4th Cavalry Brigade Staff Assessment Standards Training Staffs and Operations Centers for Sustained Combat Operations

The 4th Cavalry Brigade is a traveling observer controller (OC) team comprised of a headquarters, six subordinate OC battalions/ squadrons, and a logistics support battalion. As apart of First Army, the brigade specializes in every Army warfighting function and provides high-end collective training and pre-deployment Army training and evaluation programs (ARTEPs) to Reserve Component (RC) units during post-mobilization. The “Saber Brigade” deploys year round to mobilization stations across the eastern United States, providing tough, challenging, and realistic collective training to prepare RC units for sustained combat operations. During the course of training, and with extensive collaboration with the 3d Brigade, 75th Division, Saber Brigade developed a system for tracking the training and progress of brigade and battalion staff operations centers. We refer to the system as the staff assessment standards (SAS), which has a set of criterion intended to increase the efficiency of staffs. These standards are not intended to increase the effectiveness of a staff, as staff effectiveness requires judgment and experience in application. However, SAS does increase staff efficiency in the five critical areas of time management, staff estimates and integration, common operational picture, information analysis and dissemination, and generating relevant options, which enables them to become more effective. Each of these five categories has established standards that are evaluated on an assessment level ranging from 1 to 5. An as-Efficient: 1. Being effective without wasting time or effort or expense. 2. Able to accomplish a purpose; functioning effectively. Effective: 1. Producing or capable of producing an intended result or having a striking effect. 2. Able to accomplish a purpose; functioning effectively. 3. (military) equipped and ready for service. — Webster’s Online Dictionary — 11 sessment level of 1 or 2 indicates the staff section is lacking and not performing its functions efficiently; in which case, observer controllers provide feedback to section leaders on how to improve to meet the standard. If the section earns a level 3 assessment in a category, it is consistently meeting all standards in that category; level 3 is the standard for a staff section. When staffs function as collective teams, going beyond effectiveness at the section level, they will attain assessment levels 4 and 5, which are extremely difficult to achieve and are rare in young and inexperienced staffs at any level. As a set of doctrinal, clearly defined, and achievable standards, SAS is used as a tool to measure the collective performance of the staff in accomplishing its purpose and function. We also use the SAS regardless of unit function, and because it is compilation of basic staff doctrine, it works just as well with a deploying engineer brigade conducting route reconnaissance and clearance as it does with a deploying infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) conducting convoy or route security missions. Time Management Time is always critical and good staff officers effectively manage time and resources. They must consider not only their own time, but that of the staff, as well as higher headquarters and subordinate units. The staff must prioritize work and set reasonable suspense dates and timelines. Nested and published battle rhythms and timelines that integrate current and future operations are the only acceptable way to manage time. Additionally, well-established work priorities and personnel roles and responsibilities will enable staff sections to effectively manage time. To reach standard, the staff section must first understand the parameters of the mission and its functions in support of the collective staff effort. The section must consistently update internal timelines with regard to both the collective staff timeline and the mission timeline, and conduct continual self-assessments in terms of suspense commitments and actions. Section leaders conduct troop leading procedures, including internal section warning orders, on all internal and external missions. Requests for information (RFI) and commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) are continuously monitored for timeliness and requirements, both within the section and the collective staff, and are anticipated and proactively researched. The section coordinates specific timelines with other staff sections, as well as higher, lower, and adjacent units, and has a thorough understanding of higher headquarters timelines, limitations, and constraints, as well as higher headquarters’ time-sensitive CCIR. The section consistently battle tracks its internal actions within the collective staff. (See Figure 1.) Staff Estimates A staff estimate is an assessment of the situation and an analysis of those courses of action (COA) a commander is considering that best accomplish the mission.1 During planning, each staff section, to include special staff, must prepare a staff estimate that develops facts and analyzes information within their warfighting function. The estimates must be “running estimates,” which are continuously updated throughout the operation. The estimates should consider both the quantifiable and intangible aspects of a given operation and translate into the ability to help the command see the battlefield in terms of themselves, the enemy, and the terrain. Time Management Based on Assessment Levels 1-5: 5: Section anticipates future actions and interjects with timely and accurate knowledge-based assessments/judgments and/or section-specific knowledge directly contributing to command decisions. All lesser included. 