Leadership Doctrine forthe AirLand Battle

There is avoid between leadership doctrine and battle doctrine.

AirLand Battle doctrine calls for tenets of leadership that many Army leaders cast aside during the Vietnam era. During the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, we witnessed a trend to exercise control at the highest level possible. Leaders at all levels suffered from this tendency. Virtually every activity from combat operations in Vietnam to subjects for unit training schedules were victims of centralized control. Then, during the late 1970s, senior Army leaders began to reconsider discarded leadership styles. General Donn Starry, in his videotape, "Sergeant's Business," recalled the role of noncommissioned officers in leadership and in training. Leaders everywhere joined the move to get troop unit leaders more involved in training decisions. There developed a consensus among leaders that many decisions being made at division level or higher should be delegated to battalion and company. Concurrent with these initiatives, senior Army leaders adopted AirLand Battle doctrine.

This doctrine ushered in new roles for leaders at all levels. Under this new doctrine, we envision small units sometimes operating in isolation with only mission-type orders, and senior leaders fighting battles with enemy units two or three days before those units reach the close battle area. Furthermore, we now expect leaders to perform in conflicts of varying degrees of intensity, from small-scale guerrilla actions to operations on a nuclear battlefield. While we have adopted AirLand Battle doctrine into Army training and organizations, we have not retooled leadership doctrine. The principles of leadership in FM 22-100, MilitaqJ Leadership, are still valid; but, they do not apply equally to all levels of operations and they are not clearly defined for application to battlefield doctrine. The purpose of this article is to discuss the tenets of our new operations doctrine as tenets of leadership doctrine.

Agility applies equally to leaders at every level, from squad leaders to army commanders. A leader must have the agility to meet changing situations, to make his leadership style fit his environment. The audience and type of operation determine the leadership style. For example, a battalion commander's audience is relatively inexperienced. To be effective with these young officers and noncommissioned officers, the battalion commander dedicates his effort to direct supervision of people to meet immediate rcquirements. In contrast, a corps commander's audience consists of senior officers with a large degree of motivation and broad experience. Thus, ideally, the corps commander devotes little time to supervision of people; his primary effort is devoted to focusing the efforts of subordinates on long-term objectives.

As leaders move to more senior positions, they must make a conscious effort to adapt their leadership style to their audience and to their operation. Also, they must cultivate their ability to apply the leadership tenets of depth, synchronization, and initiative to different audiences and operations. They must hove the agility to make their leadership style fit the situation.

Depth In leadership doctrine, depth is a variable that has greater application at senior levels. Depth is the vision a leader has; it is the leader's "mark on the wall" to which he seeks to raise his unit; it is his picture of what the unit will resemble in the future. Depth transcends goals and objectives commonly used by junior leaders to guide training and operations. Depth is a grand vision that looks both to history and the future for definition.

Senior leaders use depth as a means to give organizations direc- - -ARMOR - May-June 7988 "... Each leader must consciously make the synchronization process support what he wants his unit to accomplish....'I lion. The first direction is toward a philosophy for Icadership. For example, as the Vietnam era ended, senior leaders faced the perplexing task of overcoming the penchant of leaders at every level to centralize activities and decisions for training. Many general officers recalled the time when sergeants conducted training, while officers focused their efforts on evaluating and managing training. One result of this historical perspective was the Battalion Training Management Systcm (BTMS), an effort to decentralize training and to get sergeants back to "sergeants' business." These senior officers aligned a leadership philosophy for decentralized operations with the management, evaluation, and conduct of unit training. The second direction is to tactical doctrine. In the late 1070s, senior leaders began to carefully analyze the conflict spectrum. They saw hat-tlefields of varying intensity where young leaders would fight, usually outnumbered, without access to their higher command structure. These senior leaders' vision of doctrine to meet these contingencies included refinements of doctrine for light operations in low-intensity or unconventional battles, and AirLand Battle doctrine for fighting in depth to defeat forces with greater numbers on conventional or nuclear battlefields. These leaders aligned battle doctrine with their vision of what they wantcd units to look like before, during, and after future battles. The final direction is toward long-term performance standards.

Several years ago, the TRADOC commander initiated performance standards for tactical opcrations in the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). He developed observable standards for tasks Army leaders previously considered to he immeasurable. As the various proponents refined performance standards for each tactical operation, training management improved, the quality of training improved, and Army readiness improved. He had a vision of where he wanted the Army to be in readiness; he developed and executed a plan to bring Army units to his level of excellence. Thus, in each of these three areas, senior leaders showed depth in making their vision, as well as in executing the plan to make their vision reality.

