ONE PICTURE IS WORTH 10,000 WORDS

\ A Platoon Leader of the 45th Reconnaissance Squadron presents his ideas on an old training aid. The sand table, an old Army standby has always proven that...

by FIRST LIEUTENANT RICHARDT. O'BRIEN The Lieutenant is given a mission-Erect a portable sand table to be used for instructing tactics classes directly on the ground where the problem is to be conducted. Here is one solution which might help you to improve your quality of instruction. Fill a ¥!-ton trailer with approximately twelve inches of sand and haul it to whatever training area you are to use for conducting small unit tactical problems. The accessories can be constructed from material within the company. The vehicles, houses, factories, and pillboxes are all made from scraps of wood. The signs and symbols were cut out of manila folders. The roads are shown by white engineer tape and the streams are strips of blue cardboard. The bridges are carved out of GI soap. Trees and grass are made by using the local foliage in the area where the problem is located. In the top photo the platoon sergeant is briefing his squad leaders. It took him about twenty minutes to set up his problem. The sand table terrain is a miniature laid out to portray the actual terrain in the immediate vicinity where the application phase of the problem will be conducted. Notice that the terrain includes ridges, woods, streams, bridges, roads, and buildings. The attack arrow in the lower left hand corner indicates the direction of attack against the enemy positions. In the lower photo the author looks over the accessories for the ¥!-ton trailer sand table. They can be carried easily in two cigar boxes. The friendly vehicles and symbols are to the reader's right of the engineer tape. The svmbols are white. The miscellaneous items nd enemy vehicles and symbols shown to the right of the tape, can be carried in one box. The enemy vehicles have white tops, the symbols are painted red. The accessories estimated for one ¥!-ton trailer sand table to be used by one platoon or less are listed. 3 squad area symbols I platoon area symbol Friendly vehicles and symbols: 2 OP symbols 2 machine gun symbols 1 accessory box 3 directional attack arrows 2 entrenchment symbols 5 -ton trucks 2 command cars 3 tanks 1 mortar lA-ton vehicle 2 anti-tank guns 1 half track 2 houses 1 factory 1 piece foil for lakes ARMOR-May-June, 1953 I platoon CP symbol 2 minefield symbols l rocket launcher symbol Enemy vehicles and symbols: 2 trucks 2 pillboxes 2 rocket launcher symbols 2 machine gun symbols 2 minefield symbols 2 entrenchment symbols Miscellaneous Items: 20 pieces 1" x 6" blue cardboard strips for streams 2 bridges vehicles for 1 platoon 2 OP symbols 3 squad area symbols 1 platoon area symbol 3 attack directions arrows 1 accessory box directional marker roll engineer tape, for roads 45 by CAPTAIN RICHARD D. TRUE,.

Here is the second and concluding article on the selection of sites and fording techniques for tanks and organic vehicles in a battalion fordability school II INCE there is no assurance that a ford with all the qualities of a good ford will be found, many crossings will be made on poor but passable fords. The manner in which the fording is conducted makes a substantial difference in the efficiency of the ford and proper driving may make the difference between success or failure. Wet banks and muddy, soft bottoms are chronic problems. Water depth may b a problem for a portion of the platoon and not for the rest. There are various ways of overcoming the difficulties to be encountered in fording. Since traffic on the stream bottom may cut it up, causing a lot of soft mud to be formed, the lightest vehicles should cross first. It may be possible to cross on abroad front, so that all vehicles do not use the same track. Crossing the tanks at one place, and the wheels at another, is also a possibility in preserving the life of a ford. Getting a tank across and towing the others or daisy-chtrining three or four lA-ton vehicles and towing them in a train are methods of helping the wheels through deep water. It is expeditious, if a ford is doubtful, to attach a cable to the towing hooks of a vehicle before it enters, making recovery of a vehicle much easier, should it bog down or drown out. The lA-ton truck will take the least depth of water of the vehicles in the reconnaissance platoon. The figure 30 inches has been listed in the technical manual, and this is based on slow careful movement of the vehicle through the water, without ex- 46 cessive fan spray, with crankcase and oil filler valves closed. Going over this depth to an absolute maximum of 36 inches may be undertaken with the fan belt off, to eliminate the throwing of spray into the air intake, and drowning the engine. Always enter a ford in low-low gear, with 4-wheel drive engaged, and the fording knob on the dash pulled out, regardless of the anticipated depth of the water. Ruts or holes in the bottom can plunge a vehicle in deeper than was expected and care must be taken to avoid damage to the engine. Go in over the bank slowly, and drive not over four miles an hour in the water, less if there is much current, to avoid forming a bow wave. Keep a steady