120mm Tank Ammunition: Extremely Lethal; Equally Safe

The Abrams tank has proven to be the most effective fighting platform on the battlefield today; whether training or executing combat operations against hostile forces, U. S. tankers continue to lead the way. As apart of the overall system, 120mm ammunition provides the high level of lethality required for the Abrams tank. While this lethality is well known, requirements also exist to make it as safe as possible for our tankers. Development Procedures During the development of 120mm ammunition, there are several phases which focus primarily on the safety aspects of our rounds. These phases are evaluated to ensure they conform to very rigid standards. These standards are outlined in the International Test Operations Procedures (ITOP), which are adhered to by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and France. The ITOP testing is divided into several major areas, which include hazards related to ammunition handling, transportation of ammunition, launch, flight, environmental conditions, and the compatibility of the ammunition with the weapons system regarding weapons safety. Several test facilities are required to fully evaluate each of the above areas. These facilities include:

• Firing ranges used to evaluate launch and flight characteristics.

• Temperature chambers that are capable of conditioning ammunition from -50 oF to +160 oF and can simulate relative humidity from 5 to 95 percent. These variations in temperature and humidity allow for simulation of environmental conditions found worldwide for storage and usage.

• Laboratory vibration equipment used to simulate transportation of ammunition, both packaged and unpackaged, at temperatures ranging from -50 oF to +160 oF.

• Drop test facilities used to simulate accidental packaged and unpackaged ammunition dropped from heights ranging from a few inches to 40 feet. One of the simulated incidents this facility can perform includes dropping a pallet or around from various heights; ammunition is dropped individually and in its palletized (shipping) configuration, as well as exposed from its packaging.