4: Section has internal timeline as well as situational understanding of the staff collective timeline and the mission timelines. Section aids the commander in visualizing current and future missions and anticipates future actions. All lesser included. 3: Section has internal timeline and consistently updates with regard to both the collective staff timeline and the mission timeline. Section continually assesses itself in terms of suspenses and actions. Section leaders conduct troop leading procedures (including internal section warning orders) with all internal and external missions. Section consistently monitors requests for information and commander’s CCIR for timeliness. Section anticipates requirements both within the section and for the collective staff, and proactively researches. Section coordinates specifics of their timeline with other staff sections as well as to higher, lower, and adjacent units. Staff has thorough understanding of higher timeline, limitations, and constraints, as well as higher time-sensitive CCIR. Section battle tracks its internal actions within the collective staff. All lesser included. 1-2: Section understands parameters of mission and their functions in support of the collective staff effort. Section wastes commander’s/decisionmaking time. Staff Estimates Based on Assessment Levels 1-5: 5: Section anticipates changes to variance within the plan; staff immediately conducts coordination and issues fragmentary orders to execute sequel operations in coordination with (ICW) higher and adjacent headquarters. Staff presents viable options to the commander in a timely manner. All lesser included. 4: Section anticipates requirements and prepares feasible, acceptable, and suitable options in advance of mission requirements. Section coordinates, rehearses, and is immediately prepared to execute branch plans. All lesser included. 3: Section clearly articulates in doctrinally correct language the specified, implied, and essential tasks for any given mission. Section has thorough understanding of staff collective requirements as well as mission requirements, timelines, limitations, and constraints. Section continually monitors the tactical situation and maintains a “running estimate” of both the staff collective current and future missions as well as higher, subordinate, and adjacent units. Section generates options for the command in the form of feasible, suitable, and acceptable COA based on current and future situations. Section provides clarity and unity of effort in all written communications, warning orders, operations orders, and fragmentary orders. Section continually updates estimates based on incoming information and anticipates changes. 1-2: Section executes estimates on current missions. Determines and analyzes the vast majority of specified tasks, implied tasks, and determines the essential tasks. Section preserves or forfeits options. 12 — Figure 1 Figure 2

To achieve standard in staff estimates, the section must clearly articulate, in doctrinally correct language, the specified, implied, and essential tasks for any given mission. The section must have a thorough understanding of the staff’s collective requirements, as well as mission requirements, timelines, limitations, and constraints. They must continually monitor the tactical situation and maintain a “running estimate” of the staff’s collective current and future missions, as well as higher, subordinate, and adjacent units. The section must generate options for the commander in the form of feasible, suitable, and acceptable COA based on current and future situations, and provide clarity and unity of effort in all written communications, warning orders (WARNOs), operations orders (OPORDs), and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs). The section continually updates the estimates based on incoming information, and anticipates changes to the mission or situation. (See Figure 2.) Common Operational Picture The unit will have an effective method of displaying information within the command post that provides the commander and key personnel with a quick update of the unit, enemy, and friendly situation. For a command post to function effectively, it must efficiently and effectively manage information, which provides the common operational picture (COP). The COP should provide the commander and staff with the ability to receive an instant knowledge transfer without asking copious questions; the ability to cross-level critical information vertically and horizontally; and provide a quick and efficient means of processing information and making decisions. There is value to all staff sections in the COP and it must be integrated to be effective. Current technology allows commanders to achieve a much higher level of situational awareness than previous technology. Technology also allows for a more efficient