A Future U.S. Main B.lttleTank For the Year 2010 - A New VIsion

A Future U. S. Main Battle Tank For the Year 2010 - A New Vision by J. B. Gllvydis Introduction The U. S. lank design community, looking toward the lank of the year

2010. is following two parallel pathways, one conventional and the other electrical. These paths will explore nOI only improvements of present tank technologies, but the development of new technologies which are essential for laying a sound foundation for the lank of the year 2010. But why two pathways; why nOI just one? There is a reason: the all-electric tank is considered a very high-risk proposition that may nOl materialize. But that does not mean we should abandon it outright. We should try to approach it with a well prepared and coordinated plan. The all-eleclric tank, of course, is not anew idea. Many people worked on it in the past Unfortunately, there has been a lack of progress in the electric armament and high-power electric storage technologies. Anew method will have to be devised and followed with the emphasis on coordination and seriousness. We certainly cannot discount the possibility that someday. somewhere. someone will be successful in this endeavor. If so. it could bring us a very big pay-off. It is well worth trying. We also should proceed with continued development of conventional technologies. This approach still leads to many exceptional improvements and is a proven, low-risk path. It can also serve as a fall-back position. We certainly should never put all our eggs into one basket. There is too much at stake. too much to lose. For the future, we are planning alight and highly mobile U. S. combat

"One should not think of a tank as some kind of a ton-weight entity, which unfortunately is the "in" thing to do today. A tank is not just any vehicle carrying a tank gun." force. The tank that will be a member of that force is also projected to be much smaller and lighter in comparison with its oversized and overweight counterparts of today. The weight goal is 50 tons. Of course, this does not mean that the future tank could not tum out to be much lighter or much heavier than 50 Ions. It all will depend on how successfully the required technologies can be developed. Of course, our primary objective will be to hold and preserve the three main tank characteristics that distinguish it from other combat vehicles - firepower, survivability and mobility. One should not think of a tank as some kind of a ton-weight entity. which unfortunately is the "in" thing to do today. A lank is not just any vehicle canying a tank gun. Thai would not require any great preparation. What we are talking about here is a different kind of beast - a true main battle tank for the year 20 I O. The Threat The threat date against which its requirements should be written, however, is nOI the year 20 I 0, as most people would falsely assume, but 2010 plus a number of years representing its life. Thus, for a bare minimum 10-year life. the threat date would be 2020. More realistically. it should be a 20-year life with a threat date of 2030. For argument's sake, let us say it is 2020. Even this date would be a shock to most people who are accustomed to equating threat dates with the date of a tank's introduction. It is time to change and be responsible. It is proposed thai for the year 2010 tank. the Ihreat date of 2020 be set as a minimum (2030 would be preferred). There will be people saying that it is impossible to project what the threat might be around the year 2020, much less for the year 2030. Let us not lis- 7 ten to them; it is possible to project the threat accurate ly for the year

2020. There is no reason why it cannot be done. To develop a successful tank for the year 20 I 0, we will require a major upgrade of some of our present tank subsystems. plus new technology developments. Here is the main list of those subsystems: Firepower By the year 2020, we can expect that threat tank protection will improve by a minimum of 50 percent over the present 1'8OU capabilities. A lOO-percent would noc: be a surprise. To deal successfully with these projected increases, we will require a KE round with twice the penetration capability of the M829A2 penetcator. and -... We will require a KE round with twice the penetration capability of the M829A2 penetrator, and we do not have anything like that...· we do not have anything like that. either in our arsena1 or on our drawing boards. Our latest gun systems in development. the ATAC (XM29I) and the high pressure 120mm (XM302). will not be adequate either. We will need anew and a much more powerful system. For the conventiona1 system, we'll require anew gun. either a brand new design or an upgrade of an existing system. With it we'll need anew KE round capable of twice the penetration of the M829A2. It should be relatively light and compact. For the electrical system, there is a requirement for an EM gun, be it a rail. coil, or any kind of an electrochemical hybrid. it should be relatively companlble in weight and size to existing gun systems. It should be reliable and cost-efficient. It should have the same penetration requirement 8 as the future conventional system. In addition, an efficient energy storage system will be required. along with the switches. contacts, cables. heat dissipation systems, etc. that are pan of the EM gun system. Protection Horizontal Threat. If development follows