THE REPLACEMENT SYSTEM

m URING World War II, I made numerous efforts to find out what system was being followed in the various theaters for estimating needs and for handling and assigning replacements. It was difficult to get a clear and definite picture of the work. After several readings of replacement data I came to the conclusion that, rather than a definite overall system, a hit or miss procedure was followed, tailored to suit the ideas of each theater. I agree with the Patch Board that the replacement system in the war was a failure due to poor estimates, poor handling and misassignment of personnel, not to poor training in the United States. Certainly this was true of Armored Force replacements. In World War I, I was in the Remount Service of Quartermaster Corps, where I purchased, trained, conditioned and issued horses and mules for the Army. I feel sure that five classes of animals-riding, draft and pack horses, and draft and pack mules-were far more efficiently handled in that war than were human replacements for the arms and services in World War II. The Remount System put horses and mules, by class, where they were needed and when they were needed at the front, and far more effectively than the Replacement System did for personnel in World War II. The remount organizations in the States and overseas were similar in operation. They talked the same language and kept in close contact with each other. The understanding and teamwork in all animal matters such as estimates, organization and operation, did not exist in the personnel replacement system in World War II. In the late war all of my service 50 was spent in the Replacement System for the Armored Force. In my commands the training and issue of more than a quarter million men was either conducted or thoroughly inspected. The opinions expressed here are based upon this work and this source of information. I am convinced that replacements should be trained and handled from the training center to the front line by the arm or service requiring them. The most demoralizing sight I have ever seen occurred early in World War II at Shenango, Pennsylvania, where combat replacements for Infantry, Artillery, Armor, etc., were being handled by the Service Command. Efficiency and morale were restored at once when Army Ground Forces took over this work at Fort Meade, Maryland, and Fort Ord, California. In stating that the failure of the replacement system of World War II was due to misassignments and poor estimates, and not training in the United States, I am sure this is true of Armored replacements. At no time was there any complaint of lack of training of Armored Force replacements. There are on record numerous commendations, official and personal, from many sources, as to the efficiency of this training. The first one received was from the North African Theater early in 1943 ( General Camp's report as observer in this theater). This report stated in effect that "the Armored Force replacements were the only ones sufficiently and properly trained and were not only efficient as armored replacements but also as infantry unit replacements." This fact is mentioned not because other arms did not later give as good training as Armor but to stress the following important points which I believe were essential to assure good training. They are not revolutionary, but are just based on common sense. First: Upon assuming command of ARTC in August of 1942, I got authority from General Devers, then commanding the Armored Force, to hold over training battalions not needed at this time as replacements and to give them two weeks of field training not then given to replacements. Second: Upon initiating this field training, a whole day was spent testing and questioning each trainee on all subjects given in previous training and finally in getting his ideas on training. This test revealed these extremely important matters: That the company clerks were keeping the paper record of a man'straining but there were no steps taken to assure that this record conformed with actual training. As a result, some men carried as tank driver had not driven, while others carried as gunner hadn't fired, etc: That the soldier himself didn't know what subjects should be covered in training, how he had been rated in the ones covered, or what his MOS was: That he had never been asked for any suggestions or any opinion on training: That men absent or sick for a week or more rarelv ever made up the training they had;nissed but were issued at the end of training period just the same. Third: To correct these conditions I decided to bring the trainee as fully as possible into his training and to give him some check on the main instruction he should receive. Therefore, he was issued a small durable card, similar in size to a driver's license or identification card. This card showed the small arms training, the machine guns to be fired, vehicles to be driven, and tank weapons to be ARMOR-November-December, 1952 fired, and opposite each was a space for rating the proficiency attained. The men carried these cards to training in their wallets and the instructors entered their rating thereon after the completion of each subject. Finally, at the end of training the company commander entered the job the man was best qualified for such as "tank driver," "tank gunner," "rifleman," etc., assigned his MOS and signed it. Very few lost these cards and they were easily replaced in training. Men called them "our diplomas" and they kicked if any training was omitted. These cards at first got through to Fort Meade, Maryland, where they were reported most useful, and then to units receiving men in the active theaters. Unsolicited reports praised them highly as just what was needed to show training of men and to help in proper assignment. However, after six months they were taken up and destroyed at embarkation points as "violating security measures" and "as unnecessary paper work." Fourth: Men of each battalion, before being shipped out, were questioned on their training and were asked for suggestions. They contributed many valuable ideas as to where time was too long or too short, where instruction was most effective and where it was poor. A surprisingly large number desired manuals and reading material on tanks, gunnery, etc. As