The Battle of Booneville

Philip Sheridan's Tactics as a Precursor to AirLand Battle Doctrine by Captain O. C. Burnette It is 1 July 1862. Your cavalry brigade of some 800 troopers hw been battling for most of the day against an enemy cavalry force of eight regiments with a strength of close of 5,000. The enemy has attacked twice and was repulsed the second time only after hand-to-hand combat. The enemy is now flanking your left, threatening your supplies and lines of communications. No reinforcements are in sight. Your forces are wholly committed and defeat is imminent. How do you win this battle?

If you lire Colonel Philip Sheridan, commander of the Union Second Cavalry Brigade, you create a reserve out of forces already committed and you atlack! The Battle of Booneville, Mississippi, is the story of how a Union cavalry brigade, battling odds of 5.5-to-I, routed a Confederate cavalry force through Sheridan's superior leadership, his good use of intelligence that he personally gathered from a thorough ground reconnaissance before the battle, the excellent firepower of his troops, his sheer determination to win, and his use of the indirect approach to the battle. In analying this battle, I will look at how Sheridan applied what we know today as the AirLand Battle tactical considerations of anticipating the enemy, using indrect approaches, deception, speed and violence, flexihility, reliance on the initiative of junior leaders, rapid decision-making, and having a clearly designated main effort. I will also address the AirLand Battle dynamics of combat power: firepower, protection, leadership, and mancuvcr.

Historical Background After the Battle of Shiloh, Tennessee, April 6-7, 1862, the Confederate Army, commanded by General P. G. T. Beauregard, retreated to and fortified Corinth Plagued by epidemics of typhoid and dysentery, and threatened with siege by the advancing Union armies commanded by Major General Halleck, Beauregard evacuated the city on the night of 29 May.' Union cavalry drove south to locate the Confederate army.

The Confederates sent out cavalry to screen the movement of their army, the "Army of the Mississippi." The battle took place 1 July, 1862, as eight regiments of Confcderate cavalry, commanded by Brigadier General James R.

Chihers, attacked Colonel Philip Sheridan's Second Cavalry Brigade of the Union "Army of the Mississippi." Mississippi, a strategic rail center. 1 The Battle On the morning of 1 July, Sheridan's brigade was encamped just north of Booneville. Pickets, under the command of Lieutenant Leonidas S. Scranton, were posted three miles to the west, just out of the woods and along the Blackland-Booneville road. (Map 1). The heads of the Confederate columns hit these pickets and drove them back east through the woods. Scran-ton's men fell back slowly, fighting dismounted and firing from behind trees, until they hit the point where the two roads converged. Here, Scranton made a strong stand, using timber for cover, and reinforced by pickets that had been posted on the road to the south?

Sheridan sent Scranton four companies of reinforcements with Captain Campbell, who assumed command of the defense. This temporarily stopped the Confederates, and forced them to deploy. As the Confederates deployed four regiments, two on each side of the Blackland-Booneville road. the magnitude of the Confederate attack first became apparent to Sheridan, who ordered Campbell to hold his ground, but authorized him to fall back slowly if he had to. At the same time, Sheridan ordered Colonel Hatch, commander of the Second Iowa Cavalry Regiment, to form up his entire regiment, except three saber companies, in the rear of Campbell's position "to protect his (Campbell's) flanks and to support him by a charge should the enemy break his dismounted line."' (Map 2).

As Sheridan was briefing Hatch, the Confederates continued their assault on Campbell's position. They attacked with double lines dismounted, double-mounted columns on each flank, and with a solid mounted column charging into Campbell's center: They attacked across an open field and advanced to within 25 or 30 yards of Campbell's line, when the Second Michigan opencd fire with its Colt six-shot repeating rifles and revolvers? This devastating lire temporarily halted the Confederate advance, and they switched tactics to take advantage of their numbers. They attacked again, flanking both sides of the Union line. Campbell was forced to pull back to a prepared line to his rear. However, once the Confederates saw the Union lie withdrawing, they sensed victory and surged forward.

Campbell's line held only after desperate hand-to-hand combat, aided by the arrival of the Second Iowa. (Second Iowa was now deployed to either side of the Second Michigan, which held the center). 7 Although the Union forces had twice repulsed his attacks, General Chalmers' numerical superiority allowed him to attack once again, and he forced the Union line back towards Booneville, which gave him more room to deploy. He assaulted again, this time swinging around the left end of the Union line, held by the Second Iowa.

This move threatened Sheridan's communications, transport, and supplies?(Map 3).