application of power, and do not spin the wheels, or they will dig clown in a soft bottom. If necessary turn so as to approach the far bank at right angles. As the climb up the far bank begins, slowly add power, but try not to spin the wheels. If there is room, do not follow the track of preceding vehicles but pick a path that has not yet been rutted. Once clear of the ford, move on away from the bank, to avoid holding up the following vehicle. The half-track can traverse only slightly more water than the:JA-ton, the manual listing 32 inches. This vehicle can also exceed the 32-inch depth by disconnecting the fan to avoid spray. Absolute maximum depth is 43 inches. The performance of the half-track in soft mud leaves much to be desired and it should be regarded as the least capable vehicle in fording the platoon. Driving the half-track into and out of the ford is accomplished in the same manner as the lA-ton truck. If exit from the ford is over a steep bank, overlooked in selection of fords, especially along streams which are marginal as to fordable depths, backing the halftrack across so that the tracks climb the bank first is an aid, for if the tracks spin while on the soft bottom the half-track will immediately bog down. Crossing the half-track in the same place as the lA-ton crossings, after they have crossed, is the best method. Do not have the half-track follow tanks; the bottom will be cut up too badly for the track to make it if it is not of a good firm gravel. Light tanks and medium tanks have approximately the same fording capabilities, except that the engines of the M-47, T-18, T-41, and M-32 are less sensitive to immersion than those of the M-24 light. Tanks can get in and out over banks which completely stop wheeled vehicles and their four-foot fording depth capability is more than will be needed in crossing the vast majority of streams. Entry can be made over very steep banks, six to eight feet high, but a lower, more sloping bank is needed for exit. Creeping speeds are required. Entry must be made as slowly as possible or a considerable bow wave will be generated, filling the driver's compartment with water unless buttoned down. In making entry over a steep bank, the drop into the water is eased if a clump of small trees growing on the bank is pushed ARMOR-May-June, 1953 over by the tank into the stream. The bank, if steep and high, will cave while the trees are being toppled, lowering the tank gently into the stream. Approach the bank at right angles to avoid tipping or canting of the tank, unless the slope is gentle. This is especially important in the M-24, as the air intakes are at the outside rear of the hull and canting the tank while in the water may cause one engine to drown out. ln making exit from a ford in water nearing four feet in depth over steep banks, additional precautions should be observed. Add sufficient power as the tank begins to rise up the bank to assure exit on the first try. A lot of water will be carried up the bank by a tank, making the bank slippery. In this, steel track is superior to rubber, since it digs in and gets under the superficially wet bank surface better. If the bank is quite steep and the tank cannot make it up, there are two courses of action open. The tank can be backed down and a crossing tried at a different place, or a turn can be made and the tank run up or down stream until an exit can be made, if the bottom is solid enough. At this point another danger arises. If an M-24 tank is clawing its way up a very steep bank and is allowed to slip back into deep water, tail first, there is great danger that the air intakes will be submerged, killing the engines. This danger does not exist in the M-47, T-41, T-18, or M-32, as their air intakes are located well forward. The 2Y2-ton truck is capable of fording as great a depth as any other vehicle in the battalion. However, due to the heavy weight of the loaded truck and the frequency with which the 21/2 must tow trailers, it is not usually an easy vehicle to ford. The present truck does not have good flotation in the soft stream beds and will bog down readily. In order to get the 21h-ton truck through, a low, shelving bank is a necessity on the exit side of the ford. In low range this truck is quite powerful and will spin the wheels if sudden or too much power is applied. This will cause the truck to dig in deeply and must be avoided. Driving methods for entering the ford with the 21h and leaving the ford are the same as for other wheeled vehicles. The ARMOR-May-June, 1953 height of the fan is an advantage on this truck, as it clears all but the deepest of fords. The %-ton truck fords very similarly to the lA-ton except that it will pass greater depths. Trucks which have winches are assisted greatly in getting through difficult fords. Crossing a tank first and using it as a holdfast for the cable is a handy expedient. I discovered that, having written a rather extensive paper on the subject of ford selection and fording, I was well prepared to give the classroom work which followed. Where a manuscript such as this will not be written for most instruction, when you are feeling your way along in a subject with which you are not familiar this type of