a result, a book store was established where as many as 10,000 training manuals were purchased in a training cycle. Also, the Armored School provided free for this purpose a number of very valuable pamphlets on driving, motor maintenance, gunnery and tactics. They were simple, profuselr illustrated, and far more readable and understandable than the dry, finely printed, complicated government-issue literature. Invaluable as training aids, they were issued free. This leads me to state here that sometime I think in our training methods and procedure we forget that we have highly intelligent soldiers the majority of whom know how to read and write and so can instruct themselves for military duties just as they do for school work. Fifth: Most of the subjects taught at this time (August, 1942) were in the company where an NCO was struggling to put over 26 subjects to 12 men. This can no more be done m instructing an individual in the Army than it can be done in high school, college or in officer education. So each training regiment was required to conduct training by committees in 5 sections, namely: 1. General subjects; 2. Small arms; 3. Vehicle driving and maintenance; 4. Tank gunnery; 5. Field training. It was the unanimous opinion of everyone, officers and soldiers alike, that instruction under the committee system was far better and more thorough than by company. It also was most economical in equipment. (For example, training by company at one period of the war would have required 1,- M AJOR GENERAL CHARLES L. SCOTT is afar· mer commander of the 2d Armored Division, I Armored Corps, the Armored Force Replacement Training Center and the Armored Command. 800 tanks in ARTC; by committee only 1,000-savings 800 tanks worth $80,000,000!) Sixth: Based on my observation of tank units in battle in the Middle East with the British Eighth Army, the following (not then taught in RTC)were introduced into training: Overhead fire with the machine gun and tank cannon; simple fire problems for tank crews and for tanks within the platoon; booby traps; mine laying and removal. All important subjects previously taught were reviewed and tied in at this training. Men questioned for a year rated this period of field instruction as the best of all instruction given, regardless of the hardships suffered when it was carried out in bad weather, heat or cold, rain or shine. Seventh: The Armored School ARMOR-November-December, 1952 greatly assisted in this work, as officer candidates and specialists such as radio operators, mechanics, etc., were able to participate, thus greatly reducing the overhead in instructors and specialists. It also gave this school personnel practical experience in the field-certainly, too, overseas replacement depots receiving men with this amount and character of training should not require much overhead to carry on effective training. Eighth: Fortunately the Armored Replacement Training Center was receiving a steady flow of one battalion (1000 trainees) per week. Therefore, I directed that any man missing more than five days of training (which couldn't be made up as a rule) would be transferred to a following battalion. This was a temporary loss of strength to the battalion making the transfer but in the end it was evened out by receipt of men from preceding battalions needing to make up training. This assured complete training for all men. The foregoing eight steps, to my mind, assured turning out a replacement trained in the prescribed subjects and prevented any complaints of lack of training from overseas theaters. It set up a check of his own training by the trainee himself, and he took this seriously, too. Prior to instituting these steps the administrative preparation of records was the all-important work before shipment overseas. These steps made this paper work a true report of training and not just good administrative paper work. In the Armored Replacement Training Center a start was made with competent overhead personnel. As manpower grew short the situation became worse and depots were subjected to numerous changes in policy. "Keep and use over-age men;"... "ship over-age men and use 18-year-olds;"... "use 4F's, ship 18-year olds;"... "ship best of 4F's, keep worst, and use men rotated from active theater." The only trouble then was that all rotated men were being discharged on the point sytem. I officially recommended the adoption of anew class for overhead "U. U.-utterly useless." Certainly at the start of a major war efforts to conserve personnel serving in U. S. installations and fit for combat duty should begin at once. Retired personnel and over-age and physically defective but mentally ca- 51 pable individuals should be used first: then wounded and men rotated from active theaters. I found no objection to this work on the part of personnel returned from active theaters except where they, too, were misassigned (for example, an infantryman assigned as an armored instructor). Early in the war some instructors were obtained from hospitals after being returned from the North African and Italian theaters. Most of them were Regular Army men and were obtained through personal contact ( not official action of G1 or AGO). They were our top instructors. Some had lost an eye, an arm or a leg. They taught motor maintenance, tactics, and gunnery. Trainees called them "The Purple Heart Club." The morale factor in training, I found was invariably tied in directly and almost exclusively to instruction. Poor instruction meant poor morale-high class instruction, high morale. American boys drafted in wartime know a poor instructor from a good one at once. Poor instruction is resented as a waste of time and as a failure in providing a fair chance to exist in battle, and these opinions are all too true. In the Armored Force, up until November, 1943, a'll specialist training for clerks, radio operators, mechanics, and specialists of this nature was conducted at the Armored School after the trainee had his full course of instruction as a fighting soldier cmd tank crewman. This I think was correct procedure. Eight weeks of basic training and a nine-week specialist course at Replacement Training Centers to my mind did not produce a good soldier and provided only a "ham" mechanic and halfway specialist. At one time the ARTC