The Battalion Support Platoon at the NTC

= Flexibility Is a Must By First Lieutenant Michael P. Gilroy Flexibility. the ability to be at the critical point "firstcst with the mostest" is the deciding Factor in any battle. This is no less true in the logistics arena. In fact, it is more critical. Unfortunately, there is a current dearth of information regarding how the battalion support platoon operates in the Field. What we need is some practical advice, notably lessons learned at the NTC, as well as that staple of every Armor Oflicer's Basic class, a Field SOP. Until that information arrives in the Geld, there -re some basic principles thitt guidc the operation of the support platoon. The key principle is flexibility. Captain William Hedges' "Push-Pull Logistics" (ARMOR, Nov-Dec 1987) laid out one system that works for the battalion support platoon. This article seeks to expand on that system. Task Force 2-34 Armor went to the NTC in February 1988 as a balanced task force with one tank-pure company, one tank-heavy team, one mech-pure company, and one mech-heavy team. It deployed with its parent brigade and anew twist: the 3-27 Infantry (Light) from Fort Urd, Calif. In pre-exercise planning at home station, we realized that, with alight infantry battalion in the picture, the battalion support platoon would have to he extremely flexible in order to deal with any task organization. The key to flexibility was the support matrix (Figure I).

The support matrix allowed the support platoon to respond quickly to any changes in mission and/or task organization. Its major advantage is that it is a quick and easy system, which provides a common frame of reference for all logistics personnel. It scrved as the operations order for the service and support section of the battalion, and provided a format to make any changes with a FRAGO by radio. Every individual in the logistics chain of TF 2-34, from platoon sergeant to battalion XO, had a blank copy of the matrix. The task force S4 formulated his support plan, based on the mission, and conipleted the matrix The comniandcrs received the matrix at the evening orders bricf. When last minute changes occurred, it was then a simple matter to make any changes by FRAGO over the radio. The matrix was also uscd to inform the support platoon leader or H HC commander of the logistics plan if face-to-face contact could not he made. The systcm proved to be invaluable in the support of specialty platoons. Oftentimes, the scouts would reccive a mission, only to hitve it changed in the early morning hours, negating the earlicr support conccpt. With the matrix, the S4 sent the changes to the support platoon leader in the brigade support area (BSA) prior to the formation of that LOGPAC. In an emergency, the scout platoon scrgcant, with his blank copy of the matrix, could also coni-municate directly with the support platoon leader. The matrix was used as a FRAGO: when the niecli commander received a late mission to detach two squads (20 men) to the scout platoon to assist in the reconnaissance effort, the niech first sergeant contactcd thc task force S4 at the ALC to inform him of the chan-gcs to thcir supply requirements. The S4 called the support platoon leader in the BSA and informed him of the changes.

The transmission sounded like this: '2 24 this is L 77, siipport nratriv clrurige, O VER. It "L77 this is A24, sard it, OVER." "24 this is L77, lirie one coliiiii llrree 95, line one coliiriii siv 42, OVER."

The support plittoon leader tlicn read the change back. With this short message, the scout platoon's headcount for Class I was increased by 20, and the mech team's headcount was decrcased by 20. The task force S4 had decided, prior to deployment, that he would use the sponsorship concept as much as possible to support the at-tachedhpecialty platoons. Under the sponsorship concept, aline companyheam supply package will include the supply package for another unit, usually an attached/speciiilty platoon. By assigning every unit in the matrix a color, it was also a simple matter to change the "sponsoring" unit. Example: The ADA platoon was originally to receive its support pilckage with the D Companv LOGPAC. Due lo a late mission change, the ADA platoon will now be closer to A Team. The transmission sounds like this: '224 this is L77, ntatriv cltange, OVER. "

ARMOR - May-June 7989 35 "L 77 this is A24, serin it, OVER. " "A24 this is L77, lirte one, coliiitii eight, Bhie, OVER."

"L77 this is A24, line one, coliiniii eight, Bhie, ROGER OUT."

With this short transmission, the support platoon leader learned that the ADA platoon would receive its package as part of A Team (Blue), and to configure the LOGPAC that way. For the support platoon to preserve its flexibility, it must be able to communicate. One of the advantages of the support matrix is that it shortens radio transmissions on an already crowded admin/log net. But this is not enough. Thc current TO&E gives the support platoon only one ANWRC-46 radio. Early on, we realized that this would not nicsh with the system we wanted to employ. An AN/VRC-M radio was taken "out of hide" and installed in an M977 cargo HEMTT. This provided the support platoon with its own net. With his expanded communications capability, the platoon sergeant used the radio-equipped HEMTT as a trail vehicle in convoys to provide command and control, and 11s a second "command post." This allowed the support platoon leader to control two operations at the same time. On occasion, the platoon leader controlled the recovery of a LOGPAC while the platoon sergeant supervised the establishment of an engineer forward supply point. The support platoon could now divide itself in half to support anywhere on the battlefield. The major disadvantage of the support matrix system is that it relies heavily on FM communications, which, owing largely to the great distances at the NTC, are not always possible. We solvcd this prohlcm using a retrans station provided by brigade, as well as our organic radio tcletype (RATT) rig. Radio telctype is an outstanding logistics multiplier. With RATT, you can send matrices as hard copies to the brigade RATT and for personncl in the battalion licld trains on a regular basis. RATT all but negates the effect of distance on the support effort. As 1 mentioned before, radio communications are not reliable. Each individual, down to vehicle operator Icvcl. must have a complete understanding of the support matrix and the task force mission. There is also no substitute for face-to-face contact between the S4 and the support platoon leader. It must occur each day at the logistics release point. Additionally, the support platoon lcadcr should zittempt radio contact with the S4 every eight hours, at a minimum. AI-though the support matrix was originally conceived to handle any possible task organization with attached light infantry, it provcd its utility in the support of at-tachcd/specialty platoons and other elements, such as the TOC and combat trains. It was particularly effective in ensuring Classes 1 and IV were in the right place at the right time. The matrix allowcd the S4 to form a good plan immediately. as opposed to a perfect one later, secure in the knowledge that it could be updated quickly if the need arose. This allowed the support platoon more time to itself for it'sown planning, as well as maintenance and rest. Central to all this was the expanded communications capability of the support platoon, which ensured that it could execute any mission once it received the order. First Lieutenant Michael P. Gilroy was a distinguished military graduate of the ROTC program at Providence College, Providence, R. I.

A graduate of the Armor Officer Basic Course and the Improved TOW Vehicle Trainers Course, he was a tank platoon leader, battalion support platoon leader, and company XO before his assignment to his current slot as S4, 2-34 Armor, Fort Riley, Kan.

ARMOR - May-June 7989