Making the Staff Estimate Run

As the military transitions to a powerful reliance on computers, networking, and pervasive sensors throughout the battlefield, the intellectual processes of humans must also change. Part of this change will focus on how machine processes assist a previously manual method. Ideally, the development of the computer network into combat systems will parallel the changes in military thought. The addition of technology changes the way brigade and below units and their staffs will operate; so it is no longer business as usual. Most of the futuristic combat systems and methods continue development to fight a more symmetric enemy with some adapting to asymmetric ones. Meanwhile, the Army continues to experience combat with asymmetric forces, driving it away from training, leadership, and thought processes most closely aligned with systems under development. Operations and methods for small units necessarily require the ability to support either type of operational environment. How it Works Today Several “staff estimates” are recognized in the current series of field manuals. These staff estimates are primarily planning tools to help the staff collect and organize data to support a particular future mission. Data elements, organized in the staff estimate, become information to support selection of a course of action (COA). Each of the various staff sections, including the commander’s estimate through special and personal staff members, seeks to list and consider possible influences within their area of expertise on selecting a COA. Results of the estimate’s work are oriented on providing the commander up-to-date facts and the best analysis possible for the staff area. This results in a recommendation by the staff section regarding supportability of a particular COA. The commander’s considerations are the intangible factors concerning soldiers, including their capabilities, equipment, history, experience, and esprit de corps. Brigade and below commanders must evaluate these factors and decide how and where factors not easily assigned a quantitative value in a matrix or detected by a sensor system fit for success. Staff officers use their estimates to assist in planning, but also to decide what is important for tracking during execution of the selected COA. U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production (January 2005), details the requirements for estimates by staff officers as:  Mission.  Situation and consideration.  Course of action.  Comparison.  Recommendations and conclusions.1 Commanders have the responsibility for integrating all the various considerations concerning the COA that may solve a tactical situation. Assisted by the staff, the commander selects, modifies, and final- 16 — ly decides the overall COA. This point of decision marks the transition of the staff from a collection and processing organism to a providing and monitoring assistant to the commander. For the staff, there is a transition from “staff estimates” to “staff running estimates,” or more commonly, “running estimates.” These running estimates have limitations for tracking data, processing it into information within a staff area of responsibility, enabling the staff to build unit operational historic trends, which enable future unit operational predictions to become more accurate. As information materializes during an operation or mission, the staff provides updates or revisions to their estimate, based on the differences between the COA and actual events. The running estimate gives the staff a method of tracking battlefield information against desired or expected results. Measurements against anticipated results permit the staff to track assigned units and success once the operation commences. Staff predictions fit inside or outside a band of acceptability, based on previous predictions, and may require some adjustment to subordinate unit tasks or a commander’s decision. Those measures found inside the band of tolerance require close monitoring by the staff or decisions within their authority. Those things outside of tolerance, or the authority of a staff member to fix or adjust, require a coordinated solution with a recommendation made to the appropriate decisionmaker for the brigade or battalion. In the recent past, the staff estimate depended on unit reports, historical trends from tables in various publications, and the training or experience of the individual staff officer. Unit reports reflected current information at a fixed time or date, which quickly aged. When unit status was the basis of planning and a COA selected, anew set of reports would likely have already been generated. The cyclic nature of manually collecting data and reporting it through layers of command on a time schedule meant most information was hours or days old. Large changes in data or immediate operational reports could significantly influence the commander’s decision, which places decisions in the operations cycle of act–react–counteract instead of the planning cycle. Staffs monitor changes closely, attempt to anticipate, and factor in changes as they occur. Historical trends from manuals are relatively stable, although revision or extension of the data is necessary. Unit historical trends from operations in theater would provide better and updated trends of consumption or enemy capabilities over time. Relative experience and education of individual staff officers remain a highly variable and difficult factor for the quality of an estimate as a product. There are staff schools to train officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) on their basic duties, until they can gain experience in their units. In the past, and likely for the near-term future, units compensate as a whole for the differing relative levels of knowledge and ability in relationships among brigade and battalion commanders, and their respective staff officers and NCOs. Over time, the staff members and commanders establish a bond of trust and experience, permitting concentrated and refined activities to support the unit as a whole. During the planning phase, the staff estimate