The Ten Lean Years - Part 3

”Major Philips of the German Army paid us a visit during the spring and gave us his impression of Hitler..... 8 March: Withdrawal from Law-renceburg, Troop A covering and Troop E rear guard... return march via Hodgenville. The regiment was learning its business. With the regiment together we had an opportunity to think about organization. Of many new ideas, some were a service troop taking all supply trucks away from combat troops; a separate armored car troop; one squadron of two similar troops with scout combat cars, machine guns, and riflemen; and a second squadron of combat cars. The idea was to have a balanced regiment with the reconnaissance under the regimental commander’s control, one squadron primarily for holding and support power, and one squadron for striking power. In a sense this was a carryover from the Mechanized Force, but with better balance except for artillery and the other non-cavalry units. Organization Day was celebrated on 2 March 1933 when the regiment became 100 years old. Beautification was not overlooked this spring. On 17 March we transplanted one-hundred and thirty sugar maples from the outer reservation to the barracks area. One of the more important projects was the establishment of a “Mechanized Board” under the name of “Technical Committee.” The press noted on 27 April: Orders have been published in the 1 st Cavalry (Mechanized) setting up at Ft. Knox a technical committee to deal with the testing of experimental equipment in that regiment... Membership is Maj. R. W. Grow, Capt. R. N. Atwell, Capt. C. J. ‘7 > /” / /7,’ A’, Rohsenberger, Capt. W. D. Steiger and Lieut. W. P. Withers. The Committee conducted tests Thursday on three of the experimental units now assigned [to] the regiment. An exhaustive test was made of the new kitchen truck... At the same time, a road march test was given the new 4-ton. 4-wheel-drive truck... the command car from the same troop was subjected to a test in which anew experimental generator manufactured by a Louisville firm was tried out. The Committee became increasingly important and eventually became the Armor Board. The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) descended upon us in April, but aside from preparing their area and furnishing them a few officers, we were not initially involved with their projects. Construction work, which had continued all spring in spite of a very rainy season, was nearing completion by the end of the month. My diary records: Clearing, fencing, leveling, shops, grease racks, wash racks, lights, drainage, etc. take more time than the garages themselves. It is beginning to look like the end. All work had been troop labor. By June, the CCC, a task which had started out mildly, began to take such a large toll of officers that the regiment was down to a skeleton staff and troop commanders. In return, however, we began to get a good bit of fatigue work from the CCC. We were still able to keep up field exercises and demonstrations during the summer. Major Philips of the German Army paid us a visit during the spring and gave us his impression of Hitler (favorable) and described the German Army. He was given rides in an armored car and the Christie. I was pleased to note that the German ideas on Mechanization agreed with ours and not with those of the Chief of Cavalry. He returned during the summer, this time accompanied by Major Hans Von Greiffenberg (both were General Staff officers who went on to become generals during WW 11). Their visit brought about some very interesting discussions. We gave them rides in the M1 armored car and showed them the radio. (The caliber.50 machine gun was kept under wraps). After a pleasant dinner at Doe Run one evening, we had a discussion on comparative mechanized development. My impression at this time (as well as subsequently) was that our thinking was ahead of theirs with respect to the employment of self-contained fighting units, but that they were ahead of us in the development of vehicular equipment. They were going all out in anticipation of a European war in the near future, while we were hamstrung by the Depression and no imminent threat. International politics, in fact, affected us deeply. Van Voorhis came back from a conference in Washington in June and asked me to work up the reorganization necessary in case combat cars and tanks were ruled out by the disarmament conference. We were “deep in the taxi business” during the summer, running range convoys for ORC and ROTC. Demonstrations, tests of new equip- ment (Dilot Dersonnel carrier: 1%- ton, %ton, a i d 4-ton trucks; -Christies with both La France and Liberty engines; the kitchen truck; etc.), and command post exercises (CPXs) were worked into the schedule. Our recommendations on the kitchen truck were not too kindly received by the War Department. