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ARMOR · May-June 2009

Developing Intelligence to Drive Follow-on Missions

Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Broadwater
pp. 15–19Features2009

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Developing Intelligence to Drive Follow-on Missions by Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Broadwater Developing and collecting intelligence that leads to follow-on missions is the goal of every patrol within every unit in any environment. Patrols are tasked to answer commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) or enhance situational understanding. Properly preparing patrols, incorporating enablers into operations, and conducting detailed analysis support a unit’s ability to achieve its stated purpose and enables reallocation of combat power for other missions. Focusing patrols to collect intelligence means that everyone must first understand what is important to the commander. Staffs and subordinate commanders must understand the commander’s intent and purpose of the mission to help develop CCIR that are nested and understood by all. Priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and friendly force information requirements (FFIR) help commanders make a well-informed decision. Some decisions are easier to identify than others in a continuous environment. Decisions are developed from each line of effort (LOE) and concentrate on moving the formation forward to achieve the next intermediate objective within each associated LOE. Most units have a solid understanding of information gaps, such as target location, additional details about the physical description of the target, and patterns of life, which must be answered to action a lethal target, but struggle to identify information voids required for nonlethal target execution. Analyzing and visualizing potential decisions beforehand and what the project will achieve at endstate will help. CCIR must constantly be reviewed to ensure the unit remains focused in the right direction as conditions are constantly changing. It could be that the wrong information is being collected because conditions change, the focus has shifted within the population, or the enemy has adjusted its actions based on how coalition forces are operating. Once the commander’s guidance is articulated and understood by all, subordinate commanders and staff then focus on developing specific information requirements (SIR) to collect, allocate resources, and request additional enablers where gaps exist in the collection plan. Realizing, for some targets, all the required information will take time to collect before the target becomes actionable, a system must be in place to store all the intelligence as it becomes more refined. The chart in Figure 1 is a very simple tool that can be used at platoon and company levels to help any unit keep up with information as it is answered. Once information is collected, it is color-coded green, yellow, or red depending on if the SIR were completely, partially, or not answered. The information is then stored until all pertinent information requirements are met and the target becomes actionable. Other information can be added to the sheet, depending on the unit’s desires, such as a high pay-off target list (HPTL) to increase situational awareness. The patrol operations order (OPORD) and the pre-brief are two important steps in ensuring all members of the patrol know and understand what information is to be collected and the recon focus before mission execution. The patrol pre-brief serves as a method for leaders to update all patrol members on current enemy and friendly situations in the area of operations (AO), concentrating on significant activities over the past 24-hour time period and any updates or changes to the recon focus. By doing this, all members of the patrol have the most current information before mission execution. Close interaction between the intelligence support team (IST), S2, and S3 is paramount to maintain persistence so that the information given to patrols remains current and constantly updated. The rehearsal remains a key component to developing actionable intelligence as it provides time for the patrol to verify all soldiers understand what information is going to be collected and that enablers and special equipment are ready for the mission. The patrol has many pieces of equipment, such as handheld interagency identity detection equipment (HIIDES) and robotics, for use at IED and cache locations that must be checked and uploaded regularly. All members of the patrol must understand how to properly use X-Spray and how to handle evidence and prepare appropriate documentation prior to the evidence being collected. The integration of human intelligence collection teams (HCT), psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs (CA), explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), weapons intelligence team (WIT), human terrain teams, interpreters, and, most importantly, host-nation security forces greatly enhance the likelihood that SIR will be collected, but requires extensive time to rehearse and ensure everyone understands their roles and responsibilities. Sharing information with coalition partners not only helps everyone better understand the sources of instability and threat, it also ensures all forces have unity of effort within the AO. All parties stay nested by verifying they are targeting the same individuals and enemy cells. The best way to do this is through a multinational targeting meeting that includes all security forces, as well as key leaders, operating in the AO. Key leaders can help with the information and consequence management phases of the operation by explaining to the population why an individual was detained by security forces. Target packets and other products must be translated and declassified. Multiple interpreters must be available to translate and record the information to ensure it is properly disseminated to all parties. The meeting also ensures that everyone understands which nonlethal targets are being executed and what effect they might have on the population. If local security forces know the current status of a lengthy project in their area, they can have a huge calming effect on the population by showing the people that their leaders are working toward a solution. Combined targeting meetings also teach and establish standards/triggers for mission execution with host-nation units, giving them credibility with the population once an individual is detained. Enforcing Figure 1 16 — May-June 2009 AO BONE Weekly Recon tasks for 20 SEP 2008 Ashraf Tariq Abdul-Qahhar (Al Jaff Senior Leader) – responsible for coordinating AQI activities between senior leader and groups in Al Jaff. Hashim Baktiyar (Al Wahde AQI Leadership) – Finances, develops, and executes attacks against Coalition forces in Khadaa Wadhe. Left after raid of his house in August

