The Art and Science of War through the Lens of Contemporary Doctrine

Over the ages, volumes upon volumes have been written on the art and science of war. From antiquity to present day, arguments among theorists on whether war is an art or a science has taken place on the pages of their work. While opinions vary on what exactly war is — an art or a science — the conclusion is evident in reading primary theorists on the subject; it is both. Just as with any other argument, a common basis must be established for comparison and that basis should be common and relevant to the contemporary military professional. Using contemporary definitions provides a lens through which each of the theorists can be equally viewed. U. S. Army Field Manual 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, compares art and science: “Science deals with the study and method of a body of facts and processes based on principles from the physical or material world. Art, as opposed to science, requires expert performance of a specific skill using intuitive faculties that cannot be solely learned by study or education.”1 “The art of command lies in the conscious and skillful exercise of its authority to fulfill command responsibilities through decisionmaking and leadership. The true measure of the art of command is not whether a commander uses certain techniques or procedures, but if the techniques and procedures used were appropriate to the situation.”2 “Control, as contrasted with command, is more science than art. As such, it relies on objectivity, facts, empirical methods, and analysis.”3 In looking at contemporary doctrine, the science of war is process-centric and is based on study and education, whereas the art of war is performance-centric and based on talent and skill. Through the lens of contemporary doctrine, classical strategic writers viewed war as both an art and a science. Niccolo Machiavelli published several works on the conduct and execution of war. One piece is titled, like many others, Art of War. Had Machiavelli published his book today, and used the lens of contemporary doctrine, it would have been titled Science of War. His book focuses on the methods and the process of waging war. Machiavelli discusses the selection of soldiers, equipping the force, properly training it, and how to properly march an army.4 Most of Art of War details how to perform certain physical processes. In his work The Prince, Machiavelli opens the chapter, “That which Concerns a Prince on the Subject of the Art of War” with, “A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline…”5 This would focus the prince on the process, but with the purpose of its application in the execution of war. He insists that one should study “to exercise the intellect,” and that “the prince should read histories, and study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and defeat, so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former…”6 While Machiavelli’s prescribed study allows for its application in battle — the increase of a skill and fitting contemporary doctrine’s definition of “art,” — his writings center on war as a science. Very interestingly, this early writer captures the essence of war, that it is both an art and a science. His advocacy of study and education in the processes — 43 and principles of war to refine talent and cultivate skill allow for the increased ability to exercise the art of war. While this is not expressed directly by Machiavelli, it is inferred, just as it is with the other writers. Jomini approached war as an art, but an art form with rules — rules more overtly stated than Machiavelli’s. Jomini prescribes using a fixed set of principles as a guide in the application of the military art. In essence, Jomini advocates a system that is basically in use today — the study of war allows the use of principles and a refined doctrine which provides a set of instructions for battle captains. He wrote that, “Correct theories, founded upon the right principles, sustained by the actual events of war, and added to accurate military history, will form a true school of instruction for generals.”7 While Jomini does not go as far as to say this education is a replacement for talent or military genius, he does affirm that it produces “generals of sufficient skill.”8 There are several arguments over Jomini’s work and how it relates to Clausewitz’s (issues of jealousy, criticisms, etc.), but Jomini’s inability to codify war as an art or a science is seen in his vacillation between the levels of war. Jomini does concede that, “war in its ensemble is not a science, but an art,” but his writings focus on the process allowing for performance; Jomini believed in its execution, war is an art. This fits with contemporary doctrine definitions that war is both an art and a science and also leads to Clausewitz’s thoughts. Clausewitz’s works are probably the most difficult to read of any of the classical theorists. The best comparison is to the Bible. The Catholic Church prescribes reading the Bible over the course of 3 years, reading in small, related passages daily to allow for reflection. Clausewitz’s works are similar with one disadvantage — there has been no refinement or editing of his works. One very important consideration any Clausewitz reader needs to keep in mind is that his works were unfinished, that he was unable to edit, refine, or even delete passages based on how conclusions written later affected what he had thought — and written — earlier. At first glance, Clausewitz’s works appear to be full of rules and absolutes, rules and absolutes that the U. S. Army loves to quote and sprinkle through its various doctrinal manuals. Several passages seem to have been written as rules, which fit the modern definition of science; however, Clausewitz leans to the side of war being an art. His views on military genius and what he refers to as coup d’oeil allow insight on the value he places on talent. Through his works, Clausewitz deals with both absolutes and application, which is important to remember, because without actually doing so, leads to taking his words out of context — the related thought may well have been written later or may have still been in his head at his untimely death. The bottom