Contemporary Sniper and Observation Post Operations

On 5 July 2004, the 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment re-stitched their opposing force (OPFOR) desert combat uniforms with standard Army regulation insignia and began preparing for war. The Ironhorse Squadron’s task organization mirrored that of an armored task force with a 10-HMMWV scout platoon. With many of the usual uncertainties, such as a deployment date, area of operations, and platoon mission, we simply focused on the basics. As a scout platoon sergeant, I focused our training on physical fitness, advanced rifle marksmanship (ARM), room clearing, and vehicle and personal searches. Training culminated with a National Training Center rotation in November 2004. With the limited time, I knew I was not going to take the most prepared platoon to war; my goal was to take a disciplined and versatile platoon to Iraq. Three months into theater, the platoon had conducted various missions, including combat patrols, reconnaissance, escorts, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) employment, raids, and route clearance. However, it quickly became clear our main role would be sniper and observation post (OP) operations in the counter-improvised explosive devise (IED), counter-rocket, and counter-mortar fight. During the first two months in north Baghdad, east of the Tigris River, we rapidly learned the techniques of reconnaissance in an urban environment. The first few times our OPs were compromised, the quick reaction force (QRF) rushed in to extract them. It soon became apparent that the dismounts could gain valuable information if they stayed to develop the situation. Even abandoned buildings tend ed to get frequented, and “non-hostile com promise” was usually inevitable. We had some engagements during those early days, which resulted in both confirmed and unconfirmed enemy killed in action (KIA) and the elimination of an IED cell operating in the Al Muthana Bridge area. We took these lessons and further refined our techniques in western Abu Ghraib, a sector in which the squadron reduced IED activity by more then 50 percent in six months (see Figure 1). Thankfully, the squadron commander did not divide up the scout platoon. His guidance was to retain OP, sniper, command and control (C2), QRF, and sustainment operations all within the same self-contained unit — the scout platoon. We mitigated the risk of using two- and threeman teams by using a dedicated, internal QRF. The scout platoon served as the squadron’s primary shaping element. We conducted weekly platoon-level after-action reviews (AARs) prior to our operations orders so that all new information and procedures, along with all significant events of the previous week, could be discussed by everyone. The scout platoon remained under squadron control throughout the deployment and significantly shaped the battlespace for the main ground force. The Quick Reaction Force We experimented with multiple QRF postures: initially four vehicles, then three, finally establishing two for the remainder of the deployment. Ultimately, it was the two-truck QRF that enabled continuous operations. The QRF had to stay within communications range, usually within 2 to 3 minutes of the snipers and OPs, but not close enough to deny the kill zone established by the dismounts. The QRF would recon future positions, noting times and frequencies that civilians used buildings. As secondary tasks, the QRF inspected suspicious activity reported by the OPs that did not warrant engagement; kept the sniper team supplied with enough water to sustain it for up to 48-hours on a rooftop; and verified team concealment, informed them of necessary adjustments, and coordinated with other elements in sector. Sniper and Observation Post Teams Our two sniper teams consisted of three men each: the team leader, the sniper, and the security man. The team leader (a junior noncommissioned officer) carried an M4 carbine with an M203 grenade launcher. The sniper used either the bolt-action M24 sniper weapon system (SWS) with PVS-10 day/night sight or the M14 rifle. Although the M107 Barrett sniper rifles were available, the teams preferred the more manageable M24 rifles to facilitate movement into and out of positions. The team leader and sniper were either school trained or attended a modified course conducted by the San Bernardino Police Department, focusing specifically on the mechanics of long-range marksmanship. The security man carried an M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW) with collapsible buttstock and short barrel. The team’s normal operating time was 24 to 48 hours. The OPs mirrored the sniper teams, with the exception of the sniper; they normally operated with just two men for 18 to 24 hours. When they did take three men, the third also carried an M4 carbine. As shown in Figure 2, the major difference between the two was the organization and engagement strategy. Insertion During insertion operations, the object was to find the quietest way into the house and verify sectors of observation. In some cases, using the front door was the only way into the house, which sometimes presented problems. In a country of much lawlessness, a team could find itself in contact with someone simply trying to defend his home. Once the team verified observation from its position, it was time for a little gambling. If the team leader thought there was no way to avoid compromise, he would wake the man of the house, explain the situation and his intentions, and complete the search of the house accompanied by its owner. If the team leader thought compromise could be avoided, he would quietly search the house on his own. From what we found, Iraqis are generally heavy sleepers. If the team did not coordinate on arrival and was subsequently compromised, negotiations would then begin. The goal of