2007. Current reporting has him out of the country. Amr Faqih Ghazi – IED emplacer and arms supplier works directly under Jamal Idris Husam. Basil Fadi al Din – cousin of Akil Hatim Sahib, sniper responsible for shooting an American soldier. Last Seen vic of Kut Adeera. Abdul Hussein (Al Jaff Cell) – responsible for coordinating insurgent activities between the Al Karma Cell and an insurgent group in Khadaa Wasl. Idris Dabir Muta (Kut Adeera Cell) – responsible for emplacing IEDs. He holds daily meetings with Hashim Baktiyar’s insurgent group in a mosque in Al Wadhe. HUMINT reports say he left the area after raid of his house in April 07; location unknown. Jabir Cernal Alaa (formerly Bobcat) – in charge of a terrorist cell that conducts sniper, IED, and mortar attacks. Believed to have left the area; location unknown. Fakir Uthman (possibly Market or SEO) – mid-level terrorist in Market and Bobcat. Responsible for multiple murders in Kifri. Believed to have left area for possibly Laqlaq or Tawuq. Ubaid Shadi (Al Zahoor Cell) – IED emplacer and arms supplier. Talal Saraj (Al Zahoor Cell) – Allegedly transports weapons for the cell and works directly for Ubaid Shadi. R Not answered A Partially answered G Answered Bone Trooper TASKS/SIR

1. Take pics of vehicle make, model, and license located at 38S NV 3990696238; Take pics of house; it’s supposed to be residence of Talal Saraj (HPT #10). (PIR#3)

2. Area Recon Fakir Utham’s house at 38SNV4012995605. Search for weapons especially PKCs and RPGs (HPT # 8). (PIR#3)

3. Photograph the residence of Ubaid Shadi at

38S NV 4012995605. (PIR#3)

4. Area Recon, method cordon and knock the homes of Ashraf Tariq Abdul-Qahhar, Abdul Hussein, and Khalid Ahmed Saleh Alhabi, suspected IED emplacers. Look for IEDs and IED components in each of the homes. The three residences are located at 38SNV4010995779, 38SNV4035395651, and 38S

NV4014095747. (PIR#1)

5. Take a picture of Abdul Hussein, as well as any MAMs in the area. (Contractor for wall project)

6. Report to CAT-A the schedule of when schools will be in session.

7. Take a picture of Ubaid Shaid’s house at NV4035395651. Take pic of MAM’s near house. A G R R A R R In Troop AO Outside of Troop AO / In Squadron AO SQDN HPT List (as of 20 SEP 08)

SQDN PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE

REQUIREMENTS

1. Is Ashraf Tariq Abdul-Qahhar still operating in the AO?

2. Is Hashim Baktiyar still operating in the AO?

3. Are Illegal checkpoints still being conducted IVO the Al Zahoor? If so, where are they being conducted, by who, and where are the bodies being taken?