line is that Clausewitz did not discount intelligence, education, or the study of history; much of his work resulted from studying Napoleon. He wrote throughout his writings, “It follows that the term ‘art of war’ is more suitable than the ‘science of war.’”9 Clausewitz simply placed a premium on talent and the ability to apply the military art. Clausewitz argues that opposite to art is not a mathematical science, but rather theoretical science. He writes that, “Theory should then be a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books…but this is simply in accordance with the scientific law of reason…never to construct an algebraic formula for use on the battlefield.”10 Again, like the Bible, the overarching philosophy of the entire work is important, not simply single passages, to allow the reader to gain a comprehensive understanding. One military writer who was influenced by Clausewitz is Moltke. Much of his thought is connected to Clausewitz, as evident throughout his writings, where he quotes Clausewitz several times. A book edited by Daniel J. Hughes, Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings, is a compilation of selected works authored by Moltke and translated into English. Much shorter than Clausewitz’s volumes, it is probably closer in size to what Clausewitz would have published had he not died due to cholera. Moltke contends that, “In war, as in art, we find no universal forms; in neither can a rule take the place of talent.”11 While in this passage Moltke acknowledges what is contemporary military science, he asserts that it is not replacement for talent, or in contemporary terms, military art. This is the opposite tact that Jomini takes. Moltke not only describes art as it relates to science, but he does so in the context of strategy as it relates to tactics in his assertion that war is both art and science. In fact, it is through the relationship of tactics and strategy that Moltke asserts the relationship of art and science is found in that, “…war becomes an art — an art, of course, which is served by many sciences.”12 Moltke argues that tactics requires a greater proportion of art than science, wherein strategy requires a greater amount of science than tactics. He wrote that, “Strategy furnishes tactics with the means for battle and assures probability of victory by directing the movements of the armies and bringing them together on the battlefield.”13 This does not condone “micromanagement;” rather, it introduces a concept persistent in contemporary doctrine, the concept of “nesting,” or ensuring that lower-echelon commanders fit their in- “ ‘The art of command lies in the conscious and skillful exercise of its authority to fulfill command responsibilities through decisionmaking and leadership. The true measure of the art of command is not whether a commander uses certain techniques or procedures, but if the techniques and procedures used were appropriate to the situation.’ ‘Control, as contrasted with command, is more science than art. As such, it relies on objectivity, facts, empirical methods, and analysis.’ ” 44 — tent within their higher commander’s intent. Another writer that closely relates levels of war and the art and science of war is B. H Liddell Hart. In his chapter, “Strategy and Grand Strategy,” Strategy, Liddell Hart discusses the relationship between strategy and tactics, “We can now arrive at a shorter definition of strategy as, ‘the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.’ …When the application of the military instrument merges into actual fighting, the dispositions for and control of such direct action are termed ‘tactics.’ The two categories, although convenient for discussion, can never be truly divided into separate compartments because each not only influences but merges into the other.”14 It is here, with the advantage of studying other theorists, such as Moltke and Clausewitz, where Liddell Hart depicts the relationship between strategy and tactics not as two “levels” of war, but as a continuum across the spectrum of operations. In a later passage, he describes the relationship between the art and science of war in nearly the same manner, “The relativity is inherent because however far our knowledge of the science of war be extended, it will depend on art for its application.”15 The skills gained from formal education and experience allow for the increased ability to apply one’s talent in war. Through the lens of contemporary doctrine, Liddell Hart views war as both an art and a science. Sun Tzu’s writings are considerably shorter than any other discussed piece; however, very much like every other classical writer, Sun Tzu looks at war as both an art and a science. In Samuel B. Grif-fith’s translated version of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, the first chapter is “Estimates.” In this chapter, Sun Tzu lays out “five fundamental factors” and “seven elements” to be taken into consideration by the general. Turning once again to the contemporary definition, “Science deals with the study and method of a body of facts and processes based on principles from the physical or material world.”16 In reading his work, Sun Tzu strongly advocates the use of military science. In what is perhaps one of his most infamous passages, Sun Tzu writes, “Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered. Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will then be total.”17 Sun Tzu speaks to “facts…from the physical or material world.” But like Clausewitz and Moltke, Sun Tzu writes how art lies in the execution of operations. Looking again at contemporary doctrine, we are reminded that, “The true measure of the art of command is not whether a commander uses certain techniques or procedures, but if the techniques and procedures used were appropriate to the situa- “Jomini advocates a system that is basically in use today — the study of war allows the use of principles and a refined doctrine which provides a set of instructions for battle captains. He wrote that, ‘Correct theories, founded upon the right principles, sustained by the actual events of war, and added to accurate military history, will form a true school of instruction for generals.’ While Jomini does not go as far as to say this education is a replacement for talent or military genius, he does affirm that it produces ‘generals of sufficient skill.’ ” — 45 tion.”18 It is this definition of “art” that most think of when reflecting on Sun Tzu’s writings. Sun Tzu further writes, “…a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates.”19 At first glance, this passage appears to point to the application of the military art, but it speaks to both art and science. The description of the commander as “skilled” refers to experience and education, while referring to the “situation,” or the commander’s knowledge of the factors described elsewhere in Sun Tzu’s writings, speaks to the science of war. But it is the commander’s skill and how he uses the information in the decisionmaking process that allows for application of the military art. Sun Tzu continues: “as water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions. Thus, one able to gain victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine.”20 This passage not only speaks to the application of the military art wherein, “Art, as opposed to science, requires expert performance of a specific skill using intuitive faculties that cannot be solely learned by study or education,” it also sounds remarkably similar to other classical military writers previously discussed.21 The command and control of armies has been a complex problem from antiquity to the contemporary, and through the years, man has struggled to define how to study and conduct war. Classical strategic writers in their entirety have covered the entire spectrum, from science to art and strategy to tactics. In looking at strategy and tactics, and the ability of modern-day doctrine writers to codify nice, neat categories, it is done for the purpose of the definitions. As with discerning between the art and science of war, the levels, or categories, lies a continuum from one extreme to the other. Just as the theater-level commander must include tactical-level considerations in his strategic decisions, the rifle platoon leader must include strategic-level considerations in his tactical decisions. As the rifle platoon leader ascends to higher rank and greater levels of responsibilities, his formal military and civilian education is increased. Whether through professional reading, masters degree studies, or by attending a general staff college, the military professional’s ability to apply “objectivity, facts, empirical methods, and analysis” to a tactical problem increases consistently with his development. Likewise, the ratio between talent and skill (art and science) changes. The sum of both does not remain constant; as the military professional gains the capacity for science, his capacity for art does not diminish. His talent — his ability to apply the military art — does not remain constant, but increases with formal education and experience. And it is from here, the perspective that the talents of the military professional are cultivated and refined over time through both education and the conduct of campaigns that Clausewitz’s assertion rings true: “For in the art of war, experience counts more than any abstract truth.”22 Notes 1U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Command and Control of Army Forces, Headquarters, Department of the Army, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, August 2003, pp. 1-3. 2Ibid., pp. 2-13. 3Ibid., pp. 3-9. 4Niccolo Machiavelli, Art of War, Translated and edited by Christopher Lynch, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,

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5Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Translated by W. K. Mar-riot, The Project Gutenberg, 2006, p. 40. Available online at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1232/1232-h/1232-h.htm. 6Ibid., p. 41. 7Baron Henri de Jomini, Art of War, Translated by Captain G. H. Mendell, The Project Gutenberg, September 2004, p.

321. Available online at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/13549/ 13549-h/13549-h.htm. 8Ibid., p. 325. 9Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989, p. 148. 10Ibid., p. 141. 11Daniel J. Hughes, et al. eds, Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings, Ballantine Books, New York, 1993, p. 124. 12Ibid. 13Ibid., p. 125. 14B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: Second Revised Edition, Meridian, New York, 1991, p. 320. 15Ibid., p. 323. 16FM 6-0, Command and Control of Army Forces, p. 1-3. 17Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Translated by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971, p. 129. 18FM 6-0, Command and Control of Army Forces, p. 2-13. 19Sun Tzu, The Art of War, p. 93. 20Ibid., p. 101. 21FM 6-0, Command and Control of Army Forces, p. 1-3. 22Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p. 164. Captain James D. Maxwell is currently an instructor of military science, U. S. Military Academy, West Point, New York. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy and is currently a Masters of Arts student at the American Military University. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Scout Platoon Leader Course, Armor Captains Career Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff College, and M1A2 Tank Commanders Certification Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, Al Dora, Baghdad, Iraq, and Fort Hood, Texas; assistant chief of operations officer, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood; task force liaison officer, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (OPFOR), Fort Irwin, CA; and XO and scout platoon leader, A Troop, 4th Squadron 7th Cavalry, 2d Infantry Division, Korea. “ ‘…a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates.’ At first glance, this passage appears to point to the application of the military art, but it speaks to both art and science. The description of the commander as ‘skilled’ refers to experience and education, while referring to the ‘situation,’ or the commander’s knowledge of the factors described elsewhere in Sun Tzu’s writings, speaks to the science of war. But it is the commander’s skill and how he uses the information in the decisionmaking process that allows for application of the military art.” 46 —