22 12 15 13 12 13 Total 57 41 40 34 32 35 23 Figure 1 Doctrinal “3-Team” Task Organization

OR 0 Figure 2 these negotiations was to present a professional appearance and encourage the locals to come and go as they please while remaining silent about our presence for the sake of making the country a safe place to live. Whenever possible, we sent the same team to a specific area, which helped establish relationships and gain trust among the local population. The same team possessed familiar faces and had an intangible knowledge of the area that cannot simply be briefed to another team. The teams would have candy, coloring books, and other items for the children. Some of the families who lived near IED hotspots had actually lost members of their families to shrapnel from the bombs. Out of respect and professionalism, and to prevent anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) from compromising home owners, we paid strict attention to policing up all trash. “Non-hostile Compromise” The teams, particularly the snipers, began learning both verbal and nonverbal communications techniques and began effectively interacting with civilians to develop the situation. For the most part, the Iraqis seemed happy with our efforts; they did not necessarily feel great about us operating in their homes or places of work. No doubt, there were times when local nationals simply sent the message throughout the neighborhood that American forces were in their homes so they would not be held liable by AIF. However, even compromise produced denial, which prevented AIF from emplacing IEDs in that area. — 45

Many of the local people were willing to support our efforts; however, in many cases, explanations and negotiations were necessary. For example, one of the teams was using a particular house that had missing bricks on its balcony, which provided great observation cover. However, one day the team returned to use the house again and found the owner had made repairs to the balcony. The team leader asked the man why he had repaired the bricks. When the local national realized the missing bricks provided observation, he carved out a couple of bricks for us. We caught an insurgent that very night! When the engagement was over and the dust had settled, the man came up to the rooftop and shook the soldiers’ hands. Later on, during another operation on that rooftop, we paid him for his assistance. The non-hostile compromise was unfamiliar to most of the team. The importance of how the team negotiates with an Iraqi national during anon-hostile compromise cannot be overstated. As stated earlier, in the beginning of our tour, we would simply rush in the QRF to handle these situations. A couple of times, we tried to intentionally and “unintentionally” detain local nationals in a house or building. Unintentional detention means the security man plays cards or visits with the family to keep anyone from leaving, without using force. On other occasions, we simply told them they had to stay. Both of these techniques proved unsuccessful; however, once the teams became proficient at explaining and persuading, the family would usually come and go as they pleased, and on many occasions, even fed our soldiers. Only once was an OP or sniper team engaged by the enemy over the entire year, which proved to be an unpleasant defeat for the AIF. Engagement Strategy Initially, we anticipated one or two enemy over a two- or three-phase emplacement operation, based on intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) from OIF I and II veterans. While we did see this tactic, we also witnessed several different IED emplacement techniques: single person on a bicycle; vehicle with multiple persons; multiple vehicles and persons; and even the drop-and-pop technique where the car never comes to a complete stop. AIF emplaced IEDs using covert operations during hours of darkness and high-traffic situations during daylight hours. We had to rethink and adjust our engagement strategy after our first engagement with a two-vehicle AIF team. The engagement strategy or battle drill was executed as follows:

• Sniper prepared to fire while security man prepared automatic weapon.

• Team leader alerted the QRF by radio and QRF began movement (time permitting; otherwise, they called at first opportunity).

