Here are my changes and reasons

To the Editor: Having spent almost two years as a Reconnaissance Platoon Leader ( Co. B, 4th Rcn. Bn.) CMOS 1204), I feel that there is no better unit to command in the Armor Branch. It is a small task force in itself. You have mobility, firepower, shock action; and last but not least, it is very easy to employ the principle of maneuver, whether mounted or dismounted. However, as the result of my experience, there are certain changes I would make in the Table of Organization and Equipment of the Reconnaissance Platoon. Here are my changes and reasons: by LIEUTENANT HENRY S. MARCANTONIO

• Equip the Support Squad with a Half Track, in lieu of the two onequarter ton vehicles with trailers, until the armored personnel carrier is available. The reason for this is that the two one-half ton trailers are not large enough to carry even the squad's basic load. In the event the vehicle with the mortar is knocked out, the squad is useless. Then again, in the setting up of the mortar, there are times when the squad will have to pull off the road to set up and give support to the platoon. There have been many times when one of my vehicles with trailer has bogged down on the way to their set-up position, thus slowing down the arrival of the much-needed mortar fire. A half track can carry at least four times the amount of ammunition that the two one-half ton trailers carry, and the half track can offer some protection to the crew from small arms fire.

• Arm the five men in the support squad with pistols. In the event of a vehicle breakdown while the platoon is moving forward, the mortar is one weapon that I want right behind me. Therefore, the squad would have to carry mortar and ammunition forward. The shoulder weapon would definitely.be a hindrance, as the squad is normally in the base of fire, and the only reason for individual weapons is for self-protection in the event of an infiltration.

• Promote one of the support squad leaders to Sergeant First Class, and see to it that he receives training in the use of the M-10 Plotting Board and the Aiming Circle. I would also make the M-1 0 and the Aiming Circle TO&E to the Reconnaissance Company. The Sergeant First Class mentioned could be in charge of the mortars when they fire in battery. Another change would be in the ARMOR-November-December, 1951 communications system. The two SCR 300's mounted in the tanks are useless. If our company were a tank company I could see their use. But in a Reconnaissance Company, I normally dismount mine and give one to the Scout Section when they work dismounted, and the other stays in the platoon headquarters. I strongly suggest three SCR 536's-one in platoon headquarters, another for the Rifle Squad, and the last one in the Scout Section. It is well known that the Reconnaissance Platoon at times may have to fight dismounted. There are too many reconnaissance unit commanders who are under the impression that the only way a mission can be successfully performed is by staying mounted. I have found, from past experience, that my platoon has worked just as much on foot as mounted. It seems to be the general policy for the Rifle and Scout Sections to dismount their SCR 510'sand convert them to SCR 509's. Did you ever carry an SCR 509 while working as a maneuvering element? Well, believe me, it is a hard task, and slows down the squad considerably. So, it boils down to doing away with the two SCR 300'sin the two tanks, and adding three SCR 536's. Other than that, the communications system cannot be beat. Of course, new radios would help. I would eliminate some of the many items that are TO&E and which my platoon has not used in our past operations, as executed on problems and maneuvers that covered all sorts of situations and under most of the weather variations. The first item that would go is the telescope. There are three in the platoon; one in platoon headquarters, and the other two in the Scout Section. I have never used them, and feel that they are just expensive pieces of optical equipment that the platoon leader and the section leader have to worry about. Next, the assault boats. I can see one in the platoon, but we have never found use for two boats. Eliminating one would give us that much more loading space on the inadequate one and a half ton trucks that we use in lieu of armored personnel carriers. I would issue the lensatic compass in lieu of the wrist compass. The final changes I would make are: Designate the.45 cal. pistol as the TO&E weapon for the platoon leader. There are many times when the platoon leader will go with the maneuvering element, and the tank section will be part of the maneuvering element. In firing the reconnaissance platoon in the attack, using live ammunition, I have found the carbine to be a cumbersome weapon. A General Officer who critiqued one of our company problems, once stated: "If I had my way, all platoon leaders would not be equipped with a shoulder weapon. Their job is to employ their platoon and not shoot at the enemy. In an instance where you need a weapon for self-protection, the pistol is adequate." In the Scout Section, I would change the light machine gun to the A-6. There are times when the Scout Section is used in the maneuvering element, and I should like to have a few machine guns along. However, the A-4 is too cumbersome to carry, whereas if the A-6 were TO&E, there would be two automatic weapons that could be used to lay down some good fire. * * * I have given my ideas on the changes I would make in the light of what I have actually learned in the field. I know these ideas are open to criticism, as this is but one platoon out of several hundred. I have employed and worked with this platoon under training and simulated battle conditions. Naturally, platoon leaders in Korea or the States may not agree with me. But as far as my work with this platoon is concerned, I feel that the changes I mention would enable me to set up my base of fire much faster, and my communications with the maneuvering element would be much better. 17 editorials