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Van Horn Moseley, opposed the truck because he felt it was too elaborate and thought that men should eat if and when they could. My diary records: This is one of those discouraging things that have come up repeatedly in the past threeyears-old men who can’t accept progress, who want mechanization without modernization. Our Christie tests led me to note that what we really needed was an all-track vehicle and not a convertible. Training lessons were also evaluated. After one combat exercise in which the troops failed to deploy promptly or properly, I noted, “Moral: You can’t learn to fight by marchingon the highway.” Nevertheless, by the end of the summer we could feel that the 1st Cavalry (Mechanized) had developed into an effective, self-contained fighting unit. The fourday September field exercise that covered most of central Kentucky seemed to bear this out. I recorded in my diary: The Forrest Hill battle which terminated the four days worked like a charm. Main body arrived on 7th Ave at 0830 (from Hodgenville). Fragmentary orders were issued by 0900, the attack over and position consolidated by 0925. One Christie changed to tracks in 23 minutes, the other a little longer. The French general and Norwegian captain (visitors) quite enthused. All reserve officers did well. Van Voorhis very enthusiastic about the whole exercise. Chaffee, Otto Trigg, and Paddy Flint had their eyes opened. The best one-sided maneuver I ever saw. Staff work and enlisted staff excellent. Orders were put out in the field in a correct and realistic manner. Communications were good. Things were coming together well. Vehicular combat firing during the fall developed many points. I recorded in my diary: There is too much tendency to halt in exposed places to lay down fire. Combat cars must not halt to fire but continuously press forward. firing as targets appear. On the subjects of march forma-Must be prepared for the latter [ambushers] and have platoons of combat carsdesignated to promptly leave the road and attack without waiting for a regimental order. After a 700-mile march to Jackson, Tennessee, and back, my most enthusiastic comment was, “Christies came through fine, all four of them.” The training would have its payoff in the spring when the regiment deployed to Fort Riley for maneuvers. A garrison dimountedreview on the field in front of the club was held on 8 November 1933 to officially celebrate the opening of construction of the new post. During the winter of 1933-1934, much time was devoted to experiments with vehicular weapons mounts and squad organization as we began to prepare for the big Riley maneuvers scheduled for the spring. The Riley Maneuvers The 1st Cavalry (Mechanized) was relatively isolated from the rest of the cavalry arm. Some horse units were stationed on the Rio Grande, some in a few small garrisons in the Northwest, and the remainder were located at the Cavalry School in Fort Riley, Kansas. Although the impact of the mechanized development at Fort Knox was felt in the War Department and by Regular Army and civilian component units in the V Corps area, cavalrymen as a whole failed to recognize the significance of the evolution that was under way. The maneuvers of 1934 at Fort tions and ambushes, I wrote: Riley, which pitted mechanized cavalry against horse cavalry, were an important factor in establishing the fact that the cavalry role in battle could be performed with iron horses. Although the equipment availableto the 1st Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized) was crude and experimental, the forward-looking officers at the Cavalry School, as well as those at Fort Knox, could see the great possibilities ahead. Tentative planning had started in the fall of 1933. During the winter we had conferences on tactics, supply, and maintenance, while we carried on correspondence with the Cavalry School. Meanwhile, the regiment was faced with a considerable turnover in personnel. Col-, one1 Van Voorhis was reassigned as the Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Department, and left at the end of February. Lieutenant Colonel Adna

