Employing the Heavy Mortar Platoon in the Offensive

by Captain Richard F. Atkinson Mortars in the offense provide the battalion or task force commander with responsive, close indirect lire support, thus disrupting the enemy’s defensive plan and aiding friendly forces in seizing and maintaining the initiative. The 1073 Yom Kippiir War illustrated this vital need for mobile and continuous fire support in armor offensive operations when the lack of artillery and mortar support played a major role in the costly failure of Israeli attacks against the Egyptian bridgehead over the Suez Canal. With our current doctrine focusing on the AirLand battle, which stresses a strong offense, fast pace of attack, and weapon systcms slipporting this concept, the task of mortar employment has become increasingly difficult. This article will propose techniques of mortar tactical employment in the offense, focusing on two critical missions, movcmcnt to contact and the deliberate attack. It is often stated that the mortars are the weak link in fire support. Given the importance of mortar fires on the battlefrcld, this presents an alarming prohlcm. This dcficicn-cy has bcen attributed to poor positioning by the FSO and the mortar platoon leader, and undcrutiliza-tion by the company FSOs. In order to solve this dilemma, the mortar platoon leader must get involved with the planning process. After all, he should be intimately familiar with the platoon’s strengths and weaknesses. Furthermore, the mortar platoon leader should activcly follow the battle and talk with the FSO. By doing so, he will be able to keep pace with the battle and insure the fire control net is open. With this in mind, we can now address tactical employment in the offense. A lack of knowledge of the enemy’s location characterizes the ARMOR - movement to contact. As a result, the movement to contact is a rapid movement, in order to surprise the enemy, giving him less time to mount a successful defense or counterattack. In order to effectively support the movement to contact, the mortar platoon should be forward. no more than 1,ooO meters behind the lead company or team. By doing so, the platoon will be ahle to concentrate one-half to two-thirds of its maximum range in front of the lead element. Therefore, it will be able to provide immediate fires on suspected enemy positions, or screening fires in the vicinity of certain danger areas or ohstacles. During this move, the platoon should operate split section on line, maneuvering no closer than 300 meters, to enhance survivability. During the move, the platoon lcadcr and the platoon sergeant each should lead one section and position themselves in the lead. This will facilitate the move. and decrease the amount of internal radio traffic, because the section will key off the lead vehicle. Because platoon leader and platoon sergeant have wheeled vehicles, these leaders should consider controlling from an MlM mortar gun track, thus enhancing their mobility and survivability. The wheeled vehicles can be placed at the trail of each section, or with the combat trains. Movement for each section should always keep in mind security, especially since the platoon would be operating so far forward. Therefore, movement formations, i such as wedge, line. or staggered column should be considered. If thcrc is one area in which mortar platoons are particularly delicient. it is in this area. They find it very diF licult to deviate from the traditional "ducks in a row" tcchnique of movement.

When arraying the platoon with sections ahrcast and continually moving with the I d hatt. 'I I' ion or task force element, the "hip shot" is the best method for employing fires quickly and accurately.

Two methods are particularly good, enabling the platoon to have rounds out of the tubes in two minutes for a T-rated platoon.

The first is the distant aiming point method, or DAP. When using this method, the element leader (platoon leadcr or platoon sergeant) sights in on a recognizable point that is no less than 1,500 meters away, and preferably located on the flank. He would then shoot an azimuth to this point. Once the fire direction control centcr (FDC) computes the azimuth of fire, the element lcadcr quickly computes the back a7imuth of fire and sub-tracts this from the azimuth to the DAP. He then gives this data to the guns and identifies the DAP. With the data indexed on their sights, the crews then sight in on the DAP I7v adjusting the tube. If the squad Icadcrs are accurate in aligning their vehicles on the azimuth of fire, and sighting in properly on the DAP, a quick check with a safety circle will reveal a difference normally of only a few mils. The DAP method, given its speed, is very accurate. Some of the drawbacks, however, are that during periods of limited visibility, this technique can't be used, nor can it he used in heavily forested areas, hecmse it relies on sighting in on a distant point.

The second mcthod is the M2 compass method. Here, the base gun aligns the vehicle on the azimuth of fire. The other vehicles reciprocally lay off the base gun. Slower and not as accurate as the DAP, the M2 compass method is more versatile, not succumbing to limited visibility or distant points.

During each hip shot, the called section would fire, while the other section would continue movement forward. Once the firing section takes its systems out of action, it would hastily catch up to the lead company. It is in this manner that the platoon is able to effectively maneuver with the battalion or task force. During a movement to con-ARMOR - May-June 7989 tact, any other method would quickly put it out of range.

During a deliberate attack, which is "characterized by more planning time, detailed intelligence, and a more detailed scheme of maneuver," the mortar platoon leader should plan in detail the positioning of his forces during the move. This is necessary so that the platoon can provide immediate fires on critical targets and maintain sufficient fires forward, one-half to two-thirds of its maximum range, in order to suppress enemy counterattacks and unexpected enemy positions. This is a two-step process. First, the platoon leader must discuss in detail with the battalion or task force FSO the fire support matrix and accompaning target list. By doing so, the mortar platoon leader will understand the concept of the operation, and the commander's intent regarding lire support. Furthcr-more, he will have had a chance to wargame with the FSO covering the "What ifs" of mortar support. The second step focuses on the displacement plan drawn up by the mortar platoon leader. This plan should include, as a minimum, primary routes and firing positions, as well as alternate routes and firing positions. Additionally, the plan incorporates platoon control measures and movement techniques. Depending on the speed o l the attack, the platoon will either employ successive or alternate hounds. Again, the platoon leader and platoon sergeant should lead their respective sections, rather than moving forward of the section to prepare the next firing position. By using the pliitoon leader and sergeant in this manner, if the unforeseen happens during the move, the leadership will be there to react appropriately. Once the displacement plan is completed, bricl the FSO and S3 to insure compliance with the battalion's schcme of maneuver.

Mortar employment in the offense should be Ilexixihle enough to react to the fluid nature of the modern day battlcfield. By employing the techniques described, the platoon should be morc responsive, given the two offensive missions addressed. In fact. these methods of employment could be tailored Cor most offensive operations, including the hasty attack, exploitation, and pursuit. Through eflcctive training, planning, and leadership. the mortar platoon will be able to provide the commander with accurate fires when he needs them.

Captain Richard F. Atkln-son was a distinguished military graduate commissioned from ROTC at the University of Delaware, where he earned a B. S. in Economics. Assigned to the 1-33 Armor at Fort Lewis, Wash., he served as leader of a scout platoon, tank platoon, and mortar platoon. He wrote this article during AOAC 4-88, prior to his attendance at Cavalry Leaders Course. ARMOR - May-June 7989