Fighting Smart at the National Training Center

The sight of OPFOR smoke hanging heavy in the valleys is a familiar one at the NTC. At right, soldiers of the 194th Armored Brigade begin their rotation, wiring, camouflaging, and preparing tank obstacles. Photos for this NTC package are by Captain Stewart Joslin and Sergeant First Class Dale Butler of the 194th PAO. Fighting Smart at the National Training by Captain Michael D. Furlong (In a relatively shofl period, the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, CA, has become a proving ground for the Army’s newest training and tactics and a place to learn. Many soldiers returning from the NTC call it the most realistic training they’ve ever received in the Army. This month, in two articles, ARMOR presents some of the lessons of the N TC. The first is by Captain Michael D. Furlong, who commands one of the motorized rifle battalions that make up the realistic opposing force (OPFOR) at Fort Irwin. The second article reflects the experience, know-how and wit of Sergeant First Class (P) Richard Wagner, former battalion master gunner for the OPFOR ’s 1- 73 Armor. Every unit that comes to the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, meets essentially the same problems and defeats as do other units. And while this article does not presume to teach the basic tactics of the deliberate attack and the defense, it will, hopefully, point out those problems so that when your unit cojmes to the NTC you will not fall prey to the usual misconceptions about some *points of U. S. doctrine that have trapped others. Included here are some training tidbits that highlight tactics that have worked at the NTC - and some that haven’t worked. However, it must be noted that these items represent only “ 9 3 away - not nece’ssarily “the” way. Also, the information is based mostly on desert fighting tactics and techniques. Planning the Deliberate Attack Reconnaissance. One of the major errors noticed in training units at the NTC is that of not seeing the battlefield. Some commanders depend too much upon the intelligence picture as developed by higher headquarters. It is vitally important that the commander conduct a detailed reconnaissance of his objective prior to initiating a deliberate attack. U. S. doctrine states that we attack an enemy’s known weaknesses, not his strength. To do this, you must conduct 26 a ground reconnaissance to determine the enemy’s strengths, dispositions, orientation, boundaries, economy of force areas, obstacles and other things. During this detailed reconnaissance, make each company reconnoiter its own tentative route to the objective. Also, look for approach routes for close air support and hide and attack positions for attack helicopters. The reconnaissance unit should use binoculars, night observation devices and thermal sights to increase its effectiveness. The unit should identify individual tank and BMPpositions on a large sketch map. It is also wise to maintain the flexibility of your reconnaissance patrol by task-organizing it for a combat reconnaissance contingency mission. This combat patrol could breach lanes through obstacles during limited visibility conditions and even leave stay-behind tank hunter-killer teams. These teams could destroy enemy units or smoke his fields of fire at critical moments during your attack. Doctrine says that we will conduct frontal attacks as a last resort. Therefore, based upon the detailed reconnaissance information you have received, you can isolate the bulk of the enemy’s strongholds and concentrate your combat power on an economy of force area, a boundary, or a weak flank, to obtain at least a 6:l force ratio. Your plan should allow you to attack an enemy platoon with two reinforced companies while suppressing the rest of their defense with a small fixing force, large volumes of smoke, and artillery. You may add attack helicopter fires or close air support fires to the fix force as well. Planning Time. Your companies need time to obtain this detailed reconnaissance information. This is why it is imperative for task force commanders to give their subordinates about two-thirds of the available planning time. It takes a lot of time to draw up a sound plan. However, General George S. Patton once said, “A good plan today is better than a perfect plan tomorrow.” Another misconception in the planning process is that you must accept all orders and graphics from higher headquarters without question. Higher headquarters can make mistakes, and it never hurts to ask for a clarification or a change to the order or graphics. Because of the real-world succession of command problems on the MILES battlefield at NTC, it is important for leaders down to squad level to be fully briefed about your attack. A picture is worth a thousand words to any young noncommissioned officer, so make sure that the graphics are on every map down to squad leader level. Planning Considerations. Because of the extremely long attack