R. Chaffee took command of the unit and I remained as its executive officer. Major I. G. Walder became the S3 and Major H. A. (Paddy) Flint took the 2d Squadron. I was ordered to Fort Riley early in March for 10 days of consultation on the maneuvers. My reception by the commandant, Brigadier General Lott, and by all of the school and post personnel was cordial. Colonel Bruce Palmer, who was due to take command of the 1st Cavalry in July, was assistant commandant and Lieutenant Colonel John Millikin was director of instruction. We worked over the plans for all of the exercises. I reconnoitered by car and horse all of the areas, and we finally settled the administrative and supply matters. Although some changes were made, the problems were not slanted to favor either the horse cavalry or the mechanized cavalry. They were designed to bring out the capabilities of both, operating together as well as against each other. I was highly satisfied about the plans and arrangements we had made. Back at Fort Knox, we tried to work the bugs out of the regiment and its equipment. We were still trying to develop the principle of the convertible tank, although I had lost faith in it. After three years of training it still took us far too much time to change the vehicle from its wheeled configuration to its tracked configuration. Anew combat car, the T4, was given ex- tensive tests both before deployment and at Fort Riley. Several field exercises in March did much to develop a smooth-working, self-contained fighting unit. My diary recalls: Took defensive position Roosevelt Ridge-Forrest Hill and withdrew after dark to OP6 area. Regiment did the best of the year... operations at night easy. Plane worked us both dayand night. Communications excellent. Regiment is shaping up into a maneuverable unit. Chaffee well pleased. The organization was flexible and could be easily adapted to fit the situation. We were ready for the maneuvers. As we were about to leave for Fort Riley, orders were received which designated General Henry as commander of the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized), beginning in July, replacing General Lindsey who was due to retire in September. The orders also announced that Colonel Leon B. Kromer would be the new Chief of Cavalry. Both Henry and Kromer attended the Riley maneuvers. The regiment donned its new shoulder patches (yellow circle with tank superimposed) and received its new standards at a review and full field inspection on 14 April 1934. We dispatched on the first leg of a six-day march to Fort Riley on 19 April. We conducted an exercise each day along the way. The Chicago Tribune ran a story with a picture of Chaffee beside an MI armored car: The 1 st Cavalry (Mechanized), one of the most complete fighting units in the peacetime army, will load its 600-odd soldiers into its grim looking fighting cars and depart Thursday for a four-day hike to Ft. Riley, Kan... The regiment wilt spend two months in maneuvers with horse cavalry, the first time mechanized and horse cavalry are to be coordinated. We actually took six days, amv-ing in camp soon after noon each day with reconnaissance and march formation problems en route and careful first- and second-echelon maintenance on arrival. Our arrival at Fort Leavenworth on 23 April was witnessed by the student body, in bleachers, the units being described as they passed by. The press carried along article describing our arrival at Fort Riley, part of which read: Bearing the old insignia, a black hawk on a yellow ground, of the time-honored First Dragoons, the leading car was followed by a color guard with regimental colors displayed. Each troop carried its own guidon. A Troop contained the 20 armored cars, B Troop the fleet of scout cars, and E and F Troops comprised the combat squadron. The Machine Gun Troop and Headquarters Troop, to which were attached the cars of the supply train, completed the column... Any old-time trooper on the Ft. Riley reservation would tell you, if you asked him, that while the mechanized cavalry might supplement him today, it could never, in a thousand years, supplant him entirely. The upcoming maneuvers would prove otherwise. It is hard to evaluate the full effect of the seven maneuvers and several demonstrations on the future of the cavalry arm, but no cavalryman at Fort Riley disputed the fact that mechanized cavalry proved its ability to carry out all types of cavalry missions, both day and night, in fair and foul weather. Weaknesses were demonstrated, 24

Snapshot above shows command group in bivouac at a roadside stop near a cemetery. LTC Chaffee is second from left. In photo above right, cavalrymen mounted in a scout car orient on their maps prior to moving out at daybreak. At left, an experimental autogyro maneuvers with light tanks at Fort Knox. but overall, the speed, flexibility, firepower, communications, and supply of a self-contained mechanized regiment convinced all but the more shortsighted “horsemen” that the future of the army lay in mechanization. The need for vast improvement in equipment was apparent, but that could be foreseen. In retrospect, one wonders why more senior cavalry officers failed to sense the inevitable. We can only assume that tradition and devotion to their faithful mounts clouded their thinking and obscured a clear recognition of the role of cavalry. While there were