Not a Rear Detachment

From the outset of his tenure in command, Dagger 6, like most current brigade commanders, knew his organization would deploy in support of overseas contingency operations. Operational planning for the reset and reorganization of the brigade combat team (BCT) began even before the previous deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II ended. As part of the deliberate military decisionmaking process (MDMP), which produced his intent and directives for forming and training the BCT for combat, Dagger 6 identified an operational need for a dedicated and parallel effort to sustain operations at the BCT’s home in Schweinfurt, Germany. Given Dagger BCT’s home in Germany, the sustainment of its warfighting readiness required a deliberately formed, trained, certified, and resourced organization. This formation would use less than 2 percent of the BCT’s authorized strength. Furthermore, this formation included soldiers unable to deploy due to injury or other issues. Only a well-led and empowered team of professionals could effectively support a deployed brigade while concurrently sustaining families in Germany within an isolated garrison community during the long war. This team had to accomplish critical condition setting for the next iteration of redeployment, reintegration, reset, and retraining (R4). This team was Task Force (TF) Guardian — the Dagger brigade combat team’s rear detachment, and the recognized model of effectiveness in U. S. Army Europe (USAREUR).

What Had to be Done The first step in forming TF Guardian was identifying the tasks required for success and leveraging the authority already inherent to a BCT commander in task organizing his formation to achieve success. The task force’s key tasks included:  Staffing TF Guardian with quality soldiers and training them in Guardian operations. From the outset, commanders at every echelon recognized that soldiers selected for this duty would handle responsibilities exceeding those normally expected. As an economy of force effort, Guardian soldiers would hold more than one duty position and perform effectively with great autonomy. Those selected to perform duties as members of TF Guardian were hand-picked through an interview process governed by the BCT commander’s intent that “these soldiers were the ones you want to have with you in combat.” The commander of TF Guardian held a key developmental assignment as the 9th Engineer Battalion executive officer when the task force formed.  Establishing TF Guardian standard operating procedures consistent with 1st Infantry Division, 1st Armored Division, V Corps, and U. S. Army Garrison (USAG) Schweinfurt policies and directives. In a modular Army, TF Guardian had to be ready to succeed under the administrative or operational control of any likely higher headquarters. The con- 40 —

“To avert ‘information fratricide,’ it was critical that the total community spoke with one voice on key issues. Accomplishing this entailed establishing several new forums within the entire community. For example, under the direction and intent of the BCT commander, Guardian formed a sentinel working group specifically to integrate military, FRG, and local community leaders…” stant rotation of headquarters in and out of USAREUR necessitated the assignment of TF Guardian directly under 1st Infantry Division (1ID), 1st Armored Division (1AD), TF Iron Sentinel, and V Corps. Additionally, USAG Schweinfurt became the principal source of logistics support for Guardian, almost in the manner of a habitually associated forward support battalion. The strong framework laid out in USAREUR regulations for operations at home station assisted in accomplishing this task. TF Guardian leaders had to have the agility and presence of mind to operate effectively despite the ever-changing command and control relationships in USAREUR.  Maintaining continuous contact with forward deployed commanders, TF Guardian commanders, and Family Readiness Group (FRG) leaders. Current technologies on the battlefield simplified the coordinating requirements for TF Guardian to some extent. The joint node network (JNN), fielded by the Dagger BCT just prior to deployment, allowed real-time “radio” communications between the BCT forward and Schweinfurt. This enabled the Guardian commander to communicate effectively in BCT net calls. However, the sheer number of subordinate formations, community agencies, host nation leaders, lateral and superior headquarters in Europe, and the constant need to provide effective communications with families demand ed a fully formed task force staff.  Fostering teamwork and coordination between TF Guardian, USAG Schweinfurt, other tenant units, and FRGs. To avert “information fratricide,” it was critical that the total community spoke with one voice on key issues. Accomplishing this entailed establishing several new forums within the entire community. For example, under the direction and intent of the BCT commander, Guardian formed a sentinel working group specifically to integrate military, FRG, and local community leaders into a functional working group focused on families negotiating the unique aspects of health care in Germany. They concurrently developed systems to support our wounded warriors in Schweinfurt and Landstuhl.  