routes across the desert at the NTC, be certain you plan your attack in phases. Use key and critical terrain for intermediate objectives because it is vital that you control the key/critical terrain features within your boundaries and along your axis of advance. Your tactical formation for a deliberate attack needs to be flexible enough to enable your task force to quickly mass its combat power. If you let an OPFOR motorized rifle company in prepared defensive positions engage and destroy your lead elements before you can mass your total combat power, you will be destroyed piecemeal. This happens quite frequently. In the deliberate attack, the task force will usually attack a company. Attacking with 3:l odds ensures success only if you use your ingenuity to achieve 6:l odds for short periods of time at a critical place. Also, you must avoid being piecemealed into engagement areas. The key is to know where your enemy is and to know exactly at what point on the ground you will have to muster every asset in your combined arms team to overpower him. Fire Support. In planning fire support for your scheme of maneuver, you will make much better use of your indirect 27 fire assets if you direct them to conduct specific missions. Giving them strictly general support (GS) or direct support (DS) missions makes them less prepared to support specific preplanned missions such as smoking the objective. Decide which unit is best suited for the mission, assign it to that unit and they can stockpile the right assets to do the job well. Another way to improve fire support responsiveness is to develop a list of Target Reference Points (TRP) that you can use to track the task force or company’s forward movement. You call your support artillery or mortar unit and give it the TRP just ahead of you. The indirect fire unit will then set the data on its guns. While you are under the influence of that TRP, and if you receive enemy fire, the response time of the indirect fire support is only the time of flight of the munitions. While the maneuver units continue to call TRPs ahead of them as they move, the indirect fire unit ‘dry fires’ the support of the maneuver unit until contact is made. If needed, immediate suppression can be quickly laid on and can be easily adjusted. Synchronize all your combined arms assets. After the intelligence data are analyzed, determine where and how you will mass the power of your direct-fire weapons, attack helicopters, close air support, smoke and electronic warfare assets simultaneously. If you know your enemy, then synchronization of your attacking team is easier to achieve. Executing the Deliberate Attack Battle Drills. The best way to achieve smooth execution is to formulate and rehearse battle drills. Coming to the NTC without detailed and rehearsed battle drills is like going to the Super Bowl‘and making up your plays in the huddles. As a minimum, companies and battalions need to formulate and repeatedly practice the following offensive battle drills: Breaching obstacles; immediate action drills against direct fire, indirect fire, air attack and NBC attack; changing from tank lead to infantry lead; massing units on line; conducting fire concentrations or fire distribution and, fire and movement. Your battle drills need to be very explicit. For example, each man in every armored personnel carrier (APC) should know what his exact role will be during a breaching operation. The drill should pinpoint who will suppress the far side of the obstacle, who will throw the smoke (or call for it), who will breach with grappling hooks, and who will secure the far side of the obstacle. These SOPS must be rehearsed until they become instinctive drills. Elaborate materials are not needed to clear lanes through most obstacles. At the NTC, it has been repeatedly proven that a handful of infantrymen with D-handle shovels can breach a first-rate tank ditch in a matter of minutes. They don’t fill it in, they simply cave in the approach and exit walls so that tanks can ease into the ditch and power out. Make sure that every APC carries a few shovels and grappling hooks. If you give them a smoke pot or two, they will be able to handle almost any breaching operation. The NTC is predominantly tank lead country. But when you are receiving effective antitank fires, run into restrictive terrain, get stopped by an obstacle, or are operating during limited visibility, doctrine says the infantry takes the lead. You must be able to switch your lead without stopping your attack. A Typical Scenario task force at the NTC follows: A typical scenario of an attacking The task force attacks with two teams abreast and one back. The two lead teams are usually about 2,000 meters ahead of the trail team. The scouts are screening a flank and the GS TO Ws are in overwatch without their tracker heads up. The lead companies come under fire and quickly lose the bulk of their lead tank platoons. Everyone runs for a gulley, stops, or backs