The After Action Review

The link between training and the Army Standard by Captaln Mark Alan Eastman “These are hard times in which a genius would wish to live. Great necessities call forth great leaders... therefore it is said that one may know how to win but cannot necessarily do so.” (Leaders. Sun Tzu) Battles are won because of successful engagements at the platoon and company level. Many mistakes in planning battles at higher levels can be overcome by aggressively execated fundamentals. Our success on the modem battlefield depends on execut-ilrg basic tactics to standard. The pur-pce of this article is to provide the combat leade!r/rrainer with doctrine, techniques, and ideas for conducting an After Action ReGew (AAR). My intent is not to restrict the combat trainer in the conduct of AARs, but, to supplement existing references. Our success depends on perfming to the Army Standard. In order to assess our training and performance we must conduct an AAR following each training event. The AAR is the critical process that links training and standards. The AAR is a review of the training event that allows the soldiers to “discover” for themselves what happened during training, and most importantly, why. The AAR is a professional discussion that includes all members of the h.aining unit and focuses on established objectives for training. The AAR gives soldiers the opportunity to identify strengths and weaknesses and to “discover“ solutions to correct weaknesses and maintain strengths. The AAR is not an evaluation. An AAR should not judge success or failure. It should not be a lecture or a critique. The AAR must not humiliate or embarrass soldiers, undermine the chain of command, or become a loose discussion/bull session. The AAR must have structure and must focus on training objectives. This process is key to learning our strengths and weaknesses, and we, as trainers, must not place unrealistic expectations on performance and outcomes that cause the AAR to become a “bloodletting” session. Who attends the AAR? At platoon level, the entire element attends. But, depending on the level at which the AAR is conducted -for example, at company or task force level -it may be necessary to limit the AAR to leaders. Attendance may be limited during continuous field operations or to preserve the individual soldier’s confidence in the chain of command when the unit performs poorly. Regardless of the circumstances, all expected attendees must be present and an AAR must be conducted after each mission without exception. The focus of AARs at platoon and company level must be the junior leaders, squad leaders, sections sergeants, tank commanders, and their equivalents. The individual soldier attends the AAR for several reasons. First, to satisfy his natural curiosity and need to know what his platoon, company, and task force accomplished during the engagement/training event. Secondly, to discuss his conhibution. Finally, to serve as a participant whose comments help his platoon leader discover how to improve the performance of those he leads and the overall effectiveness of his unit. The platoon sergeant, platoon leader, company commander, staff and task force commander attend AARs at each level for much the same reasons. The AARs at company and task force level serve to satisfy the leadership’s need to know the battle outcome or results from a major training event. The attendees discover, by their participation, what can be done to improve the performance of their subordinate leadership and their entire element, at platoon, company, or task force level. There are some general guidelines and suggestions for preparing and presenting the AAR. The combat leader conducting the AAR must look sharp and wear the proper uniform (in the field environment by unit SOP, full field uniform with Kevlar). He must maintain eye contact; avoid wearing sunglasses. He is the center of attention and focus, and must not allow distractions such as eating, smoking, or sleeping to occur during the AAR. He sets the standard for conduct of the AAR and sets the tone for leaming. The AAR should last no longer than one hour and be conducted as soon after the event as the situation allows to avoid distraction from follow-on missions. An AAR which lasts longer than one hour tends to wear on the attention span of the participants and reduces the training value. The combat leader must keep in mind that he is not only training the unit tactically and technically, but he is also teaching the unit “how to tdn.” The trainer must be aware that his methods may be imitated by those he is training, so set and demonstrate the standard. To enhance the presentation, consider holding the AAR where most of the action occurred, where the participants can “see the battlefield.” For example, hold the AAR at an obstacle where the unit attempted or succeeded at breaching, or on a platoon/company battle position overlooking the en-46 ARMOR - gagement area, or in the unit training room. The actual area can be a very effective training aid. In the AAR, the combat leader uses training aids to facilitate discussion. Examples of commonly used training aids are: charts displaying defensive planning steps, actions on contact, formations, or reverse planning schedules; the use of a terrain model or sand table with micro armor, butcher paper, or chalk on the side of a vehicle to display key information from the Wing event. Training aids, along with an agenda or format, can greatly enhance the organization and content of the AAR. Besides site selection, training aids, and content organization, ensure the AAR setting provides reasonable comfort. If possible, get the unit out of the elements, allow the participants to take off their gear and relax. The goal is to facilitate their ability to concentrate, participate, and learn.

