Back to Basics: Training for Today’s Battlefield

Soldiers and leaders of combat units returning from Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF) consistently report the skills critical to their success in the counterinsurgency (COIN) fight were the same skills they would have trained on in preparation for high-intensity conflict. Faced with the challenge of returning a recently redeployed unit back to an acceptable level of combat readiness, the leaders of Anvil Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th U. S. Cavalry (subsequently reflagged to 1st Squadron, 91st U. S. Cavalry), took that feedback to heart. They developed a training methodology, consistent with the Department of the Army’s Warrior Tasks Program, grounded in the fundamentals of Army training management and rooted in the combat experience of a solid corps of noncommissioned officers, which focuses training on basic reconnaissance and security tasks applicable to any operational environment. It’s Basically Basics The fire hose of lessons learned, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), and after-action reviews (AARs) can drown any leader in an overabundance of information. Moreover, that fire hose of information draws not from a single source, but from a staggering operational tempo (OPTEMPO) across a global battlefield that generates tremendous velocities in the flow of data. These varied experiences and insights challenge leaders to select and apply this superfluity of information according to their needs. One lesson, however, is immediately apparent — soldiers across the Army must have fundamental warfighting skills to survive on the battlefield. This is hardly news. For centuries, American soldiers trained on basics of marksmanship, drill, leadership, first aid, and other basic tasks. Further, common task training and testing was, until recently, an annual requirement for every soldier in the Army. Fighting Linear in the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) How training and testing is conducted and how much emphasis it receives is very much a function of command and the commander’s understanding of the modern battlefield. Until recently, combat maneuver units emphasized basic warfighting skills as a matter of course, which was less true for combat service (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units — commanders in these units trained with a linear battlefield as a combat setting. Even maneuver commanders with CS and CSS units in their command openly accepted, or accepted by default, the idea that a linear battlefield, with its front line and rear areas, made warfighting for CS and CSS soldiers less imperative. This was not true, as years of rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) documented the opposition force’s ability to cripple or even kill alight brigade by targeting its CS and CSS units. In the late 1990s, newly emerging doctrine labeled what had been happening at the JRTC the contemporary operational environment (COE), which meant there were no rear areas and battlefields were no longer linear. Still nothing changes quickly in a military until war forces such changes. Combat units in Afghanistan in 2002 credited their JRTC experience as the best possible preparation; however, the rotations they referred to occurred prior to 9-11. Unfortunately, the same could not be said for all units as they prepared to invade Iraq in 2003. During the drive on Baghdad, the 507th Maintenance Company met with disaster, which had been foretold during hundreds of rotations at the JRTC. The incident, soldiers being unable to fire their weapons because they — 21 were jammed with dirt, stirred a bit of publicity, which accomplished what those hundreds of rotations at the JRTC failed to do — get senior leaders’ attention. The Warrior Task Site Selection Board In the fall of 2003, U. S. Army Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker, established the Warrior Task Site Selection Board, whose purpose was to “compile a list of essential tasks and drills that all Soldiers should be proficient in.” This directive was based on information coming from the front lines of Iraq and Afghanistan, which identified that there was no real “front,” and soldiers of all military occupational specialties (MOS) were subject to enemy fire, and all soldiers required a baseline of warfighting skills. Images of Private First Class Jessica Lynch, and the dramatic mission to rescue her and her comrades after falling into Iraqi captivity, were still fresh on the minds of America and its armed forces. The AAR for this incident and many others unearthed several lessons learned, specifically those that indicated that noncombat arms soldiers were not receiving the same level of training on basic soldier warfighting skills as their combat arms peers. So-called common-task testing was not as common as Army regulations directed and, as a result, soldier’s lives were at risk. As exemplified by the 507th Maintenance Company, soldiers in the COE fight on a nonlinear, asymmetrical battlefield where there is no true “rear area” and everyone must be prepared to close with, engage, and destroy the enemy. The board shaped, save minor modifications by General Schoomaker, what