conducted a six-week course for NCO's. The product was highly complimented in the United States and overseas in combat units. "These men are just what we need... Up to date in all new equipment and technique, especially good in instructional methods" were the comments received. This instruction was discontinued just before the invasion of Europe when these men were most needed. I believe AFF schools should train all specialists and also some NCO replacements and that replacement centers should have 17 weeks of training for the individual, to include his work within the platoon. Officer candidates, as a whole were, I believe, quite satisfactory. They furnished a large part of the leaders for the company in combat. They defeated the two enemies-Japan and Germany-who were supposed to be exceptionally well led in battle. Of course, this type of officer lacked instruction in mess management, court martial procedure and other administrative duties because the seventeen short weeks allowed to make them into officers was primarily and properly spent on combat duties and leadership in battle. Therefore, if our nation wants better officers in wartime it should provide more time (and money) to select and instruct reserves in peacetime and for OCS in wartime. I have no patience with the postwar cntrc1sms of our officer personnel (and "brass hat") so popular in the press, in Congress, among ex-GI's, and elsewhere. It is neither fair nor justified. I think, too, that this is the time to point out the loyalty of the commissioned personnel towards constituted authority and to the men under them. This loyalty comes at a time, too, when loyalty is at a low ebb in business, in labor and in politics. Officers might have come back at enlisted men, too, and pointed out that there were some bad and worthless "GI's." However, it is to their everlasting credit that they did overlook this failure of a few men under them and did remain loyal to the vast majority who were exceptionally fine soldiers. Until all of the complete data of our World War II replacement system is thoroughly studied and digested, I doubt that all of our military agencies will fully appreciate the terrific waste and the other terrible effects occurring from inaccurate and uneconomical estimates for personnel for active theaters and from careless misassignment to arms and services. I point out below some ill effects which I believe occurred for armored personnel.

a. According to my best information from many, many sources, scarcely 50 per cent of the tank replacements of World War II were ever assigned to a tank company. At Fort Knox, 1,000 medium tanks, worth one hundred million dollars, were provided to train them; millions and millions of rounds of 75mm, 90mm, and l05mm and other ammunition-needed, too, in combat-were fired in training them. Millions of gallons of gasoline-needed everywhere else-were also used. And so go the other costs involved in this training. Much of it was wasted by misassignment! Infantry replacements on the way to 45th Division at Nettuno, Italy in WWII.

b. Reports from hundreds of sources show that tank replacements issued to other arms were actually needed in armored units; maybe not on the day or in the week when they were misassigned, but within a relatively short period. Having misassigned the armored replacements this error was compounded by sending, to fill armored needs, infantry and other replacements. These men had to be 52 ARMOR-November-December, 1952 trained, frequently in combat, adding more to the cost and providing, at best, only a makeshift replacement. Thus the fighting efficiency of combat units was invariablv lowered by misassignment. " c. I've never seen a soldier thoroughly and properly trained for one arm who didn't prefer service in that arm. Misassignment, therefore, does more than any other act can do to lower morale. The soldier looks upon his basic arm training and his time as being wasted and, furthermore, believes his chances to survive in combat are lessened by his misassignment. I believe the widespread misassignment of personnel is responsible to a large degree for the resentment and criticism which has been evinced by former World War II soldiers toward the Army and their Replacement tankers undergoing instruction near the front lines in Korea. officers. efficient methods for handling and d. Finally, we do not know how issuing rplaem.ents. Te system many, but certainly some men were and rgamzat10n m the Umted ttes killed for lack of training in one and m each theater must be similar arm when they would have sur-in principle. vived if properly assigned. Second: Arms and services should To me it is most surprising t see handle the training and issue of their that the War Department abdiated ow replacements ir: depots in the in matters pertaining to estimates _ Umted States and m each theater. 'or T · b d · · h ganization and operations of are- o. tram y arm an service m t e placement system in a war where UIted States and then to hav men replacements, instead of divisions in Ixed up overseas and nally Issued reserve, were depended upon for con-hke heep out of a chute IS a compl.ete tinuity of action. As a result we see and mexcusable waste of everythmg that the Army Ground Fores, the essenial to winning a war. Service Command, the Air Force and Third: Where replacements be-each theater operated in no coordi-come the main reliance of a theater nated manner, but under different commander for keeping his armies in systems and, in many cases, in my ontinuous operation they assume an opinion, not on any careful estimates, Importance equal to that of the armies. but on over-estimates and poor guess-Therefor, correct.esti_mates, by arm es. Of all the high commands, it and service, orgamzatwn of replace-is also my opinion, that only AGF ment depots, correct issues, etc., be-gave the replacement system a place come a major command responsibility in its plans and operations worthy of which cannot be delegated to an its importance and at the same time AGO, to a GI, or to a Service Com-made conscientious efforts to keep mand. overhead down and to get proper Fourth: Everyone in the chain of estimates. Any of its suggestions or command, everywhere, in peace and recommendations for active theaters in war should be required to study