Three- or Four-Company Battalions?

Analyzing Real-world Possibilities With a Commercial Wargame

Now, I know what you are thinking. Does that battalion have four companies, or only three? To tell you the truth, in all the excitement and change, I kind of lost track of that myself. So, the question is, how lucky do you feel today? Long time readers of ARMOR have seen many changes in the tank battalion organization. When I came into the Army, there were three comp anies in a battalion, 17 tanks to a company. Companies controlled their own maintenance sections and battalion controlled some centralized supply assets. The Combat Support Company controlled scout, mortar, and air defense platoons. Then came Division

86. Division 86 increased the number of tank companies to four, but reduced the number of tanks in a company to 14. It consolidated all maintenance assets at battalion, removed the ADA platoon to the Divisional Air Defense Battalion, and moved the scout and mo rtar platoons to headquarters. This was the organization that fought in Desert Storm, and it was very effective. Now, we are coming back full circle. Battalions are returning to a three-company organization and losing still more of their assets as the maintenance and supply sections are sent to the Division Support Command. This continues a trend of stripping support assets away from line commanders. Yet, by definition of command, they remain responsible for their readiness and receive control of many of these assets when they go to the field. Digitization is supposed to improve the combat effectiveness of our battalions, enabling them to do more with less. However, it seems to me that the Army 21 battalion has thrown away some of the significant advantages of the Division 86 battalion because of budgetary and recruiting problems without waiting for the new systems to be fielded or proven. I wonder if the fielding of these systems will cause the recall of the Active Army to the continental United States and a further reduction in the number of divisions to eight, or even six. To refresh everyone’s memory, the advantages of the Division 86 battalion were: - a built-in reserve, - the ability to defend on two avenues of approach, - the ability to weight the main effort. While the AWE has been proclaimed a success, recent observations from the NTC seem to indicate that the Opposing Force (OPFOR) still wins at least 50 percent of the time. It seems that the technology has provided new weak points for an enemy to attack, in spite of the promise of easing command and control. Now, you may expect that I am an opponent of digitization and change. This is not the case. However, I believe that changing from the Division 86 battalion to the Army 21 version, without the advanced equipment necessary to realize the full potential, is a mistake. My feelings on this were intensified by an article in Army Times saying that the change had been ordered without the benefit of simulation study. Accordingly, I decided to simulate the organizational change with Steel Panthers III: Brigade Command, a commercial wargame by Strategic Simulations, Inc. Many may think that using a commercial game to study the problem was inappropriate, but Steel Panthers III is a powerful game that provides a good feel for modern armor battle. It models platoons and sections, similar to the Brigade/battalion Battle Simulation (BBS), and generally delivers results comparable to BBS. Commercial, turn-based wargames provide some advantages when studying battles, namely:

57/19/9 124/41/20 0/0/0

57/19/9 124/41/20 0/0/0

65/33/16 90/30/15 13/5

12/6/4 15/8/4

14/7/4 18/9/4 9/9/0

4/3/2

60/30/15 130/65/32

60/30/15 130/65/32

60/20/10 97/49/24 12/13

12/6/6 15/8/6

16/8/8 20/16/8 9/9/0

4/3/2 Survivability 15 15 9 5 5 4 Electronic Warfare 0 0 1 0 0 0 Fire Control 40 45 30 15 20 15 Accuracy (Gun/Missile) 8 8 7/22 5/22 5/22 3/20 A = Normal Armor, H = HEAT resistant Laminate Armor, R = Reactive Armor

Figure 1 40 ARMOR —

• An excellent and simple to use scenario generator

• Steel Panthers (and most wargames) give the player excellent information on the enemy force, not unlike the capabilities the U. S. is striving for with the fielding of the new, digitized weapons systems and “tactical” internet.

