Future Heavy Forces: * The Need For Better Air Deployability

The Army must re-evaluate plans for future heavy fighting systems. The best way to assure fielding of Armored System Modernization Program (ASMP) weapons is to reduce their size to fit into the contingency business. A "leapahead in heavy force air deployability will give future planners a broader range of strategic, operational, and tactical options.

Air-deployable heavy battalions will permit rapid force projection to reinforce light Army divisions and Marine elements. Even in light-intensity conflict, deploying heavy forces will dramatically shift the balance of combat power, as illustrated recently in Panama.

Some believe Operation JUST CAUSE showed that alight tank is sufficient to augment light forces. Certainly, we need an Armored Gun System (AGS) to replace the Sheridan in scenarios requiring forced entry airdrop capability. We should not be lulled, though, into thinking AGS makes light divisions competitive with enemy armor.

With a 105-mm gun, AGS does not penetrate modern enemy tanks. With light armor, AGS will not survive long on a higher intensity battlefield.

To defeat heavier forces, light divisions would need many AGS battalions to compensate for low system survivability and limited combat effectiveness. This would require extensive new force structure per light division or contingency corps. Instead, picture a future balanced task force that can deploy using the C-17 sorties required to move two AGS battalions. Given this capability, all ten ground maneuver battalions and three field artillery battalions of the 24th Infantry (Mech) could air-deploy using 400 C-17 sorties. That is only two-thirds of the sorties required to deploy the 82nd Airborne. Admittedly, those 400 sorties exclude some battalion equipment and other support assets of a heavy division. But if the contingency is in the Persian Gulf, we can preposition this other equipment in a host country or on prepositioned ships. The resultant force will provide a more credible defense against enemy armor until other heavy divisions can deploy by sea. POMCUS stocks in NATO provide additional justification for improving heavy weapon deployability. Congress may want to reduce future POMCUS stocks to save additional funds.

More deployable heavy weapons may allow us to preposition trucks -.

and other less costly division equipment. POMCUS stores of expensive tanks and other fighting systems can be substantially reduced if heavy weapons are more air-deployable. Weapons that do remain in POMCUS can serve as a source of forward-deployed equipment for other contingencies. The shorter distance between Europe and the Middle East will reduce sortie turnaround time, making it easier to air deploy multiple heavy brigades with lightened armored systems. Some argue that at some point, instead of decreasing the sue of threat-driven weapons, we must increase the number of air-deployment assets. We should. But a C-17 costs more than an entire battalion of MlAls. In the current budget atmosphere, we are unlikely to convince anyone to buy more aircraft just because we decide to build larger armor systems.

The threat dictates the armor required to stop a given "bullet." It does not dictate that we buy bigger weapons with more area to be armored. Nor does it require that every weapon withstand a tank's main gun round, an ATGM, or top-attack munitions. For years, we have used tactics to evade such threats. We also need to get smart and use technology to build smaller weapons that survive by being harder to detect and hit.

A second argument often heard is that only a fraction of the heavy force will ever air deploy. Sea deployment will move the bulk of heavy forces to a contingency area. Therefore, why not build huge howitzers and future infantry fighting vehicles with tank-like armor protection as the ASMP proposes? Comparison of C-17 Sorties Required to Deploy A Notional Current and ASMP Balanced Task Force Current: Number & TvDe of Svstems Svstem Weiaht G17 Sorties Reauired 1 Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV) 28 MlAl or M1A2 Tanks 26 M2A1 or M2A2 lWs 8 M109A6 SP Howitzers 4 FA Ammo Spt Vehicles 12 M901A1 ITV

M3A1 or M3A2 CWs 6 Pedestal-Mtd Stinger HMMWVs 57.5 tons 65-70 tons 25-33 tons 30 tons Loaded 29 tons 13 tons 25-33 tons 4.5 tons 1 28 %-13 4 2 **0 *2-3 9 46-51 Sorties *Smaller figure is for A1 models **Assumes that all are deployed on same G17s carrying tanks Armored System Modernization Program: Number & TvDe of Svstems Svstem Weiaht G17 Sorties Reauired 1 Combat Mobility Vehicle (CMV) 28 Block 111 Tanks 26 FlWs 8 AFAS

Pedestal-Mtd Stinger H M W s 4 FARV-A tons 55 tons 50 tons 50 tons 40-50 tons 30 tons 7.5 tons 4.5 tons 1 28 26 8 2-4 3 *o 32 68-70 Sorties** *Assumes that all are deployed on same G17s carrying tanks **A 3352 % increase over sorties needed for current task force.