Honoring the fallen of the Dagger BCT through professional memorial ceremonies and assisting family members. In this task, Guardian could not fail; formed and enabling them to be self-reliant, informed, and fulfilled. It is becoming an axiom that the Army recruits soldiers, but it retains families. To sustain the effort for the long term, it is critical that families understand the need for their sacrifice and a BCT demonstrates a commitment to mitigate their burden in every way possible. Also, effective home station operations are impossible if the “us here/them there” mentality prevails. Soldiers in Schweinfurt were in touch with the realities of life in theater, and their efforts clearly related to enabling the success of the entire BCT.  Receiving, processing, equipping, and training incoming soldiers to deploy. Guardian never forgot where the main effort was. Personnel actions in USAREUR are complicated by transformation, stop-losses, a diminishing manpower footprint, and the oddity of the date of expected return from overseas (DEROS) system. TF Guardian overcame this friction to ensure that every eligible soldier not permanently assigned to a position in the Guardian task organization arrived at the fight within 45 days. During OIF 06- 08, TF Guardian trained and deployed more than 500 soldiers.  Maintaining and improving property, facilities, and left-behind equipment. Deployment represents a unique opportunity to recapitalize infrastructure during times of limited usage. TF Guardian provided the leadership energy to ensure that Schweinfurt retained its capacity for resetting and retraining the BCT.  Supporting the deployment and redeployment of Dagger BCT; planning, coordinating, and supporting reintegration for Dagger BCT. Not only did TF Guardian function as a command post for the BCT, it freed the BCT to concentrate on operations in theater by assuming oversight of deployment and redeployment. This ensured Dagger’s ability to maintain the maximum combat power forward. Forming the Team Once our MDMP provided the key tasks, Dagger 6 established the task organization for the task force. TF Guardian was led by a lieutenant colonel, a captain executive officer, and a task force sergeant major. The TF staff represented every it is the cornerstone that demonstrates that soldiers in the Dagger BCT exist in a two-way relationship. Loyalty, a core value, extends not only to the command, but from the command. TF Guardian executed 59 memorial ceremonies from across the command. Every leader present attended along with the entire task force.  Caring for Dagger BCT wounded by ensuring they received professional medical care and organizing visits to hospitalized patients. This is not solely the responsibility of the medical community. Every wounded soldier received a visit from their chain of command the day of their arrival in Germany. TF Guardian supported soldiers’ administrative and personal requirements outside the hospital. Also, Guardian played a key role in notifying family members of wounded soldiers and coordinating visits to distant facilities.  Working in conjunction with FRGs to establish outreach programs to contact family members and engage them throughout the deployment. Study after study demonstrates that families cope best with deployment when they are part of the team, not glued to the 24-hour news networks. Powerful FRGs provided the most effective partnership organization for TF Guardian, while concurrently providing a vital network of support. They understood the military family situation in-nately and relieved the chain of command from the necessity to resolve all but the most serious challenges.  Empowering families and TF Guardian soldiers to thrive as members of the Dagger BCT by keeping them in- — 41 normally constituted staff section with primary staff in the grade of E-7 or above. Each forward deployed battalion constituted a D Company, not a rear detachment. Delta companies had a permanent establishment of one commander in the rank of captain, one first sergeant, and a company noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC)/family readiness liaison (FRL) in the grade of E-6 or above for each deployed company within the battalion. These company NCOICs were rated as platoon sergeants since their units operated as enhanced platoons. TF Guardian’s policy acknowledged these nontraditional duty descriptions, but it was essential for promotion boards to understand the performance and potential of all the leaders selected. Therefore, the term “rear detachment” did not appear in any evaluation. Delta company commanders were rated alongside all other commanders in a battalion, as were company first sergeants; they had a clear, published rating chain and standards for performance. The 2d BCT attached the delta companies to TF Guardian when the brigade initially task organized 8 months prior to deployment. Further, the BCT’s four separate companies’ home station efforts were consolidated under a single commander and first sergeant and formed “Team Patriot.” Over the course of the deployment, these companies varied in strength from 10 to 200 soldiers as wounded soldiers, new arrivals, and intra-theater transfers from returning units arrived in Schweinfurt. See Figure 1 for Guardian’s organization chart. The next priority was establishing Guardian’s mission essential task list (METL) and training soldiers. This effort was an integrated part of the BCT’s full force training and mission rehearsal exercises. TF Guardian’s METL was fully nested within that of Dagger BCT and 1ID, and the following missions and key tasks:  Command and control Task Force Guardian.  Sustain effective Family Readiness Groups.  Enable family members to be informed, self-reliant, and fulfilled.  Maintain and improve property, facilities, and left-behind equipment.  Receive, process, equip, and train incoming soldiers for deployment.  Honor the fallen and care for Dagger wounded.  