up. Incomplete reports are sent back to the task force tactical operations center (TOC). Eventually, the mounted infantry are called forward to estimate the situation. They move around the dead lead vehicles and are also killed. A shocked lull follows and then more vehicles are ordered forward. They are also destroyed and the OPFOR security platoon then withdraws to the main defense belt. After along lull, the frag order to continue the attack is given and the task force (now definitely minus) begins to move forward. This time, the OPFOR waits until the lead vehicles reach the T-72 trigger line and they open up throughout the depth of the task force’s formation. All but a few vehicles are killed. After some reporting and reorganization, the handful of sur- 28

I An OPFOR motorized rifle battalion races across the desert as the attack begins. Colonel Arthur T. Carey, at left, the 194th Armored Brigade’s deputy commander watches his men react. One of the Brigade’s M60’s. right, moves up with all eyes scanning the landscape. viving vehicles make one final cavalry charge. They die. Lessons Learned. There are proven ways to prevent all this happening to your task force. First, you must look again at the fundamentals of the offense. You can use many different techniques, but you very rarely are able to violate the fundamentals and remain successful, If you don’t use every intelligence asset available when developing your plan, then you are violating the first fundamental - see the battlefield. A problem well-defined is a problem half-solved. So, get an accurate picture of the enemy on your objective, then you will have a better start in knowing just how to take that objective. Seeing the battlefield is a continuous and ongoing process. It begins with your initial reconnaissance and continues during the battle with accurate, timely and complete reports from your scouts and other lead elements. You must be able to continuously account for all the enemy’s subunits in order to outmaneuver him. On the NTC battlefield, outmaneuvering the OPFOR is a big part of the battle.. See the battlefield with respect to key and critical terrain. Control this terrain and you control the battle area. Some other vital observations regarding NTC training include: Lead units must do a better job at giving complete and accurate spot reports. The quality of your frag orders during your attack will be directly por-portional to the quality and quantity of the intelligence information you receive during the battle. Your unit should never be surprised during a deliberate attack. You should know where every enemy unit is and when to expect contact. If you have this information, you will ultimately be prepared to overpower the OPFOR at the critical point and time. 0 Use weapons systems to their best advantage and concentrate overwhelming combat power. These things are easier said than done. Long, slow formations that don’t provide you the ability to quickly mass your combat arms assets are doomed to failure. You must be in the optimum formation that can concentrate and distribute fires at 3:l or even greater ratios. If your formations call for long columns that can achieve only 1:l ratios against prepared defenses, then you need to reexamine you way of doing business. Your reconnaissance efforts should give you a good idea of when to expect contact. Your scout elements should confirm your expectations. Then the companies and the task force can move into the right formation immediately prior to contact. 0 Don’t forget to prepare the battle area with smoke to assist your high speed assault. The idea is to take away the OPFOR’s fields of fire while you close on the OPFOR faster than they can combat you at close range. 0 Remember, the MI13 APC is nothing more than an armored taxi. It was designed to get the infantryman to the objective quickly and ready for the ultimate mop-up at the objective. The APC is not a true fighting vehicle. The M2 Bradleyis another thing altogether. This APC misconception is costing a lot of casualties in the units traitling at the NTC. If several of the lead tanks are getting killed at the front of your formation, then you are probably re- 29 ceiving effective antitank fire. Doctrine says to send the infantry forward. But, if your tanks are getting killed, then your APCs will surely get killed as they bolt forward. So, dismount your infantry, along with dismounted TOWs, Dragons, Vipers and small arms. Move them forward quickly, using covered and concealed routes, to root out the OPFOR from their prepared positions. This does not stall your momentum if you’ve been held up. You can’t stall what you never had. Momentum is firing and maneuvering on the enemy and gaining groun& If you are dying without gaining ground, you never had momentum to start with. Once the infantry gets the enemy moving out of his positions, your TOWs and tanks can start picking him off. Synchronize the use of TOWs, tanks, artillery, mortars, attack helicopters, close air support, jammers, smoke, etc., during the lull created by the dismounted operation. Conduct a swift assault on a flank or other weak spot when everyone is ready. Penetrate this area and begin to roll up the OPFOR’s flank. By penetrating his flank and getting some depth into his rear, you begin to win his entire initial position by maneuver alone. The OPFOR units out in front are not in contact and are endangered by being cut off or flanked. 