack followed by the planning considerations and, Gnally, let us look at a sample counterattack operations plan (OPLAN).

Throughout history, counterattack operations have had a significant effect on battle outcomes. And, while it is not the intent of this paper to analyze specific battles, it is instructive to give some examples. For instance, the battles of Cannae and Cowpens re sulted in victories for the counterattack form. In these two battles, the attacking m y struck and pushed back the defensive army. Then at the decisive moment, the defense counterattacked from the flanks, and muted the attacker. The tam defensive offensive (not used in current U. S. literature) describes the above battles. Ekom our own Civil War, the battle of Gettysburg also demonstrated the power of the counterattack. During the defense of the Union left flank at Little Round Top, the 20th Maine found itself low on ammunition and probably unable to beat back another charge. The commander decided on a counterattack as his only choice to prevent the flank from being turned. Only about 250 men participated in the counterattack, but it caught the Confederate Army completely by surprise; it was succe88fuL The 1920 war between Russia and Poland demonstrated yet another example of the counterattack. In this case, the Polish Army, which was numerically inferior to the Russians, conducted a strategic retrograde move ment west toward Warsaw. When the Poles had enough maneuver space, they consolidated their army and counterattacked around the Russian left flank into the rear. This attack so disrupted the Russians that they retreated. If the Poles had been stronger, this battle could have been another Cannae, with the attendant massive destruction of the loser. During November 1941, the British Eighth Army attacked Rommel in North Africa. In 40 days Rommel was pushed back 400 miles, but then the British attack lost its momentum. Rommel counterattacked and in turn pushed the British back 350 miles in 20 days. By now, Rome1 had stretched his supply lines so thin he had to stop. Besides illustrating the successful application of the counterattack, these examples also demonstrate the different situations where counterattacks have been used. Cannae and Cowpens were planned counterattacks, the attacker was deceived and fell into a trap. In the battles of Gettysburg and Warsaw the counterattacks were actually desperation typea where the alternative (attrition warfare) would have been disastrous to the defender. In Rommel’s case, he was an opportunist. He recognized the loss of Brib ish momentum and calculated this to be the time for a counterattack. Thus, he let the situation dictate the right moment. ““A counterattaek is the most decisive element of the defensive battle. It is the only naneuverthatcantakeadvan-tage of enemy vulnerabilities of the moment.” On the modern battlefield, a defensive battle can only be influenced by the commander’s uncommitted re serves. Lest this point be misunderstood, it is necessary to digress and briefly review the purposes of the defense. Generally an army defends during one of the following conditions: 0 The attacker has superior strength and has taken the initiative. 0 Key terrain must be held An economy of force is needed in one area to allow sufficient offensive power to be massed in another area. In short, the purpose of defense is to buy time until sufficient forces or other conditions (loss of attacker’s momentum) exist to conduct offensive operations. It follows, therefore, that only units with powerful reserves have the capability to influence a d e fensive battle to the extent that offensive activity is regained. Indeed, some of the great military thinkers of our time have stressed the importance of the reserve in their writing. Major General J. F. C. F’uller in his book Machine Warfare says: “There is yet one other point which battles between mechanized forceswill aaxntuate-name ly, the increasing value of a powerful reserve, because increased mobility carries with it power to surprise. As one of the great difli-culties in such operations will be to gauge the enemy’s intentions, unless strong reserves are kept in hand, it will be impossible to meet unexpected situations.” Additionally, Field Marshal General Rim von Leeb has the same opinion. This paragraph h m his book Defense published in 1943, prcb vides the modern reader with some practical concepts for using reserve forces: “The determination of the decisive ones does not depend only on the defender but also on the attacker, at least to the extent that the defender must take his opponent’s actions into account. Each attacker knows that against an organized defensive front, be it in a war of movement or a war of position, only an attack led with force and articulated in depth has any prospect of breaking through with its entire gravity. Strong and mobile reserves spare many womes to the commander of an operative defense. But he needs also increased, constant, and far-reaching reconnaissance and observation.” Now that we have seen some examples of counterattacks andestab lished the importance of a reserve, let us turn to the purposes of the counterattack. Generally, munMttacks fall into two categories-C-ain+riented and enemy-oriented. Terrain-oriented counterattacks could be undertaken to reat~re a position or reinforce a threatened defensive area as in “restore the F’EBA”; securing an objective could also be a purpose. Enemy-oriented counterattacks are employed to destroy the enemy in an area (such as a raid or tank sweep, or to create a trap for the enemy that can then be attacked either by fire (artillery, tac air, direct fire), or by fire and maneuver. november-december 1983 23 this would be the type of counterati level reserves, division or corps, are tack employed by fixing forces. Higher- .1 3 . -

