Javelins and Skirmishers on the Battlefield

“I contend that a single shot from one of these irregulars is worth ten from any other.”

Skirmishers became more widely used as accurate rifles became available in the latter half of the eighteenth century. The British army resisted adopting skirmishers until General Braddock’s force ran into them in the French and Indian War. They then established a “light” company in each foot regiment to cover advances and perform other special missions. The French abandoned linear tactics altogether, along with military organization, as a result of the Revolution. They covered the dense formations of the levée en masse with “clouds of skirmishers,” a habit Napoleon would retain even after he restored discipline to the army. Throughout the American Civil War both sides employed skirmishers as an essential element of their battlefield tactics.

Skirmishers fell out of favor as artillery and mechanization began to dominate the battlefield. The deadly effect of artillery and machine guns effectively transformed the infantry attack. No longer would soldiers form into the tightly packed masses which were so vulnerable to the skirmishers. By World War II, the battlefield was dominated by indirect artillery, the shock power of armored tanks, air power, and amorphous groupings of infantry. Once again, skirmishers lost their place on the battlefield.

Shadows of things past still emerge in the present on today’s battlefield. In the past, massed infantry would be exposed to the slings and arrows of the enemy before closing to destroy the other side’s massed infantry. Today, massed armored vehicles are attritted by indirect fires before closing to destroy the other side’s massed armored vehicles. Artillery has displaced skirmishers as the dominant forward missile weapon, with one important difference: the skirmisher aimed for particular targets. Artillery most often uses forward observers and spotters to direct artillery into a general area. Skirmishers of the Civil War would aim and rapidly fire specifically at the lead horsemen of the attacking cavalry formation. Killing those leaders could have two effects. First, an obvious loss in cohesion would follow. Second, other leaders might be more reluctant to step forward. This is how enemy formations and intentions were broken by skirmishers.

Indirect artillery on its own cannot reproduce the effects of skirmishers. Two displays of artillery used against an opposing force (OPFOR) at the National Training Center (NTC) illustrate this point. In the first case I notionally apply artillery against an OPFOR formation depicted as it actually looked on an attack in the fall of 1994. The conditions are ideal for artillery as the OPFOR attacks through constricting terrain in column formation with a lead Forward Security Element (FSE) followed by the Advance Guard Main Body (AGMB). In this example, I use two notional artillery battalions that are timely, perfectly accurate, and never lose a gun.

ARMOR — BATTALION 2

M109A1 RANGE = 23 KMs

FSE in column enters 1st Artillery Battalion’s range at 0705 hrs.

Crosses point of fires for six minutes.

Battalion 1 fires 192 rounds on FSE.

Equals 1 T-80 and 5 BMPS killed.

M109A1 RANGE = 23 KMs

Battalion 1 starts move 0711. Set 0744.

Main body in column enters Battalion 2’s range at 0733 hrs.

Crosses point of fires for six minutes.

Battalion 2 fires 192 rounds on AGMB.

Equals 1 T-80 and 5 BMPS killed.

The minute it completes its fires, the battalion does a doctrinal survivability move to avoid enemy counterbattery fires. It takes a good battalion, under ideal conditions, about 15 minutes to break down, 3 minutes to move the minimum of 1 kilometer, and another 15 minutes to set up again. Add to this the 7 minutes the battalion will need to obtain its next target and we cannot expect to have the first artillery battalion available to fire again for forty minutes. While the M109A6 Paladin-equipped battalion reduces the time threshholds for all operations, the sequence of events remains the same. Although we could use the second artillery battalion to continue pounding the FSE, we wait to fire on the AGMB. If we did engage the FSE, calculating as we did above, we would kill about one T-80, three BMPs and four AT-5 anti-tank systems. This battalion would then have to conduct a survivability move and may not be ready when the AGMB arrives. As it turns out, the FSE was scattered over nearly eight kilometers following our first strike and does not offer much of a target. Meanwhile, in Figure 2, we see that the enemy AGMB enters the second artillery battalion’s range at 0733 hours. If we calculate fires as above, the second artillery battalion would destroy one T-80 and five BMPs. We accept the risk of keeping the second battalion from moving until the first battalion is set to fire at 0740 hours. In the seven minutes from 0733 to 0740 hours the second battalion fires only an additional 48 rounds, enough to kill perhaps 2 BMPs if they could adjust fires on the moving target. Before the enemy enters the close engagement area range, the first battalion gets one more shot at the main body. Results: one more T-80 and five BMPs. Total enemy losses are: FSE lost one T-80 and three BMPs; the AGMB lost two T-80s and 12 BMPs. That leaves in these units about 10 T-80s and 28 BMPs rapidly concentrating on a point in our defensive line.