focuses gathering, tracking, and potential situations that may effect the envisioned operation. Once converted to the running estimate, the staff remains limited by their ability to have current information available directly from the unit. To gain immediate updates, the staff must generate more electronic traffic with subordinate units to update the last cycle of unit reports. Depending on current conditions, reports could be less than completely accurate. Transition from the Present to the Future Each level of command in the Army is busy with tasks and requirements. Reporting requirements add a requirement of manual collection, processing, and reporting. Computer networking with subordinate units permits e-mail, chat, or voice communications, or file downloads and uploads, over a secure tactical internet. While this speeds the movement of information, there remains a sizeable amount of human interaction to collect and input the information. Having the ability to operate a database of unit statistics with subordinate units reporting or modifying data as it occurs provides a significant advantage. Increasingly, this collection, movement, and collation of data through basic processing for display gives the staff greater knowledge about the unit. Increased information velocity and overall processing of the data means better information to support recommendations and decisions at the tactical level. As a structure, the staff estimate has a basic format to assist with collecting and organizing information for supporting the COA selection process. The focus of the initial form is specifically on understanding the initial intent and desires of the commander regarding the next mission. Having the estimate as a general information collection and assessment tool for any of several courses of action assists the commander in ultimately making a selection. Details of a particular COA become available for specific use. Even though not every piece of data remains useful as part of the recommendation process, it does support the individual staff officer’s situational awareness later. Each staff officer must then sort the information for usefulness based on how it supports, or does not support, any particular COA under consideration. Computer data management, consisting of sensors mounted on vehicles and equipment, and carried by people, report to a centralized database that collates the various inputs into categories or summations of activity as immediate unit status reports. These types of production-monitoring systems are already widely available in civilian industry. They offer the capability to manipulate acquired data easily and permit access from remote locations, giving units the capability to have an immediate relationship with the data collection and transfer. At each higher “Each level of command in the Army is busy with tasks and requirements. Reporting requirements add a requirement of manual collection, processing, and reporting. Computer networking with subordinate units permits e-mail, chat, or voice communications, or file downloads and uploads, over a secure tactical internet. While this speeds the movement of information, there remains a sizeable amount of human interaction to collect and input the information. Having the ability to operate a database of unit statistics with subordinate units reporting or modifying data as it occurs provides a significant advantage.” — 17 level, subordinate unit information is up to date and easily configured for display to decisionmakers. While traditional paper charts and butcher boards have transitioned to databases, spreadsheets, and PowerPoint slides, there has not been much work in using automation to perform an analysis. Gradually, vehicles and equipment systems would have incorporated sensors that would make them capable of reporting various status characteristics through the vehicle’s data management system. Having all types of sensors permits units to have responsibility for larger geographic areas, discover more data, and move data through quicker processing to an end user. The Army is currently using unmanned aerial vehicles to survey the battlefield generally or conduct specific reconnaissance missions to support operations. Networking vehicle internal data management systems provides friendly unit status to decisionmakers faster and more precisely than previous manual methods. While current soldier and vehicle systems primarily provide position data or enhanced communications, sensor systems for personnel status, vehicle fuel consumption, and ammunition status are not far off. The internal engine, fire control, and data management systems in the Stryker already link as a single system. For brigade and below units, this is a major advantage for monitoring a subordinate unit’s status and mission performance. Leaning forward with these systems in combat permits the Army to gain direct feedback on how the running estimate actually collects information during the operation — actually running on the network and collecting information constantly — to determine how intelligent agents configure aggregated information for display to decisionmakers. The commander and his staff smoothly transition from planning to operations with a configurable tool that provides a powerful, familiar information tool. The Automated Running Estimate Discussion A multitude of sensors to find, track, and report information automatically for human decision support means change will occur for brigade and below units in their battlefield tasks and areas of responsibility. The brigade and battalion staffs have an increase in quality and quantity of information to sort and assign value. For staff members, this will mean some generic database information with tailored automatic inputs and collections to meet the staff section’s requirements. The common Mission name, phase, or other identifying method to avoid confusion with current order and plans. DRAFT or FINAL “Draft” is usually not released outside the staff section or indicates the staff is still working on the information; “final” indicates information is released to the unit for use.

