Breaking the Paradigm of Crisis Maintenance

The U. S. Army’s equipment is built for durability and to accomplish the mission for which it is designed, even in the harshest of conditions. However, this “mil-spec” endurance is often short lived due to an all-too-often “don’t fix it until it breaks” attitude. One could term this as crisis maintenance versus preventive maintenance. The bedrock of any maintenance program lies in a unit’s ability to conduct quality services. Truth is: our military equipment can only perform as well as the services we conduct. Why Some Vehicles Breakdown If services are done to standard, our equipment will have a better than 95 percent chance of not experiencing a meantime failure between services. In simple terms, you won’t breakdown unexpectedly. However, units are consistently challenged with conducting scheduled services for one primary reason — time. This problem normally stems from a failure to allocate time on unit training schedules for services. Successful units include the conduct of services in their quarterly training guidance and note scheduled services on the battalion’s long-range training calendar. Such visibility allows commanders to see likely points of friction between scheduled training and scheduled services. Having visibility of this early in the planning process allows commanders to mitigate and adjust training schedules to allow for quality services. Like mandatory training, services are also required; unfortunately, the latter often pays for the former. One Size Does Not Fit All Each vehicle in the Army’s inventory has a prescribed amount of time required for a given service. This is provided to commanders and maintenance managers on the Maintenance Allocation Chart (MAC) of the respective vehicle’s technical manual.1 Maintenance standard operating procedures (SOPs) often direct a specified amount of time for the conduct of services. This is usually broken down by tracks and wheels (one week for tracks and three days for wheels). For in-Breaking the Paradigm of Crisis Maintenance by Brigadier General Mike Tucker — 49 stance, the MAC allocates 120 man hours for an M1A1 annual service and 36 man hours for the annual service on an M998 HMMWV.2 It is evident that a “cookie-cutter” approach in our SOPs will not provide the amount of time required to conduct quality services. Motor Pool Math Let’stake a closer look at what we would normally consider a 40-hour work week in the motor pool. Are we getting the number of hours we think we are each week in the motor pool? Is it enough to get the job done? Most Army units conduct physical training from 0630 to 0730 hours daily, followed by first formation at 0900 hours. Usually, this formation is conducted in the company area and often command information is disseminated along with occasional promotions and award presentations. We then march to the motor pool, draw our tool boxes, don our coveralls, secure the keys to our vehicles, and move to the vehicle line or maintenance bays to begin work. By this time, it is at least 0930 hours, if not later. Most units break for lunch at 1130 hours and return for formation at 1300 hours. Again, more command information, march to the motor pool, and so on. Finally, we are back on the line at work about 1330 hours. Again, most units break for motor pool cleanup at 1630 hours and the day is complete. Adding all this up, my math comes to five hours in what we would consider to be an eight-hour day. Further, taking into account that sergeant’s time training is conducted one day a week, we average 23 hours a week of actual maintenance time. This, of course, fails to account for the often Monday or Friday training holiday, which brings us to an 18-hour week; afar cry from 40. If the commander has allocated even two weeks for a tank platoon service, he may fall short, unless steps are taken to further mitigate. Always Begin with Before and End with After In accordance with the applicable technical manual, completing vehicle services to standard requires the following be conducted: begin with a before-operations check; dispatch the vehicle; drive the vehicle a minimum of five miles; conduct a during-operations check on level ground; return vehicle to the unit motor pool; and perform an after-operations maintenance check. Real efficiencies are achieved when a unit conducts commo checks from distant locations in conjunction with the during-operations checks. These checks are recorded on the vehicle’s Form 5988 and become the actual document from which the service is conducted, in conjunction with the service checklist from the applicable technical manual. Failing to begin a service with a before-operations check could cause maintenance personnel to overlook potential mechanical problems, such as the vehicle’s steering pulling to one side, the vehicle shifting improperly, the brakes or linkages binding, the hubs overheat ing, or any of the fluid lines leaking. More importantly, this same process is repeated during the after-operations check to determine if any of the replaced hoses or filters are leaking and if the vehicle is operating properly. Ways to Mitigate Commanders should have an appreciation for the amount of time it takes to conduct services on assigned equipment. Completely understanding time require- “Each vehicle in the Army’s inventory has a prescribed amount of time required for a given service. This is provided to commanders and maintenance managers on the Maintenance Allocation Chart (MAC) of the respective vehicle’s technical manual. Maintenance standard operating procedures (SOPs) often direct a specified amount of time for the conduct of services.” 