This scenario assumes perfect conditions for the artillery. The enemy attacks in columns right into our targets, we never miss, and we avoid counter-battery fires. Our survivability moves were only one kilometer, allowing us to recycle our artillery very quickly. In this perfect world we destroy about 23 percent of the enemy’s tanks and 35 percent of his personnel carriers. In reality, ten to fifteen percent would be ARMOR — 39 M1A1 BRADLEY

Lost 1 tank, 7 BMPs, and 1 AT-5 to Arty Lost 2 tanks, 11 BMPs, and 2 BRDMs to co/tm TIME: 0720

As shown in Figure 4 the company team engaged the enemy battalion as it emerged from the passes. By the time they realized they had their sights set on something big, it was too late to fall back. The brigade’s artillery had a better than average deep fight and killed one tank, one AT-5, and seven BMPs, which equates to about 8 percent of the enemy’s tanks and 16 percent of his other systems. The forward-deployed company did even better, killing two tanks, two BRDMs, and 11 BMPs and raised the total enemy casualties to 23 percent of his tanks and 43 percent of his other combat systems. Remember also that part of the artillery’s success resulted from the enemy’s delay on targeted areas while his lead elements tried to deal with the forward-deployed company team. The forward company team was an ad-hoc skirmish line. Imagine if the team employed above had been trained to execute as true skirmishers with fire-and-forget weapons. They could have planned to fire and fall back along the enemy flank in successive positions all the way back to friendly lines. What would be the compounded effects of targeting enemy lead, command, and engineering vehicles? How can such actions be tied into our indirect fire plan, obstacle plans, and close air support?

One of the problems preventing the proper employment of skirmishers has been the lack of proper weapons systems to do the job. The wire-guided missiles require crews to visually track the missile into their target and they are too cumbersome for the skirmish role. When a BRDM fired a SAGGER at my company in the Gulf War, at least six tanks saw the flame of the missile’s launch and fired at the BRDM before its missile reached us. Add the technical limitations of firing wire-guided missiles over trees, water, or snow and such missiles are impractical for use by skirmishers. Laser designators are vulnerable to tracking difficulties, too unwieldy for run-and-gun tactics, and require coordination for munitions. Current tanks are potential skirmishers but are better designed for shock weapon roles. Recent technological advances now offer a perfect solution for arming skirmishers.

The new breed of smart missiles are about to fundamentally change ground battle systems, organization, and tactics. One such missile, the JAVELIN, offers us the opportunity to gain tactical depth by adopting skirmishers. The JAVELIN utilizes an infrared seeker that takes only 10 seconds to cool down and can defeat smoke and fog. The missile flies 2,000 meters, then uses a top-attack flight path to strike the thin top armor of an enemy tank with a tandem warhead that also defeats reactive armor. Unlike wire-guided missiles, the JAVELIN can be fired over trees, water, and power lines. The fire-and-forget technology means the gunners no longer have to track the missile optically, so they can quickly move, set up, and engage with reduced risk of observation. It enables rapid direct firing against selected targets in enemy formations, thus increasing our ability to disrupt the enemy. With the latest communication and battlefield awareness technology, the effect of skirmishers directed by an informed commander can be like that of a scal-pel in the hands of a surgeon. Half a century ago it was common for big ships to carry big guns and close to within sight of each other to duel. Now smart missiles reach out and touch enemy ships. Fighter pilots who flew into the teeth of enemy formations to bring down bombers now release missiles from standoff ranges. Before long, it is possible that skirmish lines with smart missiles can similarly change armored warfare. These weapons and tactics are a critical step in the “smart weapon” revolution. Skirmishers can make a shot from such a weapon, to paraphrase Marshal Saxe, “worth at least ten from any other.”

“The new breed of smart missiles are about to fundamentally change ground battle systems, organization, and tactics.” 40 ARMOR — Major James K. Morningstar is a graduate of the U. S. Military Academy and Kansas State University. He has served in a variety of armor positions, including tank platoon leader and company executive officer in the 1-33 Armor Battalion in Germany, S4 in 1/4 Cavalry at Ft. Riley, and company commander of Delta Company, 3-37 Armor in the Gulf War. Before his current assignment, he spent three years as a brigade operations trainer/observer controller with the Bronco team at the National Training Center at Ft. Irwin. He is currently assigned as the Army Liaison to the Commander of U. S. Navy Second Fleet (Atlantic) on board the USS Mt. Whitney somewhere in the Atlantic Ocean.