BCTP Full-Spectrum Exercises: Observations of an Observer Trainer

This article identifies fundamental training opportunities and keys to success when conducting a brigade-level, full-spectrum exercise with the battle command training program. While this article specifically focuses on battalion-level commanders and staffs, it applies to brigade-level commanders and staffs as well. In the past few years, Operations Group Charlie (OPSGRP-C), Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), shifted its focus on full-spectrum exercises (FSX) away from primarily U. S. Army National Guard units, and adopted a whole-army approach to conducting these training events with a renewed emphasis on Active Component (AC) units. These days, more than 75 percent of OPSGRP-C’s annual exercises are made up of AC brigade and regimental combat teams. Although the demand for FSX, formerly known as warfighter exercises (WFX), has increased for AC units, many commanders and staffs remain unfamiliar with available opportunities during training events. Competing requirements, both in the field and in garrison, create challenges for commanders and staffs responsible for allocating significant time and resources to adequately prepare for FSX. Battalion commanders have limited opportunities to conduct collective training events during which the brigade headquarters is manned, passing and receiving information, and integrating all digital systems. Failing to capitalize on this training opportunity reflects negatively on leaders and is often based on a failure to understand FSX benefits.

Training Opportunities It is important to understand that the BCTP typically conducts FSX for brigade combat teams early in the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle and prior to deploying to any combat training center (CTC). Generally, a brigade conducts a FSX prior to its leader training program (LTP) and dirt rotation to the National Training Center (NTC), Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), or Joint Military Readiness Center (JMRC). Young staffs, working together with limited experience, typically execute the FSX. This is not to say that staffs do not have experience; on the contrary, battalion staffs typically have a significant amount of operational experience. As my boss says, “It’s new people on anew team, doing new things with new stuff.” To maximize a unit’s participation in a FSX, battalion commanders and staffs should focus their efforts on four fundamental areas: validate and refine the tactical standard operating procedure (TSOP), the tactical operations center standard operating procedure (TOCSOP), and plans standard operating procedure (PLANSOP), as applicable; establish a tactical operations center; conduct the military decisionmaking process (MDMP); and exercise mission command. Validate and refine the TSOP, TOCSOP, and PLANSOP, as applicable. Although somewhat self-explanatory, this is one of the greatest challenges observed at BCTP and the NTC. Oftentimes, units do not have standard operating procedures (SOPs) in place, and if they do exist, staffs are unfamiliar with the content thereof. This fact is becoming more and more understandable based on new staffs being formed, new commanders at all levels coming onboard, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) changing regularly. The best practices for validating and refining SOP begin with an initial review and observation of procedures and practices, official or unofficial, currently in place, which can be used as a basis for refinement. The staff should have at least one hard copy of this ‘work in progress’ SOP posted in its tactical operations center (TOC), which serves as a rewrite draft to which changes can be made or added throughout every training event and exercise. At the commander’s insistence, the staff identifies, validates, and/or refines the draft SOP throughout the exercise, which is an ideal opportunity to capture lessons learned and pass them on from one training event to the next. Establish a tactical operations center. First and foremost, the TOC (or command post) should be set up in compliance with the unit’s SOP. If the SOP does not describe the components and ergonomics of the operations center, then capture them in the SOP once an initial standard is established. The definition of a command post is “a unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities.”1 Regardless of how simple this definition may appear, a TOC is actually the nerve center of a unit. For a battalion or squadron, it is the lowest level at which a full staff exists to conduct planning and synchronization for combat operations. A company/troop staff’s capabilities and resources are much less than those of a battalion/squadron staff, which is significantly limited compared to brigade or higher headquarters.