L 1 1 - 1 F A counterattack is the most decisive element of the defensive battle. It is the only maneuver that can take advantage of enemy vulnerabilities of the moment. One of the purposes of the defense is to seize the initiative from the attacker by conducting offensive operations. Counterattacks satisfy this purpose. If counterattacks are so critical to the defense, when then is the opportune moment for this operation? Unfortunately, there are no pat solutions; it is entirely dependent upon the situation. Intelligence becomes a very vital key to the commander's timely decision. Successful counterattacks d e pend upon surprise and speed. The commander must consider his own power, the rate of the enemy advance, and the weight and location of enemy reserves. Then the commander must decide if he can cope with the penetration (or other vulnerability, such as an exposed gap or enemy loss of momentum) with his own reserves, or if he must hold and call for help. This decision is the most difficult Thus, it becomes the most critical of the d e fensive battle. Now that we have established a firm base for counterattack operations, just what are the considerations for planning this event? The planning factors that follow include the number of plans, organization of forces, counterattack type, time and location, unity of effort, and a contingency plan for failure (table 1). Plans. As a minimum, counterati tack plans are prepared to attack an assumed penetration on each principal enemy avenue of approach. As the intelligence of the enemy develops, other plans should be developed. Initial plans will probably conform only generally to the situation that actually develops. Therefore, the sue cess of the plan must not be based upon preselected areas into which the enemy must be canalized before being attacked, We must remember that the only certainty in battle is uncertainty itself. Forces. Defensive combat forces are organized into security or covering forces, fixing forces, and reserves. The covering force is a minimum force used to gain information, delay, die organize, divert, and weaken the attack in preparation for the counterattack. Some of these forces may remain as stay-behind-forces to further refine the intelligence already collected. The i k h g force uses a combination of holding ground, delay, and limited-objdve attacks to further weaken and canalize the enemy attack. Then, when an enemy vulnerability is apparent, or when the attack has been slowed, stopped, or has become disorganized,, the reserve is committed as a unit to destroy the enemy. Types. Counterattack types include the use of &-e, local reserves, or the reserves of higher headquarters. A counterattack by &-e can be employed in a killing zone or in an ambush. Local reserve counterattacks might be those employed by a brigade commander in a division area. Normally, 24 novernber-decem ber 1983 me a-ve CounwrawcK rorces m the overall conduct of defense. There fore, the most powerful and mobile elements in a defensive area are these higher level reserves. l'bning-htion. Obviously, the timing and location of the counterattack are important considerations of the plan. The counterattack may be against a flank, a seam, or a gap, or against the nose of a penetration. It may develop that the counterattack will have to be launched at night or under cover of other poor visibility. This will affect timing, amount of traffic control, and the effectiveness of combat support units such as air sup port and attack helicopters. Unity of effort. A counterattack plan must also provide for unity of effort. All forces must be oriented on the execution of the plan for it to be successful. Unity of effort can be established in one of the following ways: Designate a single higher commander. 0 Attach units in the area to the counterattack force. 0 Have the counterattack force conduct a passage of lines. Adjust boundaries. 0 Organize a special task force. Plan for failure. Finally, what ifthe plan, when executed, fails to achieve its objective? One of the dangers of this situation is a loss of depth, there by reducing the ability of the defending force to react to enemy initiatives. Commanders will have to decide whether to hold current positions and wait for reinforcements, to try again in another sector, or to conduct some sort of retrograde to regain time and space for reorganization, To communicate a counterattack plan to his subordinate units, the commander uses the operation overlay and OPLAN formats. The overlay requirements for the counterattack are the same as for a coordinated attack and should have, as a minimum, a line of departure, an objee tive, an attack position, a direction of attack and boundaries. Additionally, the overlay may have assembly areas, fire support coordination lines, phase lines, coordination points, and contact points. Figure 1 assumes an enemy pene tration on the avenue of approach in the 1st Brigade sector. ("hi3 may be one of several, because a plan should be made for each enemy avenue of approach).