many converts, there were never enough, especially from the Mexican Border units, to bring about an orderly transformation of the arm which was destined to lose its place on the battlefield to anew force under anew name. Details of the Riley maneuvers are covered in official reports; however, some extracts from my records are revealing. Three days after our.arrival, we staged a review on Smoky Hill Flats followed by an inspection in line of troop columns by all post officers. We were highly complimented by Lott and Kromer. Later demonstrations by platoons and finally the regiment in attack went fine, especially the speed of closing, which made a good impression on those present. The first maneuver was a reconnaissance problem and is described in my diary: To Abilene the afternoon of 4 May in heavy rain... With chains on wheeled vehicles, marched without lights to Wakefield where superior enemy forced change of plan... at 0150 marched via Chapman to Junction City, forced Washington St. bridge and initiated reconnaissance in force to the north... night driving difficult due to slippery mud... Everyone surprised at mud mobility of the 1st. The mobility of the 1st Cavalry (Mechanized), in fact, was to surprise quite a number of people over the next few weeks. The second maneuver, three days later, was a meeting engagement with the 1st advancing from the village of Riley to seize Four-Way Divide Ridge. I recorded in my diary: Colonel Smith (2d Cav.) was apparently bewildered by the speed of our approach... Armored Car Troop attained a speed of 65 miles per hour from Riley to Estes Gate. The main body marched [at] over 30 [m.p.h.]... Communications wereex-cellent. Chaffee did nobly. The T11 armored car proved very good. The regiment performed exceptionally well. We were making our point. The third two-sided maneuver began on the afternoon of 10 May, with the 1st Cavalry (Mechanized), reinforced by a battery of artillery, jumping off from Dwight. We were ordered to hold the horse brigade north of the Riley and Junction City bridges. It was too much front for a regiment. The night was dark and the driving difficult without lights, but only one vehicle was damaged. The cavalry brigade was handled very well. On 14 May, starting at 1400 from Topeka, we carried out the great encircling maneuver that astonished everyone, including ourselves. We lost the race to the Big Blue River, whose bridges had been destroyed by the horsemen. We side-slipped to the north, marching all night and testing all crossings now held by the enemy, till we finally made a crossing at Barnestown, Nebraska, and headed west. We moved to the Republican River bridge at Republic, turned south there at 1100 on 15 May, advanced to Bennington, and then turned east to Talmadge, where contact was made late in the afternoon. We bivouacedfor the night and attacked at dawn on 16 May, terminating the maneuver. It was the longest and fastest tactical operation ever made by American cavalry to that date. The Leavenworth class came to Fort Riley on 22 May. We put on a demonstration for them, then marched to Council Grove for the next exercise, a combined exercise with the brigade. Troop A moved out at 2230 and the main body at 0200 via Dwight, Manhattan, and Keats. We advanced north of the reservation and attacked Morris Hill in conjunction with the brigade for the benefit of the Leavenworth visitors. My diary records: Poor brigade communications. Palmer tried to plan his battle too far in advance. Horse cavalry is tired... Chaffee gets better every problem. In my mind, Chaffee was the finest tactician that I ever knew. George Patton was the next. The last maneuver was staged on 25 May when we were brigaded with the 13th Cavalry and attacked the 2nd Cavalry. The exercise went well. The regiment remained at Riley for two more weeks and devoted its time to maintenance, tests, range firing, plus a final regimental exercise of our own to test a suggested reorganization. I recorded in my diary: All four troops organized with two combat car and one machine gun platoon each, plus the usual armored car troop. This made two similar squadrons... This organization is better than the one we have now; much more flexible, but I do not know if it is the best. Sadly needs another squadron. As acting regimental commander, I had no reserve except the armored car troop. We marched back to Fort Knox from 12 to 16 June, the last leg being a night march from Vincennes. In June 1934, it is safe to say that mechanized cavalry was established. The lessons of the Riley maneuvers rang out loud and clear to every cavalry officer who would listen. Major General Guy V. Henry, who as Chief of Cavalry fought against apathy and penury to give the mechanized cavalry a start, was now commander of