The Future of Armor

The weapons of warfare have changed through the ages, but the principles of warfare, which dictate the employment of weapons, have remained substantially the same. Of all the weapons which have come to hand, there is none, not even the airplane, which lends itself more readily than armor to the application of all the principles of winning warfare..

The generic term armor, of course, includes the whole of the armored team-the light, medium and heavy tanks of the armored cavalry, the armored infantry in personnel carriers and the self-propelled artillery. In the selection of an objective which is to be seized and physically held, only the airborne commander is afforded a wider choice than the armored commander. Even so, for the consolidation and exploitation of that objective, he is today dependent upon the arrival of his attached armor by land or sea, and will tomorrow await armor by air as well as land or sea. As for maintaining or regaining the offensive, it was armor, almost without exception in World War 11, which gave our commanders this capacity, and prevented costly repetition of the static combat of World War I. Armor is equally preeminent in the practice of the allied principles of mass, movement, surprise, and simplicity. This emphasis on the advantages of armor does not in any way detract from the credit due other ground arms, and the sea and air forces, for their contributions toward victory in the last war. But armor possesses to a marked degree the advantages of economy of force and security, both principles of major importance in any conflict. Comparison of armored division accomplishments with casualties per day of combat gives striking evidence of efficient utilization of manpower, plus added security for units as well as individuals. And, lastly, it is in cooperation, in basic battleground teamwork, that armor completely fulfills the final principle of warfare. On the working level, armor helps infantry realize its greatest potential, infantry complements armor, artillery supplements both. World War I1 demonstrated the invincibility of the United States Army’s infantry-tank-artillery team; any future war would prove the same combination an even better bet, no matter what the odds, because of the improvements we have already effected and those we are in process of achieving, in both organization and materiel. To take full advantage of the potentialities of armor from all of these aspects, its role in the field forces is being emphasized heavily in current training, and would be stressed even more strongly in the event of a future mobilization. We envision afield army organized on the basis of one armored to three infantry divisions; each infantry division would have organic to it the equivalent of two heavy tank battalions, and each corps would have one light armored cavalry regiment and one heavy tank group-a total of more than three thousand tanks in an Army of three corps. Each airborne division, too, would have attached to it two tank battalions, and we may hope that, in time, some or all of these tanks will be air transportable.

The future of armor is limited only by the ingenuity of American industry and the resourcefulness of the officers and enlisted men who belong to armored units. To those qualities there are no limits-nor are there to the future of armor.