50 — ments for the MAC, coupled with an understanding of “motor pool math,” commanders can ensure that enough time is allocated to conduct services to standard. Conducting the pre- and post-service road march is also important, and in some circumstances, will require appropriate convoy and road-march clearances. Again, incorporating vehicle services into the training guidance early in the planning process is very important to help facilitate coordination efforts. Present and Accounted For During services, the vehicle operator/crew must be present, as well as the mechanics. Services should never be conducted without this marriage of skill sets. Commanders must make adjustments to the duty roster to ensure essential personnel are present for duty in the motor pool for the duration of the service — not to mention the availability of maintenance personnel. Setting Condition In addition to the factors mentioned above, commanders should address certain concerns to determine if the scheduled service is set up for success. For example, commanders should ensure the correct number of service kits have been ordered; that adequate petroleum, oil, and lubricant products are on hand to conduct the service in accordance with the applicable lubrication order; that adequate dry nitrogen is on hand to properly purge optics and turret components when conducting services on fire control systems; that the unit-level logistics system-ground (ULLS-G)-produced “parts received-not installed” list has been purged and a plan has been developed to install them; and that adequate numbers of operational steam cleaners or pressure washers are on hand. This article validates the fact that services do not just happen but must be planned and appropriately resourced if they are expected to be completed to standard. We owe this to our soldiers, who must man and operate our vehicles to accomplish their assigned missions. Services, as well as routine maintenance, are top-down operations that will fail if unit commanders do not give maintenance programs the proper attention and emphasis. A unit with routine breakdowns and unscheduled maintenance requirements is a unit with a poor service program and a commander who does not deem maintenance readiness important to the unit’s warfighting readiness. Finally, commanders must spend quality time in the motor pool observing and assessing the maintenance efforts of their unit. Cameo appearances and “drive-bys” are inadequate. World War II veteran, GEN Bruce C. Clarke said, “An organization does well only those things the boss checks.”3 Without question, soldiers will know what commanders deem important by observing where they spend the majority of their time. If services are done to standard, we will stop senseless breakdowns and equipment failure. This sends a bad message to our soldiers — they must not only have confidence in their leaders and training, but in their equipment as well. Notes 1The complete Maintenance Allocation Chart (MAC) can be found in Technical Manual (TM) 9-2350-264-20-1-5, Unit Maintenance Manual, Vol 5 of 5 for Tank, Combat, Full-tracked: 120mm Gun, M1A1, Appendix B, pp. B-4 through B-

16. MACs originate early in the production cycle as a joint venture between the TRADOC combat developers and the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). The process starts with OEM engineering estimates and logistic support analyses (LSA), which are then validated by TRADOC combat developers. The combat developers conduct these logistics demonstrations in a controlled environment using soldiers from various TRADOC installations. These soldiers perform selected tasks from the OEM task list. Once time and standards are validated, the OEM task list is published as the MAC in the applicable technical manual. 2According to TMs 9-2350-264-20-1-1 and 1-2, the semi-annual service for the M1A1 is 58.8 hours for the hull service and 61.2 hours for the turret service. TM 9-2350-264-2-1-1, Unit Maintenance Manual, Vol 1 of 5 for Tank, Combat, Full-tracked: 120mm Gun, M1A1 and TM 2-2350-264-2-1-2, Unit Maintenance Manual, Vol 2 of 5, for tank, Combat, Full-Tacked: 120mm Gun, M1A1, Headquarters, Department of the Army, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 3 May 2003. 3GEN Bruce C. Clarke, From Leadership to Commandership, online at www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/clarkebimage3. htm. Brigadier General Michael S. Tucker is currently serving as assistant division command er (support), 1st Armored Division, Baumholder, Germany. He received a B. S. from University of Maryland, an M. M. A. S. from the School of Advanced Military Studies, and an M. P. A. from Shippensburg University, PA. His military education includes Officer Candidate School, Airborne School, German Ranger School, Canadian Command and Staff College, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the U. S. Army War College. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include XO, Headquarters, U. S. Army Europe, Heidelberg, Germany; commander, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Friedberg, Germany; G3, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA; commander, 1st Battalion, 64th Armor, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Stewart; and commander, Combat Support Company, Company C, and Headquarters and Headquarters Company, and S1 and S3, 1st Battalion, 35th Armor, 1st Armored Division, Erlangen, Germany. — 51 “Without question, soldiers will know what commanders deem important by observing where they spend the majority of their time. If services are done to standard, we will stop senseless breakdowns and equipment failure. This sends a bad message to our soldiers — they must not only have confidence in their leaders and training, but in their equipment as well.”