Sheridan realized the acute danger facing his forces. Now he showed his mettle. On an earlier reconnaissance, he had discovered a trail running through the woods parallel lo the Blackland-Booneville road and then connecting with it on the west side of the forest. In his memoirs he states, "Remembering a circuitous wood road that I had become familiar with... 1 concluded that the most effective plan would be to pass a small column around the enemy's left by way of this road, and strike his rear by amounted charge simultaneously with an advance of our main line on his front. I knew that the attack in (his) rear would be a most hazardous undertaking, but in the face of such odds as the enemy had, the condition of affairs was most critical, and could he relieved only by a bold and radical change in our Sheridan then selected four saber companies, two from Second Iowa and two from Second Michigan, to execute his plan. Sheridan briefed Captain Alger, who was to lead 'this force of 90 mounted men, to follow

SHERl DAN

"... Sheridan did well to attack quickly (with speed) and with as much violence as he could muster. He gave Captain Alger "just one hour" in which to begin his attack. Had he given Alger more time, it is likgly that?he Union forces would have succumbed to the persistent pressure of the Confederate attack and been defeated.... It the wood road three miles to the west, and then to follow the Blackland-Booneville road to "charge the rear of the enemy's line." He told Alger: "I give you just one hour to reach this place. When you reach it, turn up the lane and charge the enemy at once. Don't deploy them - it will show the enemy the weakness of your force. Charge in column, and, when you make the assault, shout and raise all the noise possible. When I hear you, 1 will strike the rebels with my whole force. But, whether I hear you or not, in one hour 1 shall charge them."'" Alger then set off with his command, aidcd by a Mississippian named Beene, supplied by Sheridan, to help him find his way through the pines.

An hour passed, and Sheridan heard no cheer from Alger's column. The Confederates continued their attack and the battle became more desperate. At this opportune moment, a locomotive carrying grain for Sheridan's horses arrived, giving rise to an unexpected cheer in the Union line. The Union soldiers knew about the reinforcements that Sheridan had requested at the beginning of the battle. They now thought it was a troop train, loadcd with reinforcements.

Sheridan had the engineer blow the whistle repeatedly so the Confederates would hear it and think the same thing." Sheridan ordered the attack, surprising and confusing thc Confedcrates. On thc Icft. thc Second Iowa charged the Confederate flank. (Map 4). In the center, Campbell's companies held firm. Unknown to Sheridan, Alger's attack had very nearly been completely successful. It had attacked along the designated route hut had not broken through the Confederate line. But it had captured the Confederate headquarters and given rise to the rumor among the Confederates that they were now under attack and encirclement by a superior force.12 The sudden advance of the Union forces, combined with the unnerving attack in the Confederate rcar, panicked the Southerners, and they broke and ran, abandoning thcir dead and wounded. Sheridan had won the day. He chased the fleeing Confederate forces for four miles, until darkness and a difficult swamp put an end to the prsuit.' The Battle of Booneville was over.

Sheridan did not have the strength to defeat his opponent hy force of arms alone. Instead, he made good use of deception and an indirect ap-proaclz to defeat the enemy and break his morale. He concentratcd all of his forces into one daring, coordinated counterattack. In doing so, he took a calculated risk, but ensured victory.

If Sheridan had not used an indirect appruac*lz in the Battle of Booneville, his forces would have been defeated. (An indirect approach is an attack or defcnse unexpected in nature, timing, or direction).

Sheridan's indirect approach was to attack the Confederate rear with Captain Alger's four saber com- I 42 panies. Outnumbered almost six to one, Sheridan could not have hoped to have stood his ground and repulsed the Confederates indefinitely. As the battle raged, Sheridan's forces fell hack, and thcir situation became increasingly perilous. Captain Alger's force of 90 troopers, employed elsewhere on the battlefield, would not have had anywhere near the effect it had when attacking the Confederate rear. Only there could it have been decisive. Alger's attack in rear had an unhinging effect upon Confederate morale.

Because the Confederates did not expect this attack, they did not know what to make of it. As a rcsuh, fear bested thcm. Without an adequate force to physically defeat the Confederates in a toe-to-toe battle, Sheridan had to out-think them in order to win. An indirect approach from an unexpected direction was his answer.

Sheridan's use of deceptioit was also crucial to his success. In his order to Captain Algcr, he told Alger to "charge in column so as not to reveal the weakness of the force." This tactic proposed almost more of a psychological than physical attack. Even in retreat, the Confederates had the strength to capture Alger's force had they chosen to use that force. They did not because they were deceived as to the size of the Union force. The Con-fcdcrates broke bccause they believcd that a superior force had surrounded them. The deception, gained by charging in column down a narrow forest road, raising dust to obscure their true strength, worked wondcrs for the Union forces. Sheridan did well to attack quickly (with spced) and with as much violence as he could muster. He gave Captain Algcr "just one hour" in which to begin his attack. Had he given Algcr more time, it is likely that the Union forces would have succumbed to the persistent pressure of the Confederate attack and been defeated. In having Alger charge in column, (cortcentratiort), he also created great violence with this force. He maximized the violence created by having Second Iowa charge just as Alger's force was attacking in the rear. Sheridan relied on the iititiatiw of siihorciiltute leaders when he ordered Captain Campbell to hold his initial position, but authorized him to fall back slowly if he had to. This action allowed the Second Iowa to reinforce Campbell and prevcntcd the destruction of Campbcll's force. Sheridan made k q decisions rapid-!v. Whcn Chalmers threatened his supplies and communications, Shcridan quickly decided to send Captain Alger on his mission to attack the Confederates' rear.

