Italian Armor, Past, Present and Future

The Italian Army’s first tanks were tested in 1917 and were organized in separate assault tank batteries under the concept that armor units were mobile assault artillery. During WW I, the Italians used Lancia armored cam and, after British successes with true tanks (armored, track-laying vehicles), initiated a tank production program. However, due to technical difficulties, no Italian tanks were completed until 1919. The Fiat 2000, which was not completed in time for war service, was a &ton tank armed with six machineguns and a 65mm main gun. It was crewed by 10 men. From 1919 to 19n, only one company-sized tank organization existed. On 1 October 1927, Italian armor was organized as a separate branch of the ground forces. In 1926, an independent five-battalion tank regiment was formed. During 1936 and 1937, the Italians merged their armor units with the infantry branch, although the tanks were not an organic part of the infantry divisions. They remained as separate support battalions and gained their first combat experience during the Italian-Ethiopian War of 1936 to 1939. When Italy entered WW 11, her armored divisions were equipped with the MMll/39 and M13/40 tanks. The former was alight tank weighing 11 tons and armed with one 37-mm main gun and two 8mm machineguns. The latter was a medium tank weighing 13.5 tons and armed with a 47-mm main gun and four 8mm machineguns. Both vehicles had 30-mm frontal armor. Three Italian armored divisions were sent to North Africa in 1941 where, along with Italian infantry divisions, they became part of the North Africa Command which included the Italian armored divisions along with the German Afriku Korps. They served with distinction until they were forced to withdraw due to maintenance and resupply problems caused by allied air attacks from Crete against 34 the M e d i m e a n convoys. Post World War II. At the end of the war all Italian armored divisions were disbanded and tanks were once again assigned an infantry support role. However, the red and blue colors that had distinguished the armor units were still used to trim the collar badges worn by Italian tankers. The Italian word for armor is corn-zuti. It comes from the Latin word corium, which means a leather hide and, more precisely from corruzzu or ar-maturs. The word “armor” derives from the latter word, which was the name for the leather protection worn by the Roman legionnaires in combat The 1950’s saw the reconstitution of the Italian Army’s new tank regiments. These regiments were initially separate organizations, but were later organized as the Ariete, Centaum, and Pozzwlo del Friuli armored divisions and were equipped with U. S. M24, M36, and M47

U 155-MM tanks. The renewed interest in tanks was based upon the following perceptions: 0 A doctrine that foresaw a massive employment of nuclear weapons whose effects could be exploited only by units with armor protection. Initial successes of Israeli armor in the Middle East. 0 The Soviet Union’s emphasis on the tank as the backbone of its army. In the 1 W s, Italian armor made only a few organizational changes and ao quired the M60Al tank, followed by ao quisition of the German Leopard I in the 1970’s. In 1976, one of the most signisCant changes in the Italian armored force occurred when the tank regimental organization disappeared and the armored brigade was created. The battle flags and the glorious traditions of the tank regiments, however, were handed down to the battalions, which perpetuate the lineage of the most significant armor units. Each of these 18 tank battalions borne of the reorganization bear the name of a tanker who had died in combat and had earned the Gold Medal, the highest Italian military award for valor. Italian Armored Units Today The armored division is the largest armor formation in the Italian Army (figure 1). It is comprised of two armored brigades, a mechanized brigade, and combat and combat service support units. The mechanized divisionis similar except for the makeup of its brigades-two mechanized and one armored. The Italian brigade is a complete, autonomous, formation that is self-sufficient in fire and logistical support. Armor branch is still part of the infantry. And, while this situation is not pre ferred by armor proponents, it does r e sult in closer cooperation between the armor and mechanized units whose missions demand combined arms operations. It should be noted here that the armored brigade in the mechanized division is manned entirely by cavalrymen, as are the reconnaisance squadrons of both typea of divisions. Cavalry is one of the oldest branches in the Italian Army, dating back to

1503. During that year, units of Italian and French cavalry fought each other as representatives of their respective armies because the opposing army commanders challenged one another to accept victory or defeat based solely on a battle between their cavalry forces. This historical event is known as Percentage of tanks visible at various ranges in the Italian Combat Zone. Warning Tanks Visible Distances( m) (Percent) n 7nn “The Challenge of Barletta.” Since then, there has never been a battle in which the Italian cavalry has failed to distinguish itself with courage and resolution. These traits were to reach a peak in Russia during WW I1 when the Savoia Cavalry Regiment at Isbush-enskij and the Novara Cavalry Regiment at Jagodnij charged Soviet tank units on horseback. This heroic deed astonished the world, but it marked the beginning of the end for the cavalry of all armies. When the horsemounted era ended, modernization and mechanization began. But it did not end the traditional esprit de corps and elan of cavalry. The armored brigade, whether manned by cavalrymen or tankers, is composed of two tank battalions, one mechanized battalion, one artillery battalion, and supporting units. There are three tank companies in each tank battalion and each company has three fivetank platoons for a total of 98 tanks (including 8 command tanks) in the brigade. A headquarters company provides the entire logistical support to the tank battalion. Based upon ongoing US studies of 35