means to display and update the COP, but should be used with caution, as units who show an overreliance on technology often fall into the secure internet protocol router network (SIPRNET) e-mail trap of attempting to e-mail the problem away. Technology is an enabler, but it also lends itself to the negative trend of an “e-mail action passed is an action complete.” To reach the standard in COP, a staff section must prepare, consistently update, and continually monitor the COP. It is used as a situational awareness, situational analysis, and predictive analysis tool. All information posted is relevant, with background, and allows and enables immediate knowledge transfer, as well as the ability for the unit to see itself in terms of terrain, time, and friendly and enemy forces. The COP also provides basic knowledge on villages, towns, and cities within an area of operations. Any major updates or changes to the COP are immediately disseminated throughout the staff with acknowledgement. CCIR and COP relevant RFI are tracked and monitored in coordination with the COP. Updates from higher, lower, and adjacent units are added to the COP after analysis. (See Figure 3.) Information Analysis and Dissemination Information analysis and dissemination refers to the process of breaking complex battlefield information into relevant and manageable information and getting it to the right people in a timely manner. There are many acceptable ways to disseminate information, to include staff reports and briefings. There is, however, a fine line to disbursing information relevant to the current mission — too much dissemination can result in information overload. The true staff skill is to determine in the analysis what is important and who else needs to know, which requires a great amount of staff discipline. Staff members must analyze in-depth, looking for second- and third-order effects; they must also be cautious of and avoid overreliance on e-mail and avoid fire-and-forget dissemination. To reach the desired standard in information analysis and dissemination, staff leaders must receive information, analyze the information, and determine who needs the information, all with a clear and articulate approach. Staff leaders use all means to disseminate information, such as briefings, e-mail, staff papers, Common Operational Picture Based on Assessment Levels 1-5: 5: COP provides enough information for immediate command decisions, staff synchronization, and monitoring of ongoing actions. All lesser included. 4: COP is central focus of all staff operations with each staff section using the COP for predictive analysis and collective staff option development. All lesser included. 3: Staff prepares and consistently updates the COP. The COP is used as both a situational awareness, situational analysis, and predictive analysis tool. All sections continually monitor the COP. All information posted is relevant with background. COP allows and enables immediate knowledge transfer as well as the ability for a unit to see itself in terms of terrain, time, friendly and enemy forces. COP also provides basic knowledge on villages, towns, and cities within the area of operations. Any major updates or changes to the COP are immediately disseminated throughout the staff with acknowledgement. CCIR and COP relevant RFIs are tracked and monitored ICW the COP. Updates from higher, lower, and adjacent units are added to the COP after analysis. 1-2: Unit battle tracks key events and maintains the COP. Information Analysis and Dissemination Based on Assessment Levels 1-5: 5: The staff section (through a rehearsed battle drill) quickly receives and analyzes incoming information, produces immediate products for dissemination (if necessary), and is able to help the commander make a decision based off newly arrived information within a short timeframe from receipt. All lesser included. 4: Staff sections have the discipline to review all information at all levels in the section and provide analysis prior to submission. All lesser included. 3: Staff leaders receive information, analyze the information, and determine who needs to see this information, all in a clear and articulate way. A fine line exists here regarding disbursing information relevant to the current mission. Staff leaders use all means to disseminate information such as briefings, e-mail, staff papers, reports, and summaries, within an acceptable timeframe from receipt. 1-2: Staff leaders receive information, do not analyze it, and forward it without regard to who needs to see it; thus unnecessarily increasing the information overflow to the staff. — 13 Figure 3 Figure 4 wasted on products that do not work with the current and/or projected future situation; relevant options are linked to priority intelligence requirements (PIR), friendly forces information requirements (FFIR), and decision points, and are feasible, acceptable, suitable, distinguishable, and complete; COA have been qualitatively and quantitatively analyzed and wargamed, and have the essential characteristics of all good orders — clarity and unity of effort; and all tactical and accidental risks have been identified and mitigated. (See Figure 5.) Apprentice  Journeyman  Master During training, we use a simple analogy from the trades and television industries to illustrate the