Support Dagger BCT deployment, redeployment, and reintegration. Training and Certifying the Team TF Guardian leaders and soldiers had to be trained on non-MOS specific and specific tasks for home station operations. The TF Guardian commander identified the requirement to bring subject-matter experts to Schweinfurt to train TF Guardian soldiers on their duties and responsibilities. This empowered leaders to understand the linkages between regulations, policy, and local military community practices. This approach developed TF Guardian soldiers as experts in navigating the myriad agencies associated with soldier and family support, and also helped develop functional relationships between the Guardian team and the garrison team. As the Dagger BCT entered its collective training cycle, TF Guardian began collective training and certification focused on their METL. The systems and techniques established as the BCT “deployed” to the Joint Multinational Training Center (JMTC) and Joint Maneuver Readiness Center (JMRC) were critical to later success during deployment. The task force validated reporting formats, conducted video teleconferences with the training units, and established its ability to communicate using secure communications. Guardian received incoming soldiers, coordinated individual readiness training, and moved them forward to train with the BCT at JMRC. Soldiers evacuated from the training units for any reason (emergency leave, family additions, soldiers injured during training) were assisted using the same procedures established for soldiers returning from Iraq. This emphasis on validating METL tasks under real conditions and distances from the supported BCT was essential to success in the year to come. TF Guardian conducted casualty notification training with the aid of volunteers from the local community. The training was so realistic that one notification officer reported, “If I ever have to do this again, it will be the second notification that I do.” Likewise, TF Guardian conducted a full-dress memorial ceremony rehearsal. The rehearsal exercised every step from the deployed unit’s requirements, through the unit’sown memorial ceremony “in theater,” to the ceremony conducted in Schweinfurt with full military honors with FRG leaders in attendance to further validate the totality of processes and actions associated with this vital event. Home station operations are not business as usual for most units. They involve unique challenges of distance, anticipated events, and battle handover. Failing to train with the supported BCT is a “Every wounded soldier received a visit from their chain of command the day of their arrival in Germany. TF Guardian supported soldiers’ administrative and personal requirements outside the hospital. Also, Guardian played a key role in notifying family members of wounded soldiers and coordinating visits to distant facilities.” 42 —

D 299 D 9 D 1-7 D 1-77 D 1-26 D 1-18

Task Force Guardian Organization Chart recipe for failure when the time for execution arrives. The nested, deliberate training plan of TF Guardian left no soldier questioning how to execute this complicated mission set. Command and Control: Who Does What The key to success in home station operations is identifying the resources required from each level of command, such as processing personnel actions, budgetary responsibility, and command reporting, and then ensuring that these responsibilities are acknowledged by all parties. Just as we no longer fight on a linear battlefield, units at home station may no longer have linear command and control relationships. At one time, TF Guardian conducted command reporting through 1AD’s TF Iron Sentinel, some personnel actions directly with V Corps, and maintenance operations funded through USAREUR. They were able to do this quite effectively through clear and explicit handovers of responsibility as other headquarters entered and exited Europe. TF Guardian functioned as a command and control node for the Dagger BCT in USAREUR. Guardian was the key communication node for all facets of operations that transited Europe. Obviously, this included movement control and tracking the deployment and redeployment of the BCT, but it also included tracking individual soldiers entering and exiting Iraq. This required liaison officers (LNOs) at major transportation nodes, some temporary and others permanent. Guardian had a permanent LNO at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC) and established temporary LNOs, as needed, at Ramstein Air Base, Headquarters, 1AD, and even with USAG Schweinfurt during critical events. These LNO cells were critical for ensuring that the correct leaders had communications at the right time and place. Volunteers were a critical source of reinforcements to the unit. Many of the BCT’s spouses worked in community agencies or had key skills that enhanced our knowledge base. Other volunteers led community and unit activities that might fall dormant with half of Schweinfurt’s American community absent. Most importantly, our FRGs were integrated parts of the command, control, and support systems. The network of support available through the FRGs relieves military leaders of the responsibility to provide immediate care. Guardian could be rapidly overwhelmed by the friction of maintaining adequate quality of life to families without these efforts. Command, Control, and Teamwork with FRGs It is simply impossible to recount all the individual acts that accomplished Guardian’s mission. Guardian regularly planned activities to ensure family mem-Figure 1 — 43 bers felt the same sense of ownership and belonging that uniformed members felt. Further, USAREUR resourced the BCT and its battalions with family readiness support