Early in my career, I learned six functions of a command post, which include receiving information, distributing information, analyzing information, submitting recommendations, integrating resources, and synchronizing resources. While rather simplistic, they are all still very applicable. Oftentimes, executive officers (XO) and S3s mention that their TOC setup for FSX is different from their expected TOC setup for NTC, which is different from their expected TOC setup once they deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan. However, I am less interested in how information is displayed and more interested in what information will be displayed. Having a fully established and operational TOC during the FSX allows commanders to determine if the TOC is functioning as intended and if the staff is creating options, preserving options, or forfeiting options based on setup and functionality of the TOC. Commanders must ensure that the TOC setup and configuration is exactly as it will be during deployment and while fighting. Integrate Army battle command systems (ABCS) across all warfighting functions (WFF). In a training environment, seldom do units have the ability to setup and employ all ABCS that fully exercise the digital architecture. Oftentimes, the FSX is the first opportunity a brigade/regiment will have to establish ABCS connectivity across the brigade. Integrating ABCS across the brigade is the equivalent of the signal officer’s tank table XII. Do it right and do it early or the entire exercise suffers. Based on familiarity, staffs often rely on the old PowerPoint stand-by for mission analysis (MA) and course of action (COA) development. It is inefficient and adds significantly more time to planning and execution processes. While one could write an entire article on the merits of using ABCS, units typically resort to PowerPoint because they do not understand the capabilities of the ABCS. The commander must insist that the ABCS are set up, configured, can “talk to each other,” and are understood by the primary staff. Develop and maintain a common operational picture (COP). As mentioned earlier, the TOC serves as the nerve center of a unit. It is a critical source of information management for the commander, higher headquarters, and subordinate units. A COP is a “single display of relevant information within a commander’s area of interest tailored to the user’s requirements and based on common data “Battalion commanders have limited opportunities to conduct collective training events during which the brigade headquarters is manned, passing and receiving information, and integrating all digital systems. Failing to capitalize on this training opportunity reflects negatively on leaders and is often based on a failure to understand FSX benefits.” and information shared by more than one command.”2 While the definition describes a COP as a “single display,” arguably, it can be better described as a “display” of products consisting of multiple screens, maps, and printouts that allow commanders to gain situational understanding. An effective COP will differ for each individual; however, in my opinion, an ideal COP enables a commander to walk into his TOC, coffee cup in hand, look around at all the products (both digital and analog), and achieve an 85 to 90 percent understanding of everything happening in his area of responsibility. A few pointed, direct questions should get him to the 100-percent solution. If the commander wastes time interpreting information, then the COP is ineffective. The commander consistently reinforces that his staff is responsible for establishing and maintaining an effective COP throughout the exercise, as well as determining how to illustrate the COP in the unit SOP. Manage information horizontally and vertically (force reporting). The FSX provides a great opportunity for commanders and staffs to develop and/or validate knowledge management plans. One of the greatest challenges battalion/squadron staffs face is determining what information is important and how to transfer information between FM radio, command post of the future (CPOF), and blue force tracker (BFT), as well as other methods of information dissemination such as email, chat, and phone calls. The commander outlines specific operating procedures for knowledge management and force reporting in a unit SOP, and rehearses these processes at every opportunity. Also, most battalions will not conduct routine reporting, such as sensitive items or personnel status reporting, during an FSX, which provides one of the easiest opportunities to conduct reporting (no sensitive items are actually issued and the computer generates the personnel numbers), yet units continue to fail to execute this standard reporting requirement. These reports further force staff and TOC personnel to “battle track” simple reporting requirements based on an established battle rhythm and demonstrate how to process a multitude of other reports. The commander must insist that the staff exercise its knowledge management plan and force reporting across all echelons. Execute battle drills according to SOP. Battle drills are “the general and detailed methods used by troops and commanders to perform assigned missions and functions.”3 For example, TOC battle drills may include counter-fire, downed aircraft (UAV), or “blue-on-green,” but they are only effective when understood and rehearsed. A technique for executing TOC battle drills is to post the drill on screen while the battle captain or noncommissioned officer (NCO) walks the TOC personnel through the drill. The other option is to place a “battle book” that contains battle drills in each section. Again, the battle captain or NCO is responsible for leading the TOC personnel through these drills. The FSX provides a great opportunity to execute battle drills and if the commander and staff do not conduct them in conjunction with the exercise, they should conduct them as rehearsals. At a minimum, a TOC should conduct 2 to 3 battle drills per hour (either ‘real world,’ in conjunction with the exercise, or as a rehearsal). The XO or S3 should provide the results to the commander in his daily update. Another opportunity to exercise battle drills is during the “mini-ex,” which is conducted 2 days prior to actual mission execution when all systems are running (theoretically) and TOC personnel are available to make adjustments prior to conducting actual operations. The commander must insist that the TOC exercise a set number of battle drills over a specified period throughout the FSX. Conduct the MDMP according to The Operations Process. Too often, staffs attempt to conduct the MDMP without using a reference to ensure they address all of the MDMP steps. A pilot would never fly an aircraft without conducting pre-flight checks using a checklist, so why would a staff plan complex combat operations without using a checklist? With the recent publication of the new U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 5-0, The Operation Process, it is even more important to include this manual in all MDMP steps to ensure all new concepts and ideas are integrated throughout the process.4 Regardless of how much a staff ‘knows’ about MDMP, how comfortable they are, or how much time they have, they should always use a checklist from a professional field manual or one of the many available smart books.

