SOUM: The Safety-of-Use Message Network

Picture this scenario: You are the maintenance officer for the 1st Battalion, 10th Armor, 23d Armored Division. You observe one of your maintenance teams as it lifts the powerpack from a C Company MlAl Abrams. As the M88A1 Recovery Vehicle begins to back the powerpack away from the tank, the sling holding the engine suddenly fails. The powerpack drops like a boulder, glancing off of the rear of the tank as it crashes to the ground, breaking into dozens of pieces. As the dust begins to settle, you first notice the smashed engine lying on the ground near a crushed grille door and the badly scarred back end of the tank. Then beyond, you notice the C Team Chief grimacing as he clasps his hands over his eye. Beside him, the hull mechanic, SGT Jones, is standing hunched over, holding his arm. All you can think is, what a mess!

Several days later, the investigating officer appears at your office. He begins, “Captain, I’ve got some bad news for you. My preliminary findings indicate that the equipment loss will amount to approximately $320,000 worth of damage to government equipment. The engine was a complete loss, and the back of the tank and grille doors were pretty badly damaged. ”I haven’t been able to determine the medical costs yet, though. Fortunately, SGT Jones just broke his collar bone from that pipe that broke off, so his medical expenses won’t be that bad. SFC Wilson, however, is a different story. That sheared bolt that hit him may cause him to lose his eye. The doctors aren’t sure yet what the outcome will be, or if there’s any disability involved. The bottom line is that you are responsible for two seriously injured two soldiers and will be responsible for repaying a lot of medical bills and equipment damage.”

Your only feeble response is, “Why me?“ After a few minutes of explanation, it all became terribly clear. Approximately three months earlier, an urgent safety-of-use message (SOUM) had been issued, forbidding the use of a type of engine sling. As you virtually never emptied your distribution box at battalion headquarters, the message that your logistics representative put there had apparently collected dust for several weeks, along with everything else. Consequently, this vital safety information never reached the men who needed it, your mechanics. And it was your fault.

Not a very pretty picture, is it? With the way that some individuals and units track SOUMs though, this is certainly not an improbable scenario. Fortunately, nothing as serious as this example has occurred yet.

Many people in the safety community acknowledge that the SOUM network has major problems. A real example of the magnitude of this problem was exaggerated in the earlier scenario. TACOM issued an urgent SOUM on the M1 engine sling in October of 1990. Personnel from the Directorate of Total Armor Force Readiness at Fort Knox surveyed armor battalions worldwide and discovered that only 17 percent of the surveyed battalion maintenance leaders had received the message five weeks after it was released. Several surveys combined revealed that it takes approximately si.. weeks before 50 percent of armor battalions get SOUM to the user level. Clearly this is unacceptable, and is a major accident waiting to happen.

Several problems exist with the SOUM system today.

Those problems exist from the top all the way to the bottom. Fortunately, Army Materiel Command (AMC), the Army Safety Center and many other commands recognize that there are SOUM weaknesses. A comprehensive solution may not be immediately forthcoming. An understanding of the problem will hopefully help users see some of the subtleties of the situation, so that they may better attack the problem in the interim.

At its simplest level, there are three fundamental problems with the SOUM network: format, dissemination, and tracking. Each of these three areas further contain several contributing factors. The area that will require regulatory change over time is format. To see through the fog created by poor format can be an initial hurdle in solving the problem. Unfortunately, the format problem starts at the very beginning of the SOUM. Each of the subordinate commands of AMC numbers its SOUM differently. For example: and CECOM 40-90, could be in TACOM 90-40, AMCCOM 40-90,

ARMOR - May-June 7997 reference respectively to: M1 tanks, 120-mm tank rounds, and VRC-89 SINCGARS radios. Therefore, it is very important to include the AMC subordinate command abbreviation and SOUM subject matter whenever discussing or transmitting information about a SOUM (e.g.

TACOM 90-40, M1 Series Exhaust Duct Seal). This way, there is no confusion about which SOUM you are referring to, or its subject. The next format problem will strike the reader in the very first paragraph. SOUM are worded so as to be kind, in that they say the reader "should" retransmit the message, and they "are requested" to acknowledge receipt. The fact is, there ought to be no flexibility on the dissemination of SOUM. For practical application purposes, the SOUM reader should substitute the kind words with the word, "will." The last area that I classify as a format problem is created by a periodic lack of required coordination at the SOUM author level and above. Whenever a SOUM is generated, all systems that could possibly be affected are supposed to be evaluated to see if they should also be included in the SOUM. For example, a SOUM applying to the M1 tank may well also apply to the M60A3. Sometimes coordination fails, and a system that should have been included falls through the cracks and does not get included in the SOUM. For this reason, it is important for the user to carefully look at each SOUM and see if a system that the user has may have been inadvertently omitted from the SOUM.

