Governance Development

Governance Development by Captain Irvin Oliver As my tour of duty in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 05-07 winds down, it is time to reflect and begin the post-deployment after-action review process. Every unit’s experience in Iraq is different. Our unit’s mission along the Sunni-Shia fault line south of Baghdad is quite distinctive from elsewhere. The Musayyib District is a religiously diverse area with a Shia majority and a very large Sunni minority. This diverse area straddles the Sunni-Shia fault line. The lessons our unit learned this past year resulted from a wide range of missions in which we participated. Some were quite evident and fundamental, but others required the best and cruelest teacher — experience. We achieved many of our initial goals and set the conditions for the next unit. One of my key tasks was establishing the district government for the Musayyib District of the Babil Province in Iraq. This area of operations presented many challenges to developing a viable governing body that represents the entire district. Foremost, the Shia majority distrust the Sunni minority and are reluctant to put the past behind. On the other side of the coin, the Sunnis distrust their Shia neighbors and are not willing to assume the role of minority after being the controlling demographic for more than 35 years. The seeds of distrust blossomed after the initial invasion in 2003 and have continued to grow with every sectarian attack, even if it occurs elsewhere in Iraq. This is, by far, the most difficult obstacle we faced in establishing a functioning government. There were other difficulties, such as political infighting and corruption, but those took a backseat to the distrust between the Sunnis and Shia. Commander’s Intent and Implied Tasks Units and commanders must know and understand the higher commander’s intent. The task of governance development takes place within the context of other military operations, and because it also is a military operation in a counterinsurgency, the same rules apply as if a unit were to attack an enemy position. Just as in conventional combat, one must always know and understand the commander’s intent. Governance development should be treated with the same preparation and aggressiveness as would offensive or defensive operations. Commander’s intent is critical for this imprecise task, because it defines mission success. The commander’s intent must clearly define success for all lines of operation, and subordinate commanders have to understand that intent. It is impossible for any commander to specify every task or forecast all of the opportunities or obstacles that will inevitably arise. Junior commanders must act decisively with little or no guidance; they can best do this with an understanding of the commander’s intent. Junior leaders (lieutenants, sergeants first class, staff sergeants, and sergeants) must also understand the commander’s intent and must operate using it and their own initiative for mission success. Operations are very decentralized and junior leaders are where the rubber meets the road. A common perception is that OIF and counterinsurgencies are company and platoon fights; it can be narrowed down to platoon and squad fights. When we conducted company-level operations, squads and platoons maneuvered and operated independently with the company headquarters tasked with an objective or simply command and control of the operation. When you add in the integration and/or coordination with Iraqi Security Forces, junior leaders will be on the ground to make some big decisions. They have to understand the commander’s intent, how they fit into it, and its overarching purpose. They have to be clear on what equals success. This is difficult enough during a conventional fight — it can be a significant challenge in counterinsurgency. May-June 2007 — 41

When junior leaders can act with minimal supervision within the commander’s intent, you are well on your way to reaching the objective. The other implied task is to embrace whatever mission you receive. It may not be the sexy mission you or your unit prefers, but its just as important. This may not be evident, but most missions in a counterinsurgency are not very sexy and will not have an immediately visible impact. Fight the urge to find a substitute for the Vietnam-era “body count.” Most efforts take time to develop and results usually do not make their appearance until a fair amount of time has passed. Because of this, it can be easy to say, “I’m not making a difference,” or to view your daily operations as a waste of time. Do not lose sight of your long-term objectives and tackle all of your “nonkinetic,” “nonlethal,” or “touchy-feely” operations with as much energy as you do the lethal operations. More so, you have to sell it to your soldiers, which will probably be the toughest sell — few men joined the Army to provide clean water and electricity to a developing nation. Units must also have support from their higher headquarters. Just as governance development does not exist in a vacuum, neither do units. The higher commander must evaluate and determine the priority of governance development and allocate resources accordingly. Those resources may be a diverse lot, such as discretionary funds or micro-rewards, which allow units tasked with governance development to better adhere to the local customs and culture or to request rotary-wing aviation for a demonstration of force. The higher commander must also be prepared to reinforce the efforts of the subordinate commander personally. Experience shows that rank and position matter in the developing world and Iraq is no different. We send a message by sending differing ranks to accomplish certain missions. A personal visit from the company commander working on governance issues carries more weight than sending a platoon leader or platoon sergeant. At the same time, when I wanted to send a threat-of-force message, platoon sergeants achieved our desired effects. At times, Iraqi leaders questioned the credibility of a message from one of my junior leaders, but would take the same message from me “to the bank.” Leaders must know who is the best person to accomplish a given task; this is just an extension of the old be, know, do. Leaders of all ranks must get to know the key people in the area of operations (AO), and they have to know the ethnic, religious, and tribal makeup of the people, which is critical to understanding the dynamics of the AO. Personal involvement from the next higher level may be very helpful when conflicting parties are reluctant to meet on common ground or when subordinate commanders face excessive resistance. This can be a challenge because commanders have full plates, but they must keep in mind that: Governance development does not exist in a vacuum. Governance development cannot be viewed or attempted as a separate task apart from security. Economic development is also closely linked — without a relatively secure environment, governance development is destined for failure. For example, who will collect the trash if it is not safe to pick up the trash? Units undertaking governance development must also play a starring role in providing security to the same segment of the population. This achieves two effects. Firstly, it provides the commander and unit credibility in the eyes of the population because the commander can immediately demonstrate effects and alter security operations without coordinating outside his unit. Destroying, defeating, or neutralizing an enemy force will establish the authority needed to further governance development. The people (key terrain) have to view the unit from a position of strength, which sanctions credibility; in that, the unit can provide required goods and services. “When we conducted company-level operations, squads and platoons maneuvered and operated independently with the company headquarters tasked with an objective or just command and control of the operation. When you add in the integration and/or coordination with the Iraqi Security Forces, junior leaders will be on the ground to make some big decisions.”