received scant if any consideration; the past inefficient handling of re-thus teamwork was completely lack-placements and to understand thor-ing, in my opinion. oughly the inexcusable waste of man- I believe the following things es-power, training efforts and national sential to an effective replacement resources and other ill effects that oc-system for the Army in a major war: cu through misassignment and poor First: A definite, prescribed system estimates. and organization for all arms and Fifth: Greater care needs to be ex-services are required in order to se-ercised in starting replacement depots cure accurate estimates and uniformly in the United States so that they have ARMOR-November-December, 1952 competent personnel not required in combat and are not continuously disrupted by changes in personnel policies. At the start, therefore, use should be made of retired personnel, over-age for combat personnel, and men with physical defects. Officers and men wounded and rotated home from combat should be utilized as rapidly as possible. Sixth: We have a highly intelligent class of soldier. Our equipment is becoming more complicated in each war. The vast majority of our men can read and write and, thank God, do some thinking for themselves. If furnished proper reading material and manuals they can instruct themselves in study periods in many ways, thus saving time and overhead, and probably getting better instruction, too. Seventh: In line with the sixth paragraph, above, I believe we need to radically revise our individual instructional methods for the trainee as pursued by most training depots in World War II. His training as an individual by a corporal in a company is no longer possible. His teamwork in the company will come after the individual training and this individual training, in the future, should follow more closely the individual instructional procedure pursued in our civilian school system and in our officer schools. This means the committee system of instruction by subject, and with personnel expert in the subject taught and in the best instructional methods. 53

Some Early Thoughts on Armor' Germany's Minority Spoke Out Against Opposition in 1937 Tank Attack by Fire and Movement T HE layman, when thinking of a tank attack, tends to envisage the metal monsters of Cambrai and Amiens as pictured in the war reports of that period. He thinks of vast wire entanglements being crushed like so much straw; he remembers how the tanks crashed through obstacles, smashing machine guns to splinters beneath their weight; he recalls the terror that they inspired as they ploughed through the battlefield, flames darting from their exhaust pipes, and how this "tank terror" was described as the cause of our collapse on the 8th of August, 1918. Such steam-roller tactics are one- though not the most important-of the things tanks can do; but the events of the last war have so impressed themselves on the minds of many critics, that they have built up an entirely fanciful idea of a tank attack in which vast numbers of tanks massed together roll steadily forward to crush the enemy beneath their tracks ( thus providing a magnificent target for artillery and antitank fire) whenever and wherever ordered by the high command, regardless of the condition of the ground. The fire power of the tanks is underestimated: the tank is thought to be both blind and deaf: it is denied the ability to hold ground that it has captured. On the other hand every advantage is ascribed to antitank defense: it is alleged that the defense will no longer be susceptible to surprise by tanks; antitank guns and artillery always find their mark regardless of their own casualties, of smoke, fog, trees or other obstacles and ground contours; the defense, too, is always located exactly where the tanks are going to attack; with their powerful binoculars they can easily see through smoke screens and darkness, and despite their steel helmets they can hear every word that is said. · As a result of this picture it follows that tank attacks have no future. Should tanks therefore be scrapped and -as one critic has suggested-the tank period be simply by-passed? If this were done all our worries about new tactics for old arms of the service could be scrapped at the same time and we could settle down comfortably once again to positional warfare as practiced in 1914-15. *Excerpt from Panzer Leader. Copyright 1952 by E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 54 Only it is not very sensible to leap into the dark if you have no idea where you are going to land. It follows that until our critics can produce some new and better method of making a successful land attack other than self-massacre, we shall continue to maintain our belief that tanks-properly employed, needless to say-are today the best means available for a land attack. But in order to make it easier to judge the prospects of tank attacks, here are some of the significant characteristics of tanks today. All tanks intended for serious action are at least sufficiently armored to be impervious to the fire of antitank guns. For fighting against antitank weapons and enemy tanks, such protection is insufficient; therefore the tanks so far ordered by the so-called victorious nations of the World War are considerably more strongly armored. For example, to penetrate the shell of the French Char 2C a gun of at least 75mm caliber is required. If an army can at the first blow commit to the attack tanks which are invulnerable to the mass of the enemy's defensive weapons, then those tanks will inevitably overcome this their most dangerous adversary: and this must lead to the destruction of the enemy's infantry and engineers, since the latter, being shot at by tanks and with their defensive weapons eliminated, can easily be mopped up even by light tanks. However, should the defense succeed in producing a defensive weapon which can penetrate the armor of all the attacker's available tanks, and should he manage to deploy such weapons at the right time and in the decisive place, then the tanks will have to pay heavily for their successes or may even fail altogether if the defense is sufficiently concentrated and sufficiently deep. The struggle for mastery between missile and armor has been going on for thousands of years, and panzer troops have to reckon with it even as do fortress troops, sailors and, recently, airmen. The fact that such a struggle exists, with results that continually vary, is no reason for denigrating tanks as a land weapon: for if we do, we shall be reduced to sending men into the attack with no more protection than the woollen uniforms of the World War which, even then, were regarded as insufficient. Movement It has been said, "only movement brings victory." We ARMOR--November-December, 1952

