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ARMOR · May-June 2009

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle and the Contemporary Operational Environment

Christopher D. Geeding and Thomas J. Stafford
pp. 10–11Features2009

Article

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The U. S. Army is fighting an enemy that gets to choose when and how it will engage or interact with our forces. This is the contemporary operational environment (COE) and is defined as the synergistic combination of all the critical variables and actors that create conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect military operations today and in the near- and midterm. Insurgents and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were the actors and variables that created the conditions within the COE for anew system — the mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle. MRAPs have saved lives and prevented injuries in the COE. Background The MRAP vehicles are a family of armored fighting vehicles designed to survive IED attacks and ambushes. While the MRAP program began as U. S. Marine Corps initiative, it became a joint program involving the U. S. Navy, U. S. Marine Corps, U. S. Army, U. S. Air Force, and U. S. Special Operations Command. All five of these groups were looking to acquire MRAP-type vehicles for a variety of mission profiles required during experiences in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. Based on COE requirements, the following joint urgent operational needs statements (JUONS) built the requirements for this type of vehicle: March 2006: U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Comprehensive Force Protection Initiative (CFPI) Platform Demonstration reviewed the worldwide state-of-the-art protected vehicles. May 2006: Multi National Force–West submitted JUONS for 185 medium mine protected vehicles. July 2006: Received second JUONS for 1,000 MRAP vehicles, which increased total requirement to 1,185; validated by Joint Requirements Oversight Council, December 2006. November 2006: U. S. Marine Corps Project Manager assigned to manage MRAP acquisition with Marine Corps Systems Command executing procure-ments for Department of Defense. January 2007: Designated Acquisition Category II by Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. “Insurgents and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were the actors and variables that created the conditions within the COE for anew system — the mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle. MRAPs have saved lives and prevented injuries in the COE.” 10 —

May 2007: Total vehicle requirement increased to 7,774. September 2007: Designated Joint Acquisition Category Incremental Development, Major Defense Acquisition Program by Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology. Army (Program Executive Office-Ground Combat Systems), Navy (Naval Facilities Engineering Command), Air Force, and Special Operations Command representatives integrated into Joint Program Office. September 2007: Joint interim vehicle requirement increased to 15,374. March 2008: Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved refined service and special operations command requirements, including cruising range for Army. MRAP Family of Vehicles The MRAP family of vehicles provides warfighters with a multi-mission platform capable of mitigating IEDs, underbody mines, and small-arms fire threats. These threats are currently the greatest casualty producers in overseas contingency operations. The term “MRAP” does not mean any one specific vehicle; it is a generic term intended to apply to vehicles from different manufacturers that meet a common set of capabilities. Each manufacturer provides a unique variant of the MRAP vehicle. The joint services are fielding these vehicles to improve force protection of units operating in high-threat areas of Iraq and Afghanistan. The U. S. Army Infantry Center was initially given proponency for the MRAP, with the Directorate of Combat Developments as the lead. As the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCOE) stood up in October 2008, the Mounted Requirements Division of the MCOE Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate took the lead for the Army’s MRAP effort, assuming the responsibility of representing the user, which refers to all deployed, or deploying, warfighters in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. The MCOE executed its mission by sending subject-matter experts (SMEs), who were soldiers with recent deployment experience, from the MCOE to various MRAP platform test sites. During initial platform testing, these SMEs worked with the Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA), Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), and Operational Test Command (OTC) to provide leaders and decisionmakers with professional military judgment and concerns on the MRAP family of vehicles. The MCOE is involved in all doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) areas of the program, includ-leaders and warfighters at all levels are informed of these limitations. The MRAP family of vehicles is not anew light tactical wheeled vehicle, nor is it an interim replacement for the HMMWV fleet or abridge to the joint light tactical vehicle (JLTV). The MRAP objective is to rapidly provide protected, effective, and suitable tactical mobility to deployed forces with force protection and survivability as critical attributes. Heavy emphasis on protection and survivability required trading expeditionary, transportability, maneuverability, and off-road capabilities. There are still concerns to be considered:  What role will the MRAP family of vehicles have outside the counterinsurgency/IED operational environment?  Considering the total core mission essential task list (CMETL) of the brigade combat teams, support brigades, and functional brigades, the MRAP addresses only a narrow portion of the CMETL support capability. In what other operational environment can the MRAP be employed?  Within its limitations, will the MRAP be an organic piece of equipment or a special item that can be drawn to fit the brigade’s needs within the COE? The Maneuver Center of Excellence continues to refine user requirements for the MRAP. We are using our expertise to determine the requirements for future wheeled and tracked vehicles. Chris Geeding is a combat developer and operational architect, Mounted Requirements Division, Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate, Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Knox, KY. His armor experience spans more than 30 years of total service as a Department of the Army Civilian and an active duty armor soldier. Thomas Stafford is currently the lead MRAP combat development specialist, Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate, Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, GA. He received a B. S. from North Georgia College and an M. S. from the Florida Institute of Technology. During his career as an infantry officer, he served in various command and staff positions with the 2d Armored Division, 197th Infantry Brigade, and U. S. Army Materiel Command. ing operational needs statements coming out of each theater. The MCOE maintains constant communications with both the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of operation, and the MRAP project manager, to convey the warfighter’s needs and concerns. Too many times a program will focus on “cost and schedule” concerns and not on the warfighter’s concerns. We continue to send SMEs, serving as user representatives, to ensure the warfighter’s concerns come first. The MRAP program is a success story. By fielding the family of vehicles to the warfighter in unprecedented time, the MRAP program achieved its greatest accomplishment — saving lives. The MRAP does what it was designed to do and does it very well. There are limitations to the MRAP family of vehicles; however, the MCOE is working diligently to ensure — 11 “The term ‘MRAP’ does not mean any one specific vehicle; it is a generic term intended to apply to vehicles from different manufacturers that meet a common set of capabilities. Each manufacturer provides a unique variant of the MRAP vehicle. The joint services are fielding these vehicles to improve force protection of units operating in high-threat areas of Iraq and Afghanistan.”

End of indexed article

Citation

Christopher D. Geeding and Thomas J. Stafford. “Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle and the Contemporary Operational Environment.” ARMOR, May-June 2009, pp. 10-11.

Christopher D. Geeding and Thomas J. Stafford. “Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle and the Contemporary Operational Environment.” ARMOR, May-June 2009, pp. 10-11.

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