The Battle of Arras: Fifty-Year-Old Lessons

For Today Introduction “When I want to understand what is happening today or try to decide what wiN happen tomorrow, I look back.” -Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. The Battle of Arras, France, which occurred during the opening days of World War 11, was a brief but historically significant baffle. It is replete with lessons in the massing and synchronization of combat power, especially with regard to the employment of mixed formations of armor and infantry. Many of the problems that faced the British during this battle are problems with which we are wrestling today: the compatibility of communications systems, the employment of heavy and light forces, and the acquisition and dissemination of tactical intelligence are examples. This article will review the Battle of Arras and examine some of the problems that the British faced and their relevance to us today.

On 13 May 1940, the leading elements of the German Third Army Group crossed the Meuse River and emerged from the Ardennes Forest into the countryside of eastern France. Catching the French defenders completely off guard, the Germans quickly drove through the center of the Allied First Army Group and began their dash to the Atlantic. The combination of speed and surprise that was gained by attacking with no fewer than three armored corps through the Ardennes completely devastated the Allied command structure. sending panic and despair through the ranks. The Blitzkrieg was once again succeeding more quickly than even the planners in Berlin had imagined possible.

As the German offensive developed, it became evident to the commanders of the British Expeditionary Force that their army was in imminent danger of being cut off from the main body of the Allied First Army Group, and their main lines of communication and supply. The bulk of the B. E. F. had come to reinforce the northern flank of the Allied defense and was at this time deployed in Belgium. The British commander’s worst fears became a reality on 21 May, when the spearhead of the Gman Second Army reached the coast south of Boulogne. In just seven days, the German Army had driven about 150 miles, cutting the Allied armies in half and denying the British and French any opportunity to seize the initiative or mount an effective defense. The speed of the attack caught the defenders so off-balance that General von Kleist noted “my fmt encounter with the British was when my tanks came upon, and overran, an infantry battalion equipped with dummy cartridges for field exercises... this was a sidelight on the apparent unexpectedness The commander of the British Expeditionary Forces on the continent, General Lord Gort, came under increasing pressure from his superiors in London to assume the offensive and break his army out of encirclement? To accomplish this he quickly conceived a plan which called for the commitment of two of his divisions to the vicinity of the village of Arras and the Scarpe River. Here they wete to establish a defensive line from which Lord Gort hoped to launch an attack southward toward the village of Cambrai, and break through the flank of our arrival.”’ of the German advance to the French lines. Two infantry brigades, the 150th and 13th, under the command of Major General RL. Petre, received this mission? This plan met with some success initially, and on 20 May, German units met strong resistance in the vicinity of Arras and were forced to bypass the village in order to continue their march northward! Leading the German column at Arras was the 7th Panzer Division commanded by Major General Erwin Rommel. He was followed by the SS Totenkopf Division on his left flank, and the 5th Panzer Division on his right.

The job of leading the British counterattack went to Major General Sir Howard Franklyn. The force, committed to this operation by Lord Gort, originally appeared to be quite large. “Frankforce,” as the unit was dubbed, was made up of two infantry divisions, the 5th and 50th, and the First Army Tank Brigade?

The original plan also called for a simultaneous attack by two French divisions from the south, but that plan was postponed. French participation was limited to a force of approximately 70 light tanks that protected the left flank of Frankforce!

Lord Franklyn’s infantry divisions had also been whittled down drastically by the time that the attack was to have commenced. Instead of two divisions, Frankforce was limited to two battalions of the Durham Light Infantry: the 6th and 8th. These units had no radios, no trucks, no supporting artillery, and only half of their authorized number of machine guns? The Durhams had marched almost continually for the previous ten days in hot weather, and were by now badly in need of rest.

Up until this ARMOR - + German Unit Movements British Unil NoTE:*k. Fbnbnu Ebumrdha-mBr)*k \ VlMY / BAILLEUL

150th BDE PAMPOUX time, they had been a reserve force and had received no training in maneuver with tanks before their commitment to the battle.