The next major problem area is dissemination. This problem is frequently nothing more than a common sense problem by the individuals or agencies passing the SOUM.

The first component of this problem lies with SOUM addresses. In many instances, the only way that some SOUM will reach an installation is through an AIG at Logistics Assistance Offices (LAO) or Safety Offices. If this is the case, you need to do one or both of two steps. First, hound your LAO and safety representatives relentlessly to keep updated with the latest SOUM. Second, send a message or memorandum to the headquarters controlling the AIG, and ask to have your unit included as a specific addressee in the AIG. The thing to remember with this portion of the problem is that communications center personnel will only give a SOUM to agencies that are on the address list. Therefore, the solution is to become an addressee, or go to the addressees.

The second component of the dissemination problem may occur at any number of unit levels. The problem is that many recipients of SOUM may not know to whom to give them for action. The safest countermeasure to this problem is to officially designate one individual or office to clear all SOUM that come into the brigade or battalion, or whatever echelon in question. Whoever clears the SOUM must be familiar with a wide variety of systems to ensure that the SOUM are routed properly (e.g. the reviewer should not be dumbfounded when reading a SOUM for the M231 5.56mm Submachine Gun, but should realize the SOUM addresses the M2 Bradley's firing port weapon). The reviewer must still guarantee that the commander receives a copy of the SOUM, in addition to the action officer, so that the commander may track the issue and place any added emDhasis that he wishes.

The last major prooiem area wm SOUM is tracking. Current SOUM regulatory guidance requires users The bottom line though, is that commanders must get SOUM so that: they know about the problem; they can place extra emphasis, or specific guidance; they can suspense Compliance; and, they can ensure that the mission is accomplished. of the identified equipment to respond within 15 calendar days regarding projected compliance with SOUM. There is, however, no procedure to ensure compliance within a unit.

The solution for the tracking problem has a two-pronged approach. The first prong includes what was discussed under dissemination, the command channels issue. SOW must get into command channels.

It does not matter whether this is done by direct address, or through information copies distributed by reviewers or action officers. The bottom line though, is that commanders must get SOUM so that: they know about the problem; they can place extra emphasis, or specific guidance; they can suspense compliance; and, they can ensure that the mission is accomplished.

The second part of the tracking solution pertains to unit level records keeping. File copies of the SOUM should be maintained at the reviewer level (to account for all incoming SOUM), and the action officer level (to account for SOUM specific to his equipment). Keep these records in case a future question arises about the SOUM, or anew piece of equipment arrives, which the SOUM covered.

Additionally, the unit should establish some sort of standard procedure to indicate that the steps of a SOUM have been applied to each and every vehicle or item of equip-ARMOR - MayJune 7997 I I ment in question. Record procedural SOUM on a by-name roster. A couple of possibilities for equipment records include: 1) maintain a file folder on each piece of equipment and simply place a note or memo in the folder; 2) make a small pencil annotation in the remarks block of the DD Form 314 (Preventive Maintenance Schedule and Record). Include the AMC command issuing the SOUM and its number (i.e. TACOM 90-40). This way, when your new motor sergeant shows up nine months later and asks if you performed the steps in SOUM 90-40, you can pull the record and show him. Additionally, your SOUM file will allow you to cross reference to the exact SOUM for further details from your annotation on the DD 314.

The SOUM system, as with any bureaucratic network, has its pitfalls. Responsible agencies are researching the problems to try and work out lasting solutions. In the interim, it is up to commanders, leaders, and NCOs in the field to ensure that every soldier who needs to have SOUM information gets it. Anything less is a disservice to our soldiers and an accident waiting to happen.

Some of the ideas presented here hopefully will help you work through any problems that you may have in getting and tracking SOW. The bottom line is to get the SOUM expeditiously, get the word to your soldiers, and get the SOUM by whatever means you can until a foolproof system is emplaced.

The Directorate of Total Armor Force Readiness surveys Active and Reserve component Armor/Cavalry units worldwide, to ensure that they receive urgent SOUM. If you are having any problems receiving any SOUM, or have suggestions for solving the problem, call DSN 464-TANK (24 hour recording), or DSN 464-7752/4047 (COM: 502-624-7752/

4847).