assistants (FRSAs) and they served as administrative assistants to the Guardian headquarters and in every delta company. Close, continuous contact and interaction with volunteers brought a better understanding of community and family support shortfalls to the command’s attention. FRSAs serve as liaisons, sounding boards, event coordinators, and administrative assistants for both the commander and FRG leader. They are a tremendous additional resource for maintaining continuity within FRG organizations. Many of our FRSAs were retired military leaders who had lived in the community for many years, which went along way to eliminating friction and solving problems. As this USAREUR program continues, these FRSAs will become the equivalent of the battalion master gunner in facilitating quality FRG events. Volunteers Deserve Recognition and are Needed Volunteer recognition ceremonies are essential to a strong volunteer force. If the Army cannot reward their efforts monetarily, every effort is required to show respect for those who see someone else’s need and fulfill it. The process was both democratic and standards-based with steering committees nominating those worthy of recognition and TF Guardian leaders vetting the recommendations to ensure they conformed to established policies for awards. The process was published in Guardian policy letters and closely modeled from the Army’sown procedure for recommending awards, which ensured integrity was maintained. Ceremonies were carefully planned, held monthly, and rehearsed for accuracy, appropriate duration, and cost-free for recipients. Whenever possible, distinguished visitors were invited to attend and speak. Sustaining the Effort Unit status reporting (USR) is normally deferred for deployed units; however, the needs that led to creating USR remain. TF Guardian maintained a personnel-centric USR that tracked the status of every assigned soldier, including permanent cadre, arrivals to Schweinfurt, transfers from a redeployed unit, injured soldiers, individual readiness training (IRT), and so on. This report provided a common format to communicate our status across the formation and to higher headquarters. Units at home station vary dramatically in strength from month to month as soldiers transition the formation. A clear USR format, routinely reconciled, provides clarity and precision to recurrent status inquiries. Management of table of organization and equipment (TOE) property is constrained by numerous policies, regulations, and laws. At the beginning of the deployment, all non-deploying organizational equipment was formally transferred to the property books of delta company commanders. However, this was not a static process; property was constantly transiting in and out of Iraq as soldiers deployed and returned. TF Guardian required a dedicated property book team to ensure that property leaving Schweinfurt was properly laterally transferred to the property books of the gaining unit in Iraq. Lack of a dedicated property team could result in numerous and needless inquiries into liability for lost property. Finally, the transformation effort within the BCT continued, even while the unit was deployed. For example, 57th Signal Company did not deploy more than 50 major end items of their MTOE made superfluous by their conversion to the JNN MTOE. Many of the items were needed elsewhere in the Army and TF Guardian’s ability to execute lateral transfers and turn-ins proved to be a combat multiplier to the unit and the Army. A final logistics issue was properly handling fundraising and donations to support the BCT. The legal ramifications for “Not only did TF Guardian function as a command post for the BCT, it freed the BCT to concentrate on operations in theater by assuming oversight of deployment and redeployment. This ensured Dagger’s ability to maintain maximum combat power forward.” 44 — how funds are raised, accounted for, and distributed are, to understate, complicated. TF Guardian leveraged the capabilities of the Schweinfurt Law Center and the FRSAs to ensure that it complied with law, tax codes, and Army regulation. A key breakthrough was the establishment of the Dagger Guardian Association, anon-profit, private organization dedicated to supporting the BCT in Schweinfurt and forward deployed. Staffed by volunteers, this organization complies with laws regarding the solicitation of funds by Government representatives, while ensuring that every available asset is brought to bear in support of soldiers and families. TF Guardian was a support unit acting in an economy of force role. If Dagger BCT diverted assets from the main effort in Iraq to reinforce home station, the mission suffered a major defeat. In deployment and redeployment, TF Guardian became the main effort and was reinforced by advance or trail parties as appropriate. If Guardian held on to personnel eligible for service in Iraq to accomplish home station tasks, then it was stealing resources from the main effort and the Army at large. If cadre were not trained and ready to reinforce the main effort on demand, the effect was the same. Every deployable soldier in TF Guardian was individual readiness training (IRT) qualified and equipped to deploy within 48 hours of notification. Finally, any family or military problem resident in Schweinfurt that required attention in the form of time or other resources of the command in Iraq, or if any joint problem (a power of attorney, for instance) failed through Guardian’s inaction, TF Guardian had failed. Being mindful that failure is a possibility reinforced the sense of urgency and mission orientation that drove Guardian to success. A Model for