Ground School Demonstration On Air-Ground Cooperation

Success in battle can be assured only when there is complete cooperation of all arms.” - This dictum is demonstrated forcibly to the students of The Ground General School at Fort Riley, Kansas, in a joint air-ground operation, an attack of associated arms against an incompletely prepared defensive position. The students from a centrally located observation post witness all phases of the attack as it rapidly develops before them.

A mechanized cavalry reconnaissance troop, appropriately reinforced by a platoon each of light tanks, armored riflemen, and howitzers, moves into view 4000 yards south of the student observation post. The troop, with three platoons committed over a 7000-yard front, is screening the advance of a regimental combat team. As the leading platoon on the center axis approaches the Observation Post, the students are given an excellent opportunity to observe the proper employment of the point team.

When the leading onequarter-ton truck reaches a position 100 yards from the students, it is first seen by the enemy and draws heavy fire from a camouflaged antitank gun, forcing the crew to hit the ground and crawl hurriedly to cover.

The point immediately forms a base of fire and is soon augmented by the balance of the platoon. Armored car commanders select primary and alternate firing positions. The one-quarter-ton truck crews locate firing positions and dismount their machine guns to provide more stable and accurate firing positions from adequate cover.

The troop commander, upon hearing the heavy volume of fire up ahead, hurries forward to investigate. Enroute, he orders the liaison aircraft, which has been may-iune 1985 29 e U. S. T-5 Light Tank, 1936 assisting a flank platoon, to move to the critical point. By the time that the troop commander reaches the forward positions, the platoon leader has coordinated his base of fire and committed his rifle section as flank security. (Each cavalry platoon in the proposed Tables of Organization has two scout squads and one rifle section). Preliminary estimates by the platoon leader indicate that a sizable enemy force of infantry sup ported by antitank guns is dug in along a ridge line 1000 yards to the north.

Detailed reconnaissance, greatly facilitated and expedited by the employment of liaison air, reveals that the enemy holds the ridge line with perhaps 100 infantry, at least two 75mm antitank guns, and a few medium tanks. The liaison plane also locates unidentified enemy activity in a wooded draw 700 yards northwest of the ridge line. Ground and air reconnaissance together determine that the terrain on theeast flank is rough and cut by a deep ditch whereas, on the west flank a shallow draw offers a possible avenue of approach for ground troops to within 500 yards of the enemy positions. Reconnaissance reports lead the troop commander to the obvious conclusion that he needs assistance to crack the enemy resistance. From the Regimental Combat Team he requests, and receives approval for, the sup port of fighter-bombers.

(As a result of previous high-level planning, fighter-bombers of the Ninth Air Force are on air alert in direct support of ground troops in this area.) Fifteen minutes later, the advance guard commander for the main body arrives at the Cavalry troop Command Car with the Tactical Air Central Party attached to his force.

From an observation post, the advance guard commander, air controller, and troop commander plan the attack. They decide that the tank and rifle platoons will make a carefully coordinated assault on the objective from the west under cover of an air strike. The cavalry and howitzer platoons are to support the assault from their present positions.

As the tank and rifle platoons begin to deploy, the P-51 fighter-bombers hit the target. Four planes, armed with two 250-pound general purpose bombs each, soften up the objective and are followed swiftly by four more planes each armed with six 5-inch high-velocity rockets. The eight planes in turn then make a final pass, strafing targets of opportunity. Before the air strike is completed, the tank and rifle platoons have reached their attack positions some 500 yards to the west of the objective. As the last plane strafes, the troop commander launches the ground assault by radio command. Followed by the armored rifle platoon at 100 yards, the tanks sweep on to the objective with all weapons firing. On the near edge of the ridge the personnel carriers halt, and the riflemen pour out to cover the tanks, mop up, and consolidate the objective. While the tank and rifle platoons reorganize, the fighter-bombers provide air cover, prepared to attack enemy reserves or enemy efforts to displace to the rear. Ground and air reconnaissance immediately push forward in pursuit.

The students are moved to the demonstration area along the axis of advance of the regimental combat team. The troops employed in the problem were lined up for inspection in their respective tactical formations along the route. Where elements of the Regimental Combat Team were simulated, flags marked the locations of separate units comprising the RCT. Thus, the students were able to visualize clearly various time-space aspects of the problem before it commenced. From the student observation post, which was located 1000 yards from the objective in accordance with safety regulations, the approach march of the ground troops, their deployment, the assault of both air and ground elements, the reorganization following the assault, and the pursuit were easily observed. Student briefing prior to the commencement of the problem was minimized. The tactical situation and the safety measures employed were explained, and the capabilities and limitations of P-51 aircraft, aircraft weapons, and ammunition were reviewed briefly. In order that the students might appreciate more fully the problems of planning, coordination, and execution of such an attack, pertinent radio transmissions of all tactical units were amplified. The students thus heard, as well as observed, first enemy contact, orders of the platoon leaders and troop commander, the direction of the air strike, the ground assault, and liaison air reconnaissance. This method of “reading” the students into the demonstration proved to be most effective. Because live ammunition was used, the problem required a high degree of cooperation and coordination. The amount of rehearsal time necessary to achieve the desired standard was determined directly by the state of training of the demonstration troops. Six hours of rehearsal for ground troops and four hours of joint air-ground rehearsal proved to be adequate. To control the problem, an elaborate communications system was devised. Radio was the basic means of communications for both tactical and administrative control.

To supplement radio communications for emergency purposes, flares, wires, and panels were ready for instant use. Each safety officer with the separate firing units was equipped with a ground signal projector and colored flares. By this means the firing could be stopped, or ordered to commence, as the situation required. The howitzer platoon and the mortar platoon (the troop employed its three 81mm mortars in battery) operated a joint observation post. A single telephone wire was laid from the OP to the mortar position and thence to the howitzer firing position. An open circuit telephone net was maintained by these elements; in the event of radio failure these units were able to control the firing of their batteries with no difficulty. A set of air-ground liaison panels (AP30D) was held at problem control headquarters in the event of radio communications failure with either tactical or liaison air. Panels also were used to 30