Copy 1 of 30 copies HQ. 23d Armd Div Battleground, somewhere 01 0001 A Nov 19-

OPLAN 84-1 OA

Reference: Map, series .... Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ALFA Task Organization: 1 st Bde 3d Bde 1-91 Mech 1-95 Mech 1-1 0 Armor 1-1 1 Armor 1-1 3 Armor 1-1 4 Armor 1-1 5 Armor C/23d CAB (AHC) (OPCON) 2d Bde Div Trps 1-92 Mech 1-22 Cav 1-93 Mech 1-1 2 Armor D/23d CAB (AHC) (OPCON) 1-94 M s h + + + + + +

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation. (1) Maneuver. On order, 3d Bde passes through 1st Bde; conducts counterattack to secure OBJ ACE and prep to cont exploitation. 1 st Bde assists pass of 3d Bde. reorganizesdef posand preptofol3d Bde. 2d Bdefixesenemyfwd of FEBAto prev enemy forces from shifting toward O W ACE; Prep to spt exploitation of 3d Bde success. 1-22 Cav fol3d Bde and perform rear guard as 3d Bde cont exploitation; if counterattack fails, block and cover retrograde of 3d Bde through FEBA. (2) Fires: Pri of fires to 3d Bde. 2d Bde. 1 st Bde; 1-22 Cav; upon retrograde of 3d Bde, pri is to 3d Bde; 1-22 Cav. 2d Bde. on order PL SKINNER becomes

FSCL.

b. 1st Bde. (1) Assist pass of 3d Bde; 1-22 Cav. (2) Hold left shoulder of penetration. (3) After pass of 3d Bde; assume msn as Div Res and prep to fol 3d Bde (4) Reorg def after pass of 3d Bde and, if necessary. assist retrograde of 3d exploitation. Bde; 1-22 Cav.

c. 2d Bde. (1) Fix enemy fwd of FEBA. (2) Prevent enemy from shifting toward O W ACE. (3) Prep to atk and spt exploitation of 3d Bde.

d. 3d Bde. (1) Atk through 1st Bde and seize O W ACE. (2) Prep to cont exploitation to defeat enemy in zone.

e. Firesupport. + + + c 0 + + + + I c c + c (3) Field Artillery. 1-50 FA (1 55) DS 1 st Bde.

b. Organization for Combat. 1-51 FA (155) DS 2d Bd 1-52 FA (1 55) DS 3d Bd

1-53 FA (8“) GSR 1-50

+ + c + + f. Air Defense. (1) 1-440 ADA(-) GS; A/1-440 (Vulc) atch to 3d Bde when comm (2) Upon exec of this OPLAN, prot 3d Bde mov through LD. 23d CAB (-) GS pri for airlift to 3d Bde. (1) General: 23d Engrand 3d Bdecoord mobilityreqfroma88emblyareasto (2) Organization for Combat.

g. Aviation: I c c t + + t i. Engineer Support.

PL SKINNER.

23d Engr. A/23d Engr DS 1 st Bde. W23d Engr DS 2d Bde. C/23d Engr atch 3d Bde. D/23d Engr atch 3d Bde. E/23d Engr GS: pri to 3d Bde; 2d Bde. 510th Engr Bn GS: pri to mobility opns during exploitation.

j. Div Troops: 1-22 Cav. (1) Fol 3d Bde and conducts rear guard opns to O W ACE and for (2) Should counterattack fail to regain the initiative, cover retrograde of 3d exploitation. Bde and delay enemy to FEBA.

k. Reserve: 1 st Bde fol l -22 Cav to support exploitation.