preparation is indispensable. I found too that having had a couple of college courses in Geology was a great help. Of course, while writing the foregoing, preparations were going on toward the presentation of the demonstration part of the school. I had been assigned a reconnaissance platoon from Baker company, and the platoon leader was my assistant for the course. Initially I went through the steps of selecting a ford site, using all the methods discussed above. I was further limited in making my selection in that it had to be within a few miles of the home station in order to be able to move the students to the location and still have plenty of daylight to carry out this demonstration. Finding a ford which would show up the various capabilities and limitations of all the vehicles in the battalion was a rather large order in the beginning and I was pressed to find a suitable location. I finally found just what I was looking for, while on an aerial reconnaissance flight. It was within 4 miles of the Battalion's home station, accessible by road, had a good existing ford and a wooden footbridge nearby. Also, by fortunate coincidence, the ford appeared on the sets of aerial photographs which I had on hand for training purposes. After making the tentative selection, it was necessary to obtain trespass rights to the land and then to test the location with some vehicles to prove that the ford would do what we wanted. At first we weren't sure in our own minds just what the end product of our demonstration would look like and it took a good deal of trial and error to firm up our scenario. The platoon leader, Lt. Reed, took his platoon and vehicles to the location time after time. We tried plan after plan until, slowly, the picture began to build up into what looked like a suitable demonstration. In all, some twelve piecemeal trials were held until we were ready to go into the rehearsal stage. Of course we learned a lot about fording from these preliminary efforts. We were beset with cold, snowy weather and fog, and worst of all, the river level fluctuated rapidly from day to day. Before long our whole lives seemed to revolve around that first look at the water level each morning. We had vehicles bogged down, drowned out, hung up on banks and otherwise hors de combat. But the experience and thought-provoking failures paid off in the end, for we did work out a most suitable demonstration. Since we were attempting to show the capabilities of various vehicles under a variety of conditions, our demonstration was strung along several hundred yards of river bank, each locality. chosen for a specific vehicle. We determined exact locations, to the inch, for spotting our vehicles prior to the arrival of the troops. We provided stand-by reserve vehicles in case of a last minute mechanical failure. A tank retriever and wrecker, ambulance, radio vehicle, and public address system were brought out. We had rehearsal, rehearsal and rehearsal. By our deadline day, a month from the starting day, we knew we were ready. On the big day, our snake-pit classroom was packed with officers and NCO's of the Regiment and from other organizations which had been invited to send representatives. I conducted the three-hour conference, following lesson plans prepared from the instructor's manuscript. I was able to employ as training aids: the chart I had prepared, maps and air photos which were handed to the students to use in practical work exercises in ford selections, and a balop-ticon. A blackboard and chalk were ready and used to illustrate impromptu talking points as well as previously planned and prepared sketches. It was gratifying to note that the students were able, during 47 the practical work, to pick out very logical ford site possibilities both from the l:50,000 maps and from the air photos. However, it is significant that while the places they chose were definite probabilities, no one was sure of his choice until he had made a ground check. We had the opportunity to do this when we went out for the demonstration because of the close proximity of those places chosen on the map to our actual site. After lunch, a convoy was formed up and the student body moved to the demonstration site. We had directional signs along the way to aid any stragglers, and radio contact was maintained with the home station. At the ford, signs numbering the sites were staked out, and by using the PA system, control of the spectators was easy. (Incidentally, a good battalion draftsman is a great asset in anything like this, for neat artistic signs do a tremendous amount in dressing up your demonstration.) I did not contemplate the use of bleachers because of the distances involved and I thought it better if the spectators could move right down to the river bank to get a good look at the vehicle crossings. This proved right in this case but I was on thin ice in making this decision for a crowd of this size, approximately 150 persons, can be awkward to control. I believe that the signs were my greatest help, plus the fact that we timed the successive stages of the demonstration to apace that kept something moving all the time and everyone was interested. There was a minimum of milling around. Our vehicle crews