Measuring Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare

Current operations in support of the war on terror, specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan, are unquestionably counterinsurgency conflicts. The U. S. military’s combat experience between Vietnam and the current struggle are, generally speaking, classical wars between uniformed combatants. The ability of commanders at all levels to determine their successes were relatively simple and were an analysis of whether they owned key terrain, or not, and whether the enemy still possessed the ability to fight, or not, among other qualitative measures. Counterinsurgency (COIN) requires a drastically distinct method of measuring the success of U. S. forces as COIN relies on not just combat operations, but also on socioeconomic, political, and psychological operations. Current systems of metrics do not account for the noncombat operations that are conducted at all levels. The current system still consists of the relatively qualitative measurements of high-intensity combat (HIC) and does not take into account the complexities of COIN. Success is generally defined by individual statements of accomplishments and statistics without cohesive argument on how these statements relate to each other to achieve the long-term goals of the organization. This is not to say that staffs at all levels between brigade and corps are not conducting thorough and thoughtful analysis in the methods and measurements required to achieve desired endstates. There does appear, however, a lack of unity of effort between the components of COIN and formalization in the development of goals to achieve long-term objectives. This lack of unity and formality is what causes commanders to assess their achievements by a laundry list of mildly related accomplishments and statistics. These statements of qualitative achievements are often based on input from the staff officer responsible for that organization’s particular aspect of COIN. The analysis of progress achieved is subject to the whim of his or her assessment based on nonstan-dardized evaluation. The complex nature of COIN and the massive effort of resources involved in waging it demand a more quantitative method be used. Otherwise, scarce and precious resources will be wasted as units flail through their deployments. Staffs know where they want to be, but are unaware of how far toward that goal they are, and in the most extreme cases, are unaware of what path to take to reach their desired endstate. Logical Lines of Operations Any metric of success must meet the following requirements: it must be logical, simple enough for any staff officer or noncommissioned officer (NCO) to understand, and it should be built around already existing methods. This proposal is built around logical lines of operations (LLO), as defined in U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, as “A logical line that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s).”1 The definition itself tells us that these actions must be related; however, as stated above, statements of success do not show their relationship to each other. This begs the question: are commanders determining that each line is working toward the same objective, and is each 36 —

LLO given the necessary resources to accomplish those objectives? Figure 1 is the LLO example used in FM 3-24 for a counterinsurgency.2 Although individual units may have different LLO, most units will use these basic five lines because they lead a counterinsurgent fight to a stable endstate, allowing for a legitimate government to relieve the foreign military of its duties. Units now in Iraq develop a series of intermediate objectives for each LLO, usually set for a particular month in the future. For example, most campaign plans have a desired endstate consisting of something similar to “conditions set for a free and stable Iraq that governs itself and allows the Iraqi security forces to conduct independent operations.” These plans are developed starting with what units want to have accomplished by certain time periods such as in 3 to 6 months, 6 months to a year, or more than a year. The final desired endstate is usually left as 2 or more years from the assumption of the unit’s battlespace. Though this may be a valid time period with which to actually achieve the desired endstate, this rationale in goal setting creates large gaps in logic as to how the short- and long-term goals create an environment in which the endstate is achieved. This system of passively related, and sometimes illogical, goal setting is the major cause of qualitative metrics of success. If the goals are not inter-related, but are rather a collection of independent achievements, then how is success measured? If success is being met in one LLO, what does that say about the success of the entire operation? “Units now in Iraq develop a series of intermediate objectives for each LLO, usually set for a particular month in the future. For example, most campaign plans have a desired endstate consisting of something similar to ‘conditions set for a free and stable Iraq that governs itself and allows the Iraqi security forces to conduct independent operations.’ ” — 37