1. Coordinating Instructions. + + + + + + + (4) Consider exec during night or limited visibility. To precluae any misundcdand-ings about this Counterattack plan, let us review its salient features. First, the 1 tack force is very strong and three armored and one mec )attalion, one attack heli-copL ~wlllIIany, two companies of divisional engineers, three artillery battalions and a Vulcan battery. (Table 2) Addbonay, wty or effort is provided by an initial passage of lines, then a boundary change. And finally, a plan is in plat & the force should the COI :k be unsuccessm (ngure 1). udds are this OPLAN won’t be executed as envisioned. But, as the actual location of the enemy attack becomes known, we can make the adjustments with confident SUmmaLJ Many readers will recognize that I have borrowed heavily from the old “Mobile Defense” in my example. It is a vahd tool actician and it deserves to be murrrx.ted. Indeed, the new FM 1W5 says “the commander may defend . . . by drawing the enemy deep into the area of operations and then striking him along his flanks and in his rear.” But the field manual shie type of defe t€?lTll. Gounman ningisaninte gral part of 3ive operations. Even though mOaern warfare has shown the defense to be “the stronger form” (Clausewitz), an army can only win battles with the defense; to win a war that S a m c LulLIJ lnust attack and acheve “the positive aim.”

LIEUTENANT COLONEL

SHERWOOD E. ASH was cornmis the Uni rrmor Trom California. n e IS a yrauuate of the AOAC. and C8GI i served in Vietnam I and CONUS in air cavalry troops, armorea cavalry regiments, and tank battalions. on Division mier UI- e of Evaluation and aranoatdization. USAARMS. :urreritiy II I I I r I

The term integrated battlefield was not new to the men of Alfa ?koop. The actions for chemical and nuclear attacks had long been drilled into them by extensive training. When they received the operations order (OPORD) for the troop’s participation in an Army Training Evaluation Program (ARTEP) exercise, they felt coddent that it was complete and gave them everything they needed to know. Nuclear and chemical attack, artillery, and close air sup port (CAS) were all covered in the order and in the unit standing operating procedures (SOP). There were few questions. The operation seemed to be progressing in an orderly manner the next morning except that inclement weather had slowed the tactical road march. The time to cross the line of departure (LD) would have to be moved back. Then, just as the troop entered the forward assembly area (AA), the platoons were blown right off the air by very intensive jamming. Every frequency and alternate assigned to the troop was so fiercely jammed that any radio communication was impossible. oral communications The platoon leaders did not panic, but moved smoothly into the AA using arm and flag signals. They dismounted to check with the adjacent platoons to ensure 36Odegrees of security and to coordinate fields of fire. Having so far done everything correctly, they proceeded to spend a h- trating and h i t l e s s hour trying to reestablish radio communication with the commander and within the platoons. It was about this time that everyone began to get the feeling that the fun and games were over, and that the rest of the ARTEP would be long and difficult. They were not diS€lppoint€!d. The troop commander maneuvered his platoons by going from one to another and giving them oral commands. The radio jamming continued all day. The courier system, as laid down in the unit SOP, never survived the departure from the AA. With all the elements on the move and no radio communication to tell each other their new positions, couriers sent out did not return until the jamming stopped and new locations were transmitted. Recognizing that to wait for instructions was to sit and do nothing, the platoon leaders used their own initiative to Leading a Platoon on t by Captain I struggle through their platoon missions alone and without support and, after great effort, reached the troop objective. The attack on the objective was a ragged, piecemeal &air that was surprisingly successful because the left and right platoons maneuvered to the flanks and rear of the enemy before attacking. Once on the objective, the platoons consolidated their assigned sections and reestablished the courier system. This story is true. . . . I know, because I was one of those unfortunate platoon leaders who had to struggle through that difficult and exasperating first day of that ARTEP. This experience taught me some necessary lessons about the integrated battlefield. The integrated battlefield encompasses all the difiklt factors that influence the modern battlefield using the broadest possible interpretation of “combined arms.” It includes the integration of infantry, armor, reconnaissance (cavalry), artillery, irregular forces, CAS, air defense artillery (ADA), and engineers; and always presents the threat of chemical, nuclear and, electronic warfare (E- all of which are affected by terrain and natural or manmade obstacles that impede traf€icability and obscure visibility. Basic Integration Let us begin with basics, the integration of infantry, armor, reconnaissance, and artillery into a single fighting force. The point was brought out by my former platoon sergeant who said to me, “Sir, I have been in armored battalions most of my Army career. Being in this unit (an armored cavalry squadron) has shown me for the fist time what scouts are supposed to do and how tankers are supposed to use them.” Generally, the M60 tank crewmen in career manage ment field 19E whom we receive in the squadron have had little experience with scouts or with infantry, except as members of an opposing force during field exercises. They feel that their tank is the world’s deadliest weapon and 26 november-decem ber 1983