• Turn-based games allow the player to compensate for the lack of a staff and subordinate commanders. Scenario Development Eight scenarios (each a movement to contact) were constructed. In half of the scenarios, the U. S. side went first; in the other half, the OPFOR player went first. This was to attempt to even out any advantage there may be in going first in a turn-based game. The computer played both sides to even out any prejudices that I might have for one organization or another. Four U. S. forces were used: - A balanced (2 M1A1 and 2 M2A2 companies) task force (TF) - A tank heavy TF (2 M1A1, 1 M2A2) - A mech heavy TF (1 M1A1, 2 M2A2) - A tank heavy TF (2 M1A2, 1 M2A3) The OPFOR in each case was a motorized rifle battalion with three BMP- 2 companies and one T-90 company. In order to eliminate terrain as an advantage to either side, the map was flat. Searching, hitting, rout/rally, troop quality, and tank and infantry toughness were all set to the same value. Turn length was set at 20 turns in all games, and each scenario was run 10 times. In half, the U. S. went first, and in the other half, the OPFOR went first. Testing the Concept I expected the balanced TF to win with ease and the others to be closer, with the OPFOR winning some and the U. S. winning some of the three-company battalion fights. The four-company battalion scenarios were run first, to serve as the control. In each case, the U. S. side won every game in about 10 turns with a average victory

US Russia Score Game Turns US Breaks Russia Breaks

US Russia Ratio 1 11 0 6 1 8 41 32 5485 848 6.47 2 11 0 6 0 3 41 32 5495 216 25.44 3 11 0 5 0 9 41 29 5098 1040 4.90 4 11 0 5 0 5 41 32 5468 579 9.44 5 11 0 5 0 8 41 27 5294 950 5.57 Average 11 0 5.4 0.2 6.6 41 30.4 5368 726.6 7.39 Score Game Turns US Breaks Russia Breaks

US Russia Ratio 1 10 0 5 6 6 41 25 3435 986 3.48 2 10 0 5 2 1 41 20 3257 207 15.73 3 15 0 5 8 4 41 32 3697 837 4.42 4 10 0 5 6 1 41 27 3522 370 9.52 5 13 0 5 4 3 41 24 3358 558 6.02 Average 11.6 0 5 5.2 3 41 25.6 3453.8 591.6 5.84 Average 11.3 0 5.2 2.7 4.8 41 28 4410.9 659.1 6.61 M1A2 vs MRB Game Data MRB vs M1A2 Game Data Russia US ARMOR — 41 Figure 2

The chart at right shows the results of the experiment. US Russia Score Game Turns US Breaks Russia Breaks

US Russia Ratio 1 10 0 5 3 3 41 30 5443 428 12.72 2 10 0 5 2 2 41 32 5513 259 21.29 3 10 0 5 4 4 41 25 5262 623 8.45 4 10 0 5 2 2 41 31 5436 252 21.57 5 10 0 5 0 2 41 27 5318 98 54.27 Average 10 0 5 2.2 2.6 41 29 5394.4 332 16.25 Score Game Turns US Breaks Russia Breaks

US Russia Ratio 1 9 0 6 1 0 41 32 3707 56 66.20 2 10 0 6 2 7 41 32 3707 842 4.40 3 10 0 6 6 4 41 32 3707 729 5.09 4 9 0 6 1 3 41 32 3707 410 9.04 5 10 0 6 5 7 41 32 3707 1057 3.51 Average 9.6 0 6 3 4.2 41 32 3707 618.8 5.99 US Russia Score Game Turns US Breaks Russia Breaks

US Russia Ratio 1 11 0 5 0 3 41 26 5237 327 16.02 2 11 0 5 5 3 41 32 5505 491 11.21 3 10 0 5 2 4 41 21 5027 499 10.07 4 10 0 5 0 4 41 32 5493 317 17.33 5 11 0 5 0 4 41 28 5324 261 20.40 Average 10.6 0 5 1.4 3.6 41 27.8 5317.2 379 14.03 US Russia Score Game Turns US Breaks Russia Breaks

