Lost Potential: Frozen Groups and Tank Gunnery Performance

Nothing matches the t!lan and high anticipation of a confident, field-tested unit preparing for gunnery. 1bc slridc is more purposeful. the facial expressions more SCI, and the nuances of professional behavior reflect a barely suppressed bravado based on trust in self and the team. Such was the case as a certain battalion prepared for gunnery at Grafenwohr. Everyone knew, without any doubt. that 8 Company would take lop honors. After all. it had the best company commander. a man known for hard uaining standards and deep technical gunnery knowledge: it had the best crews. crews thai had taken the previous gunnery: and it was topS in just about every measure for a company. B Company had earned trust and respect. So, in the unit environment where there is always 100 much to do with 100 little, 8 Company was left alone and battalioo attention was focused on units with known problems. B Company seemed to be on the road 10 repeated glory. Yet. B Company barely qualified, bealen by. among others, a company whose projected perfonnancc ranged from "iffy" to "solid," cenainly not "top gun," 1bc faclOl1l lhaJ. caused B Company to miss its potential and that caused 0 Company to exceed its potential are well worth study by those who would be "top gun" when all is said and done at gunnery. Although no unir"s performance can be boiled down into one simplistic reason, B Company's underachievement seems centered in a concept known as "frozen groups."1 Baskally, a frozen group is cohesion gone awry. A frozen group is a group that has become so nonnaliz.ed during its socialization process that any deviant be· havior is not tolerated, even if such behavior woukl bettef the group. Extra achievement is not seen as somelhing positive, but as a threat to the group in that it places a burden on other group members to similarty achieve. Mote precisely, frozen groups are abnormally resistive to change - and better achievement is a form of change. Groups are natu· raJly resistant to change but have mechanisms or conventions that allow them to adjust. Winning groups not only adjust but seek change in the fonn of increased performance. Frozen groups. on the other hand, lack such mechanisms. Further. they have very strong defensive mechanisms - usually peer pressure - designed to maintain the statUS quo or what is technically referred to as h0- meostasis. Ridicule is a normal tactic: "What's the matter, uying to break the curve." or "So, what makes you think you' re better than us," or '"Trying to make us look bad," or...1 think you gel the pic. ture. Another common reaction is indifference or nonchalance. Frozen groups often epitomize the negative side of machismo - of being "100 cool to care." Such was certainly the case in B Company. Crews seemed preoc· cupied with a pervading desire to avoid embanassing each other (or being embarrassed). Its "prepantion" for gunnery centered more on "mainlenance." Maintenance in this case being defined as "reviewing" and "brushing up;" or. in the case of crews who felt threatened by a potentially better crew. actually doing some debili· tating ridicule. Crews in B Company did not feel the need for the rigorous drilling that other companies were doing. After all, B Company was "besl by lesl" and had proved it had the basics down pal. If the S3 expressed any doubts about the veracity of B Com· pany's gunnery preps. he was essentially reminded that they were the same company that had taken lop gun in the previous gunnery and that he "ought to concentrate on other less capable companies and nOI rock' a successful boat." B Company's attitude seemed 10 18 convey a basic belief that. if they did go to basics, Olher companies might seriously consider outgunning them or, worse. that "mean old S3" might start to work them like the other "1e5Set'" line dogs. No, better to portray uuer self-confidence rather than introduce any doubt as to ability. Anyway, they were not average tankers: no they were "graduate level" rankers. No need 10 worT)'. NOT!!! Contrast their behavior with 0 Company. 0 Company had a strong company commander and a super first sergeant but suffered from high turnover and three new platoon leaders. Talk about pregunnery jilters! Yes, the company was of such caliber thai an OUt· sider would have seen nothing but confidence, but the pangs of self-doubt were there nonetheless. When the voices of bravado were heard at staff meetings in the form of boasts and wagers, 0 Company was silent. After all, how could you vOle on an unproved unit. 1be answer 10 challenge was a determined. "We' ll let the n:cord talk." 0 company did everything by the book and beyond. It spent almost double the UCOFr lime. even going around the clock just prior 10 gunnery (compared 10 B Company that stopped about one month prior 10 gunnery upon meeting minimum UCOFr quali. fication requirements 10 "conserve itselr,): it drilled fire commands until the responses were automatic (compared to 8 Company thaI did not feci the need, after all. it had taken firsl place 1351 gunnery with the same crews); and even drilled calibration and zeroing. (In· terestingly. during the previous gunnery, it was B Company that faced gunnery with anew commander and a high IUmover or TC· gunner pairs. Before that gunnery, drills were the nonn, not some· thing to disdain.) As I watched B Company glumly search through the wreckage of its losl victory, Twas reminded of a certain CAT (Canadian Anny Team) company thai losl its CAT competition. Obviously, it had been the beSl at one time. It was given everything. to include get· ting new NOMEX. nol to mention having the besI tank in the world. It had everything except the proressionalism it takes to buckle down to basics; everything bul the ability 10 acknowledge its weaknesses; kind of like any number or profe.uional athletes or teams who are beaten more by overconfidence (and the lack of preparation that ensues) than the skill of the opponent. Although no one realized il at the lime, during its gunnery preps. B Company had become something of a hangar queen being "pre. pared" for an IG inspcc1ion. It still had the streamers. trophies, and war stories of a lop unit. Yet, behind the well·maintained image was a unit who allowed its skills and gunnery prowess to decay, victim to inadequate maintenance and a command climate that a1. lowed belief to be untested by training. And I was reminded of other companies and realized that. unfor· tunately. winners freezing inlo losers is not all that uncommon. Here are some thoughts you might want 10 consider to avoid being embarrassed by unfulfilled gunnery potential. After all, it is up to you whether you follow a 8 Company or lead a 0 Company. How Tank Crews Become Frozen In Performance To understand how 10 recognize and remedy or how to prevent the formation of frozen tank crews, you need 10 understand how they develop.

