Developing a Heavy Reconnaissance Company

, and First Lieutenant Matthew E. Wright The opposing force (OPFOR) at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, has gone through some significant organization and doctrine changes during the past two years. The NTC has transitioned from the Soviet-based “Krasnovian” doctrine to the contemporary operational environment (COE) OPFOR doctrine. The new COE doctrine calls for a very flexible and adaptable threat force capable of conducting a variety of functions from conventional mounted operations in support of high-intensity conflict rotations to paramilitary and civilians on the battlefield operations in support of stability and support rotations. However, the one tenet that has not changed from the old “Krasnovian” doctrine is the importance of reconnaissance. U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-100.1, Opposing Force Operations, states, “Reconnaissance plays a critical role in all OPFOR strategic courses of action.”1 At the NTC, the division tactical group (DTG) continues to deploy two- to three-man division reconnaissance teams (DRTs) to set up observation posts deep in blue forces (BLUFOR) territory to set conditions for the brigade tactical group (BTG). The BTG continues to deploy its reconnaissance company to key positions throughout the disruption zone to conduct shaping operations and support the deployment of its mechanized infantry bat talions (MIBs). The MIBs are equipped with four to six BMP-2s that are deployed as reconnaissance patrols (RPs) to clear routes of march for the MIB and set conditions for deploying the mechanized infantry companies (MICs). The MICs can use one or two of their BMP-2s as a forward patrol to set conditions for the mechanized infantry platoons (MIPs). Relying on designated reconnaissance units using recon pull is the cornerstone of OPFOR’s success at the NTC. Recent organizational changes at the MIB level have allowed MIB commanders to experiment with anew reconnaissance organization, the heavy reconnaissance company (HRC). The HRC uses the survivability and firepower of T-80 tanks to augment the strengths of the BMP-2s when conducting reconnaissance patrols during MIB attacks or counterreconnaissance in a disruption zone during MIB defenses. MIB Reorganization In January 2004, we completed fielding of the OPFOR surrogate vehicle-tank (OSV-T) T-80s, which replaced the aging, visually modified, M551 Sheridan T-80 fleet. Based on the M113 chassis, the new T-80 tanks complement the OPFOR OSV BMP-2s. All OPFOR tracked vehicles can now move at the same rapid pace, and possess night fighting capabilities with gunner thermal sights and similar boresighting procedures with the like fire control systems. In addition, the M113 platform eases the logistics burden with reduced maintenance down time and prescribed load list/authorized stock level (PLL/ASL) stock requirements. This new vehicle capability allows MIB commanders to deploy their T-80s at the lead of formations and use tanks to fight at night. Because of the need for more OPFOR light infantry in COE operations, we have recently converted all of the 3d Mechanized BMP-2 platoons in 2d Squadron, 11th (2/11) Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) to light infantry platoons. This has caused the combat power of 1st MIB to drop from a 10/28 to a 10/20. Troops from 1st Squadron, 11th (1/11) ACR and 2/11 ACR combine to form MIBs, and the BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) platoons from 2/11 ACR and the T-80 tank platoons from 1/11 ACR combine to form the 1st, 2d, and 3d MICs with a combat power of 3/8 each. The new organization left our 3d tank platoons (T-80) in 1/11 ACR with no BMP-2 platoon with which to combine. The 1st MIB (A and E Troops) decided to combine the three T-80s from 3d Platoon with the one T-80 command tank and the four recon BMP- 2s to form a 4/4 heavy reconnaissance company, as shown in Figure 1. Traditional RP Doctrine MIB commanders traditionally used RPs as their eyes forward. Basic task organization included four BMP-2 tracks, as well as two command and control (C2) BRDM vehicles. Any attachments, such as mount ed AT-5 BRDMs, 2S6s, engineer assets, or smoke trucks, were as signed to the RPs based on mis sion, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilian (METT-TC) factors and combat battlefield instructions (CBI).