• Laboratory chemical facilities used to perform analyses on explosive filler exudation, propellant characteristics, and propellant stability. Testing: The Handling Phase Special environmental chambers are used to condition a tank round at various temperatures and humidity. This capability allows the ammunition to be tested — 47 under environmental conditions found worldwide. It takes 24 to 48 hours to condition the ammunition to a uniform temperature throughout the cartridge and propellant. These conditioned rounds are used during the vibration and drop testing. Vibration testing is accomplished in three phases: two phases use secured ammunition and the third phase is unsecured. Secured ammunition testing simulates transportation in the normal palletized shipping configuration by military truck or trailer for approximately 500 miles, which includes portions of paved and unpaved road surfaces. The rack vibration phase simulates 5,000 miles of transport in the tank, over paved, unpaved, and crosscountry roads, in its normal stowage location. Unsecured or loose cargo testing simulates unpackaged items, such as ammunition, weapons, and communication equipment, transported in a truck bed for 150 miles. During the secured cargo testing, a pallet of tank rounds is placed on a vibration table to simulate travel. As shown in the photo at left in Figure 1, the pallet has been conditioned to a cold temperature; the frost is still visible on the cans. The photo at right in Figure 1 is an example of rack vibration testing using a six-round tank hull ammunition rack. The ammunition is then subjected to storage tests consisting of hot-dry, hot-humid, and cold storage. Hot-dry testing cycles the ammunition from 160 oF at less than 5 percent humidity to 91 oF and 10 percent humidity for 7 days. The hot-humid test repeatedly cycles the ammunition from 105 oF and 90 percent humidity to 70 oF and 95 percent humidity over a 10-day period. The cold storage test consists of maintaining a temperature of -50 oF for 72 consecutive hours. During the loose (unsecured) cargo testing, unconstrained tank rounds, still in their original packaging, are set on vibration table fixtures to simulate rounds which may be transported outside of a banded pallet. (See Figure 2.) To pass the vibration testing phase, the ammunition, although possibly damaged, must not detonate or burn, and be safe to handle and properly disposed of, should the damage exceed the condemnation limits. If ammunition is visually undamaged, it must chamber successfully and be confirmed safe to fire. The second portion of the handling test involves dropping palletized rounds. The 2.1-meter drop test is conducted to simulate a sling-loaded pallet of ammunition Figure 1. The pallet above has been conditioned to a cold temperature for secured cargo testing. At right, a six-round tank hull ammunition rack undergoes vibration testing. Figure 2. Unconstrained tank rounds undergo loose (unsecured) cargo testing. 48 — isville. His military education includes Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course, Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course, Master Gunners Course, and Air Assault Course. During his career, he has served in various duty positions, to include senior armor trainer, Bosnia and Herzegovina; chief, Master Gunner Branch, Fort Knox, KY; first sergeant, A Company, 2d Battalion, 35th Armor, Fort Carson, CO; senior armor trainer, Technical Assistance Field Team, Republic of Yemen; and division master gunner, 2d Infantry Division, Korea. Cory Hubbard is currently a test engineer, U. S. Army Aberdeen Test Center, Firepower Directorate, Large Caliber Systems Division, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD. He received a B. S. from Pennsylvania State University. For the past 18 years, he has served as an engineering test director, specializing in ammunition performance and safety specifically for large caliber ammunition. being accidentally dropped from a hovering helicopter or a truck. (See Figure 3.) To pass this test, the ammunition must be confirmed safe to handle and fire. The 2.1-meter drop test is also conducted on individually packaged rounds with each round being dropped twice. Orientations for the drops are directed by the ITOP. The same rounds that were used in the 2.1-meter pallet drop and the 2.1-meter individual packaged drop are then subjected to the 1.5-meter bare drop. (See Figure 4.) The 1.5-meter bare drop test is conducted to simulate the accidental drop of unpackaged ammunition. Damage to the rounds during this testing phase is expected. However, regardless of the damage, the rounds must be safe to handle. If the rounds are deemed serviceable, they must be flight safe but are not required to meet performance criteria. Additionally, based on historical damage of tank rounds, the 1.5-meter height can be adjusted to a point where all, or nearly all, test items will be capable of being loaded and fired. It is implied that heights above this established standard would always damage around beyond the serviceability criteria, thus wasting rounds. The new established height used in this test (where all, or nearly all, test items will be capable of being loaded and fired) must be published in the test results. Simple release and drop mechanisms are used to conduct this test. Rounds are dropped at several different orientations: base down at 90 and 45 degrees; and horizontal and nose down at 90 and 45 degrees. The drop surface for these tests is a steel plate on a solid concrete base. We should note here that no electrical primers on the case base have ever detonated during the drop. Two additional tests are performed during ammunition development and include a 40-foot pallet drop and a 10-foot bare drop, which usually damage all of the rounds involved. The purpose of these tests is to ensure there is no burning or explosion and the rounds can be safely disposed of using standard explosive ordnance disposal procedures. All current configurations of training and tactical ammunition have passed these tests and once the handling phase of testing is completed, the ammunition will undergo additional testing prior to full release for field use. While the U. S. Army continues to teach care standards for storage, transportation, handling, maintenance, firing, and disposal of ammunition, safety is ultimately the responsibility of every person concerned. Safety is a state of mind, engendered from the top echelons of command down to the lowest working level through positive action and good leadership. Most accidents result from not applying proper safety principles. Wakeland Kuamoo is currently working as a contractor, Large Caliber Ammunition, Training and Doctrine Command Capabilities Manager-Heavy Brigade Combat Team, Fort Knox, KY. He received an A. A. from Pikes Peak Community College and a B. S. from University of Lou-Figure 3. The 2.1-meter drop test is conducted on a sling-loaded pallet. Figure 4. A 120mm tank round undergoes the 1.5-meter bare drop test. — 49

Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes 1968 – 1972 (Modern Southeast Asia Series), transcribed and edited by Lewis Sorley, Texas Tech University Press, 2004, 917 pp., $50.00 with photographs (hardcover) Few of us have the rare opportunity to sit in the highest councils and listen as men of power consider their situation, make decisions, and evaluate the results. Neither do we know of the enormous pressures that are brought to bear on them by their enemies, their superiors, their colleagues, and other institutions of power. For those of us of the Vietnam generation who have contemplated the forces under which we served, we owe a debt of gratitude to Bob Sorley for opening the windows of history and allowing us to be witness to 3½ years of candor from the legendary Creighton Abrams and his senior staff during his command of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). This is a sobering read not just for what it tells us about our youth, but a jolting opportunity to see the present more clearly. By adding to his growing list of important work regarding the Vietnam War, Dr. Sorley has added clarity to the past and opened the door for policymakers of today and tomorrow to make more informed decisions. America’s freedom and the lives of our warriors in harm’sway demands no less. The Abrams Tapes operates on three distinct levels of interest to the professional soldier and policymakers: the character of the men involved; the quality of their decisions; and the lessons that can be learned today and tomorrow. First, however, it is important to say a word about the extraordinary contributions of Retired Lieutenant Colonel Lewis S. Sorley III, transcriber and editor. This story would not be published without the dedication of this historian to wade through thousands of hours of tapes while making judgments about what to transcribe and what to discard. The transcription alone represents a heroic task of turning the spoken word into countless pages requiring accuracy and patience. The task of adding editorial comments for clarity and shaping a coherent history out of the material requires a craftsman of great skill. It is also important for the reader to understand that the story presented is through Dr. Sorley’s eyes. Another historian might well have presented a different view of the characters and events described. Regardless, this is a history of great value and adds enormous clarity and truth to America’s involvement in Vietnam. Passing through the MACV “Weekly Intelligence Estimate Update” (WIEU) briefings were most of the U. S. Army’s senior leaders of that era (June 1968–June 1972), as well as many of the Army’s future leaders. We get to hear from many of the important political figures of the day, as well as key military leaders from the U. S. Air Force and Navy. There are many candid comments and strong opinions about other political and military figures of the day. These briefings took place during periods of high drama, such as Tet, the invasions of Cambodia and Laos, and the incredible drawdown of forces after Richard Nixon was elected President. Given the incredible political restraints on the use of American military power, it is not hard to conceive of temptations to disregard or ignore the restrictive rules of engagement; however, only twice while reading Tapes did I find even a suggestion of disobedience (by an Air Force officer). There are many things to admire about the character of General Creighton Abrams, but the period of drawdown of forces in Vietnam from 500,000 to 100,000 from 1970-1972 is arguably his finest hour. He understood his orders and through rigorous planning and execution, exceeded the requirements. Was it the right thing to do? He understood his orders and did not flinch despite his personal misgivings. One target of criticism in the book by General Abrams and others is Ambassador Averill Harriman, chief U. S. negotiator at the Paris peace talks on Vietnam, who was not a participant in the WIEUs. Previously held in high regard by Abrams and others, Harriman’s contradictions of fact regarding North Vietnamese withdrawals during the bombing halts during 1969 created an enormous problem for American and Vietnamese forces on the ground. It was of great relief to General Abrams when Harriman was replaced by Henry Cabot Lodge, a former Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) from 1963 to 1964. Dr. Sorley is at his best in editing the story of General Abrams’ dramatic improvements in the organization of RVN forces that take the war to the North Vietnamese fighting in the south. Building up the regional/popular forces (RF/PF) that seized the initiative from the North Vietnamese was a tour de force of leadership in creating, motivating, arming, and training a country to defend itself. There was a heightening sense of possible victory during the 1970 timeframe when South Vietnam invaded Cambodia in Operation Lam Song IV. There was also a sense that the heavy losses inflicted on U. S. aviation support during that operation said equally as much about the capabilities and determination of the North Vietnamese. Ultimately, political decisions by the U. S. Congress to drop support sealed the victory for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. What then are the lessons of this book for today? For the professional soldier, it is simply George Patton’s famous remark, “I fight where I’m told, and I win where I fight!” Unfortunately, the U. S. Army’s ability to fight and win battles does not guarantee victory or ultimate success. Rarely, do we study the Philippine Insurgency of 1903-1918, where the U. S. Army was committed and supported by the political structure for 18 years. Deep into our current engagement in Iraq there is a sense that Panama, Grenada, and Desert Storm still represent the limit of America’s political patience. There is the famous response by Le Duc Tho to an American general’s assertion that America had won all of the tactical battles, “It was not relevant!” Members of the U. S. Army will take pride in the fact that a revered leader, General Creighton Abrams, was a commander of great vision, tenacity, and character. Faithful obedience to the Constitution is a soldier’s first obligation and our Army never wavered under his leadership. Further, his brilliance in devising strategies that wrested the initiative from the North Vietnamese is one of the untold stories clouded over by the antiwar movement. Finally, as we contemplate different conflicts under different circumstances, it is important to remember that it is not necessarily our invincible tactical and operational skills that ultimately win our wars, it is National will!