First, it's tank crews that get "frozen:' Tank crews are close-knit groups. The technical tenn is primary groups.2 "They are groups whose interactions are so close and intense on a very basic level that members affecl each other's value StnlCtures. Healthy tank crews become so close they almosl become a "pcr.;on" with c0m- mon values and drives. And although cohesion is nonnally desired, any vinue in excess becomes a vice. Frozen groups become '"muscle-bound" with cohesion a la peer pressure. Any strategy to prevent or remedy frozen group issues has to largel the crew and its primary "freezing" mechanism: peer pressure. Second, the command climate is either stifling or weak. In the case of the command climate being slifling. lank crews freeze because to lake initialive invites too much risk and. being "frozen" is beller than lI)'ing and failing. In the case of being weak. tank crews ''freeze'' at whatever level they want to because there are no coon-terprcssures or ramifications. They settle on the lowest acceptable standards because they are oot pushed or encouraged to "go for the gold." The commander creates an environment that either fails to professionally challenge ils lank crews (or to cause the better situation of lank crews challenging themselves) or allows crews to foolishly believe that hype can replace solid training; thai its okay to be ''too cool 10 care." 111ey create II climate that never teaches its solders that, in the favorite words of one prior brigade commander, ''Good enough wn'L" Third. ironically. success creates lhe potential (oc becoming "frozen." Once a crew "meets the standard," it has every reason to want to hang onto that success and, tragically, 10 believe that such success is everlasting. forgetting thai gunnery skills have a very short shelf life in the absence of refresher training. They believe that the way to keep success is 10 maintain self-confidence, war Slories, and hype. Fourth. the tanic crew has no set slandards. So called standards in units with frozen groups are vague, one-over·the-wortd "do your best" standards r. J1hCT than a systemalic sequence of developmental standards. Good developmenlal standards sets progressive goals for every aspect and step of gunnery: i.e., published UCOFf results, fire commands executed within a cenain time, sand table exercises conduc! Cd within specified parameters a specified number of times, etc. They provide crews a progressive path of development with refreshers 10 guard against peaking too early. Fifth, tank crews have standards but no incentives. A basic tenet works here as in any human endeavor, "if you want exU'a, you gOita pay for it." Asking for more with no additional "pay" will surely "freeze" lank crews as they ignore your program and develop preparalory programs equal to the "pay." As the August 3 1 page of the 1993 UJe's Lillie Instructions Calendar says: "Demand excellence and be willing to pay for it." Sixth, just as important. there are no disincentives set for marginally passing perfonnance, other than the threat of utter humiliation. The prevailing attitude is the same as the incompetent gym teacher who had 00 idea how to help so yeUed: "Get back in line and think about what you did wrong. Next time, do il right!" Show marginal crews how to do better and then make lack of demonstrated pro. gress hun - DURlNG PREPARATORY TRAINING. Failing to address marginal performance only puts the problem on the firing line, where everyone loses. Seventh, tank crews are pcnnitted to explain away weakness. They visualize themselves winning trophies and awards, but aren't forced 10 visualize or think through the situations of hard work necessary to win. They, the anointed ones, are allowed 10 believe that they can't possibly meet a problem they can' t handle and, if they do, il can't be their fault. "Aw s--t. Sir. If I can ever get the turret guys to do some decent work on my lank. thai wouldn't happen..... And, tragically, the commander buys in instead of forc· ing the crew to recognize their own role in the problem, to force them to find a work around. After all, neither the gunnery target nor battlefield enemy really cares where the problem is. il only rewards