The tanks of Frankforce were in equally bad shape. At this time, the First Army Tank Brigade consisted of two battalions: the 4th and 7th Royal Tank Regiments. These two units constituted the majority of the armor force the British committed to the continent thus far, and, gone hither and yon across the front in vain attempts to support the BB. F.'s defenses. In fact, before the 20th of May, they had been in Belgium, deployed along the Dyle Line? When ordered to rejoin the battle along the southern front, the tanks had to march approximately 100 miles to reach the British positions at Arras with no o p portunity to conduct much overdue maintenance. These tanks had not been designed to operate for such intervals over such long distances. Consequently, many of the original force were lost en route to worn-out tracks and other malfunctions. hen they did arrive in Arras on 21 May, only 74 of the original 100 tanks were available for combat?

The British tanks were of the Mark I Infantry and Mark I1 ''MatiIda" types. The Mark I, although heavily armored, was extremely slow, with a maximum speed of eight mph and armed with only an 8-mm machine gun. Designed as an infantry support vehicle, it was manned by a crew of two, and could withstand hits from all known antitank guns of the day. Due to its light armament, however, it was incapable of defeating an armored threat." The Mark I1 tank was better armored and at least as well gunned as any of the German tanks built to date. It was manned by a crew of four and armed with a 37-mm main gun and an 8-mm coaxial machine gun." The Matildas were to cause great consternation among Rommel's troops during the battle, but unfortunately, only 16 of the 74 available tanks were Mark 11s. Furthermore, in an attempt to even the distribution of heavy tanks among the attacking force, the Matildas were divided between the two attacking columns and thus not used in mass.

Three additional factors added to the disadvantaged position the British held on 21 May. The first was a lack of a coherent and effective chain of command within Frankforce itself. Though General Franklyn had placed one of England's foremost experts in tank warfare, Major General Sir Giffard Le Q. Martel, in command of the attacking force, his two attacking columns were commanded by the infantry battalion commanders. These officers were relatively inexperienced, and traveled not with the tanks leading the attack, but with their own infantrymen, who traveled well behind the tanks. Furthermore, no tank officers were present at the final orders group, so they were not entirely informed of the scope and conduct of their mission.

The second factor was the complete lack of British close air support throughout the operation. By this time in the campaign, the Luftwaffe enjoyed complete air supremacy over the continent and constantly harassed Allied troop and supply columns. The R. A. F. had been recalled to protect the skies over the homeland and was in no position to provide fighter cover for its ground force in France. The R. A. F. would not reappear in strength until the evacuation operation in Dunkirk, where it thwarted the Luftwaffe’s attempt to finish the British forces off on the beaches. Finally, and perhaps most important of all, was the failure of General Franklyn’s headquarters to provide his front-line commanders with an accurate estimate of the size and disposition of enemy forces in the vicinity of Arras. General Martel was told only that “enemy infantry and tanks were known to be operating south and southwest of Arras, but in numbers not believed to be great.”” In fact, General Franklyn’s headquarters had received reports of strong enemy forces along the Arras-Doullens road and the Arras-St. Pol road. This placed the Germans squarely between the British and the planned start line of their attack.

The Battle The British left the town of Vimy, approximately five miles north of Arras and nine miles north of the start line, at 1100 hours.