The 63rd annual meeting of the United States Armor Association will be held at The Armored Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky, on Monday, 21 January 1952. This is a departure from the usual procedure of holding the meeting in Washington, D. C., headquarters of the Association. The entire Council felt that a meeting at the Home of Armor would be of greater professional value to the membership. The concentration of members at Fort Knox, where many are attending Armored School courses, will insure a substantial attendance of those normally assigned across the country. In addition, the central location of Fort Knox will put it within reach of many members from other points. A program of great interest to all Armor personnel will be presented. All members who can possibly attend are urged to do so. This will be the largest get-together of professional exponents of mobile warfare in the 66 years of Association history. 18

The assignment of Army units to participate in atomic tests indicates the advances made in the development of atomic weapons and the focusing of attention upon tactical application. In view of these developments, the moment certainly is at hand for a closer look at the ground combat picture as it concerns atomic warfare. Considering all of the angles, there are certain conclusions to be drawn in reference to the battlefield. They are conclusions that hold great import for Armor. The tactical use of atomic weapons will multiply the value of mobility in the combat zone. Mobility will be a primary means of protection, for dispersion will be ever more important should the enemy employ atomic weapons. At the same time that mobility is essential for dispersion as a manner of tactical protection, so too will it be essential for the rapid concentration of units at decisive points. Mass employment must still be the basis for decision. Armor is ideally suited for rapid dispersion and rapid concentration. An atomic blast on the battlefield, of whatever proportion, will blanket a sizable area, an area much larger than that covered by our so-called conventional weapons. It will saturate an impact area, and will obviously require individual protective measures far advanced over those now in use. We have followed the long series of atomic experiments applied to ships, submarines and planes. As the tests go forward in Nevada, we are seeing this application extended to ground equipment. The assignment of Army units to the tests was accompanied by the explanation that these troops would set up a battalion position as executed on a battlefield, with foxholes, wire entanglements, and so on. It is said that equipment was placed in the position, including tanks and artillery. Observer troops were permitted to move into the blast area to see the effects on the positions they had set up, and to examine vehicles. Damage to vehicles was reported as moderate, and the Army stated that "they still could have been used." Armor appears to be the ideal basis from which to perfect the new defensive measures which will be required for survival on the atomic battlefield. It seems logical to assume that proper protection will be forthcoming only when ground personnel in the battle area are mounted in fully mobile armored vehicles whose characteristics include protection from blast, heat and radiation. Much of the framework exists right in our present vehicles. Only a force mounted in vehicles combining mobility, properly developed atomic protection and inherent fire power will be able to survive on the atomic battlefield and carry the fight to the enemy. Fundamentally, Armor is such a force. ARMOR-November-December, 1951

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This issue marks the completion of a year and a half of publication under our modern title, and ARMOR is happy to be able to announce the winning of an award in the Magazine Show of 1951, sponsored by the American Institute of Graphic Arts. The details of this are on another page in this issue. Although the editor is duly proud of this recognition within the trade, we also spread the credit around where it should be shared. Such an award would not have been forthcoming without, for example, the complete freedom granted the editor by the governing body of the Association. Credit goes also to the individual member of the Association. You supply the funds, through your membership, which make a production job possible. Thus, it is additionally pleasing to the editor to know that he is turning out a readable product for you, a magazine which, if the award is an indication, is acceptable to you. Editors come under a variety of titles-Editor, Managing Editor, Executive Editor, Associate Editor, Assistant Editor, Senior Editor, Contributing Editor, Department Editor, Photo Editor, Book Editor-and any combination of these, plus a number more. Each has a special