staff’s collective training level. A staff that simply battle tracks the ongoing operation is at the “apprentice” collective level. The apprentice staff (and operations center) is basically the commander’s internal “history channel” and records recent and on-going histories of the organization, and is basically reactive in nature. We consider the next higher staff level to be at the “journeyman” level when it is capable of efficiently receiving, analyzing, and then disseminating accurate and timely information and intelligence in the form of an order, such as an OPORD, FRAGO, or WARNO, containing both clarity and unity of effort. Far too many staffs do an excellent job of receiving and disseminating, but fail in the critical middle aspect of analyzing data and turning that data into something meaningful, such as an order, for subordinate units. Other staffs become mired in over-analysis and work diligently to pole-vault over simple coordination issues. Ideally, well-led staffs work based on the deputy commander/executive officer’s judgment and experience level, and execute from a common work priority. A journeyman-level staff is much like FOX or CNN on election night — when information is received, goes through “expert” analysis, and is disseminated to the viewing audience. The highest order in both the trades industry and staff profession is to have a staff with the capability to visualize, describe, and direct future actions while staying involved in the current fight; this staff is at the master level. Master-level staffs (and operations centers) are capable of dutifully battle-tracking current operations, analyzing data and turning it into a meaningful order (WARNO or FRAGO) as a lesser-included task, collectively “seeing the future,” and generating relevant options for the commander. In essence, a master-level staff is the “future channel.” The classic military history example of a master-level staff is that of General George Patton’s Third Army staff and its actions prior to the Battle of the Bulge. This staff, due to its master-level of competence, was able to see the future and provide General Patton with relevant options and begin building COA to move combat power into the Bulge quickly and efficiently. Each of the five categories relies on staff integration for the section to be efficient. The staff must understand how their section affects other sections, and they must understand the purpose and audience of running estimates. The staff must be integrated and have a mutual view of the battlefield and the commander’s desired endstate to achieve the desired effect — without integration, the staff will lack clarity and unity of effort. Using the trades industry and television analogies, and coupling them with known doctrinal standards in five key areas, allows and enables staffs (and operations centers) to judge themselves against a known standard and increase their efficiency (see Figures 6 and 7). Being efficient, however, is not enough in modern sus-Generating Relevant Options Based on Assessment Levels 1-5: 5: Through rehearsed battle drills. The staff sections produced products that have relevance to the current situation and have looked into the future based on past relevance, thus able to give the commander future options before they are needed. All lesser included. 4: The staff sections produced products that have up-to-date relevance to the current mission through staff crosstalk. All lesser included. 3: The products that the staff produced all have relevance to the current mission. All staff sections have SA and SU and produce products that relate to the mission at hand. Time is not wasted on products that do not work with the current situation. Relevant options are linked to PIR, FFIR, and decision points and are feasible, acceptable, suitable, distinguishable, and complete. COAs have been qualitatively and quantitatively analyzed, wargamed and rehearsed. Produces COAs that have clarity and unity of effort. All tactical and accidental risks have been identified and mitigated. 1-2: The staff does not understand that the products they are producing and spending man-hours on do not have relevance to the mission. Wasting hours on products that do not concur with the current mission. reports, and summaries, in an acceptable timeframe from time of receipt. A simple formula used to describe the desired endstate is: COP (seeing self, enemy, and terrain) + running estimates + predictive analysis = situational awareness, which leads to situational understanding. (See Figure 4.) Generating Relevant Options Generating relevant options is a staff function that requires time, imagination, creativity, and judgment. It allows the staff to become proactive and to focus on what can be done. In terms of options, the weak staff forfeits options for the commander through poor staff work, incomplete orders, and coordination. The average staff preserves options for the commander and the superior staff generates options for the commander. To be effective, the staff must help the commander by visualizing the COA for both current and future operations and producing a wide range of viable options. In developing options, the staff needs to determine the doctrinal requirements for the type of operation and then the decisive point of the operation, ensuring that all