- or punishes - those who cannOi persevere through its pr0b- lems. Crews frozen at the high end of performance don'l think through the zeroing of machine guns, the potential effects of climatic conditions, the effeclS of sleep deprivation, etc. Hence. they don't train to constantly check the zeros. they don't condition themselves for heat or cold, or they don'l drill crew drills so that responses are immune to environmental conditions such as fatigue. Good crews have played each possible gunnery scenario in their mind and in simulators from preps 10 execution. Frozen groups will nOl. Good commanders help crews visualize the hurdles so they can prepare; poor ones don' t. It's that Simple. So, how do you prevent this from happening? Preventing or Remedying Frozen Groups First, gel involved early on; nothing will derail a gunnery effon quicker than to come in with a plan that essentially tells crews they have wasted their time or, worse, puts them into a time-pressured situation that creates unnecessary Slress. Such conditions are sure to he divisive and, if you do have frozen crews, will definitely cause you 10 have to fight to be taken seriously. In some cases, Johnny-come-lately plans will fall in the category of the cure being worse lhan the disease. You mighl not only fail to get your crews drilled in the basics but may destroy the esprit and I!lan essential to producing winners in the process. Second. set the right command climate: a. Focus on some watchwords: challenge, tough standards. and tesL Make it OK 10 admit weakness with an immulable caveal that. once identified, it had better be worked out oc strengthened. Then hedge your bel with a series of challenges and tests that forces detailed analysis. Leave no stone untumed:

I) Stan with a thorough TCGSf, coupled with a thorough inspc:c-- lion or the lank, especially ilS fire control systems. And. if you have experienced crewl, don't just give them the same old IeSI. Give them the basic test with a few highly technical twislS thrown in 10 satisfy the egos of the "graduate tankers" or 10 humble them. By humbling, 1 mean 10 give them a taste, a reminder that they don't know or remember all there is. Watch out! Too much and the effed can be confidenee.shattering! (Shattering a crew's self-image is someliffiCS desirable for recalcitrant crews bUi such aclion must be very carefully managed.) And, whereas the possibililY exists thai there are "haunted Ianks" - tanks thai are inhabited by evil spirits whose purpose in the universe is to keep down gunnery av· erages - more times than nO! mechanical bugs bul are crew-induced; either simple oversights, taking procedural shoncuts, or adding some lanker lore device or twisl to procedures - '111is worked in Graf in '85, by Ciod! or "Geez, l ieutenanl. lhe only way to knock down a machine gun larget is hil the ground and throw rocks on it - ain'l no way you can hit one direct without busling your lime lI)'ing. Saw a whole platoon at Carson bolo Iry-ing..... EI cetera, ad nauseam.

2) Write down verbatim every TTVIII scenario and test your crews againsl the clock. Test them as a crew wilh an ·'AI" in the form of your master gunner. Even have them panlomime the moves. Accept nothing less than perfect responses wilhin time standards you seL And do it publicly. Nothing forces a crew to buckle down more than the eyes of its peers.