job to do. Few editors have the privilege, as we do, of being all of these at one and the same time. This magazine is unique in that respect. Of the tremendous staff of five, each is fully absorbed in one phase of the operation-bookkeeping, circulation, clerical details, shipping, editorial. To one person-the editor himself-must fall the entire job of putting out a magazine every two months. It begins with the conception of a rough prospectus of the issue-and carries through personal typing of letters requesting articles; reading of all manuscripts; all rewrite work necessary on every story; selection of all illustrations; securing of the book reviewer; writing of editorials, special columns, biographical sketches on authors, subheads on articles, and captions on photos; most ad composition; covering of special events such as maneuvers with pen and camera; occasional drafting of maps; complete design and layout of the magazine from cover to cover, including selection of type faces and projection of photos; necessary research and fact checking; and supervision of the final printing of the issue. On the side we run the business end and manage the affairs of the Association as required of the secretary. As we said above, few editors have the privilege as well as the necessity of handling their product in its entirety from start to finish. Where they do, the product almost inevitably absorbs the individual's personality. But there is a tremendous amount of remuneration to go along with a tremendous amount of work. Not the lesser moments are those marking the receipt of a kind letter of comment from the field-or the winning of an award. ARMOR-November-December, 1951

The press in recent weeks has carried quite a bit of coverage of the gambling and related gouging activities concentrated around armed forces establishments. The profiteers who take advantage of service personnel are well below the average standard of citizenship and decency. Obviously the gravitation of undesirable elements to centers of service activity is deplorable. But the tone of most of the coverage has been rather one-sided. No shady establishment or enterprise of any kind exists unless it is patronized. The problem can be attacked from both sides. A concerted effort by organizations and individuals will do as much as a big official investigation. It's all apart of the moral pattern we've heard so much about lately. Stay away from the joints and you will not lay yourself open to the charge of being a sucker or a mouth breather. And folks will not have to cluck their tongues over you for having been the victim of your own stupidity. 19

Sum & Substance A regular feature in ARMOR, where you may express your views in approximately 500 choice words-the effective medium between the letter and the article. This section is open to all on any subject within the bounds of propriety. Name and address must accompany all submissions. Name will be withheld upon request. No pseudonyms. One word is the keynote to effective operations by our ground combat arms- teamwork! To have the latest details on the translation of combined effort into battlefield success, ARMOR goes once again to the field in Korea for the expression of representative infantry battalion commanders from each of six U. S. divisions, writing on the important subject of TANK-INFANTRY TEAMWORK basis of so much of the action in the months of bitter ground fighting.-THE EmTOR. The writer of the following served with the 603d Tank Destroyer Battalion attached to the 6th Armored Division in the ETO in World War II. With many months of combat experience in Korea, he is Commanding Officer of the 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division. The principles taught in service schools for employing tanks and infantry together in combat remain sound and continue to stand the tests of practicability imposed in combat. The tank still is an instrument of shock and tremendous fire power and, in spite of the very limited road net present in Korea, remains a weapon both of mobility and maneuver. The terrain in Korea is a restricting factor in the employment of tanks. However, complete reconnaissance both by air and ground has revealed that tanks can be used effectively in what might appear to be non-traversable terrain. The infantry, properly trained in the capabilities and limitations of armor, offer invaluable assistance to tanks in reconnoitering routes of approach and firing positions. On innumerable occasions unit · commanders have achieved surprise while fighting the Chinese Reds by employing armor on ridge tops or through valleys latticed with rice paddies over which the enemy thought vehicles could not move. Many times the key to the success of an attack, especially against fortified positions, is to maneuver the tanks so as to bring their high velocity fire to bear on bunkers and/ or automatic weapons. Communications within the tanks 20 themselves is very effective. The most difficult communications arrangement is between the tanks and infantry, where the main reliance still is placed on the SCR 300 radio. The only answer to successful and continuous communication is prior planning, well maintained radios, and alert operators. It has been found that communications checks made the day prior to the beginning of an operation are very valuable and many times pay off at critical moments when communications are needed most. The lessons of the Korean war with reference to tank-infantry