The attacking force moved in two columns, which were made up of the following units:I3 Right-Hand Cdumn 7th Royal Tank Regiment 8th Durham Light Infantry 365th Battery, 92nd Field Regiment, 206th Battery, 52nd Anti-Tank Regi-One Platoon, 151st Brigade Anti- ‘Z’ Company, 4th Royal Northum-Scout Platoon, 4th Royal Northum-Royal Artillery ment, Royal Artillery Tank Company berland Fusiliers berland Fusiliers Lef’t-Hand Column 4th Royal Tank Regiment 6th Durham Light Infantry 368th Field Battery, Royal Artillery 206th Battery, 52nd Anti-Tank Regi-One Platoon, 151st Brigade Anti- ‘Y’ Company, 4th Royal Northurn-Scout Platoon, 4th Royal Northum-ment, Royal Artillery Tank Company berland Fusiliers berland Fusiliers The British faced the 7th Panzer Division and the 3rd SS k e r Division “Totenkopf.” These two units had approximately 218 tanks between ttem,’ and a numerid superiority in men and equipment of every type over the attackers. The 7th Panzer Division was composed of the 25th Panzer Regiment, 6th and 7th Panzer Grenadier Regiments, 78th Panzer Artillery Regiment, 7th Motorcycle Battalion, 37th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion, 42nd Anti-Tank Battalion, 58th Panzer Engineer Battalion, and the 83rd Panzer Signal Battalion.” The 3rd SS Panzer Division was composed of the 3rd SS Panzer Regiment, 5th and 6th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiments, 3rd SS Panzer Artillery Regiment, 3rd SS Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion, 3rd SS Anti-Tank Battalion, 3rd SS Panzer Engineer Battalion, 3rd SS Panzer Signal Battalion, 3rd SS Anti-Aircraft Battalion, and 3rd SS Projector Battalion.’ ti Shortly after the British began their march toward Arras, the tanks in the left-hand column ran ahead of their accompanying infantry, and the two elements became temporarily separated. They regrouped, but the column commander decided that the tanks should proceed on ahead without the infantry. The tanks had not gone far when in the town of Dainville, well short of the start line, they ran into elements of the 6th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. The British sent one troop of Mark I tanks and a company of the 4th Northumberland Fusiliers to deal with this threat. Meanwhile, the remaining tanks moved on without infantry support and proceeded to wreak havoc among the main body of the 6th Panzer Grenadier Regiment’s column, destroying many of its trucks and scattering its troops. Following this initial encounter, the left-hand column continued through the town of Achicourt to Beaurains, and in the process overran the German antitank defensive screen. This was possible due to the inability of the German 37-mm antitank gun to penelrate the armor of the British tanks. The British tankers were able to destroy many of these guns while the 6th Durham Light Infantry cleared the towns and collected prisoners. When they reached the town of Beaurains, the British encountered stiff resistance from 105-mm field guns that the Germans were using in a direct fire mode. The British had finally met their match, and about 20 of their tanks were knocked out of action, bringing the left-hand column’s attack to a halt. Matters worsened as the day wore on, and the column attempted to withdraw under constant harassment from artillery and dive-bomber attacks. Part of the reason that the left-hand column had to stop in Beaurains was the trouble that the right-hand column had in keeping to its timetable and newly received reports of enemy tanks on the other side of town. The right-hand column had begun its movement on time, but encountered problems in keeping its armor to a speed that accompanying infantry could match. As a result, communications broke down almost immediately between the infantry and armor commanders. The 7th Royal Tank Regiment became separated from the 8th Durham Light Infantry following a brief engagement with elements of the 8th Panzer Division, which had occupied the village of Duisans. Leaving the infantry behind to clear the village, the tanks r a d ahead and, through some mishap, became snarled in the rear of the 4th Royal Tank Regiment’s column in Dainille.’ This diversion from their intended route to Vailly caused them to narrowly miss coming into direct contact with 150 PzKpw III and PzKpw IV tanks of the 25th Panzer Regiment. The 25th Panzer Regiment unknowingly bypassed the entire British force and reached the village of Acq to the northwest of Arras without being challenged. Later, General Rommel ordered the regiment to turn around and attack the British from the north while they were attempting to withdraw.

The 7th Royal Tank Regiment eventually got back on course to Vailly, but only after losing its commander and adjutant to enemy fm. The attack was by now completely uncoordinated, and though it continued to wreak destruction and panic among the German troops, including elements of the SS Totenkopf Division, it eventually ran aground outside the village of Vailly after receiving direct fm from the Germans’ 88-mm anti-aircraft guns.