4. Are insurgent groups in the Al Karma Area planning attacks? If there are attacks being planned, what are the targets? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 evidence collection and teaching host-nation units how to collect evidence is extremely difficult. Figure 2 is an example battle drill used to help separate security forces understand what is expected at a crime scene, and how each security force can use its unique capabilities to work together to develop intelligence at the scene. During mission execution, synchronizing the maneuvering force with additional sensors that cue, mix, or layer can be difficult if not rehearsed and all parties understand the capabilities and limitations of each asset. Tactical unmanned aerial systems (TUAS), such as Raven and Shadow, help provide additional security to a maneuvering unit. TUAS enablers can also act independently and re-harvest combat power. Ground forces can action in one area while TUAS assets are focused in another, which allows the unit to collect on multiple targeted areas of interest (TAI) simultaneously. Adding signal intelligence (SIGINT) capability is the most complex and challenging enabler to incorporate into formations, but greatly enhances collection and development of enemy network structures. The main issue units experience during mission execution is conducting incomplete tactical site exploitation (TSE). Units fail to fully exploit an objective by not allowing soldiers, EOD, and WIT adequate time to collect valuable intelligence or evidence once the area is secure. The unit must reinforce the idea that every tactical site, such as an IED found or detonated, a cache discovered, or raid conducted, must be inspected as meticulously as a crime scene to gather all possible evidence that will lead to a follow-on mission or prosecution of an individual in the host nation judicial system. Leaders must ensure their soldiers and host-nation soldiers wear gloves, and that all possible evidence is collected without being destroyed so it can be analyzed. A cigarette butt, coke can, string of tape, or blast fragment can contain fingerprints or DNA that can be analyzed by agencies and result in leads to an enemy network or irrefutable evidence in a detainment. Minimum Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE) Kit Contents  TSE bag to carry exploitation contents to and from target location.  Digital camera to document the scene and evidence collected (never enough pictures). HIIDE systems.  Batteries (AA/AAA) for cameras, flashlights, wand.  Graph sketch pads to sketch target locations.  CD case to store media to prevent evidence damage/destruction. Figure 2 May-June 2009 — 17 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

ADHAMIYAH SECURITY FORCES

DEAD BODY RESPONSE BATTLE DRILL

TTP STEPS

Dead body reported to Adhamiyah local police. Local police respond to the murder scene, cordon off the area without touching anything and immediately canvas the immediate area for witnesses (car type, description of person, time of crime, location). Local police dispatcher alerts high crimes that they need an investigator, then coordinate with the Adhamiyah patrol police to pick up the investigator and take him to the scene if no local police are available. Adhamiyah patrol police arrive on the scene and assist local police in security and interviewing witnesses. If necessary, Iraqi army is called to the scene to further assist in security. Murder investigator takes photographs of the scene, collects evidence, such as bullet casings, and assesses bodily injuries. Once the investigator is finished with the crime scene, the local police load the body to transport it to the DJSS while the investigator talks to any witnesses to gather more intel. Once the investigator has talked to witnesses, taken statements, and obtained contact information, the local police cordon and additional security collapse and return to their respective stations. The dead body is brought to the DJSS to be documented by coalition forces then taken to medical city to await identification by the family.

 Chain of custody tags.  Chalk (multicolored) for room numbering.  Chemlites (multiple colors) to mark evidence consolidation points.  Duct tape to secure evidence, mark areas, etc.  Forms such as Arabic sworn statement forms, bilingual evidence inventory form, team evidence inventory forms, etc.  Evidence tape for marking/sealing evidence.  Flashlight for searching dark areas.  Goggles (blacked out) to blindfold detainees.  Heavy-duty trash bags to carry and consolidate evidence.  Packages of latex gloves; very important to maintain integrity of the evidence.  Measuring reference rules (metal) for photograph relationship and drawing the sketch.  Metal detector wand for searching females or detecting metal.  Paper for notes, sketches, etc.  Paper bags/burn bags for placing large items or to preserve latent prints.  Property tags to tag various pieces of equipment.  Sharpie permanent markers to mark evidence bags, etc.  Zip ties to secure prisoners or weapons.  Ziploc bags (multiple size) to hold/ secure evidence. Analyzing information collected and turning it into intelligence is extremely time-consuming. How a unit is organized at the squadron/battalion and troop/company levels is a major decision leaders will make because it requires individual soldiers to be reallocated from other roles and formations. There is no magical number of soldiers required to man the IST at the company level or enhance the battalion S2 section; it depends on the talent level and experience within each team. Principally, the IST needs to be resourced to conduct analysis to develop lethal and nonlethal targets, maintain both enemy and friendly situational awareness, and maintain all forms of intelligence/evidence collected to exploit each incident. Managing microgrants and tip-line calls, and monitoring the progress of essential service projects and numerous other systems and sources of information that the company is collecting and executing, requires a company commander to have a committed staff. The IST must be able to assist the commander in analyzing and assessing the problem set they are facing so the commander can articulate his assessment and recommendations to the battalion. Everyone, from the soldier on patrol to the battalion commander, has a hand in the analysis of information collected. The three most important items the commander adds to the unit’s system include focus through his CCIR, allowing subordinate commanders and analysts the freedom to Figure 3 18 — May-June 2009 Troop OPERATIONS Refine PIR/SIR to fit Troop AO Establish Patrol Schedule based off Patterns of Life/Trend Analysis Conducts deliberate operations S2/S3 Fusion feeds Orders Process Identifies updated HPTL that should be bottom fed from troops Troop IST Inputs Biometric Data Pattern Analysis Link Analysis Patrol Debriefs Tips