3) Drill lhe TCQC on sandlables and on driving ranges. But make it progressive. Th:u is, Slart as Single lanks, then seclions, and lhen platoons. A neat Iwist on platoon battle runs from MSG Clary, ma... ter gunner elltrnordinaire: pul numbers on lank largelS for sec· lion and platoon runs. Have loaders write down the numbers of the targels a particular tank engaged, in sequence. Then posl results in an AAR. Some very inleresling Ihings will be revealed about fire distribution and control. Then, after the 3d or 4th run. sections and 19 platoons stop fuing at the same target while leaving odlen "'un-servM:eci." They start the cross-talk so essential 10 winning ICam$ once you gel 10 mis level of training, you will ttuly have "graduate" tankers on your hands. And publish scores! Make your tankers "walk their talk."

4) Make crews do UCOFT until the hour they get on the buses to go the ranges. Make qualification the baseline requirement, not the minimum standard. Have your master gunner sel up new challenges for the super crews or at least have the good crews work with poor ones. NOlhing beats the UCOfT for drilling.

S) Make your leadership set up ''rink)' dink" home station gun- tables as if they were on the gunnery ranges. Make them sel up the commo, the COOCutTe1lt training, the scoreboards. the coffee table, the camouflage. the debriefing tenl, everything the same as if they won a full-fledged range. Ensure you have moving ranges and moving targelS wi!h corurol vehicles. Why go through such hassles for in-house stuff! So the hundreds of details that go with setting up and running a range do not disuacl from gunnery. Home station gunnery ranges provide opportunity for dress rehearsa1s. II also cleatly communicates that "good enough ain'I." that tough standards in every Slep of your gunnery preps.

6) Drill calibratiOfl and zeroing. Make a checklist that everyone follows by the number. Watch for talk like, "Don't matter if you calibrate right, that's what Ihe MRS is for.... " or " II'S a waste of lime zeroing your machine guns. Any damn fool knows only way to hit your largel is 10 walk it in, so why bother?.... You can lake this 10 the bank: the unil that gets flustered or hurried here or the unil that glosses over problems with "triclcs of the rrade" from tanker lore - the unil mat doesn't enforce the strictest adherence to basics - is the unit that will sttuggle mroogh gunnery and will cause more gray hairs and ulcers lhan bungee cord jumping. MSG Clary mimeographed a detailed, by-the-numbers sequence for calibration and zero iliat he forced each crew 10 follow and that he followed religiously as he personally checked each tank crew. Never devialed or trustt:d his memory. Fifty-three OUI of 54 tanks first-run qualifled with ammunition to spare kind of speaks for il-sc.lf.

1) And don't forgel the time honored - and proven - maxim that he who teaches knows best Make your tank cornroanden and gunners teach classes. This not only benefits knowledge but c0hesion and espril. too. As with all mings, do this correct1y or you can create a demoralizing '''mickey mouse" monster, 100. Still, iI's a good way to get frozen crews unfroz.cn as mey review the basics preparing for class.

b. Tie rewanls and punishments to the above. Enough said earlier!

c. Train by tank crews. not tank crewmen. Again, tank crews are primary groups. Encourage tank. crew independence and cohesion. And don't for-getlhe tank is an equal member of the team. Lack of confidence in their tank can destroy a crew as surely as lack of confidence in any crewmember. Encourage total - men and machine - tightness/cohesion because, as all tankers know, gunnery is a marriage of blood, sweat. and metal: ii's not a solo challenge. So, focus on crews, not crewmen - and include the tank in the batLle roster.