Table 1

The primary counter-argument against sealifting all heavy forces is response time. If Iraq had continued its attack into Saudi Arabia, light forces, AGS, and airpower could not have held for three weeks until heavy forces arrived on fast sealift assets.

We need the capability to rapidly move substantial heavy armor to suddenly erupting contingencies.

Therefore, to maintain force commonality, all heavy forces must be designed to the most demanding deployment option. Otherwise, we need another specialized division requiring extensive development costs for limited procurement of unique heavy weapons. A few weapon differences in a contingency heavy division may be acceptable. But we cannot revisit the proliferation of weapons and force structure reversal with the elimination of the motorized division.

Once heavy forces arrive in theater by air or sea, the potential for intratheater transport will always exist, given the capabilities of the C-17 and the needs of the theater commander to rapidly shift combat power. Making the entire heavy force smaller enhances this capability. If it makes sense to air deploy heavy battalions to augment light forces, then what weapons should shrink to make this an achievable option? Tanks are a natural choice for weight reduction because they have the most available to lose. The ASMP proposes a 55-ton Block 3 tank, reversing the “bigger is better” trend. This restores the combat capability to deploy two tanks on a C-5. One tank can also be carried aboard a C-17 with weight left over for other heavy or light forces.

Because tanks have always been the biggest air deployment challenge, it is curious to see that ASMP proposes a whole new generation of deployment problems. If the future infantry fighting vehicle (FIFV) and armored field artillery system (AFAS) grow to tank-like proportions, the advantage in making tanks smaller and procuring the (2-17 airlifter will be totally eliminated. A future balanced task force with supporting artillery will require nearly 50 percent more C-17 sorties if ASMP is implemented! (See Table 1.)

To improve heavy force deployability, the FIFV, MAS, LOSAT (Line of Sight Antitank Vehicle), and FARV-A (Future Ammo Resupply Vehicle) must grow smaller, rather than larger. If current systems weigh about 30 tons, composite technology and smaller modern drivetrains will make 25-ton weapons feasible while still upgrading ammunition payload and armor protection. This weight permits three vehicles to load aboard a C-17. It also allows both the 55-ton Example of Non-Contingency Combined Arms Battalion Task Force Number & TvDe of Svstems Svstem Weight C17 Sorties Reauired 1 CMV

Block 111 Tanks 26 FIFV

Pedestal-Mtd Stinger HMMWVs 4 FARV-A tons 55 tons 25 tons 25 tons 25 tons 25 tons 7.5 tons 4.5 tons 1 28 *O 3 **1 2 ***I 0 36 C-17 Sorties *** *Each FIFV is loaded on a G17 carrying a single tank **One of the four FARV-As and two AFAS are loaded on one C-17 ***All HMMWVs and two FSVs are loaded on 2 C-17s each carrying a single tank. Table 2 and a 25-ton medium family of weapons. This force alternative is the best one for the bulk of our heavy divisions. It provides a high degree of combat capability with greatly improved potential for intratheater transport, or transport from an adjacent theater. CONUS-based battalions in a contingency corps heavy division or separate brigade need to pare down even further to make it realistic to air deploy multiple battalions. Because cavalry and scout organizations need anew, smaller, future scout vehicle (FSV) anyway, the same chassis, with more armor and firepower, can serve as a contingency-oriented FIFV carrying a fire team instead of a squad. A Soviet BMD weighs about S tons using conventional armor, and it is designed to carry seven soldiers. A similarly-sized wheeled or tracked composite U. S. FIFV carrying only five troops could weigh 10 tons, providing substantially more armor protection, defeating perhaps 30-mm Ap Block I11 tank and a 25-ton medium weapon to fit aboard the same C-17. rounds frontally.

Then, we reduce the weight of our Table 2 shows the air deployment gains achieved with a 55-ton tank 55-ton-tank by 7.5 tons, to-transport the lighter FIFV or FSV on the same C-17 carrying a tank and a medium armored vehicle. The contingency tank will be a stripped down variation of the 55-ton main battle tank. Frontal modular armor, and side-skirt armor can sea deploy or be prepositioned to minimize air deployment sorties. Lighter weight reactive armor can be used frontally and on top to defeat ATGMs and top-attack munitions until modular heavier armor arrives and is installed.

