A Tale Of Two Battles: Victorious in Iraq An Experienced Armor Task Force Gets Waxed at the NTC

introduction Task F a

1-32 Armor, part Of the 2nd (Blackjack) Brigade of the First Cavalry Division, has fought in both Operation DESERT STORM and at the National Training Center in the course of the past year. Much of the fighting was against dismounted infantry, and offers a number of lessons to those interested in armored warfare. The purpose of this article is to compare two battles in which the task force fought -one in Iraq, one at Ft.

Irwii -and to draw from these battles several crucial points about fighting dismounted infantry with tanks. Task Force 1-32 &mor (Bandits) is a combined arms maneuver battalion (CAM-B) permanently task-organized with a mechanized infantry company (Charlie Company) replacing one tank company. It is otherwise organized according to standard armored,battalion MTOE. Equipped with M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley armored fighting vehicles before its deployment as part of Operation DES- -ERT SHIELD, the Bandits replaced their old vehicles with new MlAls and M2A2s while in Saudi Arabia (The scouts’ M 3 s were not replaced). At Ft. Irwin the task force drew MlAls and M s, so the weapons systems with which we fought were similar in both battles. The terrain, the mission, the weapons systems which the enemy used against us, and the outcome of the battles could hardly have been more different. Operation Deep Strike From February 15 to 19, 1991, the Blackjack Brigade of the First Cavalry Division conducted a number of border raids and ahbushes against Iraqi positions in the Wadi al Batin in an attempt to convince the Iraqis that the main thrust of the Allied attack would come up this historic approach. These attacks were intended to cover the movement of the VI1 and XWII Corps westward, to confuse the Iraqis as to Allied intentions, and to fix as many Iraqi forces as possible in place 8 A IF M CAV

A \cJ F l-32 ARMOR

The Brigade Wedge Used in the Attack Into Ira9 Saddam’s Ramparts of Sand The tracks of passing wheeled vehicles give some sense of the size of the Iraqi fire trench, at upper left.

At left, detailed view of an individual fighting position, bolstered by sandbags and ammo boxes.

At right, individual fighting positions were connected by a network of slit trenches. so that they could be taken from the tear by the main attack from the west. The culminating attack of the deception took place on 24-25 February, as the entire Blackjack Brigade attacked across the berm separating Iraq from Saudi Arabia and moved to contact. Moving in standard brigade wedge on the morning of 25 February, Task Force 1-32 Anna protected the western side of the formation. The task force was aligned in a diamond, with Delta leading in a wedge, Alpha on the left flank in echelon left, Bravo on the right in echelon right, and Charlie Mech trailing in a vee formation. The Bandits’ mission was to find a bypass through the minefields and fire trenches which protected dug-in Iraqi forces to our north by 1230 hours, or to withdraw after creating a successful diversionary attack.

Coalition forces to the brigade’s eastern flank reported significant difficulties breaching minefields and trenches filled with oil that the Iraqis lit to create smoke screens. The task force encountered an antitank minefield and breached it in stride with missed. (No crewmen were injmd, mineplows, suffering one loss as D34 and the tank returned to action within detonated a mine which a plow 24 hours.) A-10s and MLRS fought FIRE TRENCHES

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Iraqi Obstacle Belt 15 km North of Border Berm...........-.... -. ".,.... -.. *.-a. mE TRENCHES

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I Flgute 2 A Company Encounters the lraql Obstacle Belt the deep battle as the task force came on line and began engaging numerous dismounts entrenched in fighting positions with small arms and HEAT rounds. Frustrated by fire trenches protected by minefields, the tank and Bradley commanders put their hatches in open protected position to protect themselves against the small arms and mortar fire of the Iraqis. Tankers, unable to range the Iraqi positions with coaxial machine guns, fired HEAT rounds to destroy bunkers and mortar positions and adjusted fm with the tank commander's -50 M2 by watching the impact of the rounds through the Thermal Integrated Sight (TIS). Indirect fire fdled the void, as the First Cavalry Division's 3-82 Eleld Artillery fired more than lo00 rounds, and the battalion mortars fired 129, getting target effect on a number of dismounted positions. At 1230 hours, the brigade was ordered to withdraw back through the berm to Saudi Am-bia, but the deception mission was a complete success; it froze an entife Iraqi Corps in place, and helped ensure the success of the VII Corps left hook around the Iraqi defenses. Task Force Destroyer and the Battle of nefort Spur Almost a year to the day after Task Force 1-32's battle against Iraqi infantry during Operation DEEP STRIKE, the task force found itself in battle against a much more determined and betterequipped foe: the Krasnovians of the National Training Center. On February 14, 1992, Task Force 1-32 h o r received the mission to defend the Whale Gap and the Valley of Death against a Krasnovian regiment equipped with T-72 and some T-80 tanks, BMP-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, and infantry armed with effective antitank guided missiles. The task force deployed in a rough semicircle designed to prevent enemy penetration and mass fires along both possible enemy avenues of approach. Alpha Company was nestled. against the foothills on the south of Tiefort Mountain, Charlie Company tied in to the Tip of the Whale, with Delta on line between the two flanks, and Bravo behind them in reserve. Alpha and Charlie had exchanged their third platoons, so that Alpha Team had two platoons of tanks and one of mechanized infantry to help protect against an expected dismount threat from the north over Tiefort Mountain. priority of engineer effort went to Delta and Bravo, exposed along the southern edge of Siberia and expected to face the brunt of the Krasnovian attack as they drove north and east toward the Big Sandy Wash and Red Pass. However, it was Alpha Company which would do the fighting -and the "dying" - on the night of February 15.