we now know as the warrior tasks and drills. These tasks and drills serve as the foundation for all initial entry training (IET) and provide all soldiers universal warfighting skills. Once the tasks and drills were identified, several questions were raised: does the collective Army experience in Iraq and Afghanistan alter how combat arms units train for conflict; do the warrior tasks and drills replace or augment MOS-specific warfighting tasks; and how should already scarce training time be shared between mission-essential training list (METL)-focused training and warrior tasks training? The cavalry’s answer was that experience validated the need for basic warfighting proficiency. Training and mastering basic tasks allow a unit to apply its warfighting capability on any battlefield against any level of threat. The same skills a cavalry scout or infantryman would train to fight in a high-intensity con flict also suited operations in support of full-spectrum operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the spectrum of missions executed in Iraq and Afghanistan vary from lethal brigade combat team-level operations to civil military operations in support of reconstruction, the tasks that made small units successful were fundamental skill level I, II, and III tasks. By focusing training on critical tasks in support of the troop/company and squadron/battalion METL, soldiers can adapt basic capabilities to any environment on any platform, such as tanks, Brad leys, and high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), or dismounted. This training methodology enables units to deploy on short notice to any battlefield and perform its mission effectively by mastering the basics of skills. Melding Combat ExperienceTraining: The Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Based on the flexibility of basic skills, the challenge then was to meld lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan into a coherent, sustainable training plan that allowed the unit to reconstitute soldiers and equipment, as well as accommodate a major reorganization under Army transformation. Again, the answer was in the basics. We had to teach leaders down to the squad level the fundamentals of training management and assign priorities that align with the squadron/battalion and troop/company METL. NCOs were the bridge to success — we supported them by allotting sufficient time to plan, resource, and execute training inside of the constraints of reconstitution. “...soldiers in the COE fight on a nonlinear, asymmetrical battlefield where there is no true “rear area” and everyone must be prepared to close with, engage, and destroy the enemy. The board shaped, save minor modifications by General Schoomaker, what we now know as the warrior tasks and drills. These tasks and drills serve as the foundation for all initial entry training (IET) and provide all soldiers universal warfighting skills.” 22 —

Training is an Operation and Should be Planned Many leaders do not regard training as a true form of an operation, which is incorrect, and many unit leaders have relegated training to the “too hard to do” box leaving what used to be home station training to the combat training centers. There are many reasons this happened over the past decade, none of which make it an acceptable solution. Units must train and leaders must make sure they do. Training time is perhaps the most valuable resource a leader must manage if that leader is to accomplish the mission while preserving soldiers’ lives. As such, training must be studied and planned just like any other operation. Reading and internalizing U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Training the Force, and FM 7-1, Battle Focused Training, is the first step to successfully managing training for all leaders.1 Certainly training management begins at the command level, but does not stop there. True master trainers understand that training management is a combat multiplier in combined arms operations. The more leaders who understand training management and apply it daily, the more effective the unit will be in meeting its training goals. Training management should dictate how we manage our time in all that we do. If our daily activities are not planned, resourced, and executed effectively, we will waste our soldiers’ time and fumble away opportunities to make our unit better. By training leaders to understand and implement training management, we allow ourselves to structure “Training and mastering basic tasks allows a unit to apply its warfighting capability on any battlefield against any level of threat. The same skills a cavalry scout or infantryman would train to fight in a high-intensity conflict also suited operations in support of full-spectrum operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.” “By focusing training on critical tasks in support of the troop/company and squadron/battalion METL, soldiers can adapt basic capabilities to any environment on any platform, such as tanks, Bradleys, and high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), or dismounted. This training methodology enables units to deploy on short notice to any battlefield and perform its mission effectively by mastering the basics of skills.”