the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) and an enthusiastic cavalryman. Colonel Daniel Van Voorhis, who steadfastly and bitterly fought for an independent Mechanized Force and then for a balanced mechanized cavalry regiment, was in Hawaii. Brigadier General Julian R. Lindsey, the old horseman on the verge of retirement, who had come’ to recognize the fact that the cavalry role in battle could no longer be performed by horsemen, was on terminal leave. Lieutenant Colonel Adna Chaffee, who taught us that “the mission of cavalry is to fight” and how to do it, departed on 28 June for duty in the War Department budget section. I was left in command of the 1st Cavalry (Mechanized) until I, too, left on 12 July for Fort Leavenworth, almost the last member of the old Mechanized Force of 1930. I was replaced by Colonel Bruce Palmer. We were satisfied and enthused about the new officers. Little did we appreciate the opposition, as well as apathy, that remained to stifle the mechanization of more than a single cavalry brigade during the next six years and that would eventually force the creation of an independent armored force. The Command and General Staff School Leaving Fort Knox in July 1934 for a one-year tour as an instructor at Fort Leavenworth, I lost touch with the details of developments at Fort Knox but acquired an insight into the impact of mechanization upon the thinking of the Army as a whole. I was able to take an active part in establishing mechanized cavalry doctrine at the Command and General Staff School. Mechanization had been included in Leavenworth programs to a limited extent, but was confined primarily to infantry tanks and cavalry reconnaissance vehicles, with only brief consideration of mechanized cavalry units. The Riley maneuvers, portions of which were witnessed by the Leavenworth students and faculty, paved the way for an expansion of cavalry instruction, and the integration of mechanized cavalry up to brigade strength in problems of combined arms. Most of the cavalry officers on the staff eagerly accepted mechanization and worked in harmony to develop its potential. Our work included not only the mechanized brigade, but also the mechanized elements of the cavalry division and the horse regiments. In addition to the normal conferences and problems, we prepared several publications on mechanized cavalry. One was a pamphlet entitled “Tactics and Technique of Mechanized Cavalry”, that was coordinated with the War Department and approved for teaching in all service schools. This was a comprehensive document, including TO&Es for a mechanized cavalry regiment and sections on doctrine, marches, bivouacs, reconnaissance, security, attack, defense, special situations, and antiaircraft defense. Another publication was entitled “Characteristics of Mechanized Cavalry Vehicles”. This publication defined the basic requirements to be built into fighting vehicles as well as descriptions of current types. The introductory paragraph stated: Mechanization is based on the organization of units of fighting vehicles, constructed on designs carefully prepared with a view to incorporating the maximum firepower combined with mobilityand reasonable protection. So much stress has recently been laid on mobility that it is interesting to note that from the earliest days of the Mechanized Force we considered firepower of the highest importance, without which mobility is of scant value. We were called upon to comment on proposals for the reorganization of the cavalry division which had been drawn up by the 1st Cavalry Division, the Cavalry School, and the Chief of Cavalry. Among other things, we recommended a regimental headquarters for the administration, supply, and maintenance of the armored car and combat car squadrons, but not for their tactical employment or training. In other words, we did not visualize the regiment as a mechanized cavalry regiment for operational purposes. Among the matters of importance, as recorded in my diary, were the following subjects: Agreed with McBride (FA) to teach truck-drawn artillery for mechanized brigade this year. We both think self-propelled is the answer, but don’t think it proper to teach it this year. AmemotoGill(Inf.)on hisprotec-tion of motor columns. I think he has laid the foundation for one of the best things I have seen this year. He is going to move troops fast. New reference data for next year...got truck rates stepped up from 8 to 20 miles per hour. Combat car squadron of the cav- 26