The 88-mm guns were employed as antiarmor weapons in a desperate attempt to compensate for the failure of the German antitank guns to penetrate the armor of the British tanks. These guns were under the direct command of Major General Rommel himself. He had returned to the area in search of the 7th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, which was supposed to be supporting the 25th Panzer Regiment. Rommel had been riding with the lading vehicles of the armored column when he noticed that his infantry had fallen too far behind. He and his staff officer, Lieutenant Most, returned to Vailly to see if they could speed the infantry on their way. When Rommel arrived, he found his troops in a state of panic, having just been attacked by the 7th Royal Tank Regiment through their right flank. Rom-me1 and Lieutenant Most attempted to restore order to the situation by encouraging the infantrymen to stand fast and bring fms to bear on the tanks. Eventually they came upon a battery each of antiaircraft guns and howitzers which Rommel ordered to open rapid fire on the advancing tanks. Personally giving each of the guns its target, Rommel succeeded in knocking out the lead tank in the column and halted the British attack.” He was then able to restore his lines, bring order to his troops, and regain the upper hand on the battlefield. Rommel’s losses included his aide, Lieutenant Most, who was killed at his side during their engagement with the tanks.

Though the Germans were able to regain the initiative quickly and force the British to abandon their attack short of their planned start line, the battle was to have far-reaching consequences. The German commanders had been expecting the British and French to attack their extended lines of supply and weak flanks for some time. The attack at Arras was perceived to be the forerunner of such an attack, which caused the German commanders to slow their advance, allowing more time for their units to mass forces and assume more deliberate and conservative tactics. During the Nuremburg Trials, General von Rundstedt noted that this attack was more successful than any other Allied counterstroke of the campaign in France.” Indeed, the attack panicked Rommel himself, who exaggerated the size of the British force in his communication with headquarters on 21 May, stating that he had been -“attacked by hundreds of enemy tanks,” and “situation maps marked up in his own hand display arrows purporting a counteroffensive by five enemy divisions.*920 When the attack ended early that evening, the losses incurred by the British attack cost the advancing German Army 7 officers, 17 NCOs, and 65 men killed; 116 men of all ranks wounded, and 173 missing. Thirty tanks were destroyed, along with numerous tr?lcks and artillery pieces?’ Approximately 20 of those tanks belonged to the 25th Panzer Regiment. These tanks were lost when the regiment attacked the British from the village of Acq, in the north, while the British were withdrawing following their encounter with Rommel’s artillery.

The Germans ran into a Screen of British antitank guns that the 7th Royal Tank Regiment had deployed around Duisans to cover its withdrawal. Unlike their British counterparts, the German tanks lacked sufficient armor protection from their enemy’s antitank gunfire and were easy prey for the British gun crews. The result of this action was that “upwards of 20 tanks were knocked out and left burning on the ground.”” Though the British attack was short-lived and too little, too late, its significance was inflated in the German commander’s minds because it cost the German Army losses that were four times greater than the total suffered during their breakthrough into Frane.2 Conclusions The British counterattack at Arras provides us with numerous lessons in the conduct of armored warfare. The first is the need for communication between tanks and their supporting, or supported infantry. This lesson is especially germane to the planning of operations involving a heavy-light mix of forces. If radio communication is not possible, then some sort of mutually recognizable signals should be used to communicate during battle. Not only did the British infantry lack radios in this case, but few of the tanks’ radios were working by the time the battle began. Second is the lesson of leaders Id-ing from a position from which they can see and influence the battle. Though it is essential that a commander position himself so that he can quickly maneuver his forces to exploit opportunities that arise, none of the British commanders did so. In fact, they positioned themselves with the infantry, which followed the tanks, rather than with the armored spearhead of their attack. They were unable to assess accurately the situation to their front, and could not coordinate their infantry units to take advantage of the gains made by their tanks, and assist in the silencing of the German antitank weapons. Because he was in the vanguard of his division, Rommel was in a position to assess quickly and influence the tactical situation. He was able to prevent a disaster in his area of operation and quickly turn the British attack into a rout. Third is the criticality of accmte and timely intelligence to the front line commander. Had General Martel been aware of the enemy situation to his front, he would probably have adopted another, more conservative, course of action. The timetable for the entire operation was thrown out of kilter by this lack of intelligence when the British discovered enemy units on their side of the start line that “had to be mopped up to clear the way for the advance.”24 Fourth is the importance of committing tanks in mass. While the British had enough tanks available to achieve a limited local breakthrough, they lacked the numbers necessary to sustain their advance. This was especially true in light of the numerical superiority that the Germans enjoyed in men and machines in the Arras area General Martel, in reflecting on this battle stated that “if larger numbers of tanks had been available, supported by stronger mobile columns, a great success might have been achieved.”25 The British learned a valuable lesson from this action, however, as “the use of tanks in coopention with mobile columns of all arms, attacking on a narrow front, as we did in this case, eventually became a normally accepted method.”26 The superior armor protection that the British tanks possessed allowed them to dominate the battlefield initially and provoke terror among the defending German infantry, but their insufficient numbers ultimately resulted in their being forced to withdraw.