; Integrated

W. Watts that ‘‘ground pounders” are only good for cannon fodder. (I suspect the infantry has a similar, though opposite, opinion.) but after they see how the scouts can be used to exploit the tank‘s strengths and protect its weaknesses, their opinions become more favorable. Once they see the value of scouts and/or infantry they want them for all future operations. It is possible for a platoon of infantry and a platoon of armor to work together as a well-drilled team. I have seen it. My troopers and I have done it. The experiences of armies in recent conflicts (especially the 1973 ArabIsraeli War) have rather graphically shown that any pure force will most likely be destroyed in a modern battlefield, while a combined arms force will be sue cessful. I had the opportunity to participate in two ARTEPs where the opposing force was a pure armored battalion. In both ARTEPs the squadron felt that not only did we beat the armored battalion, we embarrassed them. We also felt that they were at a terrible disadvantage because they had no infantry assets attached, while we had our scouts. Even the most ardent cavalry trooper among us knew it would have been a completely different ball game if they had had an infantry company attached. Combined arms operations are necessary for victory. An armor platoon leader must be able to caU an infantry platoon leader (and vice versa), or i5-e support team, and on some occasions, even reconnaissance elements for help if we are to use combined arms effectively. The Threat’s doctrine also includes combined arms operations. Therefore, platoon leaders and company or troop commanders must consider what infantry, armor, artillery, and reconnaissance forces are available to both the friendly and enemy forces when they are planning and executing any operation. They must also know how these forces are employed by both sides. SOP for Fire Support Field artillery is an important part of combined anm. Most of the time, indirect fire is only a radio call away. But someone has to make that call. The platoon will be in contact with the enemy and able to see the battlefield. The platoon Wiu, therefore, be best able to see where and how artillery needs to be employed. Since there is no artillery forward observer with an armor platoon, more ofin than not it is the platoon leader who must call for tire. The ANIVRC-12 radio enables him to preset the frequency necessary to call for tire and rapidly switch back to the platoon net when he is finished. No one else in the platoon, except the platoon sergeant, has this capability. This situation puts the platoon leader in a @ar, but all too familiar, dilemma. His platoon is in contact with the enemy and he must stay on the platoon net to maneuver it. At the same time, he must leave the net to get the iire support he needs. The solution to this problem requires that the platoon have an effective SOP and that all members of the platoon know how to use it. This was how we did it in my platoon: If the scouts were detected by the enemy and fired upon when they made contact, the tanks would s u p press with direct fire while the scouts determined the size, composition and location of the enemy. As we had several battle drills to cover various situations, I told the platoon what action I wanted taken. I then told the platoon sergeant (PSG) that I was leaving the net. He immediately took over to carry out my orders while I called in the spot report and the call for fire. As soon as possible, I would return to the platoon net and ask the PSG for a situation report (SITREP). This informed the platoon that I was back on the net and in controL The PSG’s SITREP informed me what had happened while I was off net so I could issue additional orders if necessary. The key parts of this procedure were handing off the platoon to the PSG while I left the net so that command and control would not be lost; alerting the platoon that I was back on the net by asking for a SITREP so that they would know who was in charge and that I would know what was going on; and having SOPS, battle drills, and well-trained NCOs who could run the show while I was off the net.