1. MISSION. Restated mission resulting from the mission analysis.

a. Commander’s intent.

b. Concept of the operation.

c. Specified tasks to units.

2. SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS.

a. Characteristics of area of operation. (1) Weather. How will different military aspects of weather affect specific staff area of concern and resources?

(a) Current conditions: Temperature, barometric pressure, cloud cover, visibility, thermal crossover, air density, precipitation, wind speed, wind direction, upper winds, turbulence, icing.

(b) Light data: BMNT, SR, SS, EENT, MR, MS, % Illum, NVG use.

(c) Last 48 hours. Updated one-sentence analysis.

(d) Next 48 hours. Updated one-sentence analysis.

(e) Effects on unit operations: Ground operations – Cross country, highway Air operations – Low level, mid level, high level. (2) Terrain. How will aspects of the terrain affect specific staff areas of concern and resources? Each link highlights that aspect on the AO map. Most info produced by the geospatial products system.

(a) Cover and concealment.

(b) Key terrain.

(c) Observation and fields of fire.

(d) Obstacles.

(e) Avenues of approach.

(f) Trafficability.

(h) Critical infrastructure locations.

(i) Protected locations. (3) Other pertinent factors/facts. Each link is a written analysis or overlay from a staff section.

(a) Political/diplomatic/leadership (State Dept, CIA, intel and human terrain team).

(b) Informational (IO, human terrain team, CIA, and State Dept).

(c) Military (Intel, CIA, and State Dept).

(d) Economic (CA and human terrain team).

(e) Population (CA, human terrain team, and State Dept).

(f) Sociological (CA and human terrain team).

(g) Psychological (CA and human terrain team).

(h) Religious (Chaplain and human terrain team).

(i) Environmental (Engineer).

(j) Infrastructure (Engineer and State Dept).

b. Enemy Forces. (1) Enemy dispositions. Takes to map showing current locations. (2) Composition and strength. Takes to map showing unit equipment & numbers. (3) Capabilities. Takes to general illustration of enemy tactical possibilities. (4) Enemy COAs as they affect specific staff area of concern.

(a) Enemy most dangerous COA. Indications of adoption.

(b) Enemy most likely COA. Indications of adoption.

(c) Enemy least likely COA. Indications of adoption.

c. Friendly Forces. (1) Higher friendly courses of action. Current items are for linkage to the future possible courses of action, and show progress in the current phase of the operation with single “headline” type success criteria or alerts for users.

(a) CURRENT COA. MOP. MOE. Branches. Sequels. Active MOP. Active MOE. Active cdr’s intent criteria.

(b) Future COA #1. MOP. MOE. Branches. Sequels.

(c) Future COA #2. MOP. MOE. Branches. Sequels.

(d) Future COA #3. MOP. MOE. Branches. Sequels. (2) Current status of resources. Within staff area of responsibility. (3) Status of affecting resources. Outside the staff area of responsibility. Key Comments or notes Streaming updated inputs Hyperlinks to maps, graphics, other estimates, automated inputs, or reference materials 18 — display of battlefield and unit information may ultimately resemble a PowerPoint-like slide for quick reference, or a web page full of hyperlinks with vital information shown as automatically updated color-keyed headlines and live streaming statistical data. Defining and sorting some initial recommendations from the current standard format begins the process of linking together information. Much of the information needed by a staff member will be available and entered into accessible format by subordinate, adjacent, or higher units during their normal operations. Additional information feeds into the data management systems integrated into vehicle systems through sensors or manual inputs connected together on the battlefield. Feeding into the networked database, sorted by identification numbers to individuals, positions, and/or vehicles, sensor information amalgamates into quickly comprehended critical information. The detailed displays are available through hyperlinks to maps, overlays, live video, pictures, matrices, or text documents. A proposed running estimate for brigade and lower staffs and unit commanders covers their immediately required supporting information for the unit, the current operation, or during planning for the next operation; the running estimate and staff planning estimate may be different sides of the same page with integrated information links. Individuals will then tailor the estimate format to their specific requirements. See Figure 1 for a proposed automated running estimate. As an example for use and discussion, Figure 1, paragraph 2, a. (1) Weather, shows a hyperlink, which, if followed, takes the user to the detailed weather predictions and trends from the local weather team, possibly a brigade asset or an averaged reported condition from all responding vehicles equipped to monitor the weather. In the detailed information, a user might have access to satellite views of the area of operations with overlays for isobar maps and short- or long-term predictions. The next subparagraph, (a) Current conditions, shows a series of configurable local information in icons, numbers, or some other representation of select items taken from detailed weather predictions, shown as regularly/constantly updated references for the user. In some cases, localized data, such as temperature, could be an average of all operational vehicle sensors that measure outside temperature, instead of a distant weather team location. (4) Comparison of requirements versus capabilities and recommended solutions. (5) Key considerations (evaluation criteria) for COA supportability.

