To Estimate the Situation

by Major Michael W. Symanski, USAR Too many comparisons of the effectiveness of U. S. and Soviet equipment and doctrine are made in terms of one-on-one duels. This kind of assessment does not match us against them, either in terms of overall combat power or of the conditions that influence the decisions and actiondreadions of each com-hatant. Too often, the question we address is, "Can our tank be destroyed by a particular weapon known to be possessed by the enemy?" It would be better to ask, "What must the enemy do to destroy our tank, and how often must he do it?"

Although a weapon or doctrine is designed to close with and destroy the enemy, the existence of thilt weapon or doctrine has an effect all its own. This is the idea bchind deterrence. An arms race is a competition of possession. not application. This is true strategically and tactically. We must consider the combined effects that our material capabilities. positioning, and numbers have upon the enemy's actions. The accurate estimate of the enemy and friendly situations is basic to his planning as well as to ours. All weapons and units are designed to perform in harmonious concert, not a cnppelin. We must consider the sum of the parts. The infantry is the prime consideration because it is needed to occupy territory, where its presence coerces the encmy nation to do our politicill will. The infantryman is vulnerable to small arms fire and shrapnel, so we encase him in armored vehicles, or fortifications, and support him with weapons impervious to bullets (primarily from automatic weapons). Armored vehicles, on the othcr hand, are vulnerable to antitank weapons. Because the walking man is not generally the most productive target of an antitank rocket, he protects the tank against ATMs. Counter-battery artillcry fire is the best defense against the high explosive round that destroys armored vehicles and man alike. The enemy artillcry cannot fire from positions already occupied by our infantry. Thus, no single weapon can provide sufficient firepower, protection, or mobility in every situit' ion. None are designed to do so, and we should not expect it. The Bradley, an agile vehicle proof against small arms and shrapnel, draws criticism because it can be penetrated by a HEAT round; this is a common example of myopic estimation. We must employ all weapons and units together to succeed.

Terrain has its effect upon employment. Infantry seeks ground inhospitable to enemy fighting vehicles, and armor avoids places where hostile infantry with ATMs may be concealed and covered. These responses to terrain, of course, assume that the enemy has the weapons and numbers to exploit such ground.

Comhat power is relative. Opposed by an enemy on foot in the open, the commander applies a machine gun. The opponent meets this raise in the stakes by deploying tanks. The infantry counters with antitank missiles, mines, and artillery. The armored force calls for air support and counter-battery fire. So it ARMOR - 37 I "Part of the maturing of an officer is to sharpen his perspective of a threat. An enemy advantage of one tank is decisive to an estimate made by a lieutenant, bothersome to a captain 's, and inconsequential to a colonel's." I goes. ad iizfiizihtiiz. At any point, one side has the tactical advantage, but these rounds of "raising and calling" continue until one contestant can make no credible riposte. This escalation can easily be seen in low intensity conflict, which becomes high intensity as quickly as the participants can manage to "go heavy." The militia in ambuscade of the American Revolution became the Continental Line, and the NVA replaced the Viet Cong. Light divisions are strictly temporary measures. They will be plussed-up with armor augmentation so that they will become heavy divisions in practice. The path of insurgency is intended to lead to a decision by heavy forces.

The material demands of this escalation require a logistical base and transportation system that are up to the task. Our strength forces the enemy to invest in a material effort that we hope is beyond his means. He must somehow transport his antitank mines to his infantry positions. He must bring his T-80 tanks to the battlefield. It doesn't matter that around from a T-80 will penetrate our M60 if that Soviet tank is not present, or our numbers exceed his rate of lire.

The material requirement is easier to meet than the training requirement. Even if the weapons are there, the soldiers must know how to operate them effectively. We all know how long it takes to train to adequate standards, and how impossible it is to train someone lacking the basic education necessary to master modern equipment. Further, it is far easier and quicker to train the individual weapons operators than it is to train the commanders and staff who must bring them to contact at the right time and place. Soldiers take months to train, but staffs take years. Part of the maturing of an officer is to sharpen his perspective of a threat. An enemy advantage of one tank is decisive to an estimate made by a lieutenant, bothersome to a captain's, and in-consequentiaI to a colonel's. Equipment and training will still not providc if the soldiers are not psychologically prepared for combat. Enemy fire is not effective fire until it causes serious degradation of our relative combat power. One lost tank does not neutralize its platoon. What good is weaponry if the operators flee at the first shot? The soldiers must be willing to use their weapons in order to win in combat, where losses are inevitable, pain is unavoidable, and the contender who is only relatively stronger will prevail.

Tactically, capabilities bring thcir own share of the reward when the enemy is forced to commit to a course of action not of his own choosing. After all, the NBC capability produces most of its results not by killing large numbers of the enemy, but by degrading his performance by forcing him to suit up. Mines are not sown lo blow up the enemy, but to canalize his movements to a more vulnerable position. Our armor threat confines an infantry heavy enemy to bad terrain. Our material strength forces the enemy to invest his resources in logistics and training, which map expend his resources before the battle begins.

The combat commander and staff may not always be able to bludgeon the adversary to death, and our doctrine is based on the assumption that the U. S. Army does not hold a bigger cudgel than the Soviets. The qualitative advantage that we possess, and our often local quantitative advantage, must be applied to stress the enemy's weaknesses and enhance our strengths. Like any good poker player, we must know how to read the cards, know the odds, and make smart bets instead of gambles.

Major Michael W.

Symanski, USAR, was commissioned from the University of Illinois in 1970.

During his two years of active duty, he served as platoon leader, support platoon leader, and XO in the 82d Airborne. He is presently assigned as Troop Support/Material Maintenance Branch Chief, 21st TAACOM (CA), ln-dianapolis, Ind. He is president of Maximum Tools. Inc. 38 ARMOR - MayJune 1989