were ready, standing at stations by their vehicles, confident and keyed up at finally arriving at the wet run. They were a capable and enthusiastic group of men on that clay. The Signal Corps sent two photographers at our request and did a thorough coverage of the entire demonstration. We had previously planned to take 35mm movies of the demonstration for use in future classes, but the camera froze up in the cold weather. The platoon leader and his sergeant directed each vehicle through its test. The first was the 2Yz-ton truck which we put in the ford from a high, steep bank. He crossed through surprisingly deep water and attempted to run out the same bank. It proved too high and too muddy so he chose a more suitable place and came out under full power. We did not have the truck loaded for this demonstration nor did we have a trailer, but the running commentary which I conducted brought this to the attention of the class and they were able to predict the added effect of these loads. Next, at a different location, the ¥l-ton truck was run through at con-Steeper banks can be used to enter the water as demonstrated by this M24 tank. 48 siderable depth, but drowned out from the effects of the fan throwing water into the air intake. We had a cable attached to his towing hook and a retrieving ¥!-ton ready to take him out right away. Then another;4-ton, with the fan belt removed, ran through the same place with no difficulty whatever. On the heels of the ¥l-ton, our ¥!-ton truck made a run through the same place. This was an existing ford and quite passable to any but the first ¥l-ton truck, and offered low, sloping banks on both sides and a good gravel bottom. On the return trip the ¥!-ton did not come out the easy place but turned downstream a little and showed the effects of a steeper, and muddy, soft bank. He did not make it out and had to back away from the bank. Here we had a bit of unrehearsed demonstration, for the driver missed his turn by about a foot and dropped into a deep spot in the river, which we knew about but had previously avoided. He went in until his fan threw water over the engine and poured it out over the fenders, but although the engine sputtered a few times it kept running and the truck made it out. The half-track was poised and ready atop a four foot, nearly vertical bank from which he was to drive into about a foot of water. The bottom at this point was fairly solid, but our experience had been that if, as the rear end of the track was going over the bank, he bogged down on the little pile of mud just at the water line, then he had to be dragged out. Knowing this, the driver gunned the track just as the rear end settled, and he went on into and across with no further trouble. Coming back, up the same bank proved impossible going forward. The tracks spinning in the gravel and mud bottom threatened to dig the vehicle down until a tank retriever would be needed to get him out. The front roller, instead of lifting the front end, was simply pushed into the soft bank and the track was helpless. Reversing and getting out before it was too late, the half-track was then taken up the same bank in reverse. Becaus of that soft spot at the water line it was necessary to hit the bank fairly hard in order to have sufficient momentum to carry the rear end of the ARMOR-May-June, 1953 vehicle high enough up the bank to give the tracks a footing on firm ground. A man in the rear of the half-track directed the driver, who is nearly blind in backing a half-track. We considered this a very successful portion of the demonstration. Immediately following this, the group was moved to site four where they saw the M-24 light tank waiting across the river from them. The tank was sitting on a bank about five feet high and very steep. This particular point was on the outside of a slight curve and typified the sharp-rimmed bank being eroded at the water line, with the characteristic pile of mud resulting from sloughing off of the bank. The water was 3lh feet deep at the entry point. Easing over the bank, the steel track holding well, the tank was put in gently and crossed. On the near bank there was a good deal of cut up mud, the result of our many trial runs, and the driver had to hit it just right to make it out on the first try, which he did. He then moved into the background for the next part of his demonstration. It was important to have him move far enough away that his engine noise did not interfere with the talk. The tank then crossed at the same point. We had this tank completely drown its engine while attempting this during a rehearsal. H e had run the front end up the bank, lowering the tail just at the deepest part of the stream, and got water into the air intakes. The result was that the tank rested in the steam for over two hours until we could get a retriever. Of course the hull flooded in this length of time and we had to quickly remove the ammunition to prevent damaging it. This got some men wet in the icy water and pointed up a lack of prior planning. In our demonstration we had anticipated all these troubles and didn't have them. I had the tank commander hold his tank in position just short of drowning the engines and showed the class the danger