Commander’s Intent and the Field Artillery

L Commander's Intent and the Field Artillery by Captain Richard G. Cardillo, Jr. Throughout the night, the scouts from TF 4-77, 1st Bde, 55th Mechanized Division received periodic reports that thc division's cavalry squadron, 4-23 CAV. had been extremely successful in stripping away tlie regimentol reconnaissance company OC the 11th Motorized Rifle Regiment. It'snow 0630 hours, and the scouts have unexpectedly hegun their withdrawal back to BP 24 under enemy pressure. As the regiment transitions into its company prehattle formations, the scouts take heavy losses from flanking fires.

They conduct their withdrawal without the suppression of enemy direct-fire systems, and smoke to obscure the enemy OPs and screen the scouts reanvard movement was not planned. Back at the tactical command post, the task force commander turned to his fire support officer (FSO) and dcmanded, "Where's the smoke? Where's the artillery?"

The FSO could only respond, "Sir, I assumed you wanted to save that for the close-in battle." As the regiment approached the task force commander's primary cngagemcnt area. the FIST for Alpha Company, 4-77 initiated group AllD, too early and ini-properly positioned in refcrence to the commandcr's primary engagement area. Again. tlie TF FSO could only respond, "I thought that's where and when you wanted that group fired."

As the engagement progesses, the FSO and ALO coordinatc for CAS using Army and Air Force aviation assets into engagement area "B", not where the commander had intended to finish thc cncmy off. By now, the commander is thoroughly frustratcd with the FSO and is willing to have the young captain sacked. Eventually the regiment broke through the hattle position and secured key terrain in the division's rear area, allowing thc follow-on forces easy access into the 10th Corps rear area.

While the above scenario is fictitious, it does emphasize the importance of the maneuver commandcr's responsibility to articulate his intent for lire support to the fire support officer early in the planning process. The maneuver conimander exercises overall direction of the ARMOR - “The FSO and ALO are the commander’slink to 80 percent of all available fire support agencies (naval gun fire is the one exception). Without their synchronization into one plan, the commander’s ability to mass his firepower to delay, disrupt, or destroy enemy forces is severly degraded.” fire support system and is ultimately responsible for integrating fire support into his plans. Fire support hinges on the maneuver commander’s intent for field artillery. The mission of the field artillery is to destroy, neutralize or suppress the enemy by cannon, rocket, and missile fire, and to assist in integrating all fire support into combined arms operations. 1 will focus on one of the four basic tasks of fire support that allow the field artillery to accomplish its mission - support the force commander’s battle plan. The performance of this task enables the maneuver commander to influence the battle with Grepower. Firepower gives the commander the means to attack designated high-payoff targets whose destruction, neutraliia-tion, or suppression will be most beneficial to the successful accomplishment of his mission. In order to support the commander’s battle plan, the FSCOORD/FSO at each command level must clearly understand the maneuver commander’s first principle of war - his objective. His intent.

A common complaint from fire support officers is that their maneuver commander did not give them adequate guidance lo kormu-late a fire-support plan to support the scheme of maneuver. A very commonplace approach is for the maneuver commander to tell the FSO, “Go ahead and make up a fire plan, and 1’11 agree with whatever you come up with.“ The maneuver commander is now willing to give total control of the major contributor to his firepower on the battlefield to a special staff ofticer, without suflicient planning guidance.

This individual is probably not I he most experienced individual on the battlefield. Granted, the FSO is cx-pected to know his job and make recommendations to the commander regarding fire support, but to do so during the battle is a little too late, especially ik it could have been planned early on. Okten, the commander gives specific guidance to the S2, S3, and the engineer on what he wants done or reported, but rarely do the FSO or ALO get guidance on what to do. The FSO and ALO are the commander’slink to 80 percent o fall available fire-support agencies (naval gunfire is the one exception). Without their synchronization into one plan, the commander’s ability t o mms his fircpower to delay, disrupt, or destroy enemy forces is severely degraded. When the lime comes to execute the mission, you now have at least three plans instead of one. Rarely will a plan succeed without the integration of all combat. conibat support, and combat service support agencies into one plan - the maneuver commander’s plan. Bcfore the FSCOORD/FSO can begin developing his fire-support plan, he must have a clearly delincd objective that is in consonance with the maneuver commander’s intent. Eventually, the commander will reiterate his intent in written form under paragraph 3.a. (Concept of the Operation) of the operation order. The concept of the operation is a statement of the commander’s TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES

MElT-T

1. Receive the mission.

Mission analysis Mission

2. Issue the warning order. 0 Estimate the situation Enemy

3. Make a tentative plan. 0 Develop courses of action Terrain

4. Initiate movement.

Compare courses of action Troops

5. Conduct reconnaissance.

Time

6. Complete the plan.

7. Issue the operation order.

8. Supervise.

Figure 1.