MG, U. S. Army, Retired Editor’s Note: Indiana University Press has released anew paperback edition of Lewis Sorley’s acclaimed biography, Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times. Except for the addition of anew introduction by the author, the text is identical to the original work published in 1992. Civil War Cavalry & Artillery Sabers: A Study of United States Cavalry and Artillery Sabers, 1833-1865 by John H. Thill man, Andrew Mowbray Publishing, 2001, 519 pp., bibliography, index, $79.95 (hardcover) What a great book! Until fairly recently, there has been a paucity of books on American arms collecting, particularly on swords. The one authoritative book, Harold Peterson’s The American Sword 1775-1945 was published in 1954, 54 years ago; only recently have new treatises been written, most with a very narrow focus. But now, John Thillman, with the able assistance and support of more than 100 other arms experts and collectors, gives us this definitive encyclopedic work on sabers. This book examines the various sabers manufactured, assembled, and sold by 50 companies in America and abroad from 1833 to 1865 for use by cavalry and artillery units before and during the Civil War. Profusely illustrated, the book has more than 1,100 photographs, plus numerous drawings, which detail the many variations between sabers. The text clearly shows Thillman’s monumental research effort; for example: “Only five manufacturers supplying the U. S. market made a model 1840 artillery officer’s saber. They were Schnitzler & Kirschbaum (S&K), Ames, Horstmann, Roby and Schuyler, and Hartley & Graham. The S&K sabers are very rare as only 54 type I sabers were contracted for the ordnance department in 1840 (they are all dated 1841 on the blade). The text also includes hundreds of tidbits, such as “General George Armstrong Custer used a model 1860 Roby (dated 1864) enlisted cavalry saber,” and “Major General Thomas, ‘The Rock of Chickamauga,’ used an enlisted S&K artillery saber in the 1840s and ’50s and an Ames enlisted model 1860 during the Civil War.” This fine book is a collector’s item and probably best suited for collectors. It has a hefty price, but is relatively inexpensive when you consider the enormous amount of detailed in- 50 — formation in the book. For the serious saber student, it’s a must have; for the rest of us, it’san intriguing and interesting read, both in learning about a unique subject and in reading the numerous anecdotes of cavalry and artillery actions during the Civil War. Congratulations to John Thillman for his Herculean efforts in researching and compiling this remarkable and very classy volume.