d. Assumptions. Short form of keywords to be used for ISR tasking, in priority. (1) Enemy critical equipment locations. (Examples only) (2) Enemy obstacles and engagement areas.

3. ANALYSIS. Analyze each COA using key considerations (evaluation criteria) to determine advantages and disadvantages. Current items are for linkage to the future possible COA, and show progress in the current phase of the operation with single “headline” type success criteria or alerts for users.

a. CURRENT COA. Text. MOP. MOE. Branches. Sequels. (1) Active MOP. (2) Active MOE. (3) Active cdr’s intent criteria. (4) Current unit status and comments. This may include a pre-configured color coding of unit status as a total rating, by critical systems, or some other method the user desires to follow. When plans are approved, they may either be loaded as sequels to the CURRENT COA, or may be inserted here as a NEXT COA, at the user’s option.

b. Proposed COA #1 simulation. Narrative. MOP. MOE. Branches. Sequels. (1) Current status of unit resources to support COA. (2) Current status of unit capabilities to support COA. (3) Comparison of required resources vs on-hand with deliveries shown. (4) Comparison of required capabilities vs predicted at start of operation. (5) COA evaluation criteria with rating and comments. (6) COA overall rating; end state prediction for unit.

c. Proposed COA #2 simulation. Narrative. MOP. MOE. Branches. Sequels. (1) Current status of unit resources to support COA. (2) Current status of unit capabilities to support COA. (3) Comparison of required resources vs on-hand with deliveries shown. (4) Comparison of required capabilities vs predicted at start of operation. (5) COA evaluation criteria with rating and comments. (6) COA overall rating; end state prediction for unit.

d. Proposed COA #3 simulation. Narrative. MOP. MOE. Branches. Sequels. (1) Current status of unit resources to support COA. (2) Current status of unit capabilities to support COA. (3) Comparison of required resources vs on-hand with deliveries shown. (4) Comparison of required capabilities vs predicted at start of operation. (5) COA evaluation criteria with rating and comments. (6) COA overall rating; end state prediction for unit.

e. Key considerations, which form the evaluation criteria for COA support and comparison.

f. Assumptions. Short form of keywords to be used for ISR tasking, in priority. (1) (2)

4. COMPARISON. Compare COA using key considerations (evaluation criteria). Rank order COA for each key consideration. Comparison should be visually supported by a decision matrix.

a. Comparison of requirements versus capabilities. (1) Narrative version. (2) Matrix version. (3) Recommended COA illustration; graphic overlay; and justification.

b. Comparison of simulation results. (1) Narrative version. (2) Matrix version. (3) Recommended COA illustration; graphic overlay; and justification.

c. Comparison of COA by evaluation criteria. (1) Narrative version. (2) Matrix version. (3) Recommended COA illustration; graphic overlay; and justification.

5. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSIONS. Most supportable from specific staff perspective.

a. Overall rank order of COA: (1) Consolidated narrative comparison. (2) Consolidated matrix comparison. (3) Rank order selection of COA: COA #; COA #; COA #. Comparison produces a best, middle, and worst COA alternative. (4) Justification narrative for selection.

b. COA deficiency mitigation. (1) Known issues with recommended COA and mitigation measures. (2) Deficiencies with recommended COA and mitigation measures. (3) Identified risks with recommended COA and mitigation measures. Figure 1. A Proposed Automated Running Estimate — 19