Finally, the importance of maintenance as an ingredient of success was brought painfully home to the British during this attack. The British lost one-quarter of their armored force to mechanical failure before the battle even began. As the battle developed, more tanks were lost to broken tracks and mechanical failure than to enemy fires. These vehicles were then completely lost to the British because they lacked sufficient recovery assets, and failed to provide infantry support to protect the-recovery teams they did have, when they attempted to operate under fire.

Thus, the Battle of Arras speaks to to master the lessons that were learned in blood and frre in France some fifty y m ago. These lessons are as important to us now as they were then, and illustrate to us the need to reflect upon the past in our effort to develop our future. those of us today who are still trying Notes ‘B. H. Lidden Ha& The German Genmls Talk. Quill, New Yo* 1979. p. 130. 2Brian Bond, France ami Belgium 1939-1940, University of Delaware Press, Newark. 1975. p. 114. ’LTG

Sir Giffard Le Q. Maltcl, Our Armourcd Forces. Faber and Faber. Ltd.. London. 1945. p. 62.

4H. A. Jacobsen and J. Rohwer. eds.. Decisive Battles of World Wor 11: The Germon View, G. P. htnam’s Sons, New York. 1965. p. 50. ’Major LF. Eilis. The War in France and Flanders 1939-1940. Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1953, p. 89. %rim Bond. ‘Arras. 21 May 1940: A CIM Study in the Counter-offcnsive,” in Correlli Bamett. et. al.. eds.. Old Bottles and New Defenses: Can V e Lawn From Military History?, Brassey’s, London, 1986. p. 65. 7Nichdas Harmon. Dunkirk: The Patriotic Myth. Simon and Schuster. New York. 1980. p. 94.

‘Douglas Williams. Retreat fran Dunkirk, Brentano’s. New Yotic. 1941. p. 41. ’Nicholas Harmon. p. 93. %. T. white. TO& and Other AFV 4 the Blitzkrieg Era 193941. The Macminan Company, New Yo* 1972. p. 114. “lbid.. p 123.

“Brian Bond. p. 73. ‘%bat McQuie. ‘Historical Chrrrrteristia of Combat for Wargames.” Benchmark, July ‘sSgnel W. Mitcham, Jr., Hitler’s Legions: The German Amy Ordcr of Battle. World War 11, Stein and Day. New Yo* 1985. p. 356. 131bid., p. 67.

1988, p. D-9.

‘61bid.. p. 443.

‘7Brian Bond, p. 65. ‘*B. H. Liddell Ha& The Rommel Papers, Ham & Brace, and Company, New York. I9Alist.ir Home, To Lose a Battle: France 1940. Little. Brown and Company. Boston. 1953. p. 31-32.

1%9. p. 508.

20rbid.

2’Brian Bond, p. 73. pLTG Sir Giffard Le Q. Mattel. p 68. =Alistair Home, p. 508. ”LTG Sir Giffard Le Q. Maltel. p. 66. =Ibid., p. 69. mlbid.

Captain Charles H. Benson 111 was commissioned through OCS in 1986. He holds a Bachelors degree from the University of Alaska at Anchorage and a Masters degree in anthropology from Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio. He served as a tank platoon leader, headquarters XO, and battalion adjutant with 3-8 Cavalry in Germany. A graduate of Armor Officer Basic, A m r Officer Advanced, and Field Artillery Officer Advanced Courses, he is currently the squadron maintenance officer for 3d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, 5th ID, Ft. Polk, La.