d. Yes, encourage hype. Just make sure ii's rooted in solid professional pride thal comes from having proven oneself and not the boasting and bragging of "wannabes" too lazy 10 work or those wim a lao cool to care" philosophy. A solid indicator of successful gunnery programs is that you will see hype incidental to esprit and not esprit incidental 10 hype. Third, walch 1M tyfHJ, amowllS, and liming 0/ 1M strtss )'011 produu. Winning learns need stress; they need 10 feellhe pressure of competition. That competition can be against other crews or againsl lheir own internal standanls. Frozen crews are understressed. That 20 is, they have something that dampens!heir motivational drives, even though their hype mighl have you believe otherwise. In the case of frozen crews. hype is a defensive mechanism meanl 10 ward off '·do-gooden." So, you need 10 stimulate. Healthy, focused professional competition against a standard is the best ming going. But there is an upper limit 10 performance. Remember ParcIO'S principle, i.e., the final 20 percent of performance increase will take 80 percent of available effort. That is, measure the gains you will get against effort expended. Sometimes it just isn't worth it Your energy might be bettcr spent on some weak area that will gain big benefits with minimal effort. Frozen groups are more likely 10 invest in such efforu. Also.!here is a real cap on penormanc-e. If you try to push tank crews beyond their capabilities or beyond what they believe is reasonable. then you produce some destruclive stress in the form of frustralion. Look at Zajonc's curve' as il maps the relationship of stress 10 performance: • \ • Looking at this curve, two!hings come 10 mind: First. if your program gets people uptight, i.e.• they spend more time trying 10 cope with your gunnery train-up program than actually developing, then you lose more than you gain. The ftrst SlCp to pushing people into the emotionaJ end of the curve is asking them 10 do things that they don', sec a pay-off in, or that don't make sense considering the return on investment. Simply pul. people can only do so much in a given block of time. Trying 10 do more only frustrates!hem.. An important considenltion: as tnlining progresses, crews can do more in less time. Therefore, good programs accelerate based on improvements in abilities, not by the number of days mat have passed on the calendar. Second. crews get inlo the low end of Ihe curve with either 100 much rest or not enough. 1be best crews can wear out if pushed hard. Still, you don' t do anybody any ravon by constantly resting up your crews every time they start 10 drag. Too much rest and they become lazy and unconditioned. Good crews need challenge, not coddliog. As one SGM Juan Garcia used to say, "We grow through adversity." A corollary born of experience: 4'00 much adversity for 100 long or 100 early can destroy the unconditioned." Set a hard pace but not one that wears them out. Fourth, JI clar goals and a ckar plan 10 QChjv them: do gool piDfllling. Goal planning - setting goals and developing a plan to achieve lhem - is a must. Too many commanders feel they have done their duty by defining goals in terms of "mission type orders" like "Qualify all crews at X Gunnery." Although mission type orders are great on the battlefiekl, where maximum flexibility in the face: of uncertainty can mean the diffnce between success and failure. loose training programs OfIly tend 10 meander, squandering pee-dous resources in the process. Training 10 standard nonna1ly means I very structured environmenl that demands some excruciat-ingly detailed planning has 10 lake place:. When you fail 10 put your goals through the rigorous criticaJ thinking thai comes with goal planning, you fail to recognize, much less address, the stymying things that will cause failure: resource: constraints. level of crew ability. etc. Funher, good goals combined with good planning is more palatable and more likely bought into. Good goals without planning (guidance) often put people in a "can't get there from here" frame of mind because lhey become focused on the magni. tude of effort the goals represent rather than using a plan to put each into proper perspective. In other words, they Jose the forest for the trees and get lost and overwhelmed in the process. A couple of proven dynamics comes into play once you do some well thought out goal.setting and planning; i.e., goal planning: a. First. it selS the stage for success. Look al this model devel· oped al the now defunct U. S. Anny Organizational Effectiveness School:, • •,, •, • • • •, • •, • w_

-- - « --,-.- This model shows that - as the commander plays a role as strategist, i.e., builds the campaign plan for a successful gunnery - he must make sure he is clear in both his desired outcomes and intennediate goals. If not. then he will gain either conflict or confu· sion or - worst - failure. Still, he can be crystal clear, and if he does not ensure he has competent crews, he will get either wasted resources or, again, failure. So, the commander must do goal plan· ning that is both clear and within the capabilities of the tank crew. "Cookie cutter plans" - plans not tailored to a unit's capabilities and readiness - will often result in failure because the goals are not "clear," i.e., have confuSing and frustrating waste or are beyond the comprehension or ex.ecution ability of the crews.