The fighting began at about 2100 hours with Alpha deployed in aline, tanks backed into wadis against the foothills. Nine of the ten tanks were operational, but the platoon of Charlie Company was down to two vehicles because of maintenance problems. Worse, those two Bradleys had gone to guard John Wayne Pass to prevent an attack into the task force rear area. This left the nine tanks of Alpha Company alone to guard against an expected enemy reconnaissance effort east along the Valley of Death and expo& to infantry attack down the slopes of Tiefort Mountain. Alpha succeeded in defeating the enemy reconnaissance effort, destroying a total of four BMPs and four BRDMs that snuck in and out of the ARMOR - wadis as they attempted to gain information on the disposition of the task force. However, the company began to see dismounts creeping down Tiefort Mountain to its rear at approximately 2300 hours. Engaging the troops with coax and indirect was largely ineffective, as the enemy took up hasty defensive positions among the rocks. Repeated calls for fire killed many of the dismounts, but they continued to advance, and one of the two Bradleys was called back from John Wayne Pass to help protect the company. Charlie Company, 8th Engineers bravely dug in the nine tanks from 2200 to 0100, even as the covering force battle and the fight against the enemy infantry were taking place. Alpha tanks used their superior night vision capability to direct the Bradley against known enemy positions, and task force mortars fired a number of accurate missions until their ammunition was completely expended, but most of the enemy infantry managed to survive.

At approximately 0300 hours, the Krasnovian infantry began using illumination to spotlight the western-most Alpha tanks, now dug in and still searching for enemy reconnaissance elements to their west and south. The Krasnovians deployed hunter-killer Dragon teams in groups of three and four against individual tanks at close range. The tanks, having exhausted their small arms ammunition, called for fire on their own positions, but were overwhelmed one by one as the enemy infantry mlled up Alpha’s flank from west to east. Only two of the nine Alpha tanks escaped by abandoning their prepared battle position and fleeing southeast. The Krasnovian infantry had defeated an MlAl tank company in detail and rendered it combat ineffective. Lessons Learned Task Force 1-32 Armor faced a mostly dimounted threat in two battles separated by only a year in time, but worlds apart in terms of mission, terrain, enemy situation. and results. The task force was fortunate that the Iraqis it fought in Operation DEEP STRIKE did not have effective antitank weapons, had not emplaced them in overwatch positions protecting their well-designed obstacle, and did not have effective indirect fires available to place on the obstacle. A year later, fighting a more determined and better armed foe, Task Force 1-32 Armor had one of its tank companies decimated by alight infantry company of approximately 150 men. The Battle of Tiefort Spur demonstrates how effective good infantry can be against tanks that are not prepanxi to fight dismounts. The contra..t between the two battles offers us several lessons:. Infantry presents a very real threat to tanks. We don’t train to fight this threat enough. Talks with the observer-controllers at the NTC confmed that one of the biggest killers of tanks at the NTC is infantry fighting dismounted. The Battle of Tiefort Spur is a regular feature of NTC rotations; the observer-controllers call the OPFOR infantry company “Task Force Destroyer” and told us that fighting the dismounts in this situation is the hardest task the NTC presents to a tank company.. The best way to defear infantry is with infantry. Task Force 1-32 Armor is permanently task organized with an infantry company, yet did not use its infantry as effectively as it could have in DESERT STORM or at the NTC. Tank companies need to work with infantry units on a regular basis to establish SOPS and to learn each other’s strengths and weaknesses. Without infantry to protect tanks from enemy dismounts, a lot of tanks will get killed.. Infantry doesn’t have to be spectacularly well trained to present a real threat to U. S. Armored Forces. The company commander of the Alaska National Guard Cavalry company which defeated Task Force 1-32 Armor at the battle of Tiefort Spur (and earlier that week at the Battle of Red Pass) told me that his soldiers had seen a Dragon for the fmt time only three weeks before they fought us. They learned fast, but so may the next enemy that fights the United States with advanced antitank weapons. Kudos to the soldiers of the Alaska National Guard, who impressed all of us who fought against them with their professionalism, enthusiasm, and performance.. Tanks need dedicated indirect fiie support on board. The experience of fighting infantry on two different battlefields in less than a year highlights the need for a weapons system like the Mark 19 Automatic Grenade Launcher to defeat infantry at extended ranges, even when they are dug in. (See the excellent article by CPT Andrew Harvey and SFC Robert Firkins in Sept/Oct 1991 ARMOR for details.) We found 120-mm HEAT rounds to be an effective bunker-buster in Iraq; however, that is an expensive solution to the tactical problem. Our experience has demonstrated that tankers are at least as likely to fight dismounts as they are to fight tanks, tanks need a weapons system that will allow them to defeat dug-in infantry at ranges beyond the killing radius of hand-held antitank weapons systems.. Indirect fire support of armor units is essential, and training shows results. Tank commanders and even tank loaders called for fire at the NTC, largely due to extensive use of the Observed Fire Trainer before our NTC rotation. Tank units must train all of their personnel to accurately call for and quickly adjust indirect fire. These are just a few of the lessons Task Force 1-32 Armor learned as it fought dismounts in the deserts of Iraq and California in the last year. They are presented here in the hope of inspiring further debate in the Armor community over how to best deal with the threat that determined, well-armed dismounts present to an Armor Task Force.

A. Nag1 is a 1988 graduate of the U. S. Military Academy and received a Master’s Degree in International Relations from Oxford University. A graduate of the AOBC, Airborne, Air Assault, and Tank Commander Certification Courses, he served as 1st Platoon leader of N1-32 Armor, 1st Cavalry Division during Operation DESERT STORM, and as XO of the same company during NTC Rotation 92-4. He is currently attending AOAC.