Secondly, it provides leverage against the population if the commander deems it necessary. In our case, the ability to immediately modify, increase, or decrease the security presence within our AO was one of the primary “sticks” used to bring about change. This ability provided me personal credibility with the Iraqi people and officials. Security must be present before any real governance can develop and the same commander must have primary authority and responsibility for both, at all levels, to adhere to unity of command. This may conflict with my next point … Military units should have other government agency (OGA) support. When possible, commanders and units at the lowest possible levels should coordinate their efforts with all relevant OGAs available. With the increasing presence of the U.S. State Department and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), coordinating military efforts and support can be decisive. It may enable commanders to increase or decrease reconstruction resources (read $) in which they would not ordinarily be involved. Imagine how much more effective security operations and governance development would be if the military landowner had some say in what happens on the civil side of this counterinsurgency. In my opinion, one of the ongoing problems in OIF is that while we somewhat realize the importance of the “nonkinetic” or “touchy-feely” side of counterinsurgency operations, military landowners do not have an adequate voice in what happens on the softer side. This sends mixed messages to the local population and causes disunity of command and internal bickering on our side, which takes one of the most important tools we have — money — and negates its effectiveness. OGAs may also be helpful in establishing smaller levels of government. How much more could be accomplished if some state civilian on the PRT was assisting each battalion at the district level? Having someone with background and experience in developing political bodies would likely limit the discovery learning that military commanders are forced to do in Iraq. No matter how well read commanders may be, governance development is not a primary task; it’s not on the mission-essential task list, nor will it be anytime soon. In addition to having OGA support … Governance development requires local support for success. Governance development cannot succeed without the support of the population. We constantly hear the local people referred to as “key terrain,” and this holds true in governance development. The purpose of governance development is to create a political body that will preside over the people. Without the peoples’ support, they will reject any and all governance development efforts. Americans think of governance development as the establishment of some form of democracy — arguably the most challenging form of government to institute. Democracy simply cannot exist without the people’s support and involvement. To gain support from the people, evidence that the process is moving forward is required. When this evidence is clearly demonstrated. we can leverage the other enablers previously discussed to show progress, even if those enablers do not directly translate into voting blocs and hanging chads. People tend to get easily frustrated when they see no progress, especially in a place like Iraq where bad news dominates the media, even if that bad news is not local. Even after tangible examples of progress, such as elections, we must immediately go on to the next step because questions, such as “What was the point of me voting? What did it lead to?” inevitably arise. We must have a positive response to those questions, even if the answer is barely adequate, as long as the results are real. We have to cultivate reasonable optimism among the people to gain and maintain their support. Governance development is a challenging task with occasional operational or strategic implications. It is inextricably linked to the other lines of operations and we cannot treat it as a secondary or tertiary effort if we want to achieve positive results from our work. Even when addressing governance development early in the orders process, we must do more than just provide lip service; we must ensure everyone involved understands its intent and that it is adequately resourced. Because of the bigger picture, governance development should include as much expertise as possible, even if that expertise is not in uniform. As long as we maintain unity of command and effort, we can make it work. As we progress through the process, we must never forget that governance development will succeed or fail according to the people who will be subject to the established government. We have to bring the people in early and keep them interested in the successes of our endeavors. Governance development is not sexy and can be tedious; however, it is one of the main avenues to our success in Iraq. Captain Irvin W. Oliver Jr. is currently serving as company commander, D Company, 1st Battalion, 67th Armor, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Iraq. He received a B.A. from Prairie View A&M University. His military education includes Combined Arms Services and Staff School, Armor Captains Career Course, Infantry Mortar Leaders Course, and Armor Officer Basic Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include assistant S3 plans officer, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, TX; S3 Air, Task Force 1st Battalion, 37th (1-37) Armor, 1st Armored Division (1 AD), Baghdad, Iraq; mortar platoon leader, 1-37 Armor, 1 AD, Friedberg, Germany; and tank platoon leader, 1-37 Armor, 1 AD, Friedberg. “Leaders of all ranks must get to know the key people in the area of operations (AO), and they have to know the ethnic, religious, and tribal makeup of the people, which is critical to understanding the dynamics of the AO. Personal involvement from the next higher level may be very helpful when conflicting parties are reluctant to meet on common ground or when subordinate commanders face excessive resistance.” May-June 2007 — 43