Battling for the Initiative

Initiative is the keynote to success in war and upon its possession hinges the fate of nations. Napoleon said, “In war, the moral is to the physical as 3 is to 1.” Among the moral aspects he referred to was initiative. With that in hand, the commander is able to dictate how his assets-and, to a large extent, those of his foe-are used. But the availability of assets has never won a battle or a war; only the proper use of assets has brought victory. The question that arises is, “How can one deny the initiative to an enemy who has a numerical advantage?” The answer lies in hard fighting, the conscious disruption of the enemy’s plans, and the acceptance of calculated risks. Hard fighting entails accepting losses, but what it produces is many more losses to the enemy who does not possess the advantages of the defense. More importantly, blunting his thrust wears him down. The second and third principles go hand in hand. In order to disrupt the enemy’s plans, calculated risks must be taken. Disrupting the enemy’s plan brings about many things, specifically the waste of his assets and his efforts. He finds that his assets have either been stopped or have been wasted in senseless obedience to orders that can only bring destruction. The U.S. Army sought to devise a doctrine that would allow it to attrite the enemy while avoiding excessive losses, a doctrine that would give added depth to a numerically thin defense. The result was a defense based largely upon delay which consists of the following: 0 Inflicting losses on the advancing enemy by indirect fire and tactical air assets, and then augmenting this with direct fire. 0 When the enemy has deployed and is about to close, slipping out of his grasp to a new, or subsequent, position to the rear in order to reinflict the earlier bloody scene. 0 When the enemy has been attritted to reasonable numbers, standing fast to blunt his thrust or destroy him. Although this rather Fabian doctrine sounds quite acceptable, some problems arise if it is realistically examined. As the enemy advances, the defenders assail him with indirect fire. As the range closes, and the enemy enters the maze of prepared obstacles, direct fire commences. Despite the sophisticated target acquisition systems now in use, the tank gunner’s accuracy will probably be greatest inside 1,200 meters. However, by now, it is time to be moving to the next defense position, a move that can create problems. If enemy attrition is one of the main goals, then the greatest opportunity for this is being missed. Just as the enemy reaches the most devastating kill zone, the defenders are en route to the rear. True, this zone is also the enemy’s best range, but the defender enjoys the advantage of prepared positions. This brings up the argument that the most dangerous moment for the defender is when he begins to pull out of his prepared position. The enemy has begun to close and the defender’s vehicles are now leaving the protection of their positions. The defenders can cover their move with smoke, but the newer Soviet vehicles have thermal sights and can see through smoke. Finally, as the defenders move to their next position, they attempt to gain distance between themselves and their assailants, using the superior speed of their vehicles. Once repositioned, the scene can be set for further attrition of the enemy. This second phase of attrition will be assisted by the defender’s artillery. The problem here is that the speeding defender will also be receiving such fire from the attacker, and probably more of it. Therefore, the defender, too, will suffer from disorganization and added to that, his covered and concealed routes may be impassable, or barely passable. Thus, upon entering the new position the defender finds that he has not, in fact, put any space between himself and the enemy, but has only surrendered precious ground. This is not what is meant by hard fighting. The biggest problem is that the attacker has maintained complete control of the initiative. His movements are unimpeded by prolonged defensive presence and his plans have not been disrupted. He is free to bring the full brunt of his numbers to bear at times and places of his own choosing. For an army based so largely upon the sheer weight of numbers, this is crucial. It must keep up its momentum in order to steamroll its opponent. Under this scenario, it had done just that. An alternative defensive scheme would be to establish a solid line of positions with the greatest possible depth. Bemay-june 1984 16 cause the enemy is initially, at least, able to mass great power at points of his choosing, a strong armored reserve must be maintained. Although frontline units are not to remain rigidly in place, they retreat only when they must, after having fought hard for the ground they defended. The enemy, thus, pays for it, and the farther he gets into the depth of the main battle area, the more he will have paid. It would have to be accepted that some units will be cut off and some destroyed, and that breakthroughs are probable. Thus,’ the counterattack is the central ingredient in this type of defense. The enemy is counterattacked as he threatens to break a portion of the line. There are several advantages to this. First, the enemy will have just undergone a baptism of fire which will, hopefully, leave him in a state of disruption. His fighting power is decreased and large numbers of his survivors may be disposed of cheaply. His elements may be strung out and his command and control links weak. He is not organized to defend, but for the continuation of his attack. In this situation, relatively small counterattacking units can achieve decisive results. In addition, the enemy is confronted with unexpected developments as forces descend upon him from unexpected directions (flanks, rear) at his most vulnerable moment. His plan begins to break down and his efforts begin to lose purpose as the situation changes. He is beginning to lose the initiative. When pressure upon a sector becomes too great, defending units must be flexible enough to adjust. The difference between a delay and a retreat should be noted. A retreat implies one has fought and been forced back. A delay is a planned retrograde movement made in your own time. It is not necessary to wait for a breakthrough to employ a counterattack. Frontline units may hold a reserve to unleash upon the attacker from an unexpected position or direction, either before or after he has deployed. The resultant chaos may disrupt the attack and provide necessary edge to destroy his main force and then steal his initiative (figure 1). This idea of the defensive is by no means new. It has been employed successfully over the centuries at many places and has well served many an outnumbered defender. It may be very useful to examine one such instance-the Battle of El Alamein in which General Rommel’s German and Italian army, although defeated by the vastly superior British Eighth Army, defied the odds in its successful bid to survive. Enemy advance Me&-heavy team or a company position lank-heavy team or Counterattack tank company Obstacles Figure 1. El Alamein By autumn 1942, the last great offensive of Rommel’s Panzerarmee Afrika had run its course. It now stood on the defensive in the narrow strip of ground between the Mediterranean Sea and the Qattara Depresion to the south. The list of disadvantages facing Rommel is staggering. The first was numbers-he had about 100,000 men over his 45-mile front, facing an enemy 200,000 strong. Equally important was the composition of the opposing force. A large portion of the Axis army was composed of non-mechanized, immobile Italian infantry. The mobile elements consisted of two German panzer divisions and two light and under-armed Italian armored divisions. All were so critically short of fuel that they had only limited mobility. The British had abundant supplies for their mostly mobile force, including 1,300 tanks 17 to Rommel’s 500. The ammunition situation parallelled that of fuel, and the disparity in the number of artillery tubes was overwhelming. Additionally, the British held total control of the air.’ Rommel had a choice. He could either retreat to a more defensible position and a shorter supply line, or he could dig in. But there were no more defensible positions than those at El Alamein and to retreat without first having embroiled the British armor in a frontal battle would mean losing his slow-moving Italian infantry to swarms of British tanks.* Rommel dug in. The nature of his El Alamein position offered him his only advantages and he meant to use them. El Alamein was one of the very few spots in the North African theater where the southern flank did not have to be left dangling. The Qattara Depression was completely impassable to fighting vehicles. Any flanking attempt would have to be preceded by a frontal assault aimed at creating a breach, which would allow time for the shifting of reserves. So Rommel manned his line with his dismounted infantry and a thick belt of mines, with the infantry on ridges overlooking the desert. Thus, the disadvantage in mobility would be somewhat offset in the initial stages of the battle by the fact that the British must begin with a frontal assault into the strongly-prepared German and Italian positions. In preparation for possible penetrations, Rommel held the bulk of his mobile forces in reserve3 (figure 2). The British plan was based on a massive tank and infantry frontal assault supported by equally massive air and artillery preparation. Once successful, the armor would exploit and pursue, after first having destroyed the enemy panzers that could be expected to counterattack. Rommel, knowing this, decreed that his positions must be held at all cost and that any penetration would be immediately counterattacked by his mobile forces before it could be extended or defended.4 After long days of anticipation and preparation on both sides, the attack began on the night of 23 October 1942. The main assault was delivered against the Axis left center with the 70,000 men and 600 tanks of the British X and XXX Corps against 7,000 men of the Italian Trento Division sited on Kidney and Miteriya Ridges. At the same time, a strong diversionary attack was made on the Axis southern flank. The attacks were preceded by an artillery barrage greater than any since WW I. More than 1,000 guns laid down a barrage on the Axis front lines and then began a creeping barrage to cover the advancing British troops. Because he lacked sufficient ammunition reserves, General Georg Stumme, acting commander of the Panzerarmee in Rommel’s absence (he was in Germany on sick leave), ordered his artillery to hold its fire5 (figure 3). The British immedate objective was the capture of the Axis-held ridges. But as the British infantry and tanks advanced behind the rolling barrage, they ran into the minefields and were hammered by fire. For two days the British, despite their 10-1 local advantage, groped their way forward with some units reaching the western edge of the minefield but none able to break through. During this period, the stranded units were ripe for counterattack and would surely have received it had Rommel been there. In the meantime, General Stumme had died of a heart attack. Still, the British were on the verge of local defeat. It would be nine days before they would achieve their initial objective. The stiff Axis defense had caused them to temporarily lose the initiative, but in the absence of a strong counterattack they did not completely forfeit it.6 Rommel returned on 26 October and ordered a counterattack on Kidney Ridge where the British had set up a defense. Due to the fuel situation and the difficulty in moving units under air bombardment, only the 15th Panzer Division and ’ 18 may-june 1984 Figure 2. the Italian Littorio Division took part. Under fire from the air, and from the new British 6-pounder antitank guns, the attack was repulsed with heavy losses. Had the counterattack come earlier, before the British had time to establish a defense, it would have stood a good chance of success. Rom-me1 struck again the same day but the move was broken up by British planes while his forces were still en route to their line of departure. The situation was now critical for both sides. Rommel was almost out of fuel and his ammunition stocks were depleted. He could afford his losses far less than could his foes and his armored forces were dwindling. However, the British, despite their numbers, were also at a crisis. It appeared that they would be unable to break through the stiff defense and they, too, had lost heavily. Two hundred of their tanks were destroyed, three infantry divisions had been mauled, one corps was completely disorganized. At this point, General Montgomery ordered that the attack be shifted in a north-westerly direction, driving out from the salient he had created and cutting off the German units on the extreme northern flank. However, three days of reorganization were required and, meanwhile, the battle ground to a standstill. A week after the battle had begun, the British, with all their overwhelming advantages, were still struggling to break free. Rommel continually attacked them on Kidney Ridge, but they had their defense set up and he did not have the strength to dislodge them. On the night of 30 October, the new British assault began and by morning their tanks had reached the sea, cutting off much of the German 164th Division. Fortunately for Rommel, he had called up his 21st Panzer Division from the south (a calculated risk that left that sector extremely weak) and it, with the 90th Light Division, counterattacked, throwing back the British and rescuing the 164th. However, the Axis forces had now very nearly reached the limit of their endurance and the supply situation was even more critical. Rommel masterfully shifted his forces to relieve pressure from those hardest hit, but although his counterattacks had curbed the enemy’s initiative, he had been unable to seize it.7 At 0100 on 1 November, the British attacked again with 800 tanks. By dawn of 2 November they had cleared the enemy defense system, but there was to be no chase-yet. By now, Rommel had accepted the hopelessness of his situation and had begun his withdrawal, hoping to retrieve as was commissioned in armor as a distinguished military graduate from the University of Michigan in 1982. He attended the AOBC and served as an M7 tank platoon leader. He is currently a platoon leader in the M3 Bradley scout platoon in the 3d Battalion, 66th Armor, 2nd Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas.

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