an effective training plan that can be executed at the first-line leader level, where unit training is most important as proven on battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan. Aligning Training Models and Schedules Within our troop, we used a technique that relied on aligning the eight-step training model with the T+6 training week lock-in — near-term review (T+6 to T-1); platoon leaders and platoon sergeants back brief training for each week from T+6 to T-1 using the following standard aligned with the eight-step training model:  T-1 (AAR). Platoon leaders and sergeants provide a minimum of one sustain and one improve from the previous week’straining. Sustains and improves need not be limited to training events, but may include anything on the training schedule such as command maintenance and physical training.  T+6 (guidance). The troop command briefs templated and squadron/troop-mandated training events for T+6 and allots time for platoons to conduct internal training. The troop commander also briefs the METL focus for T+6.  T+5 (plan the training). Platoon leaders and sergeants brief training events based on T+6 guidance, including, but not limited to:  Tasks to be trained (platoon critical tasks at a minimum).  Primary instructor/alternate instructor (as applicable).  Location.  Resources required from troop/ squadron, such as land, ranges, and training support.  T+4 (train and certify leaders). Platoon leaders and sergeants brief date, time, location, and method for leader certification.  T+3 (recon the site). Platoon leaders and sergeants confirm training location.  T+2 (issue the plan). Platoon leaders and sergeants issue operations or fragmentary order (OPORD/ FRAGO) to platoon or troop, as required.  T+1 (rehearse). Platoon leaders and sergeants report the completion of rehearsals with primary/alternate instructors. During weekly planning, a task-focused METL is assigned to each platoon, which includes the individual, team, squad, and platoon levels. The task focus is based on whatever training event the squadron has assigned as the quarterly capstone event. Figure 1 is an example of a tool our troop developed to help platoon leaders and platoon sergeants organize and brief their training for each training week. NCOs are Primary Trainers The next component of our training plan was to get training back into the hands of NCOs. Too often during preparation for deployment, training is dictated and tracked at echelons higher than it should Training Week T-1 T+6 T+5 T+4 T+3 T+2 T+1 T-Week

Plan the Training Train and Certify Leaders Recon the Site Issue the Plan Rehearse Execute

* Troop commander guidance * Tasks to be trained (PLT critical task at a minimum) * Primary instructor/alternate instructor (as applicable) * Location * Resources required from troop /squadron (land, ranges, training aid support, etc.) * PL/PSG brief date, time, and location, and method for leader certification * PL/PSG confirm execution of training location recon * PL/PSG issues OPORD/ FRAGO to platoon or troop, as required * PL/PSG conduct rehearsals with primary/alternate instructors * Execute Week 44 Week 43 Week 50 Week 49 Week 48 Week 47 Week 46 Week 45 Week 44 Week 45 Week 44 Week 51 Week 50 Week 49 Week 48 Week 47 Week 46 Week 45 Week 46 Week 45 Week 52 Week 51 Week 50 Week 49 Week 48 Week 47 Week 46 Week 47 Week 46 Week 1 Week 52 Week 51 Week 50 Week 49 Week 48 Week 47 Week 48 Week 47 Week 2 Week 1 Week 52 Week 51 Week 50 Week 49 Week 48 Week 49 Week 48 Week 3 Week 2 Week 1 Week 52 Week 51 Week 50 Week 49 Week 50 Week 49 Week 4 Week 3 Week 2 Week 1 Week 52 Week 51 Week 50 Figure 1 24 — be. For example, the program of instruction for individual readiness training (IRT) was a “round robin” approach dictated at the division level and run by the squadron. This approach limited the NCOs’ abilities to train their own soldiers, who were being trained by NCOs not in their chain of command. Putting training back into the hands of NCOs allowed them to be where they should — with their soldiers. This approach was value added, in that:  It forces first-line leaders to become subject-matter experts on the skills they are required to train, thus increasing their level of proficiency.  It reinforces first-line leaders’ credibility and trustworthiness during soldier training.  It enables combat experience at the NCO level to be integrated into training at the same time tasks are trained to Army standards.  It enables training management to be understood and implemented at all echelons, creating a unit that can focus, plan, resource, execute, and evaluate training.  