tradition. and there is no reason to believe it will not. threat KE penetration can be expected to be at least as good as ours. And in the years 2010 to 2020 and beyond that could amount to a substantia1 penetration. To counter it. we will need armor with at least a 1000percent improvement in protection over what we presently have in the frontal turret armor of the MIA!. This will be a must. So. the armor will have to be light in comparison with what we have today. This implies the armor should have mass efficiencies in the range of 4 to 6 against KE penetrators. and it should work against all the penetrators - all shapes and sizes - and not just some specific ones as it is customary today. This is a tall order. But. this is what we must have if we want a survivable tank in the year 2010. This same annor, possibly with an additiona1 applique in the form of reactive armor or something new. should a1so withstand a shaped charge (SC) attack on the order of approximately twice the Hellflre capability. Against this threat, its mass efficiency should be in the order of 6 to 10. This integraJ armor. designed against both the KE and SC threat munitions. might not be possible using our existing technologies. It may require radi-ca1 new thinking and new innovations. It should be of modular design. It a1so should be designed for both the frontal and side applications. for both the hull and the turret. The side armors should defeat defined threats within a customary 6O-degree frontal arc. It a1so should have design variations for a lesser arc. such as 40 and 20 de· grees. for trade-off purposes. VertkaJ Threat Top-attack protection is required against the vertical threat. be it a missile or a bomblet. guided or dumb. using a shaped charge jet or an EFP (Explosively Formed Projectile). Presently. it is stipulated that if a special countermeasure (CM) package (smoke grenades, jammers. etc.) is used on the vehicle. its top allack protection could be drastica1ly reduced both in armor thickness and density. The CM package will have to counter all kinds of guided top-auack munitions by using techniques such as jamming their guidance. misdirection. smoke cover. etc. It prevents guided munitions from hitting their targets. Only the dumb munitions sneak through its cover of protection and are not affected. Presently there is no countermeasure against dumb munitions. They are free to hit their targets. Of course. the probability of dumb bomblets hitting a target is very low. but when high numbers of them are launched over a suspected target. some will hit. They do constitute a threat. Presently. the top annor (applique) weight distributions for vehicles with CM systems implies that dumb born-blets do not penetrate much. that they do not amount to much as a threal This is questionable. In the last Defendory Exhibition held in Athens, Greece, October 6-10. 1992. the Rus· sians were selling dumb anti-tank bomblets (PTAB-IM) that penetrate 210mm (approximately 8.25 inches) of RHA. This is a tremendous penetration capability and CM systems do not counter them; at least not yel. It is highly recommended that lOp attack protection with its CMs be evaluated in light of these new developments and CQrTCCtive action be instituted in how to deal effectively with this potential dumb threat. We need better methods to deal with it. Mines. Presently, there exists a large variety of "bottom" threats. They are land mines with various defeat mechanisms (blast, SC jet. EFP. etc.) made of various materials (metals. plastics, etc.) and having various sensing and trigger mechanisms (pressure, magnetic. IR, lilt, acoustic, seismic, electronic, etc.). The list grows continuously. Presently our tanks are protected only against standard blast mines. They can do a lot of damage - break a track. ruin suspensions and roadwheels, and rip the tank bonom plates open. They can immobilize a tank and kill its crew. Our tanks do not protect against the SC jet and EFP varieties, which can do even more damage. To make our tanks more survivable against "bottom" threats. we have to find either a more effective way of neutralizing (detecting and clearing) the mines or more effective bottom protection. We certainly need more projects directed towards these goals. new innovations, and new developments. Aclive Protection. In the future, we will need to use every possible idea to help reduce and control future tank weight One of these ideas is active protection, which meets and destroys or cripples the incoming threat munitions before they can reach their intended targets. This technology is now in its infancy. Today, with present technology, we probably could counter only relatively slow-flying munitions at best and then only under laboratory conditions. The real world would be another story. We recommend more extensive studies in this field. Of course, not every threat will be stopped by an active protection system. Some will sneak through. Plus, the active system may not be inexhaustible. For this reason. such a system may tum out not to be suitable as primary tank protection, but an excellenl protection enhance-menl. It may allow some reduction in the main armor weight. We have to understand that for every threat bullet we stop from hilling our tanks, we are way ahead. Every hit, whether it penetrates or not. does damage that could be fatal to a tank. Effective active protection would be a great addition.