november-decem ber 1983 27

A platoon leader must often leave the platoon net for a multitude of reasons. Handingaff the platoon to the PSG and vice versa is identical no matter for what reason the platoon leader must leave the net. The Battlefield Is Three-dun ’ ensional The platoon integrated battlefield is threedun ensional and includes the skies above. In preparation for our exercises, our S3 was told there would be attack helicoptem training in our maneuver area and they would be moving generally west to east. The S3 checked his overlay and made a note in the OPORD that the helicopters were friendly to the attackers. We took it for granted that the helicopters were conducting a completely separate operation that would only affect the defenders, who would have to hide h m them. Well, nobody told the pilots that. While I was conducting a zone reconnaissance in bounding overwatch, a Cobra came up behind us. He set up on line with my tanks and started watching the valley. When my scouts reported everything clear, the tanks bounded up. When the tanks were set, the Cobra moved up, passed us, and disappeared into the trees. A few moments later he popped up, spun around to look at us, spun back around, and dropped back into the trees. My scout section leader radioed me that the Cobra was telling us all was clear ahead and to move up. We played bounding overwatch with that pilot all day. I also learned a lesson in humility and attention to detail from our fiends in the Air Force. Incorporating air boxes and other control meas-for air support had become meaningless map exercises for the platoon leaders, because they neither got aircraft nor their radio frequencies; nor were they able to mrdinate with the Air Force to show them where the air boxes were located. As a platoon ARTEP evaluator, I found that things had not changed. Listening in on the troop net, I learned that the other two platoons were stopped by a large enemy force they could not dislodge. After about onehalf hour, the commander called his platoon leaders to say that there were “fast movers” on the way. One of the newer platoon leaders who had not lost his enthusiasm had prepared some control measures for aircraft The commander called for the aircraft and directed them to the target area, using the lieutenant’s control measures, and 45 minutes later I heard that the objective was secured after we had received a proper lesson on CAS from four F4s and four A-10s. We cannot afford to ignore or forget the air space above the integrated battle field, and must always use it to our advantage. Air Defense But this third dimension holds menace as well as opportunities. Most of the soldiers I have observed realize that on the integrated battlefield, cover and concealment includes concealment from aerial observation and attack. Unfortunately, the .Xkaliber machineguns and small arms have been neglected as air defense weapons. The prevailing opinion is, “I don’t care what the book says. They move too fast for me to hit with my ‘Bty.”’ Sometimes, this may be true for high performance aircrafl, but it is certainly not true for helicopters. Appearanca can be deceiving. An aircraft may just look too fast when, in reality, you are able to track, lead and hit it. Our kaserne was a favorite practice target for many NATO air forcee, so we were buzzed quite often by high performance aircraft. The first and sometimes second aircraft usually surprised us, but they established the direction the aircraft were using for their approach. So, when the third aircraft made its run, we were ready for it and our gum were already aimed at the air space where we knew it was going to fly. 28 novernber-decernber 1983