Synchronization is the process whcreby leaders bring incongruent elements together to establish a unified effort. Synchronization is the most difficult tenet to accomplish because it encompasses decision-making. The difficult dccisions include establishing priorities whcn every task simultaneously requires immediate attention, how to resolve the paradoxes of command, and how to make contending activities support command objcctives. As with agility, synchronization applies equally to junior and senior leadcrs. In the synchronization process, the leadcr accomplishes thrce things. First, he refines the "vision" of his higher headquarters to lit his own unit. Second, he makes all required tasks provide an opportunity to improve his unit's mission capability. Finally, he molds the needs of his unit and needs of individuals into pursuit of a common goal. Each leader approaches synchronization differently; the synchronization process is personality-dependent. When senior leaders adopted anew training philosophy in the late 197Os, many division Commanders saw a need to synchronize unit training and installation support requirements. To do this, they raskcd their staffs and subordinate commanders to identify mission-related training activities and support requirements that detracted from mission training. Their synchronization process called for canceling most of the support activities units performed that did not support their mission training needs. These division commanders thus synchronized a leadership philosophy with incongruent ac-t ivitics.

Each leader must conscioiisly make the synchronization process support what he wants his unit to accomplish. Synchronization in Army units makes the unit and its soldiers more efficient. The synchronization process will be an outgrowth of Icadcrship philosophy; each leader must make his process support the synchronization efforts of other units within his environmental super- -structure.

ARMOR - '... In matters of initiative, senior leaders allow, without prejudice, honest mistakes falling within their bounds of intent and acceptable risk.... 'I Initiative Initiative transcends battle doctrine and leadership doctrine. Initiative is the trait lcaders employ to "fill out" orders; they use it to create unexpected turning points for the enemy, to make the enemy reactive to our operations. Initiative is the ability to quickly generate action to meet the intent of orders. Scnior and junior lcadcrs have critical roles in the realm of initiative. The junior partners exercise initiative to fulfill their missions. The senior lcadcrs of the Army, corps commanders and above, must build an environment in which all junior partners can exercise initiative. Senior leaders have a threefold role in building an environment supportive or initiative. First, whether in garrison or in the field, senior commanders communicate thcir intent or vision, their risk parameters, and their concept for any operation. Second, in matters of initiative, senior leaders allow, without prejudice, honest mistakes falling within their bounds of intent and acceptable risk. Finally, senior leaders exercise "life and death control over initiative.

If they do not make a concerted effort to build an atmosphere supporting initiative, junior leaders will become automatons constantly looking for guidance from above. Likewise, junior leaders have responsibilities in exercising initiative. First and foremost, they must be perfectly clear on how their commander sees the completed operation. Second, junior leaders must know where they are in relation to acceptable risk parameters. Those limits are inherent to the senior commander's intent, crossing those limits may negate the desired result. Third, junior leaders must never allow the freedom of initiative to erode unit or personal discipline. In fact, units and individuals will require a higher dcgrce of disciplinc to exccute doctrine that calls for initiative. Finally, junior leaders also exercise, to a considerable degree, control over an atmosphere supporting initiative. They must exercise initiative to build successful units. The formula for AirLand Battle is knowledge plus good judgerncnt plus initiative equals success. There is no substitute for success; victory is inherent in success.

AirLand Battle doctrine places many demands on leadership. In mid- to high-intensity conflict, leaders must fight rear, close, and deep battles simultaneously. They must also be ready to conduct low-intensity conflict. These divcrgcnt re-quiremcnts call for new leadership doctrine.

FM 22-300 gives us an outline of morality; that is good, but it is insufficient for today's leaders. Just as weapons systems must be complementary, so must battle doctrine and lcadcrship doctrine. AirLand Battle-era leadership doctrine must capture our Army's senior leaders' "vision" of battle. This "vision" shows us units operating in actions across the conflict spectrum, and we see senior leaders giving missions and intent, with limits of risk, to subordinates. We see junior leaders fullill-ing this intent, many times on the basis of their own decisions. To execute this doctrine, leaders must possess the ability to adapt thcir stylcs to meet thc situation; they must have dcpth to see beyond the present; they must synchronize divergent demands into an irresistible force; and, finally, they must have the initiative to use their own ingenuity to meet situations not covered in their orders. The building imperatives of AirLand Battle leadership doctrine are agility, depth, synchronization, and initiative.

Major Thomas G.

Clark is a Texas Tech University graduate.

He received his master's degree from Campbell University and is an alumnus of the C&GSC. He served with the 197th Infantry Brigade; the U. S. Army Field Station, Okinawa; the 5th ID; and the Combined Field Army (ROWUS).

He is presently the S3 in the 4th Training Brigade at Fort Knox, KY.

ARMOR -