TwMan Crew Station For the tank of the year 2010, we project a two-man crew station. There are many good reasons for that. First, all things being equal. a tank could be made smaller. thus lighter. Second, there appear to be enough mature and emerging technologies to develop a safe and effective way to operate the tank with a crew of two, and there would be no reason to use a four-man crew if two can function as well. Third, manpower is expected to shrink and there will be fewer tankers to operate our tanks. Fourth, why expose four tankers to potential danger when a tank is hit? Two-man crews reduce the risk. Fifth. when a four-man crew is in a tank. they are usually assigned to operate for an extended period, up to some 72 hours at times. This tires a crew and renders the tank ineffective. lltat is not the way to do it. It is much better to have a split crew pool. A four-man crew could still be assigned to a tank. but only two would serve at a time and change frequently. Afresh crew is an alert and effective tank. There are others who would like to have even more crew members in the tank than there are now. They would gladly take a crew of five or more, or at least keep what they have now. a four-man crew. They argue that extra people are needed for special duties. Security is one of them. For example. when a tank is parked for the night or other reasons. a two-man crew would have a problem in posting a guard. Extra hands may be needed to do various repair jobs on the spot. such as fixing broken track, etc. However, a large crew size is becoming a lUXury that no one can afford anymore. In teday's battles and especially in future encounters, tanks will not oper-ale or fight alone. They will be part of a larger force. There will be infantry fighting vehicles and soldiers with them. which means there should be little problem in finding security guards or someone to fix a broken track. So much for the reasons behind the two-man crew. Let us look now at the crew station itself. First. let us look briefly at how the present four-man crew functions. The loader's primary job is to load the gun. His station is also equipped with a very crude observation capabil· ity - primitive at best, but something. Thus. at times. he is also used as an extra pair of eyes. Of course, he is also used as a security guard and a track repainnan and to perfonn other minor jobs - a handyman. He can be trained to take other crew members' positions when they are incapacitated, but then there is no loader. His load· ing function could be replaced by an automatic loader. Many countries. such as France, the fonner Soviet Union, and Japan, have already done that. The loader does not seem to be missed, so he could be replaced and the crew size reduced to three. Next, let us look at the gunner. His primary job is to fine-lay the gun on the target and squeeze the trigger. In other words, he operates the gun. he hits the targets - a very imponant function. no doubt. The question is. do we have to have a crew member to do that? The answer is no. The electronics could take over his functions 9 and probably do them even more effectively. At this stage of technology, we certainly do not need a crew member to squeeze the trigger. Furthermore, we certainly can track and fine-lay the cross-hairs on the target with electronics. Thus, we can also replace the gunner. As we can see, it is possible to replace both the loader and the gunner, maybe not as effectively today, but certainly tomorrow. The tank will not suffer at all. Instead it probably could be made even better. However, there is one thing that will be missed that cannot be replaced - that is the comradeship of the four-man crew. It will not be the same for a two-man crew. But then this is another story. 1be commander and the driver will be the crew members who operate the two-man tank. The tank will be shaped and molded with these two 0p- erators in mind. Presently, the commander is primarily the one who searches for targets. When he finds one, in most cases, he hands it off to the gunner. If need be, he can service the target himself, and on rare occasions, he does. In a system without a gunner, the target data (produced either manually or automatically) would be fed directly into a computer. If there should be more than one target, they could be prioritized by the com'!l8nder or the computer. 