I Letters I Continued from Page 3 Badges for other branches would not dilute the worth of the infantry award; on the contrary, they would reinforce the Army'sage-old concept of combined arms. The awards would surely boost morale.

Each branch could dictate requirements for the award of the badges. For instance, tracked vehicle crewmen (scouts and tankers) could be required to demonstrate expert gunnery, tactical, and individual skills. Soldiers would have an incentive to excel.

The design of these badges could be modeled after the EIBICIB. The badge's field could vary with each branch. Perhaps the role of the various direct and indirect fire branches has been secondary to that of the infantry in previous conflicts (a debatable point), yet it is clear that no one branch is superior (despite our Cavalry claims to the contrary) to any other. The infantry is only one part of the equation for victory. Branch politics and traditions of the service are not easy to comprehend from my place in the sand -alongside the infantry.

3d ACR Saudi Arabia Tankers and Scouts Due Equal Recognition Dear Sir: I am writing this letter for publication in hopes of gathering support for a proposal I am making as a concerned officer and member of the Cavalry/Armor community. Knowing the widespread influence your publication has, I have high expectations that circulation of my recommendation will perhaps sway influential people to agree with me and my associates on whose behalf I am writing. What I am strongly endorsing is an Expert/Combat Armor Badge in two classes: those awarded to tankers and those awarded to scouts.

I realize that this is no new issue in the Army and that Armor has been pushing for such an award for over a decade. I hope to list my own experiences as viable reasons for creating the award for all the hard working tankers and cav scouts in our Army today. I especially feel strongly about the timing of this endorsement immediately following the Perisan Gulf War, truly an Armordominated ground conflict. Let me state for the record that although there were thousands of hard working infantrymen who helped win the war, (a) they couldn't have done it by themselves, and (b) they already have the CIB and EIB as an award.

On that note, let me say that the Infantry has been awarding ElBs and ClBs for decades now to infantrymen who successfully accomplish all tasks needed to fulfill combat or combat-related tasks. What should also be known is that tankers and scouts perform many of those tasks just as successfully, i.e., land navigation, first aid, radio/telephone procedures, emplacing Claymore mines, etc., not to mention the many gunneries, NTC rotations (truly an armordominated training event), and REFORGERs participated in. In the aftermath of the recent war, making particular note of the huge, "miraculous" success of the ground conflict, it should be even more apparent that Armor needs its own qualification badges as symbols of the hard work, dedication, and effective service of its members, and also as an enhancement to esprit de corps. I do believe these are some of the major reasons Infantry has its own qualification badges. As a scout platoon leader in the 1st Cav Division's cavalry squadron, I have been an eyewitness to the professionalism, devotion, and hard work of today's cavalry scouts, my unit being merely a representative of the whole. Also, as a former tank platoon leader, I can attest to the quality of today's tankers; but do not take my word for any of this, just review the war record of the ground units involved. One thing I noticed in my unit, and specifically in my platoon, that prompted me to write this letter was the fact that I have five 11M infantrymen in my platoon assigned as observers and drivers. It is the same for the other two platoons. These men served valiantly and deserve their Combat Infantry Badges, but the rest of my platoon served just as heroically and are not eligible for any such award because they are 19D cavalry scouts. Also. the mortar section assigned to my troop will receive ClBs for each member, and, although they are deserving, it should be noted that they supported us from a doctrinally induced central position behind a screen line of cavalry scouts who ARMOR - protected their flanks. These cav scouts are, today, not eligible for a Combat Armor Badge, therefore, the inequities are blatantly obvious.

Now, let me also say that the establishment of this award should be such that armored crewmen who served in war are eligible for a CAB, and the Armor Center will obviously have to establish criteria for the testing of future armor men and the awarding of EABs in peacetime. As a further note, 1 have discussed this issue with my fellow officers, scouts, and tankers, and not only are they in full agreement, but we have also discussed the badges' designs. We are not being preco-cious, just possessing a belief that the men who would wear the badge should have a hand in creating it. What we propose is the Tanker Badge as the Armor insignia on a yellow enamel background similar to the blue one of the Infantry. For cav scouts it would be a single saber on a red enamel background. As with the CIB, awards earned in combat would have a wreath around them. As it should be, the Army will have the final word on this proposal, but as a loyal, dedicated officer who cares about the future of the Army, Armor, and my soldiers and comrades, I felt it necessary to push for this award. On behalf of all members of the Armor community, I feel that this would be a positive award and that the h y would be doing the right thing by its implementation.