At left. Sunday dinnen for officers on bivouac in Tennessee was cooked on a mess truck, sewed on field tables. At right, men of the mortar platoon wait at the Fort Knox motor pool for a parade t o form up. alry division... wants to use the squadron independently. I am opposed as long as we have no carrier support; should only be used in close cooperation with horse units. Changes we are putting in the division this year - scout cars; cal..50 machine guns; and combat car squadron. (This was for instructional purposes.) Dismounted troops (infantry or cava1ry)cannotadvance againstdis-mounted defenders unless the attackers are supported by artillery and tanks - so says McAndrew. (We did not dispute this.) We simply made the point that cavalry is able to maneuver the defenders out many times and thus permit the attacker to advance better than to employ combat cars in driblets to assist each front-line unit. We eventually succeeded in getting our fellow instructors to come around to our point of view on the use of fast tanks and combat cars. An important milestone for mechanization was the publication on 5 April 1935, by the Adjutant General, of a letter to all commanders and schools which updated the directive of 1 May 1931, in which General MacArthur had ordered the breakup of the Mechanized Force and the development of mechanization by all arms. The new directive included: The 1 st Battalion, 68th Field Artillery. has been organizedat Ft. Knox to provide the supporting. artillery unit of the 7th Cav. Brig. (Mech)... the progressive training objectives for this Mechanized Force are prescribed as follows: 7th Cav. Brig. (Mech): Ability to perform the missions enumerated in ‘General Prin-ciplestoGovern in Extending Mechanization and Motorization throughout the Army’. The missions of the cavalry arm now, as in the past, include the following: naissance. theater of reconnaissance. tactical importance.

a. Long distancestrategic reconb. Fighting for the control of the c. Seizing points of strategic and d. Tactical reconnaissance.

e. Pursuit of the enemy or delay of his advance.

f. As an exploitation force to take advantage of any break or weakened point in a hostile battle line. In this type of operation, the cavalry may act alone or in conjunction with other arms.

g. As apart of a reserve to be used tactically or strategically. It is not difficult to visualize a reserve of the future, moving out in column from head to rear-CavaIry(Mechanized), units of the Tank Corps, Infantry, temporarily embussed, all elements to be able to move at uniform speed without noise. Field Artillery must be prepared to support such a force with units especially organized and equipped to accompany it. An equally important function of the army is to preserve the cavalry spirit, an asset which, while intangible, is nonethelessavitalfactor in combat. The directive then goes on to prescribe unit training for the field artillery and combined training of the brigade and the artillery battalion. It should be remembered that the quotations above are General MacArthur’swords written in 1931 and carried over in the new directive of 1935. One of the most significant features of the directive of 5 April 1935 was that it specifically charged the Commanding General, V Corps Area, under the War Department “with the development of the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mech) reinforced.” We found later that this seriously restricted the Chief of Cavalry in carrying out the responsibilities of his office with respect to the development of organization, equipment, and training. It is alsb interesting to note the use of the term “mechanized force” in the War Department letter, although it referred to the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized). I was well-pleased with my tour at Leavenworth. I believe we made great progress in gaining acceptance of the rapidly increasing role of mechanization in all branches, but particularly in cavalry. We made no attempt to make a complete substitution of machine for horse, nor should we have at this time in view of the state of development of equipment. We did solidify the thought that mechanized cavalry regiments and larger mechanized cavalry units must be balanced and self-contained to accomplish all types of cavalry missions. I was both surprised and pleased at the high degree of cooperation among instructors of all branches. My greatest disappointment was our inability to have the close coordination with Fort Knox and Fort Bliss that we had with ‘-91% Riley, chiefly due to adm;.gtrative restrictions. Incidentally, I took an early morning ride almost every day before going to the office. There is no better place to think clearly than on a horse. The War College I left Fort Leavenworth for the Army War College in 1935. For me, the change was a relevation in contrasts. From daily involvement in tactics and troop-leading, I was thtust into anew world - the War Department General Staff. The big point I remembered from the first