Sheridan showed great flmibilip in changing from the defense to the offense when he ordered the combined frontal and rear attacks. His forces were also flexible in lighting mounted or dismounted, as the situation dictated.

Shcridan certainly had a clearlv designated ritairr efjofl in concentrot-ing all of his forces into a final counterattack. He aimed to create enough surprise and shock to destroy the enemy morale. In this he was successful.

During the initial stages of the battle, when Sheridan ordered the Second Iowa to form up behind the Second Michigan, he was practicing defense in depth. Had the Second Iowa not stood ready to support the Second Michigan, the assault that was rcpulsed only after hantl-to-hand lighting could have easily routed the Union line. The quick arrival of the Second Iowa to support the Second Michigan prevented the potential collapse.

Although he did not anticipate the eiteiny, Sheridan had at least posted pickets far enough out to react to his approach, something not done successfully two months before at the Battle of Shiloh.

In terms of firepower, the Union forces had the advantage. The Confederates were armed with single-shot weapons, while Second Michigan was armed with Colt six-shot revolving rifles and pistol.'^ This gave cach man 12 shots before he had to reload. This concentrated firepower may have been the deciding factor in helping the Union line repulse the first two Confedcrate assaults. It must also have aided Captain Alger's rear attack. This firepower confused the Confederates about the true strength of the Union forces. They had earlier received accurate reports from the Icral populace about the size of the Union camp, but the strength of the Union fire made them believe that the estimates were too low. This firepower advantage, in conjunction with the attack in rear, led the Confederates to hclieve that they were outnumbered at the end of the battle when they had an actual 5.5-10-1 numcrical superiority.

Sheridan's other military traits stood him well in this battle. He made it his business to be thoroughly informed about the nature of the terrain on which he was to fight. Without the knowledge of the trail that Alger used to flank the Confederates, Sheridan could not have sent him on his mission to attack in rear. It was not by luck that "... Alger's raid, in combination with the charge of the Second lowa, inflicted psychological shock on the Confederates and unhinged their morale.... I' Sheridan knew of this trail. In his memoirs he writes: "As soon as the camp of my brigade was pitched at Booneville, I began to scout in every direction, to obtain a knowledge of the enemy's whereabouts and learn the ground about me... As soon as possible, I compiled for the use of nlyself and my regimental commanders an information map of the surrounding country. This map exhibited such details as country roads, streams, farmhouses, fields, woods, and swamps, and such other topographical features as would be useful... (1)twas of the first importance that in our exposed condition we should be equipped with a thorough knowledge of the section we were operating in, so as to he prepared to encounter an Sheridan did everything in his power to husband the strength of his brigade prior to battle (prorcc-tion). He personally selected camp sites to ensure that they were healthy. He made it a priority to have his troops well fed and clothed. He enforced discipline to allow his men to concentrate on their duties. He reduced the number of details to allow them to save their strength for when it would be needed most." Sheridan's use oT inmeiiwr was an important element of his success. Alger's raid, in combination with the charge of the Second lowa, inflicted psychological shock on the Confederates and unhinged their morale. Sheridan's Ieadcrdiip was critical to the Union victory. He made the key decisions. A lesser commander might not have had the fortitude to hold the line initially, or the insight and audacity to counterattack. Later, at the Battle of Cedar Creek, Sheridan's arrival on the battlefield and his ride in front of the Union line had an electrifying, uplifting effect on Union morale.

Finally, Sheridan fought to win and was determined to win. He was willing to take calculated risks to achieve victory. Even holding his ground at 5.540-1 odds was a calculated risk, not to mention attacking at those odds. He stressed winning and the importance of victory to the soldier. He wrote: "Soldiers are adverse to seeing their comrades killed without compensating results, and none realize more quickly than they the blundering that often Lakes place on the field of battle. They want some tangible indemnity for the loss of life, and as victory is an offset, the value of which is manifest, it not only makes them content to shed their blood, but also furnishes evidence or capacity in those who command them."

Conclusion In the Battle of Booneville, Colonel Sheridan did many things correctly to win a battle, which by rights, he should have lost. His understanding of warfare led him to use what later would become the tenets of tactical operations of AirLand Battle. Additionally, he used the dynamics of combat power to his favor. Fighting outnumbered, he dcfeated his enemy with superior leadership, excellent firepower, good use of inlelligence, deterniina-tion, and an indirect approach.