Patrol leaders could also influence the locals with whom they spoke to report all suspicious activity to U. S. and Iraqi security patrols, or make an anonymous call to the police station. If the people want to believe that locals are not shooting at Americans, then the residents need to at least notify multinational forces or local police regarding any stranger who enters their community. Any town or district that refuses to tolerate insurgent and criminal activity deserves infrastructure improvements ahead of those communities that harbor terrorists and pretend their districts are entirely peaceful. The Diyala government delineated between violent areas and those with a populace supporting the rule of law. To further develop effective IO, the task force IO officer could use the theme, “funding is tied to security” in a variety of efforts over a period of about a month. Preparing talking points for patrol leaders to carry similar messages would be the beginning. The IO officer could also recommend that company commanders inform SOIs about their government’s coffers during visits, particularly with mayors and muqtars. The SOIs could prioritize projects for their communities and share this information with the commanders, who, in turn, could pass the data to the S5 for creating a master list. A platoon could also escort the PSYOPS team to the local radio station to conduct an interview about how the provincial government continues to mature as a competent administration, and deliver a CD containing Multinational Corps-Iraq in-fomercials. Another platoon could escort the CA team to the city power plant to discuss the effective use of funds with the plant manager. Advance coordination with the provincial television station and newspaper would ensure media coverage of the power plant tour to show the populace that the U. S. is interested in improving the quality of life for Iraqis. Another effective IO measure would be using PSYOPS channels to design fliers for patrols to distribute. The verbiage might read: “Petition your city council to improve your community’s roads and electricity — a representative government only works when the community gets involved.” IO Integration — an Essential Task in Postmodern Warfare The Global War on Terror continues to be a battle of ideals. Whoever achieves victory will be the opponent who most effectively conveys his perception of reality and aspirations for the future with a host-nation populace and an international audience. The U. S. Army can little afford to forget the lessons gained through a decade of Balkan peacekeeping operations and four years of proactive engagements since 11 September. Military leaders at all levels, most specifically at the tactical level, must accept that in the absence of a conventional threat, IO is a critical force enabler. Ensuring that we train soldiers to convey the right messages to a civilian on the battlefield today may be just as vital as ensuring they know how to close with and kill the enemy. Notes 1Information Operations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power, ed. Leigh Armistead, Brasseys, Inc., Dulles, 2004, p. 1. 2U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D. C., 14 June 2001, pp. 11-16. 3FM 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, GPO, Washington, DC, 28 November 2003, pp. 1-5. Captain Greg Tomlin is currently serving as the assistant fire support officer, 1st Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division, Camp Hovey, Korea. He received a B. A. from the College of William and Mary. His military education includes Field Artillery Officer Basic Course and the Armor Captains Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include assistant S3, 1st Battalion, 6th (1-6) Field Artillery, Bamberg, Germany; joint coordination center officer in charge, Baqubah, Iraq; rifle platoon leader, 1-6 Field Artillery, Baqubah; task force information operations officer, 2d Battalion, 63d (2-63) Armor, Kosovo; and company fire support officer, 2-63 Armor, Vilseck, Germany. Information Operations continued from Page 25 52 — DRIVER’S SEAT from Page 6 the rim should just be in view. All ACH helmets should be fitted with the thinner size 6 crown pad in the top of the helmet. The crown pad should touch the top of the wearer’s head. Fit can be adjusted by adjusting the pad positions inside the helmet, tightening the retention straps, or exchanging the helmet shell for a larger size. By inspecting, leaders can quickly determine if the bottom of the ACH comes to the top of the Soldier’s ear canal opening. If it does not, leaders are required to examine other possibilities for the improper fit and take corrective measures, to include suspension pads and retention straps for serviceability. If any of the components are broken or worn out, they should be replaced. Since there is currently no small-sized ACH, Soldiers who have a loose field of vision, stability, and hearing, which significantly enhances Soldier survivability. However, if Soldiers are un aware of the proper fit and wear of these helmets, they are exposed to increased risk of injury due to ballistic threats — knowledge is power. Leaders must ensure correct fit and wear standards are enforced. This is only one of the many safety key enablers that increase Soldier survivability. Leaders must ensure that every safety procedure on every piece of equipment is enforced. Technical references, fitting guides (with visual examples), and requisitioning instructions for both helmets are available online, courtesy of PEO Soldier, at www.peosoldier.army.mil/ achsoum.asp. “Teach our young Soldiers and leaders how to think; not what to think.” fit in a medium-sized ACH shell with size 6 pads are best accommodated in a medium-sized ACH with size 8 pads or a correct fitting PASGT helmet. It should al so be noted that when other items, such as headsets, NBC mask, and cold weather caps, are worn with either helmet, the headband and suspension on the PASGT and the pads in the ACH will need to be adjusted to allow for the additional equipment. Failure to make adjustments may make the helmet ride too high on the head, putting the Soldier at greater risk. Soldier safety remains priority one and Armor leaders are dedicated to en suring the safety of their Soldiers. The PASGT and the ACH were developed to provide ballistic protection to the head, temple, ear, and neck areas against fragmenting munitions without degradation to the Soldier’s