If you scare off enemy aircraft so that you can continue your mission, that is just as good as shooting them down. Modem air defense weapons have forced helicopters down close to the ground and low altitude flying has slowed their operations. This presents many opportunities for organic weapons to be used in air defense in such incidents as this one recounted by a tank platoon leader. An OPFOR scout helicopter was trying to find his platoon hidden under the trees. The pilot had been given the platoon’s position by the umpires, so he knew they were there. He kept getting closer and closer, and lower and lower. When the pilot finally found the platoon he was hovering 10 feet off the ground only 200 meters from the platoon, which surrounded him on three sides. The umpires ruled he had been shot down without having time to radio the platoon’s position. On a battlefield where both aircraft and ground forces are using terrain for maximum cover and concealment, closerange engagements will be common and the ground forces may well have the advantage. Another experience was related to me concerning air A platoon leader was setting his platoon into a bati tle position when a self-propelled Vulcan came up to him. The track commander/gunner hopped off his Vdcun, trotted over to the platoon leader and said, “Hello sir! I’m attached to your platoon. Where do you want me?” Suddenly, air defense had become another factor for the platoon leader to consider on the ink grated battlefield. Vulcun and C h a p a d platoon leadem will o h have their platoons spread out over a large area, possibly even split into sections for greater coverage. A tactical plan that does not integrate air defense is no good. The platoon defense: leader nearest to the air defense unit may have to do some of that integration. Using Engineer Support Engineers also have a habit of coming out of nowhere. One track commander told me that while he was on an observation post, expecting to see the enemy at any moment, a track appeared, going like a bat out of hell, and towing a l’/zton trailer. When it got close enough he stopped it and challenged its commander. It was an engineer squad attached to the troop that had been forward emplacing obstacles when they spotted an advancing enemy force. Engineers will be up front with the platoons, either clearing obstacles for the attack or putting them in for the defense. For this reason company, troop, and team commanders will often attach them to the nearest platoon 80 the engineers will have a tiein with the platoon’s parent unit. These attachments are also made so that the commander can be sure, through his platoon leader, that the engineers accomplish the right things at the right places. From the other point of view, there are few things more depressing than to see a well-trained enemy engineer unit go through an obstacle in 15 minutes that took your platoon,l hour to set up. The enemy knows how to use his engineers. Do you? Operating During Poor Visibility Two factors that will influence the integrated battlefield are 80 obvious that most of us forget to consider them. They are poor visibility and weather. Our night vision devices, no matter how good, will never turn night into day. These devices don’t provide the depth perception, peripheral vision, detail, and confidence that daylight vision gives you. These shortcomings produce an novernber-decernber 1983 29 adverse psychological effect. At night, we relax security, slow down, or cancel activity, and sleep. Unfortunately, troops will continue this behavior in the field-in training or in war-unless steps are taken to remedy this weakness in our operations. At night I have found I have to w o w about the entire crews of two or three vehicles going to sleep rather than two or three individuals in the platoon as in the day. Our confidence decreases as darkness closes in and our lmowledge of our surroundings is limited to a device’s narrow beam. Once, while conducting a night attack, my scouta (who were leading) could not determine where they were or how to get to the objective. I thought I knew where we were and the way to the objective, but due to the uncertainty and confusion we were all feeling, I put the platoon into a defensive position and left to reconnoiter the area and the route. It turned out that I was right, but we lost about 2 hours because I had lacked the confidence to take the platoon with me. Operations at night take on a wholly Merent character. Like a blind man who relies much more on his hearing, I rely much more on my radio at night to tell me where my people are and what they are doing since I cannot see them. In daylight, I usually look at the map only when I need a coordinate, or once every kilometer to check my location. Mostly I keep my eyes on the terrain and on my troops. At night, I stay inside the track with a flashlight, huddled over my map, popping up only every 15 minutes to examine the terrain to find out which grid square I am in. Generally, I act like a person playing chess by tele phone. Other platoon leaders have related similar expe riences to me. Remember that these problems affect the enemy as well. If our doctrine, training, and equipment gives us the edge in fighting at night or during periods of poor visibility, we must exploit this advantage with night operations. ueing Inclement weather Weather has many similar effects. It tends to degrade the leader’s vision and mobility, and has an adverse effect on the spirit of his soldiers-they will want to stay where it is dry and warm. One of my former commanders liked bad weather because it had these effeds on the opposing forces. He warned us that if the weather turned bad, he was going to attack. True to his word, when a damp, cold fog rolled in and cut visibility to less than 100 meters, we attacked. During the previous day’s reconnaissance I had found a rough but passable way into an isolated valley that let out just behind the enemy’s rear. The squadron commander told me to take this route and then continue to penetrate into their rear. I would then face about and set up in a defensive position near the suspeded location of a bridge that the enemy must cross while withdrawing. The other platoons (and troops) would be pushing them toward us. We were able to do all this without being deteded because of the reduced visibility. All the enemy units were caught completely by surprise. The platoon destroyed a tank company before the umpires stopped the play so the enemy battalion could get across the bridge and set up a new defense. EWCountermeasurea Let us not forget the lesson of EW. We have already seen some of the havoc it can cause through radio jamming. Offensive EW remains largely with the Signal Corps and Military Intelligence and will seldom be seen at the platoon or company level. There are, however, a variety of defensive measures you can take. 30

