Gettysburg: Reconnaissance Then and Now

— 7 U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, defines reconnaissance as “a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.”1 Used properly, reconnaissance can be the difference between winning and losing the battle, which was apparent during the Battle of Gettysburg in July 1863. General George Meade, using his cavalry in a proper reconnaissance role, exhibited modern-day fundamentals of reconnaissance, allowing his Army of the Potomac to gain the advantage at Gettysburg, while General Robert E. Lee used his cavalry in a disruption role, denying his Army of Northern Virginia an ideal battlefield position to engage and defeat Lee’s army. Reconnaissance Then The plan to invade the North was decided in May, 1863. The Confederacy had not secured the quick victory that they anticipated at the beginning of the war. Based on logistics and the fact that Vicksburg was close to falling to General Ulysses S. Grant’s forces, Jefferson Davis called on General Lee to develop a solution to these two catastrophic problems facing the Confederacy. The initial plan was to detach two divisions from General Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia and bolster the defenses at Vicksburg and other threatened points. Lee did not agree with this plan and made it known, feeling his operations would turn defensive. He knew there had to be an end to the war, which would be found within an invasion of the North. Victory in this operation would mean recognition of sovereignty by England.2 The concept of the operation was for the Army of Northern Virginia to move west of Harper’s Ferry and the Blue Ridge Mountains, oriented on crossing the Potomac River. This would force the Army of the Potomac to screen Confederate movements to the North and pull them away from defending the Union Capital of Washington D. C., which would extend the Union lines over several miles and Lee would then attack the Gettysburg: head of the column and destroy it piecemeal. General Jeb Stuart, commander of Lee’s cavalry and reconnaissance, recommended that he move his unit to the east of Federal lines. This would prevent congestion on roads leading north and allow Stuart’s force to cross the Potomac closer to Washington D. C. Lee would approve this plan, which would prove disastrous because it would take his “eyes” away and he would not be aware of Federal movements.3 The Army of the Potomac was lead by General Meade, who had recently taken command from General Hooker, who was fired for inaction. Meade used his cavalry in a doctrinally correct manner. Meade tasked his cavalry commander General Alfred Pleasonton to screen the flanks of the Army of the Potomac, upon identification of the Army of Northern Virginia. Pleasonton’s organization was a corps with eight brigades. Stuart led a division-level organization with six brigades. The typical cavalry troop organization in the North had 72 troopers and 60 in the South. The numbers would seem to give the Federal Cavalry the advantage, but this was not true during the first two years of the war. The South had skilled riders and, like its infantry counterparts, the Confederate cavalry had better leaders. The North overcame this deficiency by applying suggestions made in a memorandum written by Pleasonton in 1862. Pleasonton believed that the cavalry had to be given an identity of its own by law, thus turning it into a corps-level organization. Another issue he raised was the professional development of personnel within the organization. Officers and enlisted soldiers needed to grow in the organization, learning their duties of covering the front and flanks of the army, advanced guards, rear guards, and gaining information on the enemy’s movements. The final suggestion that Pleasonton offered was that this corps organization needed its own artillery, effectively making it a combined arms team.4 Pleasonton applied these tactical training points in the campaign leading to Gettysburg and turned the Union Cavalry into an effective reconnaissance unit. The first reported contact by Union Cavalry occurred on 24 June

1863. Pleasonton spotted the Army of Northern Virginia moving west of the Blue Ridge Mountains. Pleasonton deployed his three divisions to screen the flanks of the Army of the Potomac. Major General John Buford, the First Cavalry Division Commander, covered the army’s western flank, tracking the movements of Lee’s main force, the Corps of Generals James Longstreet and A. P. Hill. Major General Hugh Kilpatrick would act as the advanced guard in front of the Army of the Potomac, trying to locate the Corps of General Richard Ewell. Major General John Gregg covered the right and rear of the Army of the Potomac. Gregg would track the movements of Stuart and attempt to keep him separated from the Army of Northern Virginia.5 The Union Army’s movements were effectively screened from 24 June until contact had been made between the two armies on 1 July. Communications had been effectively cut between the main body of Lee’s army and Stuart’s cavalry. Lee would not have a clear picture of the composition and disposition of the Union Army until contact was made in Gettysburg. Lee intended for Stuart to use speed to get around the eastern flank of the Army of the Potomac. Stuart departed from the main body on 24 June, leaving a skeleton force to screen for Lee. Four issues would slow down Stuart: the meeting engagement at Haymarket with Winfield Hancock’s II Corps; the telegraph lines and railroad tracks that Stuart was to destroy on his march around the Army of the Potomac; the acquisition of 125 supply wagons, just eight miles northwest of Washington on 28 June that were bound