• Sniper fired, the M249 fired immediately after (team leader followed with M203, if target was a vehicle/hand grenade or was dismounted within range). The OP teams engaged with the most casualty-producing weapon first, the M203 if within range; otherwise, the M249. Instructions were shoot to kill, if an AIF member was wounded and could be of intelligence value, even better. The team executed two separate tasks during emplacement operations by AIF:

• Task 1 — kill the emplacer, the most technically competent person on the AIF team, which generally had a 1 to 2 week “During the first two months in north Baghdad, east of the Tigris River, we rapidly learned the techniques of reconnaissance in an urban environment. The first few times our OPs were compromised, the quick reaction force (QRF) rushed in to extract them. It soon became apparent that the dismounts could gain valuable information if they stayed to develop the situation.” “Our two sniper teams consisted of three men each: the team leader, the sniper, and the security man. The team leader (a junior noncommissioned officer) carried an M4 carbine with an M203 grenade launcher. The sniper used either the bolt-action M24 sniper weapon system (SWS) with PVS-10 day/night sight or the M14 rifle.” 46 — impact on the cell’s operational capability.

• Task 2 — kill, wound, or capture the AIF security element for a real, lasting effect. Nothing gets around town faster than, “Mohammed just got killed by a sniper while putting a bomb in the road!” In our experience, AIF did not stay and fight, nor did they attempt to help wounded comrades. The 3d Infantry Division distributed vignettes to train sniper teams on rules of engagement (ROE) once we arrived in theater. The vignettes helped further illustrate ROE down to the lowest individual level, instilling confidence and enabling soldiers to make competent decisions instantaneously. Companies and battalions using snip er and OP teams should seek out this guidance if it is not already available. Equipment and Aids Properly equipping the OP and sniper teams is a vital element to mission success. The list below supplements the equipment any dismounted team should have on hand (personal weapons, night observation devices (NODs), class I, and medical equipment):

• General equipment includes tactical standard operating procedures (SOP), Iraqi smart card, and zip strips.

• Commo equipment includes ASIP radio, headset, hand-held microphone, long whip and base, short whip and base, batteries, frequency cutsheet, ICOM x 1, field expedient commo equipment, and personal communications system (optional, but recommended).

• Sniper equipment includes rifle, sand sock, tools as needed (personal preference), bullets (20 to 40 rounds, personal preference), and Otis cleaning kit.

• Observation equipment includes binos, civilian laser rangefinder, night visions goggles (NVG) with magnifier (3x), PAS 13B, and batteries.

• Navigation equipment includes civilian plugger, and large-scale area maps, acetate coated.

• Near/far recognition equipment includes VS17 panel, flare, smoke, large infared (IR) strobe, IR chem lights, bug lights, and thermal tape.

• Nonstandard equipment includes desert shaded ponchos, bolt cutters, dark colored sneakers (personal preference), hijab/burqa, bug juice, English/Arabic dictionary, surefire IR flashlight, collapsible ladder (if needed), grappling hook/ large “D” ring with 30-foot cord/rope, and black plastic NOD mount (personal preference). A questionnaire (flowchart type) written in Arabic and English that allowed for “yes” and “no” answers was a very helpful item. The list of questions included “do you have any weapons;” “if so, show them;” and “do you know where AIF live?” A letter of explanation, based on current unit talking points and written in Arabic, was used by the team leader at first contact, which greatly enhanced the probability of establishing relationships. The platoon also developed a modified range card, shown in Figure 3, which recorded any vehicle that stopped to change a tire or had car trouble within the OP’s sector. The card was developed after an incident involving a sniper team: The team was observing a local national boy who was selling fuel from cans by the roadside all morning. Periodically, he