One of the main advantages of the RP element was the flexibility provided to the MIB commander for tasks, such as route reconnaissance, setting support by fire positions on key terrain, as well as confirmation of intelligence reads given by BTG or DTG reconnaissance assets. On the offense, the RP was critical to guiding follow-on MICs to contact, ap-prising the MIB commander of the situation to his front and flanks, as well as cross-talking with other MIBs to facilitate mass and momentum, depending on the commander’s intent. In the defense, RP elements provided a forward security force in the MIB disruption zone. The disruption zone is critical in allowing MIBs to execute counterreconnaissance operations, as well as occupation of ambush positions once the BLUFOR crosses line of departure (LD). The major setback for the RP was that BMP-2s very rarely provide a significant problem for BLUFOR armor and mechanized units due to weapons system constraints, especially considering that each BMP-2 is allocated only five missiles. Ad vantages of the RP include use of thermals for target acquisition, and target hand off between BMP-2 commanders and antitank assets. The new HRC possesses many advantages over the RP in both the offense and defense. HRC Doctrine in the Offense The HRC provides the MIB commander maximum flexibility for task organization, firepower, and maneuver options. “In January 2004, we completed fielding of the OPFOR surrogate vehicle-tank (OSV-T) T-80s, which replaced the aging, visually modified, M551 Sheridan T-80 fleet. Based on the M113 chassis, the new T-80 tanks complement the OPFOR OSV BMP-2s. All OPFOR tracked vehicles can now move at the same rapid pace, and possess night fighting capabilities with gunner thermal sights and similar boresighting procedures with the like fire control systems.” All photos courtesy Dudley Harris, Fort Irwin - Prepare For Desert War 1st MIB (New Organization)

BRDM x 4

T-80 x 3 BMP-2 x 8 2d MIC T-80 x 3 BMP-2 x 8 1st MIC T-80 x 4 BMP-2 x 4 3d HRC (Heavy Reconnaissance Company) 3d DIP (Dismounted Infantry Platoon) Figure 1. The new mechanized infantry battalion organization has less combat power. However, the heavy reconnaissance company allows more flexibility and firepower forward. If kept at the MIB level, the light infantry platoon can help seize or secure key terrain. The new organization gives the MIB commander more options for the deployment of main body forces. — 35 companies. Although each BMP-2 is armed with five AT-5 Spandrel missiles, a well-disciplined tank platoon easily disrupts RP operations, especially during fights in and around key terrain. Once initial contact is made, BMP-2 commanders attempt to maneuver to get eyes on BLUFOR elements and bring indirect fires on the positions. If the RP cannot hold a position long enough to pull the MIB into contact, the MIB commander is forced to commit lead mechanized infantry platoons to reseed any loss of combat power in the RP. The OSV-T (T-80) and OSV (BMP-2) composition found in the HRC brings a significant increase in the lethality and survivability of the MIB’s reconnaissance element. One tank in the HRC is equipped with a mine plow and all vehicles in the HRC are trained and equipped to conduct manual breaches. The mine plow gives the HRC the ability to conduct hasty breaches of lightly defended situational obstacles. The bottom line is that T-80s forward are able to affect BLUFOR in smaller, more flexible, more maneuverable elements to retain initiative and mass follow-on MICs into the BLUFOR formations. HRC Doctrine in the Defense One of the most important operations occurring during the MIB defense is the counterreconnaissance fight. Significantly outnumbered, the OPFOR MIB commander is spread thin in terms of terrain, which he must cover with limited assets. Typically, he is fighting with no more than an MIC+ sized element, plus attachments, such as 2S6 air defense or AT-5 vehicles. Depending on effectiveness of smoke operations and any deception effort, the MIB main defensive area is easily compromised if BLUFOR successfully infiltrates into sector and maintains eyes on defensive preparations. Denying BLUFOR reconnaissance platforms to key terrain is vital to maintaining the integrity of the defensive plan. To do this, the MIB commander relies on his RP vehicles to provide him early warning, as well as a quick reaction force to any infiltrations or attempted covert breach operations by BLUFOR during periods of limited visibility. Historically, BMP-2 tracks provided the only reliable thermal capability for the MIB due to the aging, visually modified, M551 Sheridan T-80s. The newer OSV-T T-80 tanks provide a more reliable thermal capability to the MIB. Older version T-80 tanks were almost never placed in ambush positions within the disruption zone during the defense because their limitations outweighed their benefits. When the main battle began, Sheridans were outmatched nine times out of ten. Ambush positions can now be manned by the HRC T-80s, placed throughout the MIB battlespace, providing