training parallel the general conclusions reached at the close of World War II. Too much emphasis cannot be placed on one subject-continuous training during lulls in the fighting and actually during the fighting. Tank crews and the infantrymen alike must be taught the procedures and capabilities and limitations of each other's weapons. The infantry commander who Lt. Col. Demers makes a strong attempt 'to see that his personnel are thoroughly oriented in the use of armor and, in turn, employs his armor properly, will be paid off many times over. Tanks, by the very nature of their bulk and silhouette and their faculty for making a lot of noise, still draw fire from the enemy. Tanks still rip up the roads and cut wire lines. lines. However, tanks are tremendously effective battle companions for the infantry. The infantrv wire teams must learn to put wire off the road so it won't be cut and to anticipate that when armor operates in their area, communications lines may be cut. Infantry commanders must learn that armor need not be employed in every battle formation-and that the tanks may be committed several hours l31ter. These steps are helpful in reducing the amount of enemy mortar and artillery fire which the tanks draw onto the infantry. Infantry commanders must remember also that, big and powerful as the tank is, it can be destroyed by enemy individuals with the proper antitank weapons in their hands. In areas heavily wooded and in defiles, plans must be made for protection of tanks. Continuous training of infantry troops in conjunction with tankers will produce the techniques and bases of mutual confidence so necessary in the tank-infantry team. If these things are accomplished, then the infantry commander will have the shock and fire power and can achieve surprise whenever the tactical situation presents itself. LT. CoL. RoBERT J. D EMERS. ARMOR-November-December, 1951

The writer of the following served. as a pU:ttoon leader and company commander with the 35th Infantry Division in the ETO in World War II. In Korea for over IS months, he has participated in all of his division's campaigns, now is Commanding Officer of the 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry, 2d Infantry Division. Because of the nature of 'the terrain and the fighting characteristics of the enemy in the eastern sector of Korea, the use of tank-infantry teams has been limited. With very few exceptions, armor has been used in only one of the five methods of attack, that of supporting by fire alone. Even then, the teamwork between the advancing infantry and the supporting tanks becomes of paramount importance. Prior to the actual attack, tanks are used to knock out known enemy bunkers and emplacements on the forward slopes of the objective. Tank fire is directed and adjusted by direct radio control between the attacking company commander, or platoon leader, and the tank commander. During this phase, the supporting artillery is also brought into the tank-infantry team by firing on the topographical crest and reverse slope of the objective. As the enemy is forced from his positions on the forward slope by the direct fire of the tanks, and moves through the open communications trenches to his mortar-and artillery-proof shelters on the reverse slope, he is taken under fire by the artillery, firing VT fuse. This has proven effective. As the attack jumps off, the tanks place a steady volume of fire from both the 76mm gun and.50 caliber machine guns on the objective. When the infantry reaches the point where fire has to be lifted, all tanks, except the platoon leader's, shift their fire to the flanks. The platoon leader's tank is then used to engage and destroy any bunkers or emplacements still manned by the enemy. Any targets to be engaged by the platoon leader's tank are then directed onto the new target by verbal description, use of tracer, use of colored smoke, or any combination of the above. During a recent attack, the target area was covered by a heavy fog and the tanks were unable to observe the ARMOR-November-December, 1951 Maj. Hodges target area. However, by firing tracers, and by the infantry platoon leader, talking directly to the tank platoon leader, tank fire was brought to bear and several enemy bunkers were destroyed which were holding up the advance of the infantryman. The fog was so heavy that the tank platoon leader was unable to pick up the normal 4-I machine-gun fire, so solid belted tracer ammunition was used and the target was readily identified. In using tanks to support by fire, it is highly important to maintain accurate, steady, and continuous fire on the objective, as the slightest lull in the firing affords the enemy an oppor-The writer of the following served overseas in World War II with the 6th Infantry Division in the Pacific Theater, remaining on with that organization for the Korean occupation. He returned to Korea over a year ago, in his present post as Commanding Officer of the 3d Battalion, 65th Infantry Regiment, 3d Infantry Division. Tank-infantry teamwork, needless to say, is very essential to the success of an operation. When, for example, a tank battalion and an infantry battalion are notified that they are to work together on a task force into enemy territory, it is essential that the two commanders get together at the earliest possible opportunity. At this time, in addition to making certain that the mission is thoroughly understood by both command-tunity for moving back to the