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A row of scout cars formed up at a maneuver bivouac. lecture by General Hughes, the G3, was: You can’t expect the General Staff to act quickly; it is a deliberative body. New membersoften think they have some get-rich-quick scheme of suddenly improving the War Department, but they soon find out that there is a pretty sound reason for its methods. He admitted that the G3 was weak on influencing tactical doctrine. He also mentioned mechanized cavalry just enough to show that he knew little about the subject. A few days later, General Kromer gave a fine lecture on cavalry. Later in the day he invited me to his room at the club to discuss mechanized cavalry with Chaffee and him. The trouble seemed to be that the G3 was holding up the new TO&E, saying that the trains were too large and that cavalry should not have a mortar platoon. A committee on new training developments gave its report on 25 September. The report had some good things to say about mechanization. The committee also recommended that aboard under the Chief of Staff be formed to sit at Leavenworth and coordinate training doctrine. I personally felt that the job should belong to the G3 and that he should be required to do it instead of spending so much time on administration. If the G3 did not have the resources, the section should have been enlarged. The job was apparent and someone should have done it. This board eventually grew into the Army Ground Forces and later, the Continental Army Command. the War College indicating difficulties that would occur in producing sufficient, well-designed combat vehicles to meet the demands of mobilization. At the annual meeting of the Cavalry Association (now the Armor Association) that year, there were short talks, mostly about mechanization, together with some disparaging remarks by some of the “horsey” people. My individual study paper for the a year was assigned by the College. The question I had to answer was: “What should be the policy of the War Department with reference to the organization of a GHQ Mechanized Force?” I recommended a continuation of the development of mechanization by the several arms. I also recommended the establishment of a Headquarters, GHQ Mechanized Force, and assigning to it, frop time to time, various mechanized units for experimentation and training so that on M-day, the Army would have a well-trained number of large mechanized units at the call of GHQ. They could then be used for independent operations, cooperation with the Air Corps, or reinforcement of an army or smaller unit. Although my paper was cooly received by the College, it is interesting to note how closely it resembled the eventual Armored Force, which simply extended the idea to create organized divisions from the mechanized units, not as a separate arm but as a GHQ (AGF) force. Van Voorhis, now a brigadier general, completed his tour in Hawaii in the spring of 1936 and reported back to Fort Knox to command the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized). The brigade still lacked a second regiment. The plan to reactivate the 15th Cavalry fell through, so the new plan was to move the 13th Cavalry to Fort Knox and mechanize it. During my year at the War College, it seemed that very little progress in mechanization was being made. The Civil War battlefield tours by the War College were splendid, but placed emphasis chiefly on leadership. No analysis was made as to the results that might have occurred had current organization and equipment, particularly mechanization, been available to the commander at the time. As far as mechanization was concerned, my course at the War College taught me that only with a vigorous push from the War Department, initiated and spurred on by the Chief of Cavalry, could real progress be attained. There was meager evidence of such a push. The Cavalry Branch could not pay the price without giving up horse units to be mechanized, and this it was not willing to do. (Ed. Note: This is the third part of a four-part serial on the evolution Of mechanization within the United States Army.)

W. GROW, whosecareer began as a horse cavalryman, became one of the pioneers in the mechanization of the U. S. Army. He was the first S3 of the Mechanized Force under Chaffee and Van Voorhis in the early 1930s and later commanded the 6th Armored Division in the European Theater during WWII. He retired as a major general in 1953 after serving as military attache in Moscow during the postwar years. General Grow died in November, 1985. Captain Peter R. Mansoor and Kathy Cast Garth helped to prepare “The Ten Lean Years“ manuscript for publication. During the year, I had considerable correspondence with Inspector General Walker and Charlie Unger who were at Fort Riley and sent me reports and problems for comment. We heard a number of lectures at 28