0 If you run into small pockets of resistance, think about fixing them and then by-passing them with the bulk of your forces. This will aid you in gaining, and keeping, momentum. That pocket of resistance may then have to withdraw. However, such a bypassed force can be troublesome and you should have some tank and TOW assets at the rear of your attack formation moving their tubes over their rear decks to prevent being shot from behind. 0 Once you get the OPFOR on the run, pursue him relentless&. You can run forward faster than he can run backward. If you stay tight on him, you can follow him through his own passage points anduse his safe lanes to get through his obstacles. Don’t give him an opportunity to set up in any of his hasty positions. Use two-thirds of your force to keep the pressure on him while the other one-third stops and takes well-aimed shots at the running enemy. Gunnery Skills. Finally, gunnery is the basis for all success. All of the fancy tactics in the world won’t help the unit that can’t shoot. The good units at NTC have first-class gunnery skills. Defensive Lessons Aside from being commander of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion in the OPFOR at the National Training Center I am also a mechanized infantry rifle company commander when not portraying the OPFOR. My company conducted its Blue ARTEP over the same type of terrain that rotating battalions used during their training. We were evaluated on the movement-to-contact, hasty attack, deliberate attack, and the defense. When our company teams negotiated the ARTEP, we were opposed by a motorized rifle battalion from the OPFOR regiment and were evaluated by the same observer-controllers who observe units rotating through the

NTC.

In our company team defense, we learned that a company can stop a motorized rifle battalion with a 16.5-to-1 kill ratio and remain totally combat effective in the process. The following tips and comments are based on the most frequently observed shortcomings of battalions that train at Ft. Irwin during defensive operations. Mission Understanding Many of the commanders and staff officers of the battalions that rotate through the National Training Center do not understand their missions. It is not uncommon to see a unit receive a defend in sector mission only to see them execute a retain the terrain mission. Begin by understanding the terminology of current doctrine: Defend in Sector means to attrit the enemy as far forward as possible, using a maneuver style defense, without becoming decisively engaged (not losing its ability to maneuver). It is implied that the battalion retain its rear boundary. This means accepting decisive engagement and stacking the enemy up in your protective wire if necessary. Delay in Sector for the battalion means to conduct a defensive operation which attrits and slows the enemy - by trading space for the time -while the battalion preserves its combat power. The headquarters issuing the order should specify whether or not the battalion will conduct a high-risk or low-risk delay. In a high-risk delay, the battalion is more concerned with holding specified terrain for a specified period of time than it is with the preservation of its force. A low-risk delay is more concerned with preserving the combat power of the unit than it is with holding terrain. In any case, the idea is to attrit the enemy while trading terrain for time. If the battalion loses all of its combat power well forward in the sector, then it has failed its mission. The battalion has to be able to mass its combat power (mainly tanks and TO Ws) in the initial engagement areas to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy quickly, then disengage under pressure before losing any of its combat power. Artillery, smoke, CAS, attack helicopters, and a good countermobility plan will ensure a successful engagement. If you can’t get the higher headquarters to articulate the type of delay they envision, then conduct a low-risk delay forward and a high-risk delay as you near the rear boundary. Retain the Terrain can be a specified mission or an implied mission. As previously stated, when defending in sector, the implied mission is to retain your rear boundary. When preparing to retain terrain, you must plan to accept decisive engagement and the resulting dismounted assault. Your obstacle plan must, therefore, support the possibility of a dismounted assault. Moreover, your indirect fire plan should feature registered final protective fires (FPF) so that you can bring to bear all combined arms assets at the critical place and time to stop the enemy in front of your rear boundary. A strongpoint defense is a heavily fortified defense which is the classic retain-the-terrain mission. Granted that all retain missions won’t be strongpoints but, the unit must prepare to retain terrain in that kind of detail. Fire-from defensive positions are-usually battle positions which support small subunits of the battalion or company while they fire a specified number of well-aimed shots at the enemy. The shots will be at the maximum weapon standoff. These long and medium-range weapon systems. will fire from one to three shots and leave immediately, not stay and fight or accept decisive engagement. A fire-from battle position is useful when you have a small piece of dominant terrain that affords the defender an opportunity to inflict heavy casualties on the attack early without paying any price in combat power. A fire-from position is not too much different than a glorified ambush position. The reason you don’t defend from a fire-from position is because you may not have an optimum withdrawal route or it may be apiece of terrain that doesn’t have good mutual support from other positions. These positions can support a few well aimed shots and withdrawal, but they cannot support a prolonged defensive posture. 30 ARrnOR

A favorite OPFOR trick is to occupy the tank ditches intended to keep them out. Here, two T-72 VlSMODs seek hull defilade. Analyzing the Mission The battalion commander and his staff must first analyze their assigned sector from well in front of the FEBA, from the flanks, and throughout the long axis of the sector discerning possible avenues of approach. Next, they must know the enemy’s organization and capabilities. Judging from the maneuver space available, you then determine the size of enemy force that can maneuver on the particular avenue of approach. Knowing the enemy’s organization will assist you in determining the number of medium and long range weapons systems (tanks and Saggers) that you are likely to fight. Analyzing the mission will define the exact type of defense. If it is a retain-terrain mission, you will organize your assets to kill in one major engagement area. If it is a defend-in-sector mission, you will look for several engagement areas in depth along the avenues of approach into your sector. Once you have determined where the enemy is likely to come from, in what numbers, and how you are ordered to stop him, you select engagement areas that dominate the avenues of approach. You then must determine how you can achieve at least a 1:3 force ratio in each engagement area. This force ratio is calculated by counting the number of tanks and TO Ws that you have to stop the enemy’s expected number of tanks and Saggers. Build your defense around the tanks and TOWS first. These medium and long range weapon systems get first priority for siting on key critical terrain. Then you build battle positions around these tanks and TO Ws with your infantry assets. You plan these battle positions in depth with the intent of maneuvering and attriting the enemy in your sector until you whittle him down to a size where you can defeat him by direct fire or counterattack him successfully. The next phase of planning the defense is to analyze where obstacles will be placed. You may need to reinforce terrain to channelize the enemy into kill zones. Obstacles may also be used to hold the enemy within your engagement areas, thus multiplying your combat power. These obstacles will also afford you a mobility advantage when disengaging. Skillful use of tank ditches and similar delaying obstacles also bring Dragon and LA Wweapon systems into the battle. Finally, adding other combined arms assets such as artillery, attack helicopters and close air support must be planned to bring maximum fires on the enemy at the key places and times. Controlling Defensive Fires In order to conduct an efficient defense you must plan and control fires to prevent overkillbin some areas and no killing in other areas. Divide engagement areas with markers on the ground. Controlling fires also involves selecting limited visibility firing positions for night defenses or for use against heavy smoke. You must have a contingency plan in case the enemy smokes your fields of fire. All of the above items must be considered and articulated into a well written and graphed order. Since a picture is worth a thousand words, you need detailed graphics (overlays) to clearly portray your wishes. These overlays should become more detailed at each echelon below battalion. Squad leaders and above should have these graphics on their maps. A significant item in the orders packet for team commanders is the execution matrix, which will assist commanders in the control and execution of their fires. A typical matrix is seen in figure 1. Extracting Team A’s instructions from this matrix will yield this mission. Team A will defend initially from battle position 7 with a primary engagement area of 40 and an alternate engagement area of 41. Team A’s subsequent battle positions are 71 and 75 with primary engagement areas of 48 and 30 respectively. The alternate engagement areas are 49 and 3 1 respectively. Team A will emplace obstacle B on the operations overlay. Obviously, the overlay must include all battle positions and engagement areas. Understanding the mission, analyzing the mission and terrain, and articu- 31