forward slope and occupying his old positions. For that reason, it has been found advisable to divide the supporting tank force into two groups. This allows one group to resupply or move to an alternate or supplementary position while the other group maintains the fire. Both support commanders must remain abreast of the situation so that the location of friendly elements and targets is known at all times. Tank-infantry.teamwork is not a- chieved merely by talking bout it. Each new replacement, both officer and enlisted, must realize the capabilities and limitations of both the tank and the infantryman. Most of all, the infantryman must have confidence and a knowledge of what the tank can do for him. At every opportunity, the infantryman should be shown the accuracy and destruction which can be obtained by the 76mm gun. The average infantryman, unless he has been trained, is unaware that he can advance to within fifty yards of the target and still be well outside of the bursting radius of the 76mm shell. This allows him to follow more closely his supporting fires, thereby increasing the element of surprise and shock action. Tank-infantry teamwork is achieved only by training, practice, and experience. MAJ. WARREN D. HoncEs. ers, including the plan of maneuver, routes to and from the objective area, timing, etc., it becomes a matter of getting down to the actual mechanics of the operation. How will the action be controlled once contact with the enemy is made? In other words, how can the infantry commander get the supporting fire from the tanks where he wants it when he wants it? In order to do this so that the full support of the tanks can be utilized, tank and infantry company commanders who are to work together on the operation are paired off to get down to the fine points-after the task force commander has explained the plan of maneuver of the task force as a whole and the part that the individual tank-infantry company teams will play. Here is how the 64th Tank Battalion and the 3d Battalion of the 65th Infantry (both of the 3d ln- 21 fantry Division) worked it out on an operation which took them north from Chorwon almost to Pyong-gang, then east on the Pyong-gang-Kum-wha Highway during the early part of July, 1951. The tank battalion CO ( also the task force CO) and the infantry battalion CO established their CPs together, moving to and from the objective area on the same tank and remaining together during the operation (close coordination and mutual exchange of information was thus insured between COs). The two infantry company COs rode with the tank company COs to and from the objective area. ( One infantry company rode in M-39's.) Each CO (battalion and company, tank and infantry) in addition to their own communications within their own battalions, were tied in by SCR 300 radio to the infantry net. This gave a double system of communication throughout the task force, enabled infantry COs to call for fire quickly from the supporting tanks when not close enough to use the EES phones in the rear of the commander's tank, and, at the same time, kept both battalion COs aware of the activities of all concerned. It was determined that white-smoke grenades (rifle) and WP rounds from 57mm recoilless rifles would be used to mark targets where haste was necessary or verbal description difficult. It was arranged that air identification panels would be used to mark the foremost elements of the infantry and to further minimize any possibility of tanks firing on friendly infan try troops ( which is sometimes unavoidable during the confusion of battle). Small (individual) "cerise" air identification panels were worn by infantry platoon leaders, squad and assistant squad leaders, tucked into the back of their belts. The use of these individual panels enabled the tankers to quickly locate the friendly infantry and to keep their supporting fire moving just ahead of them, and, where necessary, to bring fire on targets close to the infantry without danger to them. This system of voice and visual signals was very effective and cut down the loss of time experienced previously in getting quick accurate fire support from tanks. 22 Lt. Col. Harris For example, at one time during the operation, very accurate mortar fire held up the advance of the infantry troops and forced the tanks to button up. The mortar position was The writer of the following served with the 82nd Airborne Division in its European campaign in World War II. In Korea for more than a year he was recently assigned as division G-3 following nine months as Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division. located by the CO of Company L, who contacted the CO of Charlie Company of the tanks, which was supporting him, by means of the EE8 phone on the tank. Through a verbal description, fire was brought on the position and the position was knocked out bv two rounds from the 90mm cannon: One other very important item was the offer by the tank battalion CO to have two tanks to transport and provide protection during the operation for the Slmm mortar pla· toon. This assured us of our indirect fire support and the offer was quickly accepted by the infantry CO. Tank-infantry teamwork is just as essential as the teamwork necessary in the regiment, baHalion and company, and of course, it helps too, if the COs have worked together and especially if they get along together. LT. CoL. JoHN E. HARRIS. commanders. If at all possible, we rehearse the entire plan in