Fifteen years ago the theory of the use of mobile armor in ground combat was a difficult one to get across. The concept was appreciated by only a small group of visionary soldiers in several countries. In Germany, Heinz Guderian and a few others, in order to offset the vocal opposition to armor, prepared an article expressing the views of the exponents. It appeared in the journal of the National Union of German Officers in the Fall of 1937. Guderian has included it in his memoirs as apart of the chapter on the creation of Germany's armored forces. In view of the singularly interesting parallel with some of today's thinking, ARMOR reprints it with kind permission of E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., publishers of PANZER LEADER.-ED. agree with this proposition and wish to employ the technical means of our time to prove its truth. Movement serves to bring the troops in contact with the enemy: for this purpose one can use the legs of men or of horses, the railways or-recently- the automobile and the aeroplane engine. Once contact with the enemy has been made, movement is generally paralyzed by hostile fire. In order to permit the relaxation of this paralysis, the enemy must either be destroyed or made inoperative or driven from his positions. This can be done by employing fire power so superior that his powers of resistance collapse. Fire power from £xed positions has an effective range corresponding exactly to the observed range of the mass of the weapons employed. That is as far as the infantry can make use of its covering fire; when that point is reached the heavy weapons and the artillery must change their position in order to permit a further advance under cover of their fire power. Vast numbers of weapons and an even vaster quantity of ammunition are needed to fight this sort of battle. The preparations for an attack of this sort require considerable time and are difficult to conceal. Surprise, that important element of success, is very hard to achieve. And even if the original attack does catch the enemy unawares, the moment it is launched the attacking force will have shown its hand, and the reserves of the defense will converge on the point of attack and block it; since reserve forces will now be motorized, the building up of new defensive fronts is easier than it used to be; the chances of an offensive based on the timetable of artillery and infantry cooperation are, as a result, even slimmer today than they were in the last war. Everything is therefore dependent on this: to be able to move faster than has hitherto been done: to keep moving despite the enemy's defensive fire and thus to make it harder for him to build up fresh defensive positions: and finally to carry the attack deep into the enemy's defenses. The proponents of tank warfare believe that, in favorable circumstances, they possess the means for achieving this; the skeptics, on the other hand, say that since the element of surprise can no longer be produced as in 1918 "conditions for a successful tank attack can no longer be anticipated." But is it true that a tank attack can no longer take the enemy by surprise? How then does it happen that surprises have been achieved in warfare regardless ARMOR-November-December, 1952 of whether new or old methods were employed to bring them about? In 1916 General von Kuhl proposed to the High Command that in order to make a breakthrough primary importance must be attached to the element of surprise in launching the attack, and yet at that time he had no new methods or weapons at his disposal. As a result of surprise achieved, the March offensive of 1918 was outstandingly successful, despite the fact that no new types of weapons were employed. If, in addition to the normal methods of achieving surprise, new weapons are also employed, then the effects of the surprise will be greatly increased; but the new weapons are not a prerequisite to those effects. We believe that by attacking with tanks we can achieve a higher rate of movement than has been hitherto obtainable, and-what is perhaps even more important-that we can keep moving once a breakthrough has been made. We believe that movement can be kept up if certain conditions, on which the success of a tank attack today depend, exist: these include among others, concentration of force in suitable terrain, gaps in the enemy's defense, and an inferior enemy tank force. When we are blamed because we cannot successfully attack in all and any conditions, because we cannot storm fortifications with tanks armed only with machine guns, then we can only say that we are sorry and point out that other arms of the service possess in many respects even less attacking power than we do. We do not claim to be omnipotent. It has been maintained that a weapon only achieves its maximum effectiveness while it is new and before it need fear defensive countermeasures. Pity the artillery! It is already hundreds of years old. Pity the air force! Age is creeping up on it in the form of antiaircraft. We believe that the effectiveness of any weapon is a relative quality, depending on the effectiveness of the counter weapons employed against it. If tanks run into a superior enemy-whether in the form of hostile tanks or of antitank weapons-they will be beaten; their effectiveness will be reduced; if conditions are reversed, then they will achieve startling success. Every weapon is depedent not only on the strength of the opposition but also on its own willingness to make immediate, maximum use of the latest technical developments and thus to remain at the summit of its period. From this point of view 55 the tank will not admit that it has been surpassed by any other weapon. It has been said: "The shells of the defensive artillery travel faster than the tanks that are attacking