The responsibility for how the AAR is conducted, the format used, and the AAR site is up to the professional judgment of the combat leader/trainer. Consider the following as basic guidelines in afield environment (focusing on individual, collective and leader skills): *What was the outcome of the engagement at company/team and task force level? *What was the enemy plan/observations (Briefed by an OPFOR leader, if available)? *What was my unit’s contribution to the outcome of the battle? *What did we fail to do? What were our weaknesses? *What are our strengths, and how can we improve for the next mission? *Refight the battle on a sand table, reinforcing the lessons learned... Keep the battle focus!

Several formats for organizing the content of AARs are available for both field and garrison training events. Most importantly, the AAR must be structured in a manner to encourage learning. The plan-prep-execute format is a logical sequence. Listing skills to sustain and improve at the beginning of the AAR is an effective technique and good “icebreaker.” The use of key events, chronological sequence, and the seven battlefield operating systems are all effective techniques for structuring the content of your AAR. Despite the method used, the trainer must structure the AAR so that the participants “discover” key points about their performance and how to improve. During the conduct of the AAR, the combat leader/trainer should identify, up front, the key issues/training objectives (task, conditions and standards) to be discussed during the AAR. Additionally, the trainer should ask questions in away that encourages participation from the attendees, avoiding questions that give the opportunity for a “yes” or ‘‘no’’ answer. The AAR must always end with comments on safety. The focus of the AAR at platoonkompany level should be centered toward execution of the mission. Soldiers are usually more excited about what they did to the enemy, and vice versa, than the planning and prepmtion phases of the operation. But, in the early stages of the training event, focus on preparation and planning can help identify deficiencies in X I Sand op orders so as to enhance future performance. During the latter portions of the training exercise, the focus should shift toward mission execution. The ultimate goal of distributing the time allotted for the AAR is as follows; 25 percent plan, 25 percent prep, and 50 percent execution. Again, the combat leader/ trainer ultimately decides what the most critical aspects of the mission were, and allocates his time and efforts accordingly. His focus is on issues that will “make the most money” for future missions. The most important part of the AAR at any level is the “discovery” of corrective actions and training that can solve the problems identified by the training unit. The key question in the learning process is, how can we do this better next time? The combat trainer is the subject matter expert and must have a firm grasp of Army doc-ARMOR - trine. He must guide the questions so that answers lead to the desired solution. This is the “heart and soul” of the After Action Review.

The AAR process, by its nature, often focuses on the negative aspects of performance. Where outstanding performance is observed, it should be brought out. Always end the AARon a positive note. If done properly, your unit will look forward to the AAR and will be a better trained unit because of their participation. “This is called winning a battle and becoming stronger.” (Griffith 56) Works Cited Griffith. Samuel B.. trans. The Art # Wur by Sun Tzu. Oxford University Press. 1%3. Bennis. Wanen and Bert Nanus. Leaders: The Strategy of Taking Charge. Harper and Row, Publishers, New Yorlc. 1985. FM 25-100. Train the Force. FM 71-1. The Tank and Mechanized Com-FM 17-15. Tank Platoon.

FC 20-25. A Leader’s Guide to After Action Reviews.

Personal Experience-37 rotations as M Observer/ControUer at the NTC preparing. conducting. and participating in over 300 After Action Reviews. panylTeam.

Captain Mark A. Eastman is currently assigned as the S3 Air, 4th Battalion, 37th Armor, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), Ft. Riley, Kan. He is a 1986 Distinguished Military Graduate of the University of Louisville and received a Master‘s Degree from Chapman University, Orange, California in 1992. He served as a tank platoon leader, executive officer, and scout platoon leader for 2-72 Armor, Camp Casey, Korea, and as an observer/controller for the Armor Task Force Training Team (Cobras), Operations Group, National Training Center.