HCT

Receives INSTUM / OPSUM / FRAGOs Troop IST Inputs Conducts Pre-brief Updates SA Updates BOLO Updates BATS/HIIDE Updates Detainee/ Suspect/Protect List

PATROL EXECUTION

Combat Information Feeds Intelligence Process S2 Refines HPTL, PIR, SIR, INTSUM, ISR Plan S3 produces Specific Orders and Requests (SOR), ISR Plan, FRAGO, CONOPs Developing Actionable Intelligence Developing Actionable Intelligence make and develop opinions and recommendations based on analysis, and his personal assessment. The commander must constantly shape his assessment as he will be the best collector of information in his AO, but he must ensure he shares this information with everyone. He is no different than any other intelligence collector in the unit; the information he collects must be disseminated not only to subordinate commanders, but to his staffs as well. The S2 and S3 have the lead in the unit’s collection plan, but additional staff personnel must assist in the process. For example, EOD and WIT must maintain situational awareness on evidence such as fingerprints collected and turned over to other sources for additional analysis. They can also help develop and analyze enemy patterns for developing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), analyze similarities/differences between enemy cells/groups working within the AO, and coordinate with adjacent units to assess trends or find supply routes. PSYOP and civil affairs disseminate debriefs to ensure that current prioritized projects have a positive impact in the community and meet the expectations of the community and the commander’s intent. They can also help analyze and assess the impact of wanted posters to determine if they meet the desired effect or have a negative impact. They can analyze if the good people, targeted to help influence the population, are achieving positive results and are working in concert with government officials. Lastly, the staff and IST must understand the system in which the intelligence will be disseminated within their organization to their higher headquarters and adjacent units. Maintaining fresh intelligence requires constant attention. There are many intelligence analysis database programs that can help organize information to maintain assessments, evidence, draft intelligence information reports (DIIRs), photos, and documents collected. Adding law-enforcement personnel can help the unit establish a system. Units can prepare for this task by developing a knowledge management system before deployment and practicing it daily. Using a multiechelon training approach during simple field problems, or taking a report with associated evidence in the form of a patrol debrief, is a valid technique. The information can be analyzed at the company level, passed to the battalion for further analysis using the intelligence digital architecture, and then stored so it can be retrieved at a later date. This system will help everyone understand the process before deployment. Collecting, analyzing, disseminating, and acting on intelligence takes time, a solid understanding of all the variables within the operating environment, attention to detail, and unyielding teamwork among all involved. Once all parties are operating at this level, a unit will achieve more throughout its lines of effort, using less combat power and other resources. Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Broadwater is currently serving as Cobra 7, senior armor/reconnaissance squadron trainer, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA. He received a B.S. from the University of Kentucky and a M.S. from the Naval Post Graduate School. His military education includes the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Armor Officer Advanced Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, Ranger School, and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, Fort Stewart, GA, and Iraq; and XO and S3, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, KS, and Iraq. “The patrol operations order (OPORD) and the pre-brief are two important steps in ensuring all members of the patrol know and understand what information is to be collected and the recon focus before mission execution. The patrol pre-brief serves as a method for leaders to update all patrol members on current enemy and friendly situations in the area of operations (AO), concentrating on significant activities over the past 24-hour time period and any updates or changes to the recon focus.” May-June 2009 — 19

End of indexed article

Citation

Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Broadwater. “Developing Intelligence to Drive Follow-on Missions.” ARMOR, May-June 2009, pp. 15-19.
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