US Russia Ratio 1 11 0 6 5 4 41 20 3233 584 5.54 2 11 0 6 11 3 41 29 3553 711 5.00 3 9 0 6 8 1 41 28 3559 394 9.03 4 11 0 6 3 3 41 32 3707 407 9.11 5 11 0 6 7 2 41 26 3457 445 7.77 Average 10.6 0 6 6.8 2.6 41 27 3501.8 508.2 6.89 Game Data US Russia Score Game Turns US Breaks Russia Breaks

US Russia Ratio 1 8 0 4 10 2 41 32 5513 718 7.68 2 9 0 4 10 1 41 26 5233 598 8.75 3 9 0 5 17 6 41 27 5333 1436 3.71 4 10 0 5 18 8 41 26 4981 1646 3.03 5 9 0 4 18 3 41 31 5459 987 5.53 Average 9 0 4.4 14.6 4 41 28.4 5303.8 1077 4.92 Game Data Score Game Turns US Breaks Russia Breaks

US Russia Ratio 1 12 0 7 18 4 41 32 3707 1259 2.94 2 13 0 7 26 7 41 32 3707 1790 2.07 3 9 0 6 20 1 41 31 3663 907 4.04 4 10 0 7 17 1 41 32 3707 888 4.17 5 11 0 6 12 1 41 26 3480 592 5.88 Average 11 0 6.6 18.6 2.8 41 30.6 3652.8 1087.2 3.36 US Russia Score Game Turns US Breaks Russia Breaks

US Russia Ratio Balenced 9.8 0.0 5.5 2.6 3.4 41.0 30.5 4550.7 475.4 9.6

10.6 0.0 5.5 4.1 3.1 41.0 27.4 4409.5 443.6 9.9

10.0 0.0 5.5 16.6 3.4 41.0 29.5 4477.9 1082.1 4.1 M1A2 11.3 0.0 5.2 2.7 4.8 41.0 28.0 4410.9 659.1 6.7 Average 10.4 0.0 5.4 6.5 3.7 41.0 28.9 4462.3 665.1 6.7

Game Data MECH HVY (3 CO) TF vs MRB (+) (US Second) TK HVY (3 CO) TF vs MRB (+) (US First) US Russia TK HVY (3 CO) TF vs MRB (+) (US Second) Game Data Mech HVY, US First Game Data Game Data US Russia Balanced TF vs MRB (+) (US First) Game Data Balanced TF vs MRB (+) (US Second) point ratio of 11:1. Based on these results, I still expected the OPFOR had a chance of winning some scenarios and that the U. S. would take 11-13 turns to complete the game. Surprisingly, the tank-heavy TF’s engagement results were nearly the same as the first run-through, with a victory point ratio of 10.46:1. I concluded that the TF’s real killing power was the M1A1 and the loss of the Bradley company only subtracted a small amount of combat power. The mech-heavy TF results supported the conclusion: while the U. S. won every battle, the victory point ratio was much closer: only 4.1:1. Average game length in both cases was still about 11 turns. Finally, for completeness, I ran the M1A2 TF. I expected it to win with about the same performance as the M1A1 TF, perhaps a little better, because the fire control rating for the M1A2 is higher. Amazingly, the M1A2 organization had the lowest score of any run-through, except the mech-heavy task force. Examination of the vehicle statistics did not give any clues as to why this was so, and a few more tank-heavy TF games were played, with nearly identical results to the first group. I then played some human-versus-computer, and human-versus-human games. There was no significant difference between these and the all-computer games. On average, each game ran according to the same general pattern, about two turns elapsing before contact, then two or three turns of direct fire combat, and then 5-7 turns of the U. S. mopping up the battlefield. The OPFOR force usually broke after the second direct fire turn and would be ineffective the rest of the game. Results of the engagements are shown in Figure 2. Conclusions Considering the results of the game, I reluctantly concluded the superiority of the U. S. equipment is such that the TF has only a limited effect on the battle outcome, although there is a risk of increased casualties until the potential of digitization is fulfilled. The loss rates approximated those of Desert Storm, so I felt the performance was relatively realistic. Interestingly enough, loss rates with BBS are much more even. Repetitive playing allowed me to make some other observations that may have some relevance: ATGMs are not effective in Steel Panthers III (at least in 1999). This is a result of the values assigned to special and reactive armor and anti-missile defenses. Time after time, I watched ATGMs hit targets without effect. While the warhead-armor battle ebbs and flows with technology, it does not appear that the Steel Panthers III models advanced concepts such as increased stand-off, tandem warheads, and top-attack methods, all of which compensate for improved defenses. The IFVs routinely resisted tank and ATGM fire. If ATGMS or sabot hit real IFVs, they are going to be destroyed. Additionally, the BMP and M2 flailed away at each other, without result, which again does not match reality. LTC Michael K. Robel, commissioned in 1976 from the University of Florida, has served as a tank and cavalry platoon leader and troop XO in the 11th ACR, and as a company commander, BMO, S4, S3 Air, and brigade S4 in the 1st ID, including service as G3 operations during Desert Storm. He has worked in simulations at the 87th Exercise Div., Birmingham, has served as program manager for a game company publishing commerical wargames, and is currently working on WARSIM 2000 in Orlando, Fla.