ARMUR

novernber-decernber 1983 Using the procedures and codes we already have will go a long way to protecting us from offensive EW. OPORDs, whether written or oral are going to be rare gems on the fluid, integrated battlefield. Therefore, ensure that if you issue or receive one, that it has all the instructions necessary so that all the units involved can completely accomplish their missions in a awrdinated fashion without once using the radio. For example, control measures could be timed; do not rely on the radio if a unit gets ahead or behind. “All elementa will hold at PHASE LINE BLUE until 1030. No one will cross before that.” Coordinate an assault, using time. “All units will assault OEiJECllVE LUCIFER at 1230.” Use pyrotechnics. “Assault OBJECTIVE LUCIFER when you see purple smoke.” Couriers and wire communications can be made SOP and very effective if the situation is right. Hand and arms signals are also effective and cannot be emphasized enough in platoons. When I first joined my platoon they wondered if there was something wrong with me because I was always waving my arms around. Nine months later I watched with great pride as the platoon moved for an hour and a half in bounding overwatch without once using the radio. They used hand and arm signals. One more point: nothing beats f a c e b h x contact for long conversations. It is a lot of work to move over to ne’s position, unhook, climb out up on his (and reverse the process DUL ulere is no substitute for it. This bec method for my scout section leader, my and I when the need arose for direct co1 Finally, there are the chemical, nucle warfare factors of the integrated battlei tions, precautions, and countermeasure these types of attacks have been well d publications. My purpose here is not to n in these aspects of the integrated battle you aware of them so you can prepare i lishing battle drills and SOPs. Good SOPs Are Invalu Innovative thinking founded on the I especially the principle of the objective, c ing to the standards of unit SOPs will every crisis. SOPs or battle drills are Deciding how to react to eventa on tht they occur has several advantages. In hesitantly, or reacting before you have give the situation careful thought, you a to react, and you react with a carefully This also gives you the opportunity to k of others who have been in similar situ who know a mccmsful drill and how to e drills in my platoon were those that incorporated the ideas of the platoon’s NCOs. The drills were seldom exactly what they suggested, but did include their ideas and experiences and produced extremely effective results. Another advantage is that during peacetime training we can determine whether our SOPs and battle drills work or whether they need to be improved. After the platoon has an opportunity to use the refined SOPs and drills, the engagements must be reviewed to see if drills and procedures are adequate and if individuals properly implemented the drills. The review will indicate the need for additional instruction and training to bring the platoon up to standard. A final advantage to SOPs and battle drills is that in an emergency everyone knows what to do and does it because it has become routine. Success and survival of the platoon no longer depend on one person giving the correct commands or instructions. The instructions have already been given. If the situation is not quite what the OPORD pre dided, everyone will still know what to do and what the other members of the platoon are going to do. This enables individuals to act with much greater confidence, initiative, and aggressiveness. SUcces8. Command and Control It is entirely appropriate that the U.S. Army h o r School’s Command, Staff, and Doctrine Department is housed in Boudinot Hall at Fort Knox, KY, because Brigadier General Truman Everett Boudinot was one of the early shapers of American armor tactics and doctrine. He discovered early that mechanization extends the battle field to much greater distances and that for mechanized unita to function effectively over these distances, command and control must also be extended. For the platoon leader, this means that not only must he respond to mission-type orders and then use his initiative, he must also allow his sections and tanks to use their initiative as well. It always dismayed me when the scouts on the far right saw and reacted to a situation that I could not see. I was forced to follow their lead in maneuvering “encouragement” I needed to get off my duff, square my shoulders, and press forward. What I did not realize at the time was that he was also reinforcing the principle of objective-that all my efforts should be aimed at a specific goal, and secondary objec tives should get only secondary efforts. When jamming makes your radios useless, you will continue with your orders and reach the objective. If you get attached to an infantry company, you will execute your mission with aggressiveness. If an ADA team asks you where to go, you may not get them in the best spot, but you will get them in a place that contributes to the 8u-M completion of the mission. If hostile aircraft threaten, you will evade them, destroy them, or drive them off. If obstacles interfere, you will get engineers to clear the way. If irregular forces harass you, you will inflict as much damage as you can and then drive on. And if, heaven forbid, you are hit with a simultanmus chemical and artillery attack at the moment you are making contact with enemy attack helicopters and ground reconnaissance elements, you will not sit there in dumbfounded confusion or throw a fit of frustration Rather, you will remember your mission, determine what you must and can do to reach your objee tive, and lead the way! CAPTAIN ALAN WAlTS was commissioned in armor from West Point in 1979. He is a graduate of the AOBC, JOMC, AOAC and the Joint Firepower Control Course. He served as a cavalry platoon leader, squadron adjutant and executive officer in Germany and is currently assigned as a systems coordinator in force modernization with the 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX.

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