LT, Armor Trp 6, 1-7 Cav 1 st Cavalry Division M1 Attack "Unwarranted" Dear Sir: Jeffrey S. Goldfarb's letter in the September-October 1990 issue (T-64 no *su-pertank") still disturbs me, even after reading the excellent rebuttals in the November-December 1990 issue. What bothers me is Mr. Goldfarb's unwarranted and vicious attack on the M1 tank. Mr. Goldfarb seems to infer in his letter that the only reason we built the Abrams was to counter the T-72/64, which just isn't true. Yes, I heard all the same stories he did from the instructors at Ft. Knox about why it was so important to field the M1 to counter these vehicles, but the bottom line is that we needed anew system in the field to replace the aging M60 fleet. The Abrams has done this so well that we've had to rethink our warfighting doctrine in order to accommodate the increased capabilities of the system. We've gone from "active defense" to "Airland Battle," which emphasizes offensive shock action using combined arms. We couldn't do this with the M60, or maybe we could have, but not very well.

Mr. Goldfarb also makes some assertions about the tremendous cost overruns and mechanical unreliability of the M l with which I also take issue. I don't deny that the Abrams is expensive, but then again what state-of-the-art tank in the world isn't these days? The Ml's cost compares very favorably with every other frontline Western tank deployed today, from the Leopard 11 to the Challenger. Additionally, calling the M1 a mechanical "dog" is totally without merit and irresponsible. Perhaps if Mr. Goldfarb had stayed in the Army long enough to learn how to keep the vehicle operational, he'd have a different opinion. I've been a platoon leader, executive officer, and commander of M1 units, and I've never seen the "dog" face of the M1 surface. Quite to the contrary, the vehicle is very easy to work on, and in my experience is extremely reliable. The only time I witnessed excessive down time with the system was at the NTC, and the way those tanks get used out there, it isn't surprising. But even then, the down time only involved one or two vehicles in the fleet and not a systemic problem across the board. The measure of a vehicle's OR rate has more to do with the maintenance procedures enforced by the owning unit than anything else.

Now, having said all that, I still feel the M1 could be an even better system than it is now. However, I make these recommendations with my head held high because 1 believe in this tank. A lot of what I'd like to see on the M1 is already programmed to be added, some of it isn't and may never be, but that doesn't change the confidence I have in this outstanding vehicle.

1. I'd like to see an AP grenade launcher on the vehicle for close-in defense, or maybe an AP grenade that can be launched from the M250 smoke launchers.

2. I'd like to see a gun tube position locator in the driver's compartment, so the driver always knows where the gun tube is relative to the front slope.

3. Underarmor APU!

4. I'd like to see the COAX stowage reduced on company commander's tanks and above so that a second radio mount could be installed under the first one. This would definitely help C2 at company and battalion level.

5. Since we've gone to a HEAT/SABOT mix only, I'd like to see some sort of intermediate weapon between the COAX and the MAIN gun that the crew could use when it had a target too small for the main gun, but too big for the.50 or the COAX. If the range was great enough, the crew could also use the weapon to mark targets for aircraft with smoke rounds.

6. I'd like to see a final drive odometer, similar to what semis use, to help keep track of usage. DIPS get changed out a lot, and sometimes the mileage isn't carried over, which makes it difficult to properly record usage. A final drive odometer will always stay with the tank, and if we can develop a clear road wheel hub, I know we can do this.

7. I think we need a MILES system that allows you to boresight the tank normally.

8. I think we need an external phone. I know this is in the works.

9. I think we need to put the azimuth indicator back in the gunner's station.

10. Kind of off the subject, but I think we need new coveralls. We missed the point when we developed tanker's NOMEX, because NOMEX loses its protective qualities when it gets greasy, oily, etc. We should take a look at what race car drivers are using right now, because I think it'sin the right direction. Oevelop the flame retardant suit as an undergarment to a coverall system that can get dirty without degrading the system. If we do this, can we sew a pistol holster inside? It would sure makes things easier inside the tank! Oops, I got carried away there. Let's hope everyone didn't fall asleep. Anyway, Mr. Goldfarb posed a question in his letter that he should not have asked. In response, all you have to do is take a look at history. The T-34 did as much to win Wll as any other vehicle. By the way, I didn't notice Israel as a world leader in tape recorders, computers, and cars, but they've fielded the MERKAVA, haven't they?