that artillery." Nobody, up to now, has questioned this fact. Yet as long ago as 1917 and 1918 hundreds of tanks could be moved up to a concentration area immediately behind the front lines of the infantry: could penetrate in their swarms the enemy's line of defensive fire: could clear away for dozens of infantry and even of cavalry divisions: and what is more could do all this without any preliminary artillery bombardment, that is to say in the teeth of an intact enemy artillery. It is only in unusually unfavorable conditions that the hostile artillery can have any serious effect on the movement of tanks: and once the tanks have succeeded in breaking through to the gun lines, the batteries will soon fall silent and will thus be no longer capable even of hurting the following infantry. Even the immutable artillery tactics of having guns registered on all localities of possible danger proved a failure in the last war. The defensive fire will throw up columns of earth, dust, smoke and so on and this will limit the vision of the tank crews; but such limitation is not intolerable; even in peacetime we have learned how to overcome that. In fact tanks can now advance through night and fog on compass bearings. In an attack that is based on a successful tank action the "architect of victory" is not the infantry but the tanks themselves, for if the tank attack fails then the whole operation is a failure, whereas if the tanks succeed, then victory follows. Fire Armor and movement are only two of the combat characteristics of the tank weapon; the third and the most important is fire power. Tank guns can be fired whether the tank is stationary or on the move. In both cases the gun is laid by direct observation. If the tank is stationary range can be quickly adjusted and the target destroyed with a minimum expenditure of ammunition. When the tank is in motion the recognition of targets becomes harder owing to difficulties in observation, but this is compensated for to a certain extent by the fact that the gun is situated comparatively high above ground, which is particularly useful if the terrain is overgrown; thus the high silhouette, which has been so frequently the cause of adverse comment as presenting the enemy with an easy target, is not without a certain advantage for the tank gunner. If it is necessary to shoot while in movement the chances of short-range accuracy are good; they decrease with longer range, higher speed and when travelling over uneven ground. In any event, in land battles the tank possesses the unique quality of being able to bring its fire power to bear while actually advancing against the enemy, and it can do this even though all the defense's guns and machine guns have not been silenced. We do not doubt that guns fired from stationary positions are more accurate than guns fired in motion; we are well able to judge this, since we are capable of both types of engagement. However: "Only movement brings victory." Now should a tank attack be envisaged simply as a means of steamroll- 56 ing a path through thick and deep defensive positiOns held by infantry and artillery fully equipped with anti· tank weapons, as was done during the battles of materiel of the last war? Certainly not. A man who would at· tempt this would be thinking purely in terms of the infantry tank, a weapon whose sole function was the closest cooperation with the infantry, a weapon adjusted to the foot-soldier's scale of time and space values. This was a concept which we hung on to for far too long. We neither can nor wish to devote weeks or even months to reconnaissance; we have no desire to rely on an enormous expenditure of ammunition; what we do want to do is, for a short length of time, to dominate the enemy's defense in all its depth. We are well aware that with the limited fire power of our tanks we cannot mount a "planned artillery preparation" or achieve a "concentrated artillery bombardment"; our intention is exactly the contrary, it is to knock out our targets with single, surely aimed shells. For we have not forgotten how during the war week-long barrages by the most powerful artillery on earth failed to enable the infantry to achieve victory. We have been taught by our enemies to believe that a successful, rapid tank attack, in sufficient width and depth to penetrate all the way through the opposing defense system, can achieve more towards ensuring victory than the system of limited advances as practiced in the World War. Our shells, being aimed at specific targets, will not whistle over the enemy's heads as they did during those costly though pointless creeping barrages: rather if the attack is carried out with sufficient concentration, width and depth we shall destroy recognizable targets as they present themselves and thus drive a hole in the enemy's defenses through which our reserves can follow more speedily than was possible in 1918. We want these reserves to be available in the form of Panzer Divisions, since we no longer believe that other formations have the fighting ability, the speed and the maneuverability necessary for full exploitation of the attack and breakthrough. Therefore we do not regard the tank force as an additional means for winning battles, which on many foreseeable occasions could, in cooperation with other weapons, help the infantry to advance. If that were all that tanks were for, the situation would be the same now as in 1916; and if that were true then one might as well be resigned to positional warfare from the very beginning and give up all hope of quick decisions in the future. But neither the alleged superiority in armaments of our enemy in any future war, nor the increased accuracy and range of guns of all calibers, nor the technical advances made in the employment of artillery suffice to shake our beliefs. On the contrary! In the tank we see the finest weapon for the attack now available: we will not change our minds until such time as the technicians can show us something better. We will in no circumstances agree to time-wasting artillery preparation and the consequent danger of losing the element of surprise, simply because the old maxim says that "only fire can open the way to movement." We believe, on the contrary, that the combination of the internal combustion engine and armor plate enable us to take our fire to the enemy without any artillery preparation, provided always that the important conditions for such an operation are fulfilled: suitable terrain, surprise and mass commitment. ARMOR-November-December, 1952 t