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 1 2 3

N Figure 3 “During insertion operations, the object was to find the quietest way into the house and verify sectors of observation. In some cases, using the front door was the only way into the house, which sometimes presented problems. In a country of much lawlessness, a team could find itself in contact with someone simply trying to defend his home.” — 47 would leave his fuel cans and then return. On one occasion when the boy was gone, the team observed an approaching vehicle, which stopped at the location where the boy was selling fuel. An unknown man got out of the vehicle and placed two cans of fuel among the boy’s other fuel cans. The team clearly saw all of the man’s movements and concluded that he was the boy’s fuel distributor. It turned out that there were explosives in the cans. Thankfully, no one was injured. The modified range card helped track suspicious vehicle movement and on one occasion, helped prevent injury and or death from a vehicle-concealed IED that parked within a team’s sector of observation. The modified range cards were analyzed weekly and monthly and assisted in illustrating exactly what could be seen from each position, which enabled the platoon leader to better plan for future positions. Training The Joint IED Defeat Task Force (JIEDD-TF) spent considerable time with our platoon in Iraq to endorse the tactics of what is referred to as the “small kill team” (SKT). JIEDD-TF advocates proposed changes to the curriculum of the U. S. Army Infantry School, which would incorporate SKT tactics and employment training. While these plans are still in the works, leaders can overcome this shortfall by focusing some time on a few very important tasks, which will generate a tremendous effect through the lethality of snipers and OPs. Everyone has been developing ARM/close-quarter marksmanship (CQM) programs, which is great; however, snipers and OP teams need a tailored program. They also need training to plan for the non-hostile compromise, which should be done prior to deployment. I would also suggest focusing on vehicle identification, language skills, and sniper/OP team engagement drills. Back in the “old days” we used to do vehicle identification religiously with the “T” series tanks. There are about a dozen very common vehicles in Iraq and with the confusion of urban warfare, vehicle identification is very important. Platoons should spend at least one-half day per week focusing on language and NCOs should drill the entire platoon on language skills daily — OP teams do not have interpreters or translators! Every 19D has pulled his fair share of OP duty; however, there are vast differences between our duties in Iraq and traditional scout duties. First and foremost, the old saying of “if a scout shoots, he’s wrong,” is not applicable in this environment. Today, the enemy has the capability of emplacing IEDs in seconds — not minutes. When you secure a target, eliminate it immediately. The QRF can finish the engagement, should the vehicle flee, or go find wounded AIF that escape the scene. All soldiers, especially snipers, should be comfortable shooting from an elevated platform, off a knee, and from a seated position. Soldiers should be instructed on how to hit and immobilize vehicles and should be competent at hitting moving targets after just a day or two of training. Mocking up range towers with high and low windows on modern range facilities would be a good place to create practical training scenarios for units. Leaders, especially in the planning forum, need to be cognizant of the fact that these are not traditional OP operations. Teams are observing through windows and holes in brick walls where there is deadspace. The sector may not begin for 200 meters out, but can end 700 meters beyond. An IED could be emplaced within those 200 meters in front of the position that the OP team cannot observe. Discipline cannot be overstated! Noise, light, complacency, and fighting the sleep monster are all the basics we emphasize from day one in the Army. A lot of time and effort goes into what becomes a 5- to-10 second engagement; there are a lot more days of boredom than excitement. However, the effects of destroying enemy IED teams in front of an entire neighborhood overwhelmingly shaped support and confidence in coalition forces and instilled fear in AIF. Sergeant First Class Mathew Donofrio is currently serving as scout platoon sergeant, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Irwin, CA. He is in his 4th year of degree completion at University of Louisville. His military education includes Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course, Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course, Primary Leadership Development Course, Drill Sergeant School, and Scout Leader Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include drill sergeant, D Troop and A Troop, 5th Squadron, 15th Cavalry, Fort Knox, KY; section sergeant, 1st Battalion, 35th Armor, Baumholder, Germany; and squad leader, 2d Battalion, 72d Armor, Camp Casey, Korea. “The teams, particularly the snipers, began learning both verbal and nonverbal communications techniques and began effectively interacting with civilians to develop the situation. For the most part, the Iraqis seemed happy with our efforts; they did not necessarily feel great about us operating in their homes or places of work.” 48 —