for the Union Army; and the meeting engagement fought at Westminster, Maryland, with forces from Gregg’s Division just before crossing the Mason-Dixon Line into Pennsylvania.6 These four issues would cause intelligence and synchronization problems for Lee. According to plan, Stuart was to ride around the eastern flank of the Army of the Potomac, cross the Potomac River into Maryland, and link up with Ewell’s Corps and Lee’s advance guard to secure his right flank in Pennsylvania. The plan failed. The first engagement with Hancock’s II Corps was a prime piece of intelligence that Lee did not receive. If Lee had been properly informed, he would have known that the Army of Potomac was moving north, tracking his movements, while Washington was left virtually undefended. Stuart’s movement was further slowed down by acquisition of the 125 supply wagons eight miles northwest of Washington. The Confederates were in dire need of supplies; however, with synchronization being an issue with moving Stuart’s force into support of Ewell’s flank, the wagons were not a key task. Furthermore, Lee would have considered Stuart’s ability to get within eight miles of the Union Capital and move freely a priority intelligence requirement. Stuart’s Division (-) of cavalry could have seriously effected the political situation in the Capital of Washington. General Meade did not suffer reconnaissance failures because he used Pleasonton’s cavalry to support his move into Pennsylvania. The three division commanders, Buford, Kilpatrick, and Gregg, successfully screened the Union Army’s flanks and by Library of Congress General Pickett taking the order to charge from General Longstreet, Gettysburg, 3 July 1863. 8 —

June, Buford was making his way into Gettysburg and securing key terrain for the main army’s lines. Buford’s 1st Cavalry Division arrived in Gettysburg at 11 o’clock on the morning of 30 June. Buford immediately received reports from the townspeople that Hill’s Corps had been spotted nine miles northwest of town. Buford surveyed the area for its geographical importance for the coming battle. Gettysburg was a major artery of roads leading north, south, east, and west. Securing key terrain in this town would be essential to defeating Lee’s army.7 Buford secured Cemetery Ridge in the southern part of town. This ridge ran north to south and extended for two miles, providing excellent observation for any defending force. This is where the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia made contact. Buford dismounted his troopers and took on Brigadier General Henry Heth’s Division of Hill’s Corps. Buford would hold the ground for 24 hours, until General John Reynold’s Corps could reinforce him; at times, he took on two infantry divisions from Hill’s Corps.8 Stuart had not yet linked up with Lee’s main body; therefore, Lee did not have cavalry to provide intelligence on what he might face or where he might face it. The key terrain of Cemetery Ridge would allow the Union Army to sustain massive attacks from Lee’s army from 1 to 3 July, culminating with the significant event of Pickett’s Charge. At the time of Gettysburg, cavalry shouldered the major burden of the campaign on both sides. The effective use of reconnaissance was the issue that separated the South from the North. Reconnaissance Now Today’s reconnaissance is based on seven fundamentals: orient on the intended objective, be continuous, maximize assets, gain and maintain contact, develop the situation, report information rapidly and accurately, and retain freedom of maneuver.9 Four of these fundamentals are closely linked with events leading up to the Battle of Gettysburg on 1 July 1863. Using the first fundamental of reconnaissance, the objective is to focus on a critical area or priority intelligence requirement (PIR). The commander will base his PIRs on threat forces, terrain, infrastructure, or society.10 Meade and Lee identified their PIR as being the movements of the opposing armies. Meade was successful at gaining this PIR and tracked the Confederates from 24 June until Buford made contact with Hill’s Corps on 30 June. Lee, on the other hand, gave Stuart very loose guidance and contradicted himself with two different sets of orders. The first set of orders stated that Stuart could move east of the Blue Ridge Mountains to move through Maryland and link up with Ewell to guard his right flank. The second set stated Stuart should move west of the Blue Ridge, if the Union Army was static and not moving north. The issue was further confused when General Longstreet forwarded his preference for the cavalry to move to the west of the Blue Ridge to guard the infantry’s flank.11 Stuart was left with too much discretion and should have been given a route, which would have maintained communication with Lee and would have also provided the Army of Northern Virginia ample opportunity to gain and secure key terrain on its arrival at Gettysburg. The second fundamental of reconnaissance is to ensure continuous reconnaissance. Reconnaissance operations will be conducted before, during, and after all operations. Before an operation, reconnaissance answers all PIR identified during intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), scheme of maneuver, and course of action. During reconnaissance, the unit collects and updates information, threat dispositions, and compositions. This allows the commander to execute decision points tied to the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR).12 Meade tasked the cavalry to secure the flanks of the Union Army from 24 June until Buford made contact in Gettysburg. General Pleasonton was located in General Meade’s headquarters, which made information