1be gun would then track and service Ihese targets automatically. They could also be serviced by the commander without going through the automatic mode if he choose to do roo We do nol have this system yet. It needs to be finalized, designed, and developed. The building blocks are here. It is imperative, and it is highly recommended, that this "locate, prioritize, lrack, and destroy" target system be developed. The existence of our future tank depends on it. Presently, most tank commanders' stations are very unsophisticated. In this age of technology, they could even be viewed as downright primitive. In our tanks, technology applications are behind by a good generation 10 or so. The tank community is definitely not too inventive in this respect. It tends to live too much in the past. Presently, our lank commanders have a rotatable low-profile weapon Slalion capable of mounting a variety of machine guns. TIle commander's station mounts a sight for the machine gun, and for a commander's all-around vision, it has periscopes. The vision is somewhat poor. The commander is also provided with an elbow attachment to the gunner's sight, which the TC can use. Recently, we have developed an independent panoramic sight to improve the commander's capabilities. It provides the tank with a hunterlkiller function. While it is quite an improvement, it lacks an in-depth vision of the battlefield and beyond. To function efficiently, our tank commanders need a system that can provide this capability, and it is highly recommended that such a system be developed. It would provide the commander with a big screen over which he could watch a whole battlefield panorama and beyond. And he could watch it from many different elevations and directions. The input to his vision cree n would come not only from the tank'sown observation sights, but also from satellites, various aircraft, other tanks, observation posts, unmanned flying observation platforms, and others. This way the commander could see the whole battlefield, pick the targets, and cue them into a computer, or lei these IaSks be done automatically. The computer would lock in, track, and, together with the gun, aim and fire. We need this kind of capability for a two-man tank to be effective. Presently, many studies here in the U. S. and abroad, are evaluating tank crew reduction and, in particular, the two-man crew station. There are many articles being written on this subject. All of these studies, however, miss the point. They all discuss ad nauseam elements like reduced crew workload requirements, task sharing, function overlapping, fatigue, and other similar items. Some propose to do simulation studies on computers, while others want to build test beds. It is not that all this is not important - it certainly is in its own way. But all this alone will not solve the problem. What is needed, and none of these studies propose or even hint at it, are new innovations, new developments as described in the paragraphs above, which would not only make a two-man crew station a feasible reality. but also make the whole tank more effective and easier to operate. Mobility Power Plants. Our tank power plant of the future is not a critical item. We have a very good. development going, called the Advanced Integrated Propulsion System (AlPS). which features high fuel efficiency and compactness. AlPS could function quile well into the next century. It is not the "Iast word" in power plants, but quite good. In comparison to our M J power plant, it is approximately half its size. It represents a tremendous achievement in compactness that many did not believe could be done. This, of course, does not mean that we should be sitting on our laurels and doing nothing else. We should continue with research in future innovations. For example, there exists anew diesel development by Melchior, a French company, that represents another grand breakthrough in innovation. Horsepower for horsepower it is even more compact and lighter than AlPS. It would be a good. idea to explore the Melchior diesel technology further. Every reduction in power plant size provides us with the opportunity to reduce tank size and weight. Another possible way to reduce tank internal volume is to equip our future tanks with an electric drive system. Before this can happen, however, there will need to be new ideas. new breakthroughs. Some countries have already developed electric drive systems, but for lightweight vehicles only. No one has developed a system for tanks yet. In today's consensus, however. based on yesterday's work, electric drives for tanks are not the way to go. They seem to require more space, add weight. and are more costly. Unfortunately, today it is not an attractive alternative, but tomorrow it might be another story. It is highly recommended that we keep investigating in the hope that we may stumble onto some breakthroughS. Suspension. Our present tank, the MIAI, does have a good suspension system. It is an advanced torsion bar design developed in the late 1970s. It has a high wheel-travel capability which provides the tank with some 30 mph cross-country speed. This is tremendous. It is questionable if the tank's driver would dare to go any