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DIVIDED WE FOUGHT. By Hirst Milhollen, Milton Kaplan and Hulen Stuart. Editor: David Donald. New York. The Macmillan Company. 452 pp. $10.00. Reviewed by

This is at once a courageous but hazardous undertaking to present in one volume the story of the American Civil vVar in pictures and contemporary drawings. It was not intended for the professional historian nor the serious student of military affairs, although both will find it interesting, but for the average citizen who may be interested in one of his country's most difficult periods. There can be little dispute over the advantages of this pictorial method of education and historical presentation. A picture often serves as a thousand words. But at the same time there are serious drawbacks. It is difficult, if not impossible, to pictorially present issues, personality and character, and strategy. Without a clear notion of these factors a his-torv of the Civil War is less meaningful and perhaps even inaccurate. A narrative does to some extent mitigate these disadvantages but never completely overcomes them. This volume, due to the great care and knowledge of the editors, illustrates the many advantages and is not greatly plagued by the inadequacies of the pictorial method. The production of a one-volume The Authors Hirst D. Milhollen has been associated with the Library of Congress for 26 years. He is author of " Old Virginia Courthouses" and co-author of "Presi.. dents on Parade." Milton Kaplan has been with the Library of Congress for ten years. He compiled the catalogue " Pictorial Americana" and is co-author of the book " Presidents on Parade." Hulen Stuart assisted Mr. Milhollen and Mr. Kaplan in the selection and compilation of the pictures and in assembling caption material for " Divided We Fought." David Donald, who edited the text of "Divided We Fought," has been a teaching fellow at the University of North Carolina and assistant professor of history at Columbia University. The Reviewer Dr. George lanham is a graduate of Princeton University. He served as an artillery officer with the 7th Armored Division in World War II. Holding M. A. and Ph. D. degrees from Stanford University, he is now in England on a one-year fellowship at Oxford University, on leave from his regular post of assistant professor of history at California Institute of Technology, where he teaches European history and a course on the history of modern war. account of an event of such scope IUustrations from DIVIDED WE FOUGHT ARMOR-November-December, 1952 and duration as the American Civil War presents two serious problems. With photographs covering only certain portions of the war, and, because of the technical limitations of the period, none of action, the editors were faced with the difficulty of presenting a full and complete coverage of the war. The solution arrived at -omission or very limited coverage of those parts of the war of which few pictures were available and the use of drawings by contemporaries for the action pictures-although at times giving an unbalanced impression, seems satisfactory. A second problem was to present an accurate and well proportioned account of the war which would at the same time explain and correspond with the pictures. Here the device of quoting from participants and contemporary observers is mainly used. Since the written portion is very limited and these quotations are often wordy and not exactly to the point, it might have been better to write a concise narration to fit the selected pictures. It is a worthwhile plan to have the war explained by this method, but if the intended reader is not familiar with the basic historical facts it may tend to confuse rather than enlighten him. It seems strange that in a pictorial history the editors have not included one visual aid to geography, namely a map. In this popular account a few clear maps, not necessarily geographically detailed or militarily precise, would have made the strategy and maneuvering of the armies more understandable to the layman unfamiliar with the geography of Virginia and the other battle areas. The dissection of the Confederacy, includ- 73

COMMAND. Grant (leaning over bench) in council of war at Bethesda Church, '64. BATTLE. Forbes' sketch of Custer's capture of South's guns at Culpeper CH. DEATH. The stone wall below Marye's Heights, Fredericksburg, on May 3, 1863. ing Sherman's famous march to the sea, would be much clearer, as would McClellan'sand later Grant's advances towards Richmond. The raids of Stonewall Jackson up the Shenandoah Valley and Lee's thrusts into the north could be revealed so vividly by a map. The Civil War was well photographed, due to the efforts of Matthew Brady and his assistants, but certainly not as well as vVorld War II, as the publisher claims on the jacket. Even with the thousands of photographs available there were gaps in the coverage of the war. The editors made trips to the south to obtain pictures of the Confederate Armies, which were not so well attended by photographers as the Northern, and whose records in defeat were not so well kept. In spite of every effort and the collection of thousands of photographs, the western campaigns could not be well covered, the pictorial role of the navy was only partially available, and photographs of certain leaders were not obtained. From the great collection the editors selected nearly five hundred for inclusion in this volume. David Donald, assistant professor of history at Columbia University, is general editor and author of the text. The book in general satisfies the reader that all possible aspects of the war are covered. However, the viewer is given too many opportunities to try his skill at the game of judging the character and intelligence of leaders by their photographs, and there are many obscure Civil War generals pictured. There are approximately one hundred and twenty-five single portraits, almost all of generals, many of whom played minor roles or distinguished themselves only briefly. It seems a little out of