COL, U. S. Army, Retired On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Combat in War and in Peace by David Grossman and Loren Christensen, PPCT Research Publications; second edition, August 2007, 403 pp., $24.95 (paperback) One of the most difficult subjects warriors have to discuss is what happens in combat — they do not discuss how they felt before battle; they rarely discuss what happens during battle; and they are ashamed of what happens afterward. In On Combat, David Grossman explores what combatants experience physiologically, psychologically, physically, and emotionally before, during, and after combat. He wrote this book in collaboration with Loren Christensen, a veteran police officer. On Combat is a continuance of the ideas first put forth by Grossman in his book On Killing, which is an extension of Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall’s classic Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command. Men Against Fire explores the fact that during the World War II, 15 to 20 percent of combat infantrymen fired their weapons in combat. On Killing expounds on the fact that the U. S. Army took these statistics very seriously and began training differently. The Army began to use human-shaped silhouettes, instead of bulls-eyes, to condition soldiers to fire at human targets. Thus the firing ratio increased to 95 percent during the Vietnam War. The argument is then made that this is the reason for the proliferation of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Human beings naturally do not handle killing other human beings very well; in fact, it is repulsive, which is merely the psychological result of combat. On Combat is the natural extension to the physical; On Killing elaborates on conditioning the mind before battle and On Combat shows the aftereffects of combat on the human body. On Combat is broken down into four major sections: the first section discusses the physiology of combat; section two covers the physical distortions that occur during combat; section three discovers that some people are naturally disposed to combat while the vast majority are not; and the fourth section discusses the emotional fallout of combat. The effects of combat on the body are myriad. Grossman states that when warriors (and anyone placed in harm’sway such as soldiers, policemen, and firefighters), approach combat, adrenaline begins to pump through the body in unconscious anticipation of action. This increases the heart-rate to several different levels; white, yellow, red, gray, and black. The higher the heart-rate, the more primal the brain functions. As Grossman states, “human front, puppy midbrain, and reptilian brains stem.” White is the normal function, defined as “human front brain,” while black is the most extreme at over 180 bpm, defined as “brain stem functions.” Most combat occurs between the red and gray rate, which means that the brain functions automatically with no conscious thought — the body automatically does what it is trained to do. If the training is repetitious and correct, then during a crisis or combat, the action is automatic and correct. But if the training is sporadic and wrong, then one cannot think when one has to and the actions are wrong and deadly. Section two discusses other physical reactions to combat, which includes auditory loss, protecting hearing from gunfire, tunnel vision, and focusing on only one threat. Another common physical condition of combat exposure is shrinking capillaries, which explains why flesh wounds often do not bleed during a firefight. In this situation, training is an effective measure — if a combatant is trained to stop moving when hit by a paintball during training, he will react the same way during combat. If he trains to keep moving when hit by a paintball, then he will continue the mission during combat, and, if possible, seek cover and medical attention, thereby not exposing his comrades to fire as they try to save him. The third section of On Combat discusses the warrior’s role in society. He states that there are three types of people: those who kill; those who are killed; and those who protect the second group from being killed. He likens society to animals — the first group is wolves (predators), the second group is sheep, and the third is sheepdogs. He states that the sheep hate the wolf and despise the sheepdog because he reminds them of the wolf. Yet, when the wolf attacks, the entire flock hides behind the sheepdog, which protects them despite their earlier attitudes. This is the way of the warrior — he protects those who do not help themselves, yet they despise him for it. The only thing that sets the sheepdog apart from the wolf is a moral code and discipline. Finally, the book addresses conditioning. Grossman goes to great lengths to show the correlation between high crime and our thirst for violent entertainment. He states that the media industry is lacking in moral values for not regulating violence. He also discusses the fact that discipline is the deciding factor between the wolf and the sheepdog in society. The military trains within the aegis of discipline, the media does not. I found this to be an extraordinary book, one that I can relate to as a combat veteran; one that I wish was available prior to my own war. This book is an invaluable tool to teach new soldiers what to expect in combat, and what leaders expect of from their soldiers and from themselves. It shows the truths of properly trained soldiers and the consequences otherwise. Most importantly, this book provides combat leaders another tool for their rucksacks for discussing a soldier’s role in society. This is something I have used on numerous occasions, especially when my soldiers have a difficult time understanding why they are not always understood and even feared by those they are sworn to protect. All warriors should read this book.

The Highway War: A Marine Company Commander in Iraq by Major Seth W. B. Folsom, Potomac Books, Inc., Washington, DC, 2006, 424 pp., $29.95 (cloth) In his journalistic narrative, Major Folsom details his exploits as a U. S. Marine light armored vehicle (LAV) company commander (captain) in the early days of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He navigates the petty frustrations of the modern military at war from pre-deployment politicking, to ensure his unit’s inclusion in the coming offensive, through eventual deployment to Kuwait and the capture of Baghdad, and finally redeployment to the south of Iraq. Folsom paints a clear picture of his unit’s activities and his personal trials and tribulations while riddled with the insecurities common to a commander about to lead his troops in combat for the first time. Ineffectual higher headquarters, an insubordinate and incompetent platoon commander, and an opposing force that resists open combat on nearly every occasion are only a few of his daily difficulties. While clearly proud of the cohesive and professional unit he helped build and apparently genuinely touched by the warmth expressed by his subordinates, he is truly conflicted by the moral ambiguity of low-intensity conflict, in general, and his first close-quarters combat experience, in particular. Folsom avoids open critiques of the wisdom of the main effort and expresses no overt doubts about the legitimacy of the invasion (at least initially). Only when removed from the battlefield and training for duty as a foreign area officer does the text delve, albeit briefly, into the author’s doubt about both the utility of the Marine Corps as a peacekeeping force and the lack of a salient and viable exit strategy for American forces. This text largely ignores strategic issues surrounding the build-up, invasion, and occupation of Iraq. It is, however, a useful illustration of the personal challenges that small-unit leaders face in modern combat. Ranging from dealing with his first combat loss to the unique frustrations that specialty units feel when they believe they are being employed incorrectly, the text offers a glimpse into the thinking of a young cavalry officer on the uncertain modern battlefield. In all, Folsom provides an honest and forthright look at his experiences; this volume would be a solid addition to the library of any junior combat arms officer.