Transformation As the Army continues to transform, there are advocates for building the capabilities resident in TF Guardian into local garrison commands. This is not only ill-advised, but impractical as long as tactical and garrison commands operate under different chains of command such as USAREUR and Installation Management Agency-Europe (IMA-E). Transferring the TF Guardian role to the USAG violates the fundamental military principle of unity of command and, ultimately, unity of effort as priorities between the two chains of command are not always nested. Adapting the U. S. Army Transformation in Europe model to formally identify the senior military commander of the installation as both the tactical and garrison commander provides an opportunity worth exploring. For now, we advise against placing Guardian responsibilities under the USAG. It is possible to task organize soldiers and families into a cohesive unit, but even the Army is incapable of severing the bond between soldier and family. General Sherman remarked: “Man has two supreme loyalties — to country and to family… As long as their families are safe, they will defend their country, believing that by their sacrifice, they are safeguarding their families also. But even the bonds of patriotism, discipline, and comradeship are loosened when the family itself is threatened.” Families cannot be divorced from the BCT’s chain of command or command responsibilities. Regardless of the notion that USAG and IMA are designed to relieve the senior tactical commander of garrison command responsibilities, commanders are responsible for the welfare of soldiers and family members of the tactical unit, and thus, in practice, heavily involved, along with the command team’s spouses, in day-to-day operations of the garrison command. Formally subordinat-ing USAG and its directorates to the BCT would result in the current garrison commander being identified as the deputy commanding officer-staff (DCO-S) of the BCT. Each directorate of the garrison command would work as deputies to the BCT’s primary staff officers. Upon deployment of the warfighting units of the BCT, the DCO-S could then assume command as TF Guardian and provide the continuity of a unified command of enduring, non-deploying directorate heads. This organization would provide a more powerful sustainment capability to the force, one that is more willing and able to formally integrate family members of the deployed force into decisionmaking bodies. Until Then… Army units will continue to deploy and redeploy regularly from a fixed home station. The concept of home station as merely a deployment node from which both units and families would depart to be replaced by follow-on formations is outdated and amateurish. The ability of news, rumor, fact, and misinformation to transit in and out of the combat zone in a matter of minutes makes a formed and focused task force the only element capable of winning the information fight at home station. One soldier or family member standing before dilapidated housing can discredit the entire Army. Conversely, a spouse who testifies before CNN cameras during a visit by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that “I’ve never been anywhere where the soldiers tried harder to help,” is a battle won. General McKiernan, USAREUR Commander, recognized TF Guardian as “an example for the Army of how to do this business.” General Craddock, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe said that, “Task Force Guardian is the model for the Army of the future and needs to be studied and emulated.” Colonel J. B. Burton is currently assigned to the Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of the Army, Washington, DC. He received a B. A. from Middle Tennessee State University, an M. A. from Webster University, an MMAS from the School of Advanced Military Studies, and an M. A from the Naval War College. His military education includes the Infantry Officer Basic Course, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, and U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, Schweinfurt, Germany; G3, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Tikrit, Iraq; commander, 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX; and assistant division commander to the commanding general, U. S. Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Whittle is serving as commander, 1st Engineer Battalion, 1st Infantry Division (1ID), Fort Riley, KS. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy, an M. S. from University of Texas at Austin, and an MMAS from the School of Advanced Military Studies. His military education includes Engineer Officer Basic Course, Engineer Officer Advanced Course, and U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include XO, 9th Engineer Battalion, 1ID, Schweinfurt, GE; commander, Task Force Guardian, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 1ID, Schweinfurt; S3, 9th Engineer Battalion, 1ID, Tikrit, Iraq; XO to the commanding general, North Atlantic Division, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Hamilton, NY; and plans officer, G3, 1ID, Wurzburg, GE. Major Joseph Berg is currently pursuing a Masters degree in strategic intelligence at the National Defense Intelligence College. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Captain Career Course, and the Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, Team Patriot, 2d Brigade Combat Team (2BCT), 1ID, Schweinfurt, GE; assistant operations officer, 2BCT, 1ID, Schweinfurt; deputy G3 (training) and division battle captain, 1ID, Wurzburg; and XO, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, Fort Hood, Texas. — 45