proportion to devote nearly one-fourth of the pictures to such individuals, thus tying the narrative to them. Although portraits probably dominated the collections, many could perhaps have been omitted in favor of other aspects of the war. The public will certainly want to see the leading generals of both sides, and a few of the lesser ones, but not every general who slightly distinguished himself, and some who hardly did that. The life of the soldier of both sides is shown in its many aspects. He is pictured in full dress uniform, on 74 ARMOR-November-December, 1952 parade, in battle, in fortifications, at rest, and in training. His everyday thoughts as well as his feelings in battle, defeat and victory, are revealed by the quotations from men on both sides. The average soldier of the Civil War in many respects was like his twentieth-century counterpart. He liked to name his miserable huts or holes in the ground, just as the "GI's" did in World War II. With no language barriers there were occasional opportunities in quiet sectors for short conversations and some bartering between the soldiers of the Blue and the Gray. At times informal agreements were made as to when the sharpshooters would shoot and when they would not, similar to arrangements between the French and the German troops in World War Ion duty near the Swiss border. The dullness and inactivity of war is shown, and the soldier, then as now, solved this boredom with a little whiskey, some poker, "bull sessions," and a great deal of healthy grumbling. There is a good chapter on the naval aspects of the war. An excellent picture on page 259 shows with simplicity and stark reality the end of most of the blockade runners. The crew of the Monitor are shown in their untidy daily garb, and six United States Marines are shown in all the splendor of that corps. Amphibious operations are described, but unfortunately there are pictures only of the forts and cities which opposed these landings. Inter-service rivalry then as now appeared and, with the NAVY. Effect of fire from C. S. S. Virginia on the turret of the U. S. S_ Monitor. exception of General Sherman, the navy was dissatisfied with the army generals and felt, justifiably the editor feels, that the army took too much of the credit and glory for the landing operations. In the narrative the crucial role of the navy is explained and its successful accomplishment of its assignment is fully stated. The drawings and sketches are particularly good and very useful in the understanding of the battles. There is a good one of the Union position at Spotsylvania, another of the battle of Chickamauga, and a wonderful panorama of Gettysburg. The drawing of the wounded soldiers escaping from the burning forest at the Battle of the Wilderness shows the terror on the faces, and the hopeless position of some of the more DESTRUCTION. Ruins of rolling mill and train on Georgia Central Railroad. ARMOR-November-December, 1952 75

, The War of the Revolution l "By CHRISWI'I/1-.k ·WAR/ I _ __j by Christopher Ward 2 Volumes-Boxed-40 Maps Comprehensive and alive with incident and colorful detail, Christopher Ward's THE WAR OF THE REVOLUTION is a remarkable account of the military aspects of the American Revolution. Here are graphic portrayals of the fortifications, the terrain over which the battles were fought, the part the Indians played, the technology of gunnery and the hundreds of details that go to make up the broad scope of the War of the North, the War of the South, and the War of the Border. $15.00 76 severely wounded. The charge of Brigadier General Francis Barlow's men at Cold Harbor reveals the confusion of battle, and shows how much dispersion modern weapons have effected in battle action. The great area covered by a Civil War army and its means of supply is clearly shown by the sketch of Sheridan's supply wagons which, with their white tent covers, extend as far as the eye can see. The book includes some of the minor but fascinating episodes of the war. Dr. Lowe's balloon in which he ascended to observe for the northern forces is a picturesque forerunner of the present-day army'slight avia-LEADER. Gen. Bedford Forrest. tion. The lovely actress Pauline Cushman, who served so successfully as a Yankee spy, is shown in the only portrait of a woman in the book. "Silver Spoon" Butler, sent by Grant to threaten Lee by landing on the James River below Richmond, was "hermetically sealed" at Bermuda Hundred, and his subsequent grandiose defense schemes are described in a comic vein. The coverage in this volume is so broad that some aspect should interest every reader. Besides the pictures of soldiers performing their duties, there are sketches and photographs of places where battles took place and one knows just what Bull Run looked like at the time of the war. For those who feel that the horrors of war should be ud to discourage further wars and for realism, there are pictures of dead and wounded, of leveled villages, and of the whole pattern of military destruction. In a more constructive sense the excellent engineering work of General Haupt, often forgotten, in repairing and maintaining the vital railroads of the north, is shown and described. There are personal interest stories such as the one not always related about Grant, that he was not anxious to bring up his artillery to slaughter the fleeing mass of Confederates at Appomattox. The overall strategy and some tactics are interspersed with the general narrative while the significance of such battles LEADER. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart. as Antietam is explained in a military and diplomatic sense. The home fronts are not forgotten and the role of public opinion is pointed out. Both North and South should be pleased with the objective accounts of battles as well as the appraisals of men. Divided We Fought serves well its purpose, to give the American people an interesting and accurate pictorial account of the Civil War. The narration is sound and, in spite of some lack of proportion, due to the necessity of staying with the pictures, presents an accurate account of the war. The technique of quotations adds flavor at some expense to explanation. The book requires time and leisure. A second perusal will not prove disappointing. ARMOR-November-December, 1952