The combined use of a lighter variant lank and a smaller FSV-based FIFV reduces the C-17 sorties to deploy a contingency task force to just 29! The savings of seven C-17s over the proposed base TOE may not sound significant. It quickly adds up, though, if the contingency requires air deployment of numerous heavy battalions. The saved sorties become the primary billpayer, allowing other battalion equipment to air deploy.

Up to 11 more C-17 sorties can transport battalion or brigade FSB support equipment without surpassing 40 total sorties for each task force. The contingency heavy battalion’s tanks and FIFVs will be Proposed Contingency Combined Arms Battalion Task Force Versus Two Armored Gun System Battalions Number & TVD e of Svstems W e m Weiaht C17 Sorties Reauired 1 CMV

Block 111 Tanks 44 FINS

Pedestal-Mtd Stinger HMMWs 10 Future Scout Vehicles 4 FARV-A tons 47.5 tons 10 tons 25 tons 25 tons 25 tons 4.5 tons 7.5 tons 1 28 *O *O *O *O *O 9 29 C-17 Sorties *All vehicles carried on 29 G17s carrying either a tank or CMV. See Table 4 for load plan.

Two Armored Gun System Battalions (58 AGS each):

Armored Gun System 19 tons 29 G17 Sorties Table 3a Austere Battalion Task Force Suppart Package Number and Twe of Vehicles 11 HEMTT PLS w/ PLS trailer 11 M577 Cmd APCs/M113 Ambulances 11 Five-ton trucks w/ trailer 22 HMMWVs

*One APC, Ston truck, and two HMMV PLS truck Table 3b Vehicle Weiaht # Of G17S partially loaded 40 tons 11 12 tons *O partially loaded 17 tons *O loaded 3.54.5 tons 32 11 Sorties Is are loaded on each G17 w/one HEMTT only marginally less combat effective than the weapons in the proposed base TOE given the defensive, "buy-time" nature of the initial mission.

In the defense, use of hull-down positions can exploit the Block I11 tank's overhead gun design, reducing the impact of lighter frontal armor. Flanks will be less frequently exposed, precluding the immediate need for side skirts. The tank's 140-mm main gun will defeat any enemy armor. The reduced tank weight will enhance fuel consumption, making it easier initially to sustain the battalion.

The Block I11 tank may be fielded before technology is able to achieve a 55-ton tank. There is also a chance that the Block I11 tank will be based on an Abrams chassis. In either case, developers should strive to field as light a tank as possible. Modular armor will let us reduce tanks to 55 tons when lighter advanced armor or other technologies become available.

The contingency FIFV can be fielded with current technology. A small fire-team FIFV is more analogous to the dismounted infantryman. The substantially reduced silhouette is the biggest survivability benefit. If vehicles are hit and armor is overmatched, only half the squad is injured. Available mounted firepower doubles with two vehicles per squad instead of one. Individual squads gain amounted overwatch capability. Maneuverability and concealment in confining terrain and built-up areas is also enhanced. Admittedly, command and control of the squad is more complicated. Modem low-power communications equipment should solve that problem. On the positive side, fire team leaders will gain additional leadership and maneuver experience due to the additional responsibility of commanding a FIFV. Each platoon will have six FIFVs for the three squads, and one FIFV for the platoon headquarters. Large numbers of contingency FIFVs, based on equally numerous FSVs, reduce development and procurement costs and better justify unit PLL lines. A move to combined arms battalions may better distribute the maintenance of vehicles over a contingency division's ten battalions. Such a notional battalion is shown in Table 3a and 3b.

With a better idea of how a contingency task force appears and deploys, let us examine how it fights as part of a heavy-light mix. Envision a scenario in which U. S. forces deploy to the Persian Gulf to combat a large invading armored force. Army Rangers, an airborne brigade, and V-22 Osprey-mounted Marines arrive first to augment the invaded nation's division-sized force defending a portlairhead. A heavy-light brigade with two battalions of airborne infantry and one heavy combined arms battalion task force air lands, using 50 C-17 sorties (Table 4).