Develop, update, and use running estimates. A running estimate is “the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable. The commander and each staff section maintain a running estimate.”5 In running estimate assessments, commanders and staff sections continuously consider the effects of new information and update facts, assumptions, friendly force status, enemy activities and capabilities, civil considerations, and conclusions and recommendations. Although current doctrine is replete with the term “running estimate,” many staff officers have difficulty identifying what a running estimate involves or how it develops. The commander must ensure the staff develops, updates, and uses running estimates throughout the FSX, and ultimately captures running estimates in the SOP. Conduct staff-integrated intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) integrating civil considerations. In my opinion, IPB is the most important portion of the MDMP; not only does it establish who we are operating with and against, but where we are operating. The staff builds the rest of the MDMP on this fundamental framework. The IPB is a “systematic process of analyzing and visualizing the portions of the mission variables of threat, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of interest and for a specific mission.”6 IPB consists of four steps, which include define the operational environment, describe environmental effects on operations, evaluate the threat, and determine threat courses of action. While the definition of threat includes nation states, organizations, people, groups, conditions, or natural phenomena that may damage or destroy life, vital resources, or institutions, it is often relegated to just the enemy. More often than not, the S2 has sole responsibility for developing the IPB, which often results in an enemy-centric IPB that minimizes or negates all together the civil considerations that may be even more important than the enemy assessment. An incomplete IPB can derail progress within the MDMP, which suggests that the XO personally manage and supervise the IPB process. The commander must insist that the staff conduct a thorough staff-integrated IPB that fully integrates civil considerations and properly addresses all four steps of IPB. Conduct MA brief, COA brief, and results of COA analysis brief. Designating the staff to conduct briefings allows commanders to assess the staff’s performance throughout MDMP and provides better situational understanding throughout the organization. Typically, all staffs conduct a MA brief. Because most commanders direct a single COA (which is generally recommended for a time-constrained FSX), many units do not conduct a complete COA brief. Thus, the commander misses an opportunity to ensure the entire staff fully understands the concept of operations and intent. Unfortunately, many staffs do not conduct adequate COA analysis (wargame), which is arguably one of the most important steps in the MDMP (possibly second only to completing a thorough IPB as part of mission analysis). Staffs must commit a significant amount of time to the wargame, which allows them to identify additional decision points that the commander may need to be aware of, including problem areas and planning gaps. Because the wargame component is so important, it requires the XO to be intimately involved. The commander must insist that the staff conduct these three briefings to the entire staff to ensure situational awareness and understanding throughout the organization and to allow the commander to assess the performance of his staff throughout the MDMP as well as to gauge its understanding of his intent. Develop a complete operations order (OPORD) and issue brief to subordinate units. During the time-constrained FSX, many staffs analyze and work through slides and briefings (slides from MA and COA development and OPORD briefings) associated with the MDMP. Staffs typically struggle to complete a written OPORD for subordinate commanders. This requirement is easily ‘bypassed’ when company commanders are not required to actually develop company plans and issue OPORDs due to the nature of the FSX, thus giving the staff a ‘freebie’ when it should be required to complete this critical step regardless. While competing requirements may limit the number of company commanders available to participate in the FSX, all commanders at this level should receive the OPORD briefing. Company commanders should not pass up the opportunity to shape the staff that will guide them into the future; they should ask tough questions that force the staff to be thorough and analytical in its planning. Commanders must direct staffs to develop complete OPORDs, as well as present OPORD briefings to subordinate commanders.