a powerful punch against BLUFOR reconnaissance units. This capability, placed hand-in-hand with counterreconnaissance, means a T- 80/BMP-2-equipped HRC is more capable than ever to disrupt the lead company teams during the initial push from BLUFOR brigade combat teams. BLUFOR In the old organization, the RP was limited to four tracked combat vehicles; the MIB commander may now task organize the HRC into as many as four RP elements, either two T-80 pure sections with two BMP-2 sections, or four 1/1 T-80/ BMP-2 hunter-killer teams. The two MIB executive officers (primary and deputy), with their two C2/recon BRDMs, travel with the HRC elements to control movement, employ shapers, and develop the situation for the MIB commander. METT-TC and CBI considerations ultimately dictate the best mix of combat power. Attachments, such as mounted AT-5 BRDMs, 2S6 air defense vehicles, the MIB mortar battery, or smoke vehicles, add to the shaping effect the HRC can have in the offense. If the MIB commander needs to perform multiple route reconnaissance efforts, he has the ability to task sections from the HRC that can move independently of each other. One of the main advantages of the HRC is that the MIB commander increases the likelihood of making contact with BLUFOR units with the smallest element possible. This capability is most desirable when an MIB is tasked as the fix or assault element for the BTG. The HRC leads the main body by about 5 to 15 minutes, clears multiple routes, makes first contact, and develops the situation to allow the deployment of the MIB main body. Historically, the RP BMP-2s would make visual or direct fire contact with BLUFOR and quickly find they were facing amounted superior force in the form of M1 tanks or M2 Bradley “MIB commanders traditionally used RPs as their eyes forward. Basic task organization included four BMP-2 tracks, as well as two command and control (C2) BRDM vehicles. Any attachments, such as mounted AT-5 BRDMs, 2S6s, engineer assets, or smoke trucks were assigned to the RPs based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilian (METT-TC) factors and combat battlefield instructions (CBI).”

company commanders will find themselves facing contact to their front, flanks, and rear as the HRC fights from ambush positions to deny BLUFOR the ability to mass on the MIB main defensive area. This will cause confusion and early deployment by BLUFOR into battle formations to deal with the threat, and make attacking BLUFOR formations more susceptible to battlefield shapers at the MIB and BTG levels. Ultimately, the MIB will experience increased success in the counterrecon fight, increased lethality during direct fire contact as BLUFOR enters the disruption zone, and a decrease of attrition due to the HRC’s ability to deny BLUFOR the capability to mass direct fire effects on the main defensive area. HRC Training Plan Mission essential task list (METL)-focused training of the HRC occurs during predeployment training. The OPFOR train ing and evaluation outlines (T&EOs) are found in the 11th ACR MIC Handbook, November 2003 edition.2 The MIC Handbook contains the offensive and defensive collective tasks applicable to every maneuver element found in a BTG mission. To supplement the training of the HRC, the MIB commander uses tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and T&EOs found in Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) mission training plan (MTP) 17-57-10, Scout Platoon; ARTEP MTP 17-57-11, Scout Crew and Team; FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon; and FM 17-97, Cavalry Troop.3 The idea is to combine individual, crew, section, and unit level training from BLUFOR and OPFOR doctrine in an attempt to get the best of both worlds. For training, the HRC is composed of four T-80 OPFOR OSV-Ts, four BMP-2 OPFOR OSVs, and two BRDM C2/reconnaissance trucks. Tasks that the HRC focuses on for training include OPFOR-OFF001, conducting a reconnaissance patrol forward through the battle zone and into the disruption zone; OPFOR-OFF002, conducting fixing force operations; OPFOR-005, conducting operations as a disruption force; OPFOR-008, conducting a fighting patrol; OPFOR-DEF001, conducting disruption force operations; and OPFOR-DEF003, conducting defensive operations to deny.4 During MIB predeployment training in early January 2004, the HRC was able to focus on OPFOR-OFF001, conducting a reconnaissance patrol; OPFOR-OFF002, conducting fixing force operations; and OPFOR-DEF001, conducting disruption force operations. HRC in Practice The HRC proved its worth during Rotation 04-03 at the NTC against the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division. For Training Day 1-2 BTG attack, the HRC had an authorized strength of four T-80s, two BMP-2s, two C2/recon BRDMs, one AT-5 BRDM, three TDAM smoke BRDMs, and the MIB mortar battery. It was assigned the mission of clearing routes for the main body and guiding the MIB main body into contact on the objective. The benefit of having tanks in the reconnaissance force was seen at first