The combined force assumes the mission of securing and expanding Eighteen C-17s 82.5 tons without infantry, 86 tons with 28 light inf. Eight C-17s y\ 82 tons without infantry, 86 tons with 32 light inf One C-17 82.5 tons without infantry, 86 tons with 28 light inf. One C-17 77.5 tons without Infantry, 81.5 tons with 32 light inf. One C-17 80 tons without infantry 84 tons with 32 light inf. Eleven C-17s 77 tons without infantry 81 tons with 32 light inf. \: T\ 40 tons w/trallrr NOTE: Vehicle crewmembers are also included in weights. Ught battalion support vehicles and other personnel are deployed on 10other C-17 sorties. See Table 3b for description of heavy support package shown above. L U U riaria iur uepioyrrierit Of a Heavy/Light Brigade Task Force the portlairhead to keep it outside artillery range. The contingency corps’ aviation brigade and ATACMS assets also air deploy and begin attacking enemy armor at a distance, aided by carrier-based BAI support. Another heavy-light brigade, and a pure heavy brigade airland just as three enemy divisions at about 60 percent strength a p proach the portlairhead.

Our forces and allies in the fight defend during the day and conduct limited counterattacks at night against the larger armor force. Air deployment of supplies, supporting COSCOM, and CS forces continues unabated, thanks to adequate combat power on the ground. Heavy battalion palletized load system (PLS) trucks use the airhead as the supply point for class I11 and V needs. Pre-rigged PLS pallets with combat-configured loads, slide off MAC aircraft ready for front-lime units. The rest of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade and some heavy division support equipment arrive aboard prepositioning ships. This provides the logistical base, support structure, and adequate additional heavy forces to maintain the defense of the portlairhead, while concurrently beginning more offensive operations. With our allies and Army light forces, Marines assume the defensive mission against the enemy attackers, now at less than 50 percent strength.

Heavy Army elements (five battalions) from the heavy-light force break out of the encircled port/airhead and move to block two fresh enemy divisions approaching nearby oilfields. Three FIFV-equipped infantry companies from live heavy battalions supporting an air assault division 200 kilometers away, are sling-loaded by CH-47 to help reinforce the oil fields.

Blackhawks lift light hunter-killer teams into the dunes around the oil fields to engage enemy armor using MWS-M. Other UH-60sY overwatched by heavy battalions, dispense Volcano minefields along the enemy’s axis of advance. Air Force BAI,

Longbow Apaches, and ATACMS fires reduce the divisions to 50 percent strength before the first ground maneuver element engages the enemy.

A tank-heavy battalion with sup porting artillery deploys from Europe loaded on 45 (2-17s. It lands on a remote austere airfield well beyond the five enemy divisions. Navy and Air Force fighters provide supporting air cover. The battalion decimates the enemy’s supply trains as it maneuvers back to rejoin its own supply lines and put the weak remnants of the attacking enemy divisions in a.vise grip back at the portlairhead.

Fast sealift ships begin to arrive and offload additional heavy forces. After sufficient forces are combat ready, a major armor spearhead is launched to destroy enemy forces and drive them back into their own country.

All ten ground maneuver battalions, three artillery battalions, and austere support forces from the proposed contingency heavy division could deploy using 400 (2-17 sorties. In contrast, the same number of sorties would transport only seven task forces equipped with current weapons. Finally, just five ASMP heavy battalion task forces could deploy with the same 400 sorties.

If prepositioning is not possible in the Middle East, or if the contingency is elsewhere, the best option may be to attach heavy battalions to alight division until other heavy division organizations deploy by sea. Light division aviation, air defense, military intelligence, signal, chemical, and military police forces should be able to temporarily support a heavy-light division mix. Some heavy division engineer augmentation will be essential. Air deployment of one Combat Mobility Vehicle (CMV) or several Armored Combat Earthmovers per heavy battalion may be sufficient initially to support the force.

Light division CSS organizations can temporarily support heavy force needs if they receive COSCOM or heavy forward support battalion (FSB) augmentation. To minimize heavy FSB sorties, only medical, fuel, and ammunition resupply organizations are immediately essential. Lighter weapons reduce augmentation requirements. For instance, ASMP tank-sized FIFVs and AFASs would require twice as many supporting fuel trucks. Highly accurate future heavy weapons, coupled with smart munitions, will decrease initial ammunition consumption. This particularly applies to the field artillery, which historically consumes the most ammunition on the battlefield. The concentrated use of smart munitions