Exercise mission command. “The Army’s preferred method of exercising command and control is mission command, which is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission orders. Successful mission command demands subordinate leaders, at all echelons, exercise disciplined initiative, acting aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission within the commander’s intent.”7 Oftentimes, the FSX is the first opportunity a battalion/ squadron commander has to deploy his entire TOC and primary staff to conduct the MDMP and exercise mission command in a tactical environment with multiple sources of information flowing both vertically and horizontally. Commanders must reinforce the importance of this training event and capitalize on this unique opportunity to train in a tactical environment with all systems established and used. Develop and maintain situational awareness and understanding within the TOC. Easier said than done, this is a function of how the TOC is set up and how information is managed within the TOC. Fortunately, the FSX design is deliberately simplistic, which allows commanders and staffs the opportunity to begin establishing the functionality of the TOC during both the MDMP and mission command to ensure situational understanding is achieved early in, and throughout, the exercise. A key contributor to achieving situational awareness and understanding is the COP, as earlier discussed. The commander must ensure that the staff has the tools and systems needed to develop and maintain situational awareness and understanding within the TOC for the duration of the FSX.

Employing ABCS. Critical to exercising mission command is the commander’s ability to harness all available ABCS to assist in command and control of formations. As mentioned previously, ABCS design makes mission command easier and more efficient. The FSX is typically the first opportunity to employ all systems and staffs should maximize this opportunity. If a system is not working, the S6 should scramble to locate field service representatives and ensure all systems are brought on line. The XO and staff conduct briefings, such as staff and/or commander update briefs, through ABCS. Any PowerPoint briefings received should be returned to sender with notice that ABCS is the primary method for briefing inside the TOC. If the commander does not force the issue early on, the staff will continue to fall back to the ineffective and inefficient means with which they are comfortable. Commanders must ensure that all ABCS are set up, configured, have the ability to communicate as designed, are understood by the primary staff, and are employed in the exercise of mission command. Develop and use adequate graphic control measures via ABCS. Graphic control measures are “graphic directives given by commanders to subordinate commanders to assign responsibilities, coordinate fire and maneuver, and control combat operations.”8 Generally developed during COA development, the commander uses these graphic control measures “to convey and enhance the understanding of the concept of operations, prevent fratricide, and clarify the task and purpose of the main effort.”9 The use of ABCS early in the MDMP allows for building, across multiple echelons, easily shared graphics. More often than not, staffs do not develop adequate graphic control measures to assist subordinate units during execution or TOC personnel in effectively directing the fight. Commanders must ensure that the staff develops and uses adequate graphic control measures via ABCS throughout the MDMP and into mission execution. Synchronize and effectively employ all available assets/capabilities. There are generally two overarching challenges associated with synchronizing and employing assets and capabilities — knowing what is available and when it’s available! Commanders and staffs are typically very comfortable with their organic or habitual assets and capabilities; however, they struggle with attachments or unconven-46 “Battle drills are ‘the general and detailed methods used by troops and commanders to perform assigned missions and functions.’ For example, TOC battle drills may include counter-fire, downed aircraft (UAV), or ‘blue-on-green,’ but they are only effective when understood and rehearsed. A technique for executing TOC battle drills is to post the drill on screen while the battle captain or noncommissioned officer (NCO) walks the TOC personnel through the drill.” tional assets and capabilities, such as host nation security forces, nongovernment organizations, interagency liaisons, and provincial reconstruction teams. Additionally, the battalion/squadron may have higher-level assets, such as an unmanned aerial system or air/scout weapons team, but has no method to effectively track ownership of the assets or define capabilities. Posting a constant ‘asset tracker’ in the TOC, which shows all currently available assets (internal and external to the unit), is one technique. When an entity, such as an air weapons team, moves to another area of responsibility, the TOC updates the move on the asset tracker, which enables commanders to see available assets that can be employed. Oftentimes, the TOC’s combat power tracker is nothing more than an outdated maintenance status of organic assets, which inadequately depicts the commander’s available assets and capabilities.