light on Training Day 2, when several close air support (CAS) sorties attacked the MIB. The CAS cost the HRC one T-80 and both of its BMP-2s. The tank’s survivability paid off; if the HRC had consisted only of BMP-2s, the MIB could have lost its entire reconnaissance element to CAS before crossing start line (OPFOR equivalent of LD). The remaining three vehicles split into two sections, cleared two passes for the MIB, and established an overwatch position on the far side of the two passes, while the two recon BRDMs laid a smoke screen using smoke pots. On the MIB commander’s order, the HRC continued its move. From this point on, the MIB was assigned only one route and operated as a three-tank platoon four to eight kilometers in front of the main body. En route, the HRC executed the tasks normally expected of an MIB RP element, such as coordinating with adjacent units, clearing a defile, and conducting a forward passage of lines. The HRC’s unique capabilities did not become apparent until first contact. The HRC made contact in the complex terrain of the Bike Lake Pass/Valley of Death/Shelf area. The HRC was suddenly in contact at extremely close range with three Bradley IFVs. The tank-heavy HRC actioned on the Bradleys, destroyed them, lost one T-80, and continued its push forward to clear the route ahead of the MIB main body through the Thermopylae Pass defile. The HRC cleared the defile and set another overwatch position with an AT-5 BRDM on the far side, while deploying three TDAM smoke vehicles to create a smoke cover in the pass and at the exit. While in the overwatch position, the HRC made contact with the lead platoon of an M1A1 tank company. Before losing its two remaining T-80 tanks, the HRC was able to destroy the M1 tank pla- “BLUFOR company commanders will find themselves facing contact to their front, flanks, and rear as the HRC fights from ambush positions to deny BLUFOR the ability to mass on the MIB main defensive area. This will cause confusion and early deployment by BLUFOR into battle formations to deal with the threat, and make attacking BLUFOR formations more susceptible to battlefield shapers at the MIB and BTG levels.” — 37 toon, report the contact to the MIB commander, and fix the M1 tank company long enough for the lead MIC to deploy into a firing line. Due to the close range and extremely restricted terrain, a section of BMP-2s placed in a similar situation would have been lucky to report contact. This battle shows that a dedicated T-80- equipped HRC provides the commander with a reconnaissance asset that is survivable, can fight for information, and can pull the main body deeper into contact than would be possible with a more lightly equipped unit. As a result, the MIB was able to maintain an aggressive tempo and go into contact with a much clearer picture of the enemy situation. In short, the HRC allowed 1st MIB to “find the bastards and pile on” in the traditional 11th ACR OPFOR manner. The HRC has also proven its value in defensive operations when used as a screening or disruption force. During the 1/11th ACR’s predeployment training in January 2004, the HRC was tasked with establishing a disruption zone defense based around two critical passes as part of MIB night lane training exercises. In the past, BMP-pure units assigned this mission were limited largely to establishing observation posts (OP)/ambushes, and relying heavily on indirect fires. Incorporating tanks into the disruption zone allowed the HRC to operate a much more active defense. In both iterations of the lane, the HRC, with a combat power of three tanks and four BMPs, was tasked with establishing a disruption zone counterrecon screen, centered on two passes. Their purpose was to disrupt an enemy comprised of three to four tanks and eight IFVs attempting to secure one of the two passes. The HRC commander placed a 0/2 in OP/ambush positions on high ground outside the passes that provided good observation of suspected avenues of approach. In hasty defensive positions, he placed a 1/1 in one of the passes to deny the enemy access to the pass. The remaining 2/1 were assigned an identical mission in the second pass. Routes from one pass to the other were rehearsed both day and night and timed by the platoons to allow for quick reinforcement anywhere in the area of operations. Visual contact with the enemy was first made by the BMPs in OP/ambush positions. They maintained visual contact and reported the position and movement of the enemy to the HRC commander. Based on these reports, the HRC commander tracked the movement of the enemy until the enemy committed to one of the passes. At this time, the BMPs in OP/ambush positions readied to engage the enemy from the rear with their Spandrel missiles. The platoon in the unaffected pass began to reposition onto the flank of the enemy forces, which took approximately 20 minutes. During this interval, the lead platoon of the enemy made contact with the HRC platoon blocking the pass. In both iterations of the lane, the enemy was in contact from the front, flank, and