In paragraph 3, ANALYSIS, the heart of the staff estimate to running estimate transition occurs. Prior to this, the staff member has been collecting information and building an intellectual, intuitive, and anticipatory understanding of the total environment against what the commander intends or desires to happen. The first subparagraph provides access to the components of the current operations of the unit, showing locations, tasks, a narrative of the expected action, measures of performance and effectiveness, and access to any designated branches or sequels to the main plan through hyperlinks to maps, overlays, text, or pictures. At the same time, the use of streaming headlines, well known on the Internet web pages of news organizations, permit the “current” phase or other critical information to remain prominently displayed. The following sub paragraphs are set up and populated as necessary to support new or follow-on COA for the unit to work. At the initial use, the “current” hyperlinks might be empty, but the normal condition would quickly become populated from unit current operations. If a COA were selected but not implemented until time or conditions occurred, the estimate could be configured to move the “pending” COA to Current — Sequels, or add a subparagraph between “Current” and “COA #1,” labeled “NEXT COA.” The ability to configure the automated running estimate and have the estimate track past work for access and trending is a major advantage over past methods. Configuring the automated running estimate for text or icons as status or alert symbology would be an individual preference. Other information updates constantly on the equivalent of a web page-type arrangement as shown in Figure 1. In the near term, this permits a smooth transition from the current stylistic formal staff estimate to the less-developed running estimate. User configurable formatting permits adding or deleting displayed information to support either style or times. During a planning period, the operations officer could view all potential COA or switch back to view only current operations information to tighten the display to only what is currently critical. Likewise, using paragraph 5, “Recommendations and Conclusions,” serves a dual function. First, this paragraph shows the most supportable COA during planning. It may contain a decision matrix, with annotations and wargaming results from various simulations, available for viewing. Second, once a COA is selected, additional simulation wargame runs can show branches from the main plan under a wide range of conditions, along with any newly identified decision points for the commander or staff considerations. This could even include sub-identified actions by the staff section to ensure continuous support to the main COA and any differences during operations. The estimate, as a process for collecting, sorting, and making information avail able throughout a brigade or below sized unit or staff, remains a reasonable and useful method. Rapid and automatic collection displaying that information allows soldiers to apply experience and rationalizing logic to situational information. Unit users can configure displays according to their needs. Adding intelligent agents, subscription lists, and artificial intelligence to the process permits users to monitor additional information as it changes, but also to begin data mining the vast resources on the network. The automated running estimate in Figure 1 shows only a small example of potential capabilities for linking with critical information. Brigade and below staffs continually seek to gather information for their respective commanders and process it to supplement the commander’s mental power to direct the unit during operations. By performing this assistance, the staff requires a constant stream of the latest and most accurate information possible. As the ability to collect and move information has changed with technology — dispatch rider, telephone, and radio — the depth of collection has also increased, making it possible for the brigade to query individual vehicles and collate requirements. In the short term, technology has advanced the ability to network units together for information exchange on the battlefield, but they are using the same old gathering and processing methods to make PowerPoint slides for the commander. In the far term, this collection and display of information must be the equivalent of an F-16 fighter pilot’s heads-up display on afar greater scale. The automated running estimate is a minor step of what should be the currently envisioned result for futuristic combat systems. Today can no longer be like yesterday; in fact, tomorrow requires bettering today. Note 1Headquarters, Department of the Army, U. S. Army Field Manual 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, January 2005. Retired Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Heiden is a senior research scientist, Human Resource Research Organization, Radcliff, KY. He received a B. S. from Michigan Tech University, an M. A. from University of Phoenix, an M. A. from School of Advanced Military Studies, and a Ph. D. from Capella University. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Officer Advanced Course, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, and Air Assault School. Throughout his 21-year Armor officer career, he served in various command and staff positions, to include professor of military science, Northern Michigan University; special assistant to commander, 7th Army and U. S. Army Europe, Germany; chief of plans, G3, V Corps, Germany; S3, 2d Battalion, 32d Armor; and commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company and A Company, 1st Battalion, 68th Armor. “While current soldier and vehicle systems primarily provide position data or enhanced communications, sensor systems for personnel status, vehicle fuel consumption, and ammunition status are not far off. The internal engine, fire control, and data management systems in the Stryker already link as a single system. For brigade and below units, this is a major advantage for monitoring a subordinate unit’s status and mission performance.” 20 —