5th Signal Command FRG

ARMOR - May-June 7997 The Bustle Rack #I Anniston Army Depot Maintenance Repair Hotline Anniston Army Depot has a Maintenance Repair Telephone Hotline for the M48, M60 and M1-series combat vehicles; the engine, transmission, and power train for these vehicles; for AVLBs, M88s, and M551s/M551Als; as well as for land combat missile systems (to include the LANCE launcher/loader transporter). The hotline can also be used for problems relating to small arms, mortars, and recoilless rifles. This hotline can provide assistance to field units that are having difficulty in resolving equipment problems and is an additional source of information for the soldier, the field maintenance technician, and the logistics assistance officer. So, if you have a problem with any of the above identified items, try your supporting units, the AMC Logistics Assistance office, or give us a call, and we'll do our best to help you solve it! Our hotline number is: (205) 235-6582 or DSN 571-6582. Saber Award Winners LTG Dave Palmer, Superintendent of the United States Military Academy and the Academy's senior Armor officer, will present the Armor Association Cavalry sabers to West Point'stop academic and military Armor graduates during graduation week exercises May 27-31. Cadet Blake K. Puckett of Annapolis, Maryland, will be honored for achieving the highest cumulative grade point average of the 116 cadets branched into Armor this year. He entered his final semester with a 3.895 average. Cadet Matthew D. Morton attained the highest cadet military rank, serving as a cadet battalion commander. The Bethel, Ohio, resident also had served as a battalion command sergeant major. Battle Staff Noncommissioned Officer Course Anew course, for staff NCOs began in January 1991 at the US. Army Sergeants Major Academy, Ft. Bliss, Texas. The first pilot has ended. The reaction from the first graduating class was overwhelmingly in favor of the new course. The Battle Staff NCO Course was designed at the academy, and will integrate the current Operations and Intelligence and Personnel and Logistics courses. But, according to its developers, the course will be more than a simple meshing of the two existing courses: it is a completely new course, designed 'Yo train battalion and brigade staff NCOs to serve as integral members of the battle staff and to manage the day-today operations of battalion command posts."

NCOs were already learning their specific duties in the existing course. What wasn't happening, according to SGM Phillip Cantrell, was an effort to train battle staff NCOs to function and fight as an effective team. SGM Cantrell helped develop the Battle Staff NCO Course. Training will actually begin before the NCO arrives at the school, according to SGM Cantrell. "We are planning a six-week course which is far shorter than the ten-week Operations and Intelligence Course and two weeks longer than the Personnel and Logistics Course. With an overall reduction in course length, some of the material NCOs need to know will have to be completed by correspondence before their arrival."

SGM Cantrell said the proposed solution is to select students a minimum of four to eight months before course attendance and enroll them immediately in the Army Correspondence Course Program. After completing the required number of lessons, prospective students will receive a certificate, which they will present to an academy faculty advisor when they report to Fort Bliss for the resident phase of the course.

All the resident training will be performance oriented, based on the ARTEPs for heavy battalion, heavy brigade, and light infantry battalion. The underlying principles of the course are synchronization and "train as you fight." The following is a schedule of class dates for the remainder of the PI: Class # Start Date End Date 3-90 20 May 28 Jun 4-90 8 Jul 16 Aug The Battle Staff NCO Course is geared to handle 160 students per class. If you have any questions on how to apply, you may call Armor Branch, commercial (202)325-9080 or DSN 221-9080. 5-90 26 Aug 4 Oct Letterkenny Employees Support Desert Storm Letterkenny Army Depot employees successfully tackled another special short-turnaround project in support of Desert Storm.

Depot employees assembled and prepared for shipment more than 800 replacement tracks for the MlAl Abrams tank. The track, which was stored at New Cumberland Army Depot, Pa., is usually sent to Anniston Army Depot, Ala., for assembly. Anniston overhauls and repairs the MlA1. However, in the interest of ARMOR - time, the track was brought to Letterkenny in Chambersburg, Pa.

Employees worked around the clock for two weeks just before the ground war broke out to get the track out on time. Letterkenny normally assembles tracks for howitzers and other tracked vehicles; however, normal production is about ten tracks per month.