the rear area with skeleton crews and pla· toons. An unlimited number of brief· ings are held so that all tank com· manders and squad leaders are posi· tive they understand exactly how and when each task necessarv for the successful accomplishment "of their mission will be performed. The plan During the last nine months in and. its alternate ar::angements are Korea I have had the opportunity to speCific but yet flexible eough to directly control tank-infantry attacks compensate for the unpredictable. on many occasions. In Korea the tanks approach on a Fortunately, the battalion has op- alley floor with the ain _body of era ted for the most part in areas in nfantry_ on the overlookmg h1lls. This which we had some sort of tank-IS a cautwus approach, and even when negotiable trail in our zone. As are-anti-tank mines are encountered, the suit, I have used the entire regimental problem of control is rotine. Team-tank company or parts of it very fre-:vork poses the most senous pobem quently. In all of our actions we have m the actual attack on the obJeCtive. succeeded in getting at least three As co-ordinator of the attack, I gen-tank platoons into the operation. erally advance with the infantry to an My approach to a tank-infantry at-outpost as close to the objective as tack, especially in the Korean moun-possible and into a position where tainous regions, is anythino but the both the tanks and infantrymen are dashing Patton-type of attck. The visible. The tanks pull into prear-fast-moving, crushing potentiality of ranged firing positions, and each tank the tank is used after the objective is commences firing at a designated level taken. The approach is slow and cal-in the target area on the hill which is culating. the objective.. In our battalion we feel that control At the same time, the infantrymen IS the key to success for the tank-crawl in under this fire with the third infantry team. The prelude to control man in each platoon trailing a fluores-is the minute plan which is worked cent panel from his shoulders. As the out with the tank and rifle company troops get to a point about 50 yards ARMOR-November-December, 1951 short of the bursting area of the tank fire, I notify the tankers to walk their fire slowly up the hill. Upon this movement, the infantry company commanders and platoon leaders receive the word to move in on the enemy. This usually results in brief hand-to-hand fighting before the enemy either has been killed or has retreated over the crest of the hill. When te enemy riflemen are seen to leave their positions and head for the rear, the tanks move out fast to prearranged positions on the opposite side of the hill and pursue the enemy with fire while the infantry lays down a heavy volume of small arms fire from the crest of the objective. If this is a limited objective attack with a primary purpose of killing the enemy and not of securing more ground, these tactics work very well because the enemy is more or less trapped by fire from all angles. On the other hand, if a permanent penetration is desired, the tanks and in-The writer of the following served with the 82nd Airborne Division in the European Theater during World War II. In Korea for something more than a year now, he is Commanding Officer of the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division. In combat against an enemy who builds his defense around strongly dug-in and heavily reinforced bunkers, the tank with its mobile, highly accurate, direct fire power is a mainstay of our ground combat team. The Chinese Communist is such an enemy, and though sorely restricted by the nature of the terrain, United Nations armor and infantry have teamed together to exploit the maximum effectiveness from voluminous, mobile fire power and violent shock action in closing with and destroying this enemy. Korea at its best is not good tank country. Only in a few widely scattered locations can you find an area flat enough with ground hard enough to allow deployment of a task organization including a tank battalion. Even in some of the few "tank areas" the penetration potential is so restricted and objectives that can be gained so limited, that deployment of ARMOR-November-December,.,1951 Lt. Col. Sayre and tanker infantry can have arrangements to refuel and reload ammunition, and then, having already started to rout the enemy, exploit their advantage by continuing down the valley. Practically speaking, the SCR 300 is the basic means of communication even a tank battalion is not profitable. In comparison, it would be somewhat like holding the Memorial Day Auto Races on a football field. Hence the use of tank-infantry teams has been on a small unit level. Tank-infantry teams consisting of a tank platoon and an infantry company have become highly proficient in digging the enemy out of his honey-combed defenses and destroying him. But here again, the terrain coupled with a meager road net, has hampered coordinated operation of the team. Often the tanks and the infantrvman Lt. Col. Martin to tanks and infantry, but its use can be varied. Often, I have found it impossible to contact the tankers on the SCR 300, so I have made it a rule to hold one tank in the rear as a communications tank which is used to relay the messages. From my outpost, I can contact this rear tank either with my SCR 300, or by telephone if it is practical to run a wire to it. The use of the fluorescent identification panel trailing from the infantrymen is an invaluable marker