I I Conduct reconnaissance based on tentative plan. nforma-tion discovered is plugged back into both METT-T and Estimate of the Situation. It can cause a change of plan or even a change of mission. -ARMOR - intent, which explains why the force has been tasked to do the particular mission. It tells what results are expected, how these results contribute to future operations, and how, in hroad terms, the commander plans to achieve those results. The lire-support officer will then address, in paragraph 3.a. (2) (Fires) of the operation order, how he plans to support the commander’s intent. Commanders must hecome personnally involved in the decision-making process of lire support integration. The FSO is n o different from any other mcmlxr of the maneuver Commander’s Stiiff. An cf-fective technique in formulating the commander’s intent is to follow troop-leading proccdures as closely to the letter as possible, while putting special emphasis on the commander’s wargaming session. Using this technique, the commander gathers all of his primary and special staff early in the planning process, and using the available intelligence and prohahle enemy courses of action, the commander “fights” the battle. As he “lights” the battle, with recommendations from his FSO, he inserts his fire support assets when and where he thinks they will contribute most to the battle, giving specific information on attack guidance and desired effects. One of the maneuver commander’s greatest challenges is in synchronizing and concentrating all of his conibat power at the critical time and place. In order to assist the commander in synchronizing fire support with maneuver, the following reminders will help to clarify the commander’s intent: 0 The FSO must be included in the analysis of the mission from the time the mission is received, and his involvement must never be terminated.

The FSO must know the commander’s intcnt. Be specific. Tell the FSO everything as soon as it occurs.

- What targets to attack, where to attack those targets, and when.

- What are die desired effects of fire on thosc particular targets.

- What fire-support means will be used and when do we use them. 0 Don’t let the FSO plan in a vacuum.

The FSO must understand the scheme of maneuver.

Identify which units have priority of mortar and artillery fires. 0 Give the FSO preliminary guidance on high-valuclhigh-payoff targets.

For whilt areas or key pints during the operation should the FSO plan for in which certain risks may or may not be acceptable. ’ 0 The FSO needs guidance on specific courses of action. 0 Guidance on critical events should also be considered. By understanding the commander’s intent early in the plan-, ning sequence, the FSO is better able to inform the commander what fire support can or cannot be accomplished during the battle so that the commander can revise his plan if necessary. Additionally, if the FSO understands the intent early, the integration of the fire-support ARMOR - MayJune 1989 plan with maneuver will enhance the commander’s chance for success. Training Circular 6-71 (77ic Fire Sirppofl Handbook lor the Maiiciiwr Coninianiier) and FM 7 1-2 (The Tarik arid hfecliuriized Infant? But-tuliori Tusk Force) Chapter 6, Section II, can assist the maneuver commander in passing his intent to the FSO. The bottom line is not intended to regurgitate already published information, hut to reiterate the importance of the coni-miindcr’s intent for fire support. Without;I clear understanding of what the maneuver commandcr wants done, the fire support he receives will be a reflection of the guidance he gives to the FSO. Without the synchronization of fire support, maneuvcr, protection, and leadership, the maneuver commander’s combat power and his chances of success will be reduced. Captain Richard G. Cardillo, Jr., a graduate of Oregon State University, was commissioned in Field Artillery in 1978. He is a graduate of the Field Artillery Basic and Advanced Courses, Airborne and Ranger Courses, and CAS3. He has served as fire-support team chief, assistant operations officer, and battery XO with 2-3 FA, 3AD; operations duty officer, DIVARTY, 2AD; and as commander, MLRS Battery, 1-92 FA, 2AD. He is currently assigned as Live Fire, FSO Trainer at the NTC.