The attachment of the 70th to the 4th was unusual as it lasted until the end of the war for all but three days when the 70th was with the 63rd Infantry Division. The more the 70th and the 4th worked together, the better their operations became. It should have been that way with all independent tank battalions and the infantry divisions they supported. That it wasn’t led to untold consequences. When a tank battalion became attached to an infantry division, the question of authority for use of tanks became significant. Tankers knew what tanks could and could not do. Yet in the hierarchical structure of the Army, orders from one of higher rank must be obeyed, even if an infantry officer put tankers in needless jeopardy. The worst case occurred late in the war. Company Commander Franklin Anderson attended a meeting at infantry regimental headquarters. There was to be an attack the next morning into a shallow valley with a high ridge on the opposite end still held by the Germans. “That was a perfect place to put 88s, hidden by trees and looking right down on us,” Anderson recalls. He had examined the ground and found tank traps which would force tanks to go the way the Germans wanted. At the meeting, the regimental commander, a colonel, planned the attack. He said he could visualize tanks “barreling over the crest of a small hill into the valley.” Infantry would rush in when tanks reached their objective. With his tanks in the open, in front of infantry, and with no artillery barrage against the ridge, Anderson knew they would be in serious trouble. Yet he could not question the colonel’s authority. He did ask for the attack to begin at 0630, hoping for a morning mist. The colonel said no, it will begin at

0800. An infantry major gave the order for four tanks to move out. Within 50 yards 1-2-3-4-all were knocked out. Six tankers were killed, more were injured. Such a decision would likely not have been made by infantry and tank platoon leaders or company commanders together planning an action at the point of attack. This is where infantry and tankers had developed a relationship built upon experience and trust. When I arrived home in September, 1945, the 70th patch was on one upper arm of my “Eisenhower jacket,” the Ivy Leaf of the 4th on the other. I am proud to read that the 4th is considered among the best infantry divisions in the European War. I know one of the reasons was the excellent relationship it had with the 70th. This article is in part extracted from the author’s book, Strike Swiftly: The 70th Tank Battalion From North Africa to Normandy to Germany, Presidio Press, 1997. It was reviewed in ARMOR Magazine, May-June 1998.

Marvin G. Jensen served as a cook with the 70th Tank Battalion in five European campaigns during World War II. He holds a BA with honors in history from San Jose State College, Calif., and an MA from Stanford University. He taught U. S. history in schools and colleges in the San Francisco Bay Area for 25 years and is now retired. 42 ARMOR — Independent Tank Battalion (Continued from Page 28)