- the Division 86 concept, which has reduced the number of tanks per platoon from five to four, the Italians are undertaking studies to determine the optimum size of their tank platoon. The reduction in the leader-to-led ratio at platoon level should simplify command and control as well as enhance training. In the latter regard, I must point out that the Italian tanker is a 12-month draftee who spends the first 2 months in basic training and the final 10 months with an operational unit. This 12-month period has built-in limitations on tank crew training. The draftees spend the first 2 months of their service in the Armor School where they learn how to be soldiers and tankers before going to their battalions. During their 10 months in the battalion they are trained to fight as part of a tank platoon and a combined arms team. This training is continuous and includes bi-monthly livefire exercises. Italian Area of Operations Italy has been a member of NATO since 1949. In this role, its armed forces are ready to face any threat that should occur in the southern sector of the European Theatre. The geographic position of the Italian peninsula, in the middle of the Mediterranean region, between the German plain and the Middle East, makes Italy strategically important and sensitive to every type of land or sea threat. Fortunately, the nature of the seas washing the Italian coasts do not permit large scale amphibious operations. Neither does the terrain, with its mountainous configbration throughout the middle of the peninsula, facilitate military. operations from south to north and vice versa. These difficulties became obvious during the Italian Campaign of 1943-44 when the Allies experienced problems in dislodging the Germans from defensive positions that exploited these natural features. After the Salerno landings, for example, General Montgomery’s 8th Army advancing northward along the east coast and General Clark’s 5th Army on the west coast were forced to conduct almost separate operations due to the intervening mountainous terrain. On the other lrand, the German defensive lines ran continuously from east to west and overlooked the city of Cassino, from which they could block the attacking I Figure 5. I 36 forces by controlling the valleys below. Today, the most likely threat faced by the Italian Army seems to be a land operation led by Soviet armored units attacking the northeastern border, and subsequently spreading out into the Venetian plain to reach the industrialized northwest. Based on these considerations, it is obvious that most Italian units would be deployed close to the eastern border, determined to fight as far forward as possible where the mountainous terrain offers the defense the most advantage in blocking an invasion (figure 2). The defensive mission in this forward edge of the main battle area would be accomplished by mechanized forces reinforced by tanks. In this instance, employment of tanks in a defensive role is very effective and not as tactically uneconomical as some might think. This is true, not only because, as Liddell-Hart wrote, “A tank that shoots from a hill needs only to back a couple of meters to become invulnerable- to direct-fire enemy weapons,” but also because its armor makes it less sensitive to artillery fire and nuclear, biological, or chemical threats. Additionally, the tank’s mobility allows it to fire repeatedly from alternate hulldown positions and quickly move laterally to face enemy attacks from several directions. Its firepower also enables the tank tomake forward thrusts when the tactical situation is favorable: Therefore, the greatest defensive effort would be made in the first defensive line to prevent the enemy from making a breakthrough in order to achieve greater mobility for his armor units on the flat terrain of the plains. On the other hand, the plains area’ offers a greater challenge for the d e fender who must make maximum use of built-up areas, vegetation, and the network of irrigation canals to delay advancing forces and then block them by exploiting strong natural obstacles. Such terrain requires the employment of company-size teams due to mobility and command and control limitations. The characteristics of this environment favor aggressive ambush tactics along themain axis of advance to exploit the chessboard-like locations of the built-in areas and the cover and concealment offered by the vegetation. These teams are comprised of one or two tank platoons, one or two mechanized platoons, and fire support ele ments of heavy mortar and antitank weapons, all of which are trained from their inception to operate jointly. Tanks and Antitank Systems The presence of many natural and manmade obstacles and the resulting

Fiqure 6. limitations to observation and fields of fire do not justify the employment of tanks with large caliber guns that are able to engage targets at 3,000 meters and beyond. This is borne out by an Italian Geographic Institute study (table 1) that shows that in the combat zone only 19 percent of enemy tanks can be seen beyond 2,000 meters. At these distances and farther, attack helicopters are used to seek out and destroy enemy armor. Italian Army Aviation is primarily oriented to support antitank operations. The Italian aviation industry is very active and up-to-date in helicopter developments. In addition to the in-service A-109 Hirundo which is armed with the TOW missile, Agustais building the A-129 Mongoose-the first Italian (and European) attack helicop ter (figure 4). This twin-engine, turbine-powered helicopter, when fielded in 1985, will provide armor units with greater antitank capabilities in all-weather conditions, day and night. Great importance is also given to antitank weapons, such as the long-range TOW, the French-German Milan for middlerange, and theItalian short-range Folgore. The main antitank role is, however, played by the tank. It is the only antitank system that fires kinetic energy projectiles that can penetrate vegetation and brush and hit targets without premature explosions-as often h a p pens with antitank guided missle systems. The above mentioned study indicates that 81 percent of enemy tanks will a p pear at less than 2,000 meters. At these ranges, the M60AI and Leopard I (figure 5) 105-mm guns, both licensed to be built in Italy, provide the required performance due to improvement in their fire control systems and also in their night fighting capabilities, both of which are enhanced by Italian-built on-board systems. In the field of armored personnel carriers, the infantry has replaced its US-made MI 13s with an Italian made carrier, the VCC-I (figure 6) that allows Assuming that the current political and strategic situation remains stable for the forseeable future, and given the tactical and technical considerations previously discussed, I feel that Italian armor should select a tank that h2s speed and agility and a high rate of fire; that weighs 40-45 tons, has an automatic loader, and that is extremely lethal i t the mid-ranges. Therefore, Italian industry could play an important role in its development because of its experience and relative success in armor research.

CHlA entered the Italian Military Academy in 1960 and was commissioned in armor in 1964. Prior to attending flight school in 1969 he served as scout platoon and tank platoon leader. He also served as tank company commander and aeroscout company commander and as a flight instructor. He is a graduate of the Italian Command and General Staff College and the Italian War School. He served as a brigade G3 prior to coming to Fort Knox, Kentucky, where he currently is the Italian Liaison Officer at the USAARMC.

PASQUALINO VERDECmay-june 1983 37