rear. In one iteration, the repositioning HRC element created confusing reports of contact in the rear that caused the enemy’s center platoon to engage the trail platoon. While the HRC took heavy losses, the result in both iterations was that the enemy company was severely disrupted and attrited down to a section-sized element. The mobility and firepower of the tanks in the HRC allowed it to do much more than simply disrupt the enemy by attriting one or two vehicles and causing him to deploy. When used in conjunction with good situational awareness and accurate reporting from the OPs, the tanks allowed the HRC to quickly take advantage of the tactical situation. Rather than simply disrupt, the HRC effectively destroyed the combat power of a superior force. The OPFOR has always relied on dedicated reconnaissance and security forces at all levels. Using recon-pull tactics, the OPFOR uses reconnaissance to set the conditions for follow-on forces. When BLUFOR is successful in the counterrecon fight, their chances of success in the main battle is significantly increased. The experimental HRC, developed by 1st MIB, shows great promise for future OPFOR battles, but the organization and TTPs developed by this experimental force could also be integrated into our future armor and cavalry organizations. As the Army transforms, it is important to address how we organize, equip, train, and deploy reconnaissance and security forces. Armor heavy reconnaissance forces that can fight for information as they set conditions have proven their value in our division cavalry squadrons and armored cavalry regiments. However, as we transform, it appears these units will be integrated into units of action and combined arms battalions. Currently, at brigade and battalion levels, there is no heavy armored force to conduct close combat reconnaissance and security operations. The reconnaissance, surveillance, and tar get acquisition (RSTA) squadron in Stryker brigades is equipped with all of the new digital and sensor technology; how ever, it lacks a survivable platform that can hold its own in a direct firefight and set conditions for main body forces. The reconnaissance troop in the proposed Objective Force organization looks very promising because it puts a variety of dedicated technically advanced reconnaissance assets at the battalion level; however, survivability and firepower remain important issues for the close fight. As we look forward to transformation, let us not forget the value of proven combined arms cavalry organizations that have always set the conditions for success in battle. Notes 1U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-100.1, Opposing Force Operations, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D. C., 27 December 2004, Chapter 6, p. 6-10. 2The 11th Armor Cavalry Regiment Mechanized Infantry Company Handbook, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA., November 2003. 3Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) mission training plan (MTP) 17-57-10, Scout Platoon, GPO, Washington, D. C., 23 December 2002; ARTEP MTP 17-57-11, Scout Crew and Team, GPO, Washington, D. C., 12 December 2002; FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, GPO, Washington, D. C., 2 December 2002; and FM 17-97, Cavalry Troop, GPO, Washington, D. C., 3 October 1995. 4The 11th Armor Cavalry Regiment Mechanized Infantry Company Handbook, Chapter 8, pp. 8-1 through 8-40. CPT Robbin A. Hafen is currently serving as commander, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA. He received a B. S. from the University of Idaho. His military education includes the Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Officer Advance Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, and the Cavalry Leaders Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, including assistant S3 and S4, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR, NTC, Fort Irwin; XO, B Company, 3d Battalion, 8th (3-8) Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division (CD), Fort Hood, TX; and tank platoon leader, A Company, 3-8 Cavalry Regiment, 1st CD, Fort Hood. 1LT John Gilmour is currently serving as the scout platoon leader, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR, NTC, Fort Irwin. He received a B. S. from the United States Military Academy. His military education includes the Armor Officer Basic Course, Scout Leaders Course, and Airborne School. He has served is various command and staff positions, to include tank platoon leader, C Troop, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR, Fort Irwin, and XO, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR, NTC, Fort Irwin. 1LT Matthew Wright is currently serving as the XO, C Troop, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR, NTC, Fort Irwin. He received a B. S. from the United States Military Academy. His military education includes the Armor Officer Basic Course and Scout Leaders Course. He has served as a tank platoon leader, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR, NTC, Fort Irwin. 38 —