readily available. Lee, on the other hand, divided his cavalry from the infantry, which made mutual support impossible. Stuart was conducting continuous reconnaissance and tracked the movements of the Union Army from Washington to Pennsylvania. This reconnaissance was useless because there was no communication between Lee and Stuart. The third reconnaissance fundamental, gaining and maintaining contact, is key in describing the successes and failures of reconnaissance at Gettysburg. Contact should be established through long-range acquisition. Once this contact is established, contact cannot be broken until handover occurs with a follow-on unit.13 Major General Buford gained and maintained contact throughout this campaign. Seizing key terrain at Cemetery Ridge was the capstone event that exemplified this fundamental. Buford’s Division gained contact on 30 June and had to dismount and fight continuously for 24 hours until reinforcements from Reynold’s Corps supplemented his lines. This allowed the Union Army to seize the advantage by allowing the main body of the army to move into position to counter the offensive. On the other hand, Stuart gained contact but could not maintain it on his march to Pennsylvania because it would slow his march and he did not have support from follow-on forces. Finally, key to this campaign was reporting information rapidly and accurately. “Intelligence loses its relevance as it ages. The troop must accurately report what it observes in a timely manner.”14 Lee’s first reconnaissance failure was Stuart’s contact with Union lines on 25 June. Stuart made contact with Win-Longstreet at Gettysburg, 2 July 1863. Library of Congress — 9 field Hancock’s II Corps. Stuart tried to send a report to Lee, but the report never made it to him. Lee would have no idea until he reached Pennsylvania that the Union Army was rapidly pursuing him. Commanders need accurate and timely reconnaissance; if this fails to happen, they fall victim to reactionary tactics. The Union seized the initiative by obtaining accurate information on the enemy and fighting a successful counterreconnaissance fight against Stuart. Comparing 19th- to 21st-century reconnaissance, few changes have been made fundamentally. The seven above-mentioned fundamentals applied to cavalry organizations in 1863, just as they do today in reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) and division cavalry squadrons. The primary differences are technology and the three-dimensional battlefield. These days, intelligence not only comes from the scout on the ground with a pair of binoculars (human intelligence), it also comes from manned aerial systems, such as the joint surveillance and target attack system (JSTARS) and the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), which provides reconnaissance without risk to personnel. Finally, reconnaissance comes from long-range observation systems, such as the long-range advanced scout surveillance sensor (LRAS3) and command launch unit (CLU) of the Javelin guided missile. These reconnaissance assets can conduct handover at a reconnaissance handover line (RHOL).15 JSTARS is a U. S. Air Force asset that works at brigade or higher levels and identifies threat forces moving into a Stryker brigade combat team’s (SBCT) area of operations (AO). The AN/ APY3 radar system employs the moving target indicators (MTI) and the synthetic aperture radar (SAR). The MTI will show move ment in the AO and the SAR is geographically oriented. This system takes the target analysis and passes it to the UAV guidance unit.16 The UAV, also known as the RQ-7A tactical UAV Shadow 200, works directly for the SBCT. The SBCT will alert the RSTA squadron, who in turn will alert the surveillance troop to gain visual contact.17 The UAV acquires human targets and vehicles. Recon handoff will occur with line-of-sight assets once the UAV acquires the target. The surveillance troop will then handoff the target to a Stryker ground troop, who will use the LRAS3 to observe the target as it moves into sector. Observation will end at this point and some type of engagement system will be alerted to the presence of a threat target moving into the AO. The target will be engaged by a dismounted scout or infantryman using a CLU. Personnel using the CLU are handed the target at just a few kilometers out. The target can be acquired at this range, but not identified. Once the identification occurs, the target is engaged and destroyed. All other assets continue to observe and report any retrograde actions or approaching reinforcements.18 During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the pace of operations did not allow scout platoons at battalion and brigade reconnaissance troop levels in cavalry organizations to “develop the situation” 10 — as General Buford did on Cemetery Ridge. Two issues caused this: speed and lack of protection for the scouts. The maneuver battalions and brigades that scout platoons or brigade recon troops were supporting were accustomed to a more deliberate pace of operations.19 Operation Iraqi Freedom was reminiscent of the Blitzkrieg that the Germans used during World War II against Poland and France. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 3d Infantry Division and U. S. Marines lead with M1s, Bradleys, and light armored vehicles throughout the operation until the culmination of events in Baghdad. This was due to the speed of execution that the armor and mechanized battalions exhibited. Recon organizations during Operation Iraqi Freedom did not have the advantage of speed that was exhibited by cavalry organizations during the Civil War. Protecting scouts is a critical element of effective reconnaissance. The scout in a high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), armed with an M2 machine gun or an MK19 grenade launcher, providing reconnaissance forward of an M1 tank, does not balance. The scouts did not have adequate armament for protection from enemy attacks. The call was made to lead with tanks and mechanized infantry, thus allowing the main firepower to be at the front. Scouts were used in convoy and checkpoint security roles. The U. S. Army has decided that these two issues can be solved by introducing a reconnaissance squadron to each brigade combat team. These squadrons will be equipped with tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) and Javelin missiles, which will provide a little more firepower than typical reconnaissance organizations. In light brigades, these squadrons will be made up of two mounted recon troops, one dismounted recon troop, and one surveillance troop. In the heavy brigade combat team, the reconnaissance squadron has three mounted recon troops and one surveillance troop, and the squadron’s main weapon is the M3 Bradley.20 Reconnaissance must have the ability to fight. This has not been the focus in years past; however, recent combat action has placed scouts out front and they need armament to lead the charge. Doctrine will continue to be developed in these organizations and we will see, especially in light RSTA squadrons, alight infantry and cavalry scout mix at troop levels, which will allow troop commanders to cordon with vehicles and search with light infantry. Cavalry has evolved and regressed at points throughout its history. During the Civil War, cavalry was the eyes and ears of the commander. It allowed commanders, such as Lee and Meade, to seize and hold ground until main maneuver forces arrived to take the battle handover. This was evidenced throughout the month of June 1863 in Gettysburg. Meade employed his cavalry correctly and Lee incorrectly used the cavalry in a disruption role, which did not support his maneuver. Meade exhibited modern-day fundamentals of reconnaissance, allowing him to gain the advantage. The difference between then and now is technology based — 19th-century reconnaissance forces could not provide the reconnaissance picture of 21st-century technology. Due to the reconnaissance handover line and today’s systems, such as JSTARS, UAV, LRAS, and CLU, we can see deep into the enemy’s battlespace, and echelon our reconnaissance from joint service operations down to the basic scout platoon on the ground. On the other hand, cavalry is not the tip of the spear it once was in the 19th century; it has been relegated to missions of security for convoys and checkpoints. Cavalry is in the midst of revolutionizing to become relevant in today’s fast-paced operations. Cavalry’s goal is to become a centerpiece of operations within the BCT and get back to its job of establishing and maintaining contact until follow-on forces can take the battle handover. The future is uncertain, but with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan being noncontiguous, all branches will have to let go of deliberate operations and allow for flexibility in today’s operating environment. Notes 1U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 30 September 1997, p. 1-130. 2Paul D. Walker, The Cavalry Battle That Saved the Union, Pelican Publishing Company, 1 April 2002, pp. 94-95. 3Ibid., p. 96. 4Jay Luvaas and W. Harold Nelson, Guide to the Battle of Gettysburg, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 1986, pp. 210-211. 5Edward G. Longacre, The Cavalry at Gettysburg, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, Nebraska, 1986, pp. 161-168. 6Ibid., pp. 151-158. 7Ibid., pp. 180-182. 8Walker, pp. 105-108. 9FM 3-20.971, Reconnaissance Troop, Recce Troop and Brigade Reconnaissance Troop, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., December 2002, p. 3-2. 10Ibid., p. 3-2, 3-3. 11Longacre, pp. 148-149. 12FM 3-20.971, p. 3-2. 13Ibid., p. 3-4. 14Ibid., p. 3-5. 15Ibid., p. 3-23. 16Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Organization and Assets Conference, PowerPoint Presentation, 3d Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Knox, Kentucky, 2004, slide 33. 17FM 3-20.971, p. 3-23. 18Ibid., p. 3-25. 19Major Christopher Connolly, “Reconstructing the Cavalry Force,” ARMOR, September-October 2004, p. 16. 20Ibid., pp. 17-19. CPT Christopher L. Center is currently the adjutant, 1st Squadron, 71st Cavalry, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY. He received a B. A. from Norwich University. His military education includes Armor Captains Career Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, and Infantry Mortar Leaders Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, including squadron maintenance officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop (HHT), 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), Fort Irwin, CA; XO, D Company, 1/11th ACR, Fort Irwin; tank platoon leader, A Troop, 1/11th ACR, Fort Irwin; and mortar platoon leader, HHT, 1/11th ACR, Fort Irwin. “These days, intelligence not only comes from the scout on the ground with a pair of binoculars (human intelligence), it also comes from manned aerial systems, such as the joint surveillance and target attack system (JSTARS) and the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), which provides reconnaissance without risk to personnel. Finally, reconnaissance comes from long-range observation systems, such as the long-range advanced scout surveillance sensor (LRAS3) and command launch unit (CLU) of the Javelin guided missile. These reconnaissance assets can conduct handover at a reconnaissance handover line (RHOL).” — 11