A Metric Proposal This proposed metric system will begin with the assumption that all LLO are equally important. Success in counterinsurgency requires that all of these lines are attacked with equal vigor as the nature of the fight is based as much on social, political, and economic factors as it is on combat operations. It should be noted that not all LLO need to be attacked with equal effort simultaneously, but that commanders may focus on individual LLO as the situation dictates; however, the endstate requires that all LLO receive equal attention over time. The challenge then becomes to develop a quantitative metric that gives equal weight to each LLO and is simple enough for any staff member to develop and understand. The actual work on defining success begins during the military decisionmaking process once the unit receives its mission. The outcome of this process, the commander’s intent, is what will drive how LLO are executed. As LLO are developed and a chief for each LLO is identified from within the staff, each chief must analyze how his or her particular LLO fits into the commander’s intent. More specifically, the chiefs must analyze the desired endstate for the battlespace and determine how the endstate for their LLO leads to achieving the overall endstate. This LLO endstate would most likely be a list of interdependent accomplishments that, if all achieved, create a state within the framework of the LLO that would exist if the commander’s desired endstate were achieved. As each LLO chief defines the endstate for their LLO, the unit executive officer or chief of staff must then ensure that each endstate does actually meet the commander’s desired endstate for the unit’s battlespace. Once the endstate for each LLO has been approved, each chief must then conduct the even more difficult task of determining which events are required to transpire to meet the endstate objectives for his or her LLO. These events are essentially the intermediate objectives necessary for achieving the endstate and they must logically build on each other. The reality is that each LLO would then have sub-lines of operations that build upon the greater LLO. The timeline of achievement is not nearly as important as the events themselves, as the timeline can follow, and be adjusted, at a later date. Once each sub-LLO has been developed, the most difficult aspect of the analysis has been completed. If the staff were to stop developing LLO plans at this point, that unit would already be far ahead of units who use the current system. However, this does not solve the issue of how the staff would then measure the success of their operations or how the LLO objectives relate to other LLO. Now the quantitative aspect must be developed. Using the assumption posited above, that all LLO are equal, and with the necessity of the metric to be understandable to the average staff member, the most logical method to use would be a system of averages. The metric would evaluate how far along the unit is between the state at which it assumed the battlespace and the desired endstate for the battlespace. To keep the mathematics simple, the beginning state would equal 0 (as a percentage of achievement to the endstate) and the desired endstate would be 100 (percent of all goals complete, suggesting that the endstate has been achieved). To determine the numerical values, the LLO chief would start with his sub-LLO. The endstate of each sub-LLO would equal 100 and every task necessary to accomplish that endstate would be valued at somewhere between 0 and 100. The values would be assigned as logically and as proportionally as possible. This method would be done for every intermediate objective in each sub-LLO with the use of a table. The LLO chief would then use the following equation to determine the success of their LLO as a percentage of completion toward the desired endstate: This value, the average of all of the sub-LLOs, becomes the measurement of success within that LLO as it conveys how much progress the unit has made toward its desired final objective. This value would then be provided to whoever in the unit is responsible for determining the overall success of the unit. In the same manner as the individual LLO, the overall success of the unit would be an average of the LLO values. Using the example from Figure 1, the equation for success would be: Armed with these values, the commander and his staff can determine the progress their unit is making, as defined by their own objectives. It also allows the commander to determine if progress is lacking in a LLO and permits him to reallocate resources as needed to make up for any shortfalls in the overall success. Comments and Limitations This system of metrics allows for quantitative assessments of operations. It allows the LLO chiefs to be creative in their approach in achieving success within their line and allows them, and the commander, to accurately assess progress with a tangi-Success = (Combat Ops) + (HN SF) + (Services) + (Governance) + (Economics) 5 “This proposed metric system will begin with the assumption that all LLO are equally important. Success in counterinsurgency requires that all of these lines are attacked with equal vigor as the nature of the fight is based as much on social, political, and economic factors as it is on combat operations. It should be noted that not all LLO need to be attacked with equal effort simultaneously, but that commanders may focus on individual LLO as the situation dictates; however, the endstate requires that all LLO receive equal attention over time.” 38 — LLO Value = Number of sub-LLOs Sum of sub-LLO values at time of assessment ble value. But, almost as importantly, it forces LLO chiefs to logically and specifically plan how success is achieved within the realm of their duties. The system is also adaptive. LLO chiefs may change their sub-LLO if they become obsolete or irrelevant. Additionally, it allows the unit to measure events that may set them back. For instance, if building and running a governance center is a key objective of the governance LLO and that building is destroyed by a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, it allows the commander to determine how much time the event actually set him back from his stated endstate. This system is designed to allow staffs to understand where they are, and they should not be wary if the values decrease. Building sub-LLO and associated tasks provides the framework of the unit’s campaign plan. However, as the desired endstate may not (and will likely not) be achieved before the unit rotates out of theater, it allows the incoming unit to assess where the battlespace is and provides them with a road map on how to execute their operations as they assume their battlespace. For example, commanders may inherit a battlespace at a current rating of 60 and assess that if they attain a rating of 75 before their relief in place, then they have met their goals. The follow-on unit can then set their goals from 75 to whatever level seems attainable. There are a few limitations on this system of metrics: it is extraordinarily time consuming for the staff during the initial stages of battlespace assumption, which is already a very busy time for a staff; and to be done correctly, it requires intensive analysis and development. On the other hand, once it is developed, measuring success is relegated to referring to a table of tasks and values and calculating a simple equation, and possibly the occasional adjustment to tasks and values. Also, developing the goals, especially within LLO of combat operations, may be difficult to assess and measure. It requires significant thought and creativity to develop the tables. Another limitation is that the value for success cannot be used for information operations. The numbers are useless without the accompanying tables of values, which would be classified. As a corollary to that point, it is important that every member of the staff, as well as superior and subordinate commands, has the value tables. Without them, the value of success is as equally worthless as it would be to the general public. Numerical evaluation of success would remove many staff members, and commanders, from their comfort zones. Even without the use of valuation, the goal development outlined here would prove very beneficial to any unit waging a counterinsurgency fight. Using metrics to further define those goals allows soldiers to wrap their minds around what all their actions imply in the quest to reach a desired endstate. This system allows for the logical execution of full-spectrum operations with a unity of effort, is not mathematically difficult, and could easily be built on LLO already in use. Actual success on the ground across lines of operation depends on accurate and honest evaluation of the present state and a specific plan to achieve the desired endstate. Notes 1U. S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Headquarters, Department of the Army, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, December 2006, Glossary-6. 2Ibid., p. 5-3. Captain Jason E. Fritz is currently a brigade combat team planner, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, Iraq. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include S1, 3d Squadron, 7th (3-7) Cavalry, 3d Infantry Division (3ID), Fort Stewart, GA; XO, A Troop, 3-7 Cavalry, 3ID, Fort Stewart; scout platoon leader, A Troop, 3-7 Cavalry, 3ID, Fort Stewart; and tank platoon leader, A Troop, 3-7 Cavalry, 3ID, Fort Stewart. “…if building and running a governance center is a key objective of the governance LLO and that building is destroyed by a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, it allows the commander to determine how much time the event actually set him back from his stated endstate. This system is designed to allow staffs to understand where they are, and they should not be wary if the values decrease.”