Defensive Exec ut occupy Prepare Team A BP 7/ea 40,41 BP 71 /ea 48,49 Team B BP 8/ea 80,81 BP 83/ea 42,43 Team C BP 9/ea 90,91 BP 92/ea 60,66 AT Plt (-) BP 5/ea 40,41 BP 57/ea 42.43 AT Plt (-) BP 2/ea 90.91 BP 29/ea 66.60 on Matrix Recon BP 75/ea 30.31 BP 8Wea 32,33 BP 95/ea 35.36 BP 96/ea 31.30 BP 97/ea 33.32 The defensive execution matrix pinpoints each subunit’s defensive responsibilities, listing battl Remarks Emplace Obstacle B Emplace Obstacle D Emplace Obstacle G Fire from BP l/ea 11,13 - - - positions and primary j alternate engagement areas to be occupied. prepared. and reconnoitered Team A, for example, IS to occupy battle position 7 with primary responsibility for engagement area 40 and secondary responsibility for engagement area 41 Figure 1. lating that plan are not enough to ensure success in the defense. You must vigorously supervise the preparation and execution of the plan. This critical execution phase is where most battalions falter at the National Training Center. On numerous occasions, battalion commanders come to after-action reviews (AARs) only to find that their well laid plans were not executed as they intended. For example, a team may not have emplaced a key obstacle because the bulldozer didn’t show up or a team commander was misoriented and occupied the wrong battle position. Mistakes like these can cause big holes in the defense. That is why nothing can replace trooping the line to make sure every weapon system is located in its assigned battle position and that it is firing into the intended engagement area. Moreover, the commanders and S3 must supervise the efficient use of attached assets like the engineers. The engineer platoon leader must be given a priority of work for countermobility and survivability positions. There should be a contact on the ground to make sure each obstacle and survivability position is to the specifications intended. If possible, two crew shifts should be assigned to each bulldozer and bucket loader so that these key assets can work around the clock. Supervisors must ensure that each obstacle is in fact a working obstacle. All too often obstacles are not adequately constructed to really stop the enemy’s vehicles. Tank ditches need to be at least 10 feet across and five feet deep. Concertina obstacles should be at least three rolls deep and two rolls in height in the center and be staked down. If the obstacles don’t meet these minimum standards then the OPFOR will just run through them. If you want to multiply your combat power with obstacles, then you must cover the obstacles by fire. If the obstacle can be bypassed, then make sure that you cover the bypass route by fire. Don’t forget to plot priority artillery targets at your obstacles. Almost every rotating unit under-estimates the speed and maneuverability of the OPFOR. Once the OPFOR reaches its combat line formations its speed can reach up to 20 miles per hour. About one-third of the massed vehicles will fire from the short halt. The other two-thirds will continue to close on your position at 20 miles per hour. That kind of speed translates into a battlefield minute that covers over 500 meters. Because of this speed, you must have a countermobility plan to slow the OPFOR down in your kill zone so that he can be killed in great numbers prior to your disengagement. It is essential that your subunits recon routes of withdrawal to their subsequent battle positions. These withdrawals must be overwatched and timed so that you can calculate when you must disengage. U. S. Army forces do NOT get DIP (Die in Place) missions. It is not part of our doctrine. During withdrawals in daylight, TO Ws disengage first, followed by infantry, then tanks. In withdrawals during limited visibility, TO Ws leave first, followed by 32 tanks and then infantry. One last point in controlling the execution of the defense involves communications. Radio nets are too cluttered. You must establish wire communications for responsive command and control.

CAPTAIN MICHAEL D.

FURLONG was commissioned as a distinguished military graduate from Loyola University. He has served as a rifle, scout, and support p l a t o o n l e a d e r a n d assistant S3 in the 82d Airborne Division. A graduate of the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, he has served at the National Training Center as a rifle company commander and as commander of an OPFOR motorized rifle battalion. He earned his MA in management from Webster College.