The Draper Combat Leadership Award The annual Draper Combat Leadership Award recognizes the outstanding armor or cavalry company or troop in each division, separate brigade, and armored cavalry regiment in the U. S. Army, to include Army Reserve and National Guard units. It is not anew award. The history of this prestigious program is the legacy of LTC Wickliffe P. Draper. In 1924, LTC Draper developed a plan to test and recognize combat leadership in small cavalry units. The first tests were held at Fort Riley, Kan., then the Cavalry School. Since that start nearly 70 years ago, the award tias evolved. In 1928, LTC Draper created a trust fund to ensure the permanence of the award, and the competition expanded from Fort Riley to posts throughout the United States. in 1939, cavalry regiments that had been mechanized began to compete for the award, thus ensuring its continued relevance in a modernized Army. During World War II, the competition was suspended, but was resumed in 1946 under the title of the Armored Cavalry Leadership Award to reflect the new reality of the force. Since then, the competition has continued to evolve. Today the Draper Combat Leadership Award, represented by the "Goodrich Riding Trophy," is awarded not on the results of a test, but on the overall performance of a unit. This was done for both practical and economical reasons.

Economically, it is no longer necessary to allocate funds for a "Draper Test:" the results of all of a unit's field exercises are considered during the competition. Examining the functioning of a unit throughout the year gives a better evaluation of the true performance of a unit and its leaders than a one-time test. All company-sized armor cavalry units assigned to divisions, separate brigades, armored cavalry regiments, or US. Army Reserve Readiness Regions are eligible for consideration for the award. Air cavalry troops and attack helicopter companies organic to armored and cavalry ground units are also eligible. The program is open to US. Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard units.

The Draper Award program also recognizes individuals for their demonstrated leadership in courses at Fort Knox, recognizing the outstanding leadership graduates in both ANCOC and AOBC for their contributions and efforts while students.

The point of contact for any questions regarding the Draper Award Program is Leadership Branch, USAARMC, Fort Knox, Ky. 40121, phone: DSN 464494815450 or commercial (502) 624494815450. Elimination of MOS 19E Effective 1 October 1991, MOS 19E will no longer be a valid active component MOS. Commanders need to make every effort to ensure that all 19Es transition to 19K before this date. There are two primary options available to accomplish this transition.

(1) M1 Tank Commander Certification Course (lc", at Fort Knox. If an MOS 19E soldier is scheduled to PCS, ensure that he contacts his career advisor in PERSCOM (DSN 221-9080) and gets scheduled for the course enroute to his new duty station. The course can also be taken in a TDY-and-return status, depending on the unit's available funds. (2) Supervised on-the-job training (SOJT). SOJT packages are available from your installation learning center or from the M1 NETT Team (Commander, Knox, Ky. 40121 or DSN 464-1661/5504). USAARMC, ATTN: ATZK-DPT-NET, Fort

Many soldiers may have transitioned, but stili require the appropriate administrative actions to be completed. A review at Fort Knox found a large number of 19Es who had been awarded MOS 19K, but the appropriate papework had not been submitted to PERSCOM.

Failure to convert soldiers to 19K before 1 October 1991 could have an adverse impact on their careers. During this era of force structure cuts, SERB, and OMP, we Armor Center Hotline Have you ever had a question you needed to ask someone at the Armor Center, but didn't know who to call? Well, here's your answer, the Armor Center Hotline. Operated by the Directorate of Total Armor Force Readiness (DTAFR), the Hotline is a 24-hour service that can get you an answer. When you call the Hotline, you will be asked to leave your name, unit, a telephone number, and of course, your question or request. DTAFR will get back to you with a response within 72 hours and often it will be less than 24 hours. If the question isn't answerable within 72 hours, DTAFR will contact you with a status, then track the action to ensure you get a final answer.

Recently, the use of the Hotline has been declining, with most requests from Reserve Component units or recruiting offices asking for publications or publicity-type items. While DTAFR is happy to help fill these requests, the Hotline is also meant as your entry into the Armor Center for doctrinal, training, equipment, and safety issues. DTAFR will do everything it can to get your question answered, even if it means going to agencies outside the Armor Center. So, if you've got a question relating to Armor, call DSN 464-TANK or commercial (502)624-TANK and give the Hotline a try. need to do everything possible to protect our quality soldiers.

Questions on 19K transition, to include the administrative requirements, should be referred to Mr. Henley or SGM Gray at Directorate of Total Armor Force Readiness (Commander, USAARMC, ATTN: ATZK-TFP, Fort Knox, Ky. 40121-5000 or DSN 464-318815155).

Seeks Oral Histories for D-Day Collection The director of the Eisenhower Center is calling on all veterans of the Normandy invasion, in whatever capacity, to contribute their own taped oral history to the D-Day ARMOR - May-June 1997