faster. especially over an unknown terrain. Presently. we are developing a hydropneumatic in-arm suspension unit which will improve our tank suspension system even further. We could live with that for along time into the future. Anew development featuring a semi- or fully active suspension innovation could provide future lanks with even faster and safer cross-country speeds. Presently, this effort is of relatively low profile. It is recommended that active suspension studies be put on a much higher priority level because the active suspension idea deserves higher visibility and backing. Track- Our tank tracks are nothing to brag about - they do not last long. Their life is well below the set requirements. We definitely need a better track. It is recommended that we institute a higher priority project in improved track development. Vetronics (Vehicle Electronics) The age of Vetronics is upon us. It is a wonderful system - a must. The French already have it in their Leclerc tanks. We are in the process of developing it but are having some problems. No. not with the system and its capabilities, but with its size. At the beginning of its development, we emphasized compactness as one of the major selling points of the Vetronics system. Comparisons showed how small it is in relation to the existing electrical lank package. To emphasize all this, we saw at one extreme a huge pile of electrical harnesses, representing today's system. and at the other extreme. the Vetronics package. People believed and were impressed. But on the way to its design and development, something happened. It kept growing and growing in size. 11le way it is heading. it will not fit into a tank. It is getting too big. Granted. the system's capabilities were expanded. but that still does not justify its growth. It is out of proportion. A prototype of the Vetronics system was recently installed in a Component Advanced Technology Tes t Bed (CATrB). In addition to occupying a large allocated premium space in the vehicle. it also was necessary to use every nook and cranny inside the vehicle and its annor to squeeze the package in. If this problem is left unchecked. one might be forced to reverse the process of ins lallation and start toying with the idea of how to inslall the tank into the Vetronics instead. It might not be that bad. but it is something to think about. In any case, it is recommended that the Vetronics system be reassessed and a drastic miniaturization process be instituted. An upgraded Vetronics system will be a must for a two-man tank of the year 20 I O. but it will need to undergo a drastic reduction in its present size. Summary I've listed here many of the new technology developments needed for the tank of the year 2010. It is not an all-inclusive list. but it does cover all the major tank subsystems. It is a must list. If these technologies are developed. as recommended, we will have a magnificent tank; there is no doubt about it. Otherwise, we will get a mediocre tank at best. What are the chances that our next tank will be revolutionary? It will depend on our willingness to change. There is a stumbling block that has to be removed first. That stumbling block is our fragmented rank community. It almost mirrors the loose conglomeration of "tiny empires" of the pre-Iacocca Chrysler Corporation. Our tiny empires do not kindly listen. do not take orders, and fiercely adhere to the "not-invented-here" syndrome. It has to be changed, then our chances will be excellent. But if the tank community continues to function in its fragmented. semi-independent way. where everyone is working for himself. we will fail to achieve the requirements projected here for an effective tank in the year 2010. Presently, no one organization is responsible. no one organization is ac· countable for the actions or lack of them in their tiny empires. We lack the authority to plan, coordinate. and oversee all tank-related work. We certainly need a powerful central tank office with full authority to control all factors of tank work. Which way we will choose to go is up to us. Will it be with the soldier. the Anny and the country. or the tiny empires? Time will tell. J. B. Gilvydis is currently the special technical assistant to the chief of the Advanced Concept Systems Division. U. S. Army TACOM in Warren, Mich. He serves as Technical Project Officer of the Data Exchange Agreement on Combat Vehicles with France and as deputy co-chairman of action teams on combat vehicleslcon-ceptsltest beds with France. Germany, and Israel. He has 33 years experience at TAADEC working on the design and engineering of combat vehicle systems. He holds a Bachelor of Electrical Engineering Oegree. an MA in Mathematics, and an MS in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Detroit. 11