Combat power is defined as “the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit/ formation can apply at a given time.”10 Therefore, a combat power tracker should portray to the commander all immediately available assets and capabilities within the eight elements of combat power, which include leadership, information, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, command and control, and protection. The commander must ensure that his staff fully understands the eight elements of combat power, as well as any and all immediately available combat assets and capabilities. Conduct regular TOC update, staff update, and commander’s update briefs. The FSX provides significant opportunities for commanders and staffs to share information vertically and horizontally. At a minimum, the battalion/squadron conducts regular TOC, staff, and commander updates. TOC personnel should conduct regular TOC updates (typically every 2 hours), which are simply quick ‘around the horn’ updates, listed by war fighting function, currently ongoing throughout the area of responsibility. The battle captain or NCO should conduct the TOC update brief for the TOC personnel. The staff update brief, which should be led by the executive officer, provides the battalion/ squadron staff an opportunity to update the commander on activity throughout the area of responsibility, offering commanders an opportunity to provide feedback in the form of guidance and direction to the staff. The commander’s update brief, which should also be led by the executive officer, offers the staff an opportunity to update subordinate commanders on activity throughout the area of responsibility, subordinate commanders to update commanders on activity throughout the area of responsibility, and commanders to provide additional guidance and direction. Keys to Success While the recommendations listed below are relatively intuitive and self-explanatory, they would not be on the list if a majority of units did not struggle with most, if not all, of these during FSX. Military decisionmaking process (MDMP):

Develop and stick to a timeline.

Use checklists to conduct the MDMP to standard.

Identify in a running estimate what is expected.

Directed COA is generally best in a time-constrained environment.

Wargaming is critical (integrate key players, such as operations sergeant major and battle captains).

Always brief civil considerations as a component of IPB.

Identify a staff officer to serve as the “voice of the people” to focus on civil considerations during all steps of the MDMP.

Ensure civil considerations are integrated into mission analysis, wargaming, rehearsals, and briefs.

Integrate all assets and capabilities into planning considerations.

Integrate consequence management into all aspects of planning.

Consider the “information aspect” of all activity.

Develop graphic control measures in ABCS from the beginning.

Plan for controlling the fight in urban terrain when applicable.

Do not neglect actions on the objective plan for and wargame. TOC operations and mission command:

TOC ergonomics are critical to effective command and control.

Employ an operations schedule; synchronize and effectively employ all available assets and capabilities.

Ensure decision support matrix and associated priority information requirements and named areas of interest are briefed and understood by all involved parties.

Use graphic control measures to force subordinate units to push information.

Use this opportunity to exercise/ rehearse TOC battle drills, such as clearance of fires, blue-on-green, mass casualty, and downed aircraft at a minimum of 2-3 per hour.

“A running estimate is ‘the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable.’ ”

Information management/command and control:

Use SOPs as fundamental guidelines, continually developing and updating as changes occur; keep a copy in the TOC to annotate changes/updates.

Identify how to transfer information between radio telephone operator, CPOF, and BFT (generally will not get to BFT in FSX, but needs consideration).

Conduct a regular (every 2 to 4 hours) TOC update for all players “fighting the fight “in the TOC.

Identify specific reporting requirements for troops; recommend Green 2, personnel status report, logistics status report, and commander’s situational report. Active Component and National Guard staffs, both at brigade and battalion levels, struggle with many, if not all, of these arguably fundamental components of collective training; therefore, all leaders should pause and determine how to ensure success during a FSX. Measuring success during a FSX is simple to define — the unit’s performance either improved during the exercise or it did not. The FSX is phase one of a critically important training methodology that manages units throughout the mission rehearsal exercise and on to future deployments. The amount of knowledge earned is proportionate to the amount of preparation and commitment that go into these exercises. Commanders, staffs, and leaders, at all levels, owe it to each other and their subordinate units to maximize this critical opportunity, taking necessary steps to ensure they have a better unit, which builds confidence in the unit’s ability to function as an effective organization, which is the mark of true success in a FSX.