options are nested within the higher commander’s intent. The staff members must avoid the common pitfalls of COA development, such as becoming personally tied to a particular action or developing throwaway COA just to have more than one. Staff estimates, specifically running estimates, are a critical piece of generating relevant options. A staff section has met standard when: all staff members have gained situational awareness and translated it into situational understanding with an endstate of well-produced products relevant to both current and future missions; time has not been 14 — Figure 5 tained combat. The master-level staff must be effective in its outcomes and capable of producing “a striking effect;” unfortunately, this does not come easy and requires judgment in application. Sound military judgment is generally built from either a significant emotional event or “pressurized” repetitions. Both of these situations create the learning need in organizations. While our training methodology and SAS cannot magically build judgment in the formations we train, it can increase its internal functions and make the growth path to judgment easier due to increased efficiency. Note 1Headquarters, Department of the Army, U. S. Army Field Manual 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20 January 2005. Colonel Jeffrey R. Sanderson is currently serving as commander, 4th Cavalry Brigade, First Army Division East, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B. S. from Western Carolina University, an M. S. from Western Kentucky University, and an M. M. A. S. from the School of Advanced Military Studies. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Officer Advanced Course, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, and School of Advanced Military Studies. He has served in various command and staff positions, including chief, Stryker Brigade Combat Team Transformation Team, TRADOC Systems Manager-Stryker, U. S. Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, GA; commander, 2d Battalion, 69th Armor, 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division (ID), Operation Iraqi Freedom; S3, 1st Brigade, 1st ID (M), Fort Riley, KS; S3, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor, 1st Brigade, 1st ID, Fort Riley; small group instructor, Armor Officer Advanced Course, Fort Knox, KY; commander, C Company, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, 1st Brigade, 24th ID (M), Operation Desert Storm; and commander, D Company, 3d Battalion, 69th Armor, 1st Brigade, 24th ID (M), Fort Riley. Major Devin Larson is currently chief of training, 4th Cavalry Brigade, First Army Division East, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B. S. from the University of Nebraska. His military education includes Field Artillery Officer Basic Course, Field Artillery Captains Career Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course, and the Joint Targeting School Staff Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include S3, 1st Battalion, 410th Field Artillery, 4th Cavalry Brigade, Fort Knox; commander, Headquarters and Service Battery, 3d Battalion, 7th Field Artillery, 25th Infantry Division (ID), Schofield Barracks, HI, and Afghanistan; fire support officer, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, 25th ID, Schofield Barracks; and XO, C Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery, Fort Sill, OK. Staff Assessment Staff Assessment

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XXd EN BN Time Management 2 Will break 1/3 - 2/3 time-management rule during MDMP. Battle rhythm on administrative tasks and timelines are coming together. Staff sections track suspenses and actions. Battle update brief/commander’s update brief is short and allows subordinate units maximum planning time. Staff Estimates 2 Staff is not maintaining a running estimate. Logistics and maintenance are not being tracked in away that could provide the commander timely information. Common Operational Picture 2 COP was largely ignored during MDMP process. Was not consistently up to date. CCIRs and RFIs are posted. Tracking charts in S4 and battalion maintenance section would enhance COP. Questions about unit vehicle density and operational readiness cannot be answered timely. Information Analysis and Dissemination 3 S3 is analyzing the situational changes and disseminates across the staff and to companies timely. CCIRs are sent to every staff section; no longer stovepiped. Commander continues to receive daily confirmation briefs of their daily FRAGO from subordinate units. Generate Relevant Options 2 Wargaming too hasty; staff did not identify critical events, decision points, decision support template and matrix; did not identify associated CCIRs during MDMP. Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration planning is being overlooked. “Each of the five categories relies on staff integration for the section to be efficient. The staff must understand how their section affects other sections, and they must understand the purpose and audience of running estimates. The staff must be integrated and have a mutual view of the battlefield and the commander’s desired endstate to achieve the desired effect — without integration, the staff will lack clarity and unity of effort.” — 15 Figure 6 Figure 7