Finally, it enables NCOs to best assess their soldiers by training them and improving their skills in a supervised training management program. No Time To Waste To put training back in the hands of NCOs, we had to ruthlessly protect training time. Units just returning from a combat deployment encounter significant distractions. In particular, as other home station units prepare for combat deployments, requirements to support their deployment increases, and training time seems to melt off the training calendar. Additionally, the effort to reconstitute vehicles and equipment cannot be overex-aggerated. Inevitably, a number of soldiers leave the service or the unit after a deployment and unit leaders change command and new soldiers arrive — all of these events (and more) take a toll on calendar space. It is very easy to regard training as something “too hard to do,” and NCOs are the ultimate guard against that tendency — they ensure that even when the unit is focused on reconstituting equipment and vehicles, soldiers have the opportunity to train on individual-level tasks. Soldiers appreciate such efforts and are more responsive in all areas. Basic individual training reestablishes training systems and builds a foundation for future collective-level training. Individual skills training establishes a toehold for future training plans, around which a unit can build other effective systems on the way to beneficial collective-level training that is focused on basic tasks. Training Doesn’t “Just Happen” To further enhance training, our NCOs identified a need to allot time for planning and preparation on the weekly training schedule. They needed to integrate training enablers, such as local training areas, training support center (TSC) training aids, and fellow soldiers, and plan and resource for these enablers. So, we allotted time on the training schedule to allow junior NCOs to plan, resource, rehearse, and develop training. Training immediately reflected the additional planning and preparation time that the NCOs had put into it. In conjunction with the ability to examine scheduled training 4 to 5 weeks ahead, NCOs could prepare well in advance of a training event, eliminating a lot of the last minute “oh nos” that often plague small unit training events. NCOs had available time on the training schedule to develop training plans, coordinate and sign for training aids and training areas, and conduct reconnaissance of training areas. As time passed and NCOs became more adept at planning and executing training, the training quality continued to increase. By focusing on basic skill sets, this also allowed for repetition at the soldier level, further building a foundation of proficiency to build on during future collective-level training. Finally, giving the NCOs the mission to train soldiers and the time to prepare training reinforced their basic skills in troop leading procedures. Adding the Platoons As the time required for reconstitution tasks subsided, the troop leaders began to identify areas during the weekly training schedule to conduct platoon-level training. Platoon-level training time allowed platoon leaders and platoon sergeants, now fully versed on training management, more opportunities to exercise those skills. Additionally, it allowed platoons to build progression into their weekly training plans. For example, on weeks when Wednesdays were platoon training days, NCOs conducted “crawl phase” training, such as classes or written tests, to build the foundation for practical exercise training in local training areas during collective training on Thursday. This greatly enhanced soldiers’ task retention and it increased the pace at which training was conducted on Thursdays. Because the overall training plan focused on fundamental, low-resource, high-payoff tasks, platoons built repetition into the training plan by training similar tasks in successive days. Lastly, this allowed more time for small units to integrate retraining into their plans, a step commonly overlooked. Retraining allowed junior leaders to train all soldiers to a common standard or raise the standard when all soldiers had met common standards. War stresses soldiers, units, and leaders as they train to meet the ever-changing challenges of combat. No military has entered a sustained war and emerged unchanged; however, all successful militaries have anchored the process of change in basics. Keeping up with transforming TTP and lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan is a challenge. NCOs can help break down complex tasks and teach soldiers to use them on any battlefield against any threat. Commanders must set the conditions for their NCOs to successfully accomplish this — before, during, and after combat operations. Notes 1U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Training the Force, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, October 2002; FM 7-1, Battle Focused Training, HQDA, GPO, Washington, DC, September 2003. Major Ian C. Palmer is the senior maneuver observer controller, Task Force 3, Joint Readiness Training Center, Operations Group, Fort Polk, LA. He received a B. A. from the University of Notre Dame and is currently an M. A. student at Louisiana State University. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Amphibious Warfare School, and Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 91st U. S. Cavalry, 173d Airborne Brigade, Schweinfurt, Germany; commander, heavy division cavalry troop, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th U. S. Cavalry, Schweinfurt; XO and scout platoon leader, brigade reconnaissance troop, G Troop, 10th U. S. Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, TX; and tank platoon leader, A Company, 3d Battalion, 66th Armor, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood. — 25