for the tankers. In addition to this, the advancing troops have pyrotechnics to signal for lifting fires or shifting the strike from one target to another. The last but most important element of tank-infantry teamwork is the element of esprit de corps. A mutual feeling of trust and confidence is basic in each part of the team, and if this is shared, the battle is well on its way to victory. LT. CoL. EnwiN M. SAYRE. must operate at widely separated points; the infantry operating astride a ridge line ( heights of 1000 meters are not uncommon), and armor supporting from the base of it. It is difficult for the tanker to pick up the infantry lead elements in the brushy undergrowth predominant on most of the Korean mountain ranges. It is difficult, therefore, for the tanks to render the close, accurate fire support of which they are capable. To offset these disadvantages, particular attention should be placed on prior planning and coordination by the units involved. The tank unit commander must know every detail of the infantry plan. Multiple means of communications and recognition must be established. Maximum use of identification panels and pyrotechnics should be made. Team training should be stressed, for a mutual understanding of the problems of each element is essential. In those cases where the terrain and road net have permitted, tank-infantry teams have made coordinated thrusts which exploit the psychological effect of the crushing action of tanks and their tremendous fire power, in destroying, demoralizing, and disorganizing the enemy. LT. CoL. WILLIAM C. MARTIN. 23 J

The writer of the following has been a Marine officer since 1939. In World War II, he commanded Marines in the Second Division and First Brigade in action at Guadalcanal and Guam. Presently assistant G-3 of the 1st Marine Division on the eastern front in Korea, he commanded the 1st Battalion, Seventh Marines for nearLy six months in heavy action against both Chinese and North Korean troops. Tank-infantry teamwork, as employed by the Marines in Korea, has been prettymuch a must because the mountainous terrain where we fight in the east precludes mass use of tanks in the classic concept of armored warfare. Since tanks operating on the eastern front are denied Rat land on which to make slashing and overwhelming power drives, the tanks have had to work in smaller groups and almost always with the infantry as a close partner. Our tanks did yeoman service in the fighting for Inchon, Seoul and Uijongbu in the fall of 1950 against enemy armor and in the fight to Hungnam to cover the evacuation but this year they have had almost exclusive employment as part of the rifleman's support team. We have found three principal uses for tanks in the rough mountain country in Korea: ' First, teamed with the infantry for patrols. We customarily team a platoon or two of tanks with two or three platoons of Marine riflemen to go trouble-shooting into enemy territory from patrol bases. Lt. Col. John T. Rooney receives the Distinguished Service Cross from Gen. Van Fleet in presentation ceremony at First Marine Division Command Post. Second, supplementing ground assault on individual enemy bunkers. We sometimes send two or five tanks to reduce a local objective as a direct support for the infantry but the limited hill-climbing ability of the M-46 and M-26 restricts the flexibility of this role. Third, to screen the division Rank. When the 6th ROK division collapsed on the night of April 22 on the Marines' left Rank, the lst Tank Battalion formed a perimeter at the confluence of three valleys with the Puk-han River and held the rampaging Chinese all one day while the rest of the division made its way to positions where the enemy offensive was eventually blunted. One use made of tanks last spring was when we were pursuing the Chinese north of Hongchon after their fifth phase offensive was broken late in May. Heavy rains had swollen the Soyang River and it was in Rood. At one crucial crossing, too swift and deep for heavily laden Marines to ford on foot, we used the tanks to ferry the men across to the other side. It was vital that we keep snapping at the heels of the withdrawing enemy and maintain contact so our air could interdict them as they Red. Trucks and jeeps couldn't ford the stream and there was no time for abridging operation. Tanks got the Marines over. At present, on our positions west of Kansong, we are supporting the men in the front-line foxholes by using some of our tanks as artillery. They are run up on bulldozer-dug mounds of earth to give them a higher angle of fire. They are particularly valuable in the artillery role because of the great range of the 90 millimeter cannon in the M -46. Our infantrymen are enthusiastic exponents of teamwork with the tanks. That is evident from the number of requests we get for tank support from the infantry commanders. The noncoms and privates are just as enthusiastic. The mere sound of the treads or the noise those big 90s make when they fire seems to make the riflemen feel better when they go on patrol, or attack a bunker complex, or just when they see the tanks up there on the line with them. They do the job for us and help us fight in the style we couldn't use without them. The Marines are used to fighting as a team with our own planes and big guns backing the riflemen. The tanks are part of that team. LT. CoL. JoHN T. RooNEY. · · 24 from ARMOR. • • eason' s reetings to all • • • ARMOR-November-December, 1951