b. Second, clear goal planning helps commanders guard against a temptation that lies in having winning crews: to let those crews go and merely ride their coattails. Commanders who elect this option often find themselves in some bizarre travel stops. As Will Rogers said, "If you don't know where you are going, any road will get you there." I don't need to tell anyone who has been to more than one gunnery that there ex.ists in our fine Armor force: tank crews that are perfectly capable of finding imaginatively disingenuous routes to gunnery. And commanders who are along for the ride deserve every bit of the embarrassment and humiliation they get as they try to hack and s.quinn their way out the "'brave new worlds" they find c. Third, clear goal planning creates a complete.the-dot challenge. People love puzzles. Look at the picture below. What is it? o Most of you said "circle" rather than "a series of dots arranged in circular fashion." 1bere are lots of reasons why this happens but, for this discussion. the key reason is that human beings have great tendency to complete things, to fulfill or prove their perceptions. This comes from a lifetime of taking thousands of bilS of perce:p- tual cues every instant and quickly distilling from chaos a simplis· tic, orderly impression of the world. Management by objectives or MBO was rooted in great part in this human propensity. So, if you have a plan that shows a pretty complete picture of the fUlure suc· cess, one that only lacks their abilities and wort to be completed, you make it more likely that gunnery preps will proceed smoothly. You have removed a potential roadblock to perfonnance: i.e., your crews trying to figure out how to get "there" from "here" and you have presented a challenge that lies implicitly in your plan.

c. Finally, goal planning causes the important dynamics found in "futuring" or visualization. Simply put, the more detailed the com· mander painlS the end state he wants, and the stepS it will take 10 get there, the more he enables his crews to rehearse - mentally or physically. This concept has been proven in preparing world class athletes: the more you can visualize an activity in detail, the more likely you will do very well al it. And if you throw in something called "inoculation:'" thai is to tell crews of potential hanlships and trials so they can mentally (or physically) condition themselves for the adversity they will find, then you have created a tremendous tool for success. One of my brigade commanders captured it in one of his six. "rules": "Don't ever go where you haven't been before." This applies equally to your crews. Some final words of caution: Don't micromanage; don't ride herd too much or it becomes "your" program versus "our" program. Riding crews too hard only pulS you in the position of pushing versus leading. You don't have all the answers. Let your subordinates play in the planning. Make it "our" plan versus "my" or "your" plan. Don't go for the top score. Go for maximizing your potential. The top score will come. Finally. remember that the weakest link or crew is the uue meas· ure of your uniL That is, don't fall prey to the idea that enough top achievers will bury the impaclS of substandard crews. Focusing on top crews at the ex.pense of writing off weak crews is throwing away combat potential. And that weak crew will keep alive the very real possibility of your unit failing under pressure - on the gunnery range or on the battlefield. Or look at it another way. If every crew is trained to a point that there is no doubt that each will qualify "first run:' what are the chances that your unit will be "'top gun"? Pretty good, J think. And isn't that really the botlom line of gunnery: making sure that every tank will put steel on targeL.. first; or, in the paraphrased words of our CSA, that every crew, our $o/diu$, will leave each battle a VETERAN. Notes IGellerman. Saul. MOlivaliOft tJNJ Productivity, AMACOM, 1963. lAssociates of the Office of Miliwy Leadership, Uniled States Miliwy Academy, EditOfS, A. SlIMly of OrganitJlli()tl(l/ uOlUrship. Stackpole Books, 1976. 3Hammer. Clay, and Organ. Organiwzionol /khavior, Business Publica· tions, 1978. 4Associates of the Office or Military Leadership. United State5 Miliwy Academy, Editors. A. SlIMly of OrganizaliOMI uackrship. Stackpole Books. 1976. Lieutenant Colonel Edward Earl Hampton Jr. received his Armor commission in 1975 as a Distinguished Military Graduate of Cameron University in Lawton, Okla. Currently the chief, TRADOC Executive Agencies, Directorate of Com· bat Developments, U. S. Army Ordnance Center and School, he has served as brigade 54, 1st Brigade, 3d AD; battalion S3 and XO, 2·32 Armor; and commander, Area Support Team, Kirchgoens, Germany. He holds an MS in system management from the University of Southern California. 21