that existed in going on, and then sent the tank back and out at a better place. He made one final, complete crossing at site five, entering over a steep bank into four feet of water and coming out on a grassy bank on the opposite side. ARMOR-May-June, 1953 The value of a fordability school is proved by actual fording operations in Korea. Our M-47 from the tank company had about the same task, initiallv, as the M-24, except that it entered 'over a higher, steeper bank into about four feet of water. He came out the same muddy place and recrossed to the opposite high bank. Of course he could not climb the bank but he proved that while he put the front end well up the bank, with the engine compartment in the deep"part of the river he had no trouble with the engine taking in water. Turning downstream in the river, the M-47 cruised until he found a spot to make an exit attempt which also was unsuccessful, as rehearsed, because of rutting by previous tank crossings. He finally made it out further down, putting on a fine demonstration of cautious driving through several feet of water and maneuvering on the river bottom. The M-47 handled beautifully and came out with a great surge of power and much splashing of water. The driver had gotten wet in the initial entry into the river, since he could not hold the tank for as slow a passage down the steep bank as the light tank had made, and a considerable bow wave swept over the hatch which was open. However the ambulance was standing by with heaters running and warm blankets ready and the driver was immediately put in it and stripped of his wet clothing. We had no casualties and no cases of exposure sickness during the entire preparation and demonstration. In evaluating this demonstration, I was well satisfied with the way it ran and from the comments which have been passed to me since, they have indicated that it fixed in the minds of the students a graphic picture of the fording capabilities of the reconnaissance platoon and other vehicles in the battalion. This, of course, was my mission and I feel that the school was successful and the mission was accomplished. The work which went into preparation of the demonstration, literally days and days of practice and rehearsal, for the 75 minute final show, paid off in training value. The troops came away from the school confident in their ability to select and use fords and in the capabilities of their vehicles. This is a spirit vital to armored leaders who must use aggressive, skillful application of their know-how if they are to exploit to the maximum their units' vital mobility, and this know-how comes from training. Present plans call for inclusion in platoon trainin of fording exercises, to be based on the material presented at the school. This realistic and practical training is the type of thing that distinguishes a first class fighting outfit and while I did the spadework and received recognition for it, the real compensation will go to the battalion which is closer to complete accomplishment of its mission-Success in Combat. 49

YOU DO IT?

situation 1 You are a tank company commander in the 201st Tank Battalion, 90-mm Gun, 201st Infantry Division. Your company has been attached to the 11th Infantry Regiment. When reinforced with infantry, your company will become a task force for a special operation. A forward observer from the artillery battalion (105-mm towed) supporting the regiment joins your... company. He explains that for this operation he can - _,.... do a better job of observing from one of vour tanks.;:,.._.?.: & -=::a<''' Uti.nant, we {J •.,-·· can f1x you up / - •th k b { · ·. WI a tan ut,;,. · · you might have a -¥ _. · radio netti problem As a tank company commcmCfe what-would you tell the artillery forward observer about radio netting between your tanks and the artillery fire direction center? 50

May-June, 1953 author Maior E. Kobbe artist Pvt. H. A. Reade 2 You are a tank company commander. Your company is now experiencing the season's first day of freezing weather. It has been raining and snowing intermittently. In a short space of time you find you. are unable to contact your platoon leaders by radio although your set appears to be operating properly. You check with the platoon leaders at their positions and find they have been having the same diffj.. culty within their platoons, Look at this illustratio·n. What is the probable cause of the radio difficulties? 51

52 ' solution 1 You should tell the forward observer that tank. radios in the infantry division will ·not net with the forward observer's artillery battalion radios except on ten overlap channels. The artillery battal.ion fire direction must be operating on one of these overlap channels in order to communicate with the forward observer in your tank. 2 Large numbers of radios, in one organization, do not fail mechanically at one time. Some outside factor that happened suddenly has caused the failure. You are right-the weather! You check the antenna mounting bases and find them coated with ice from the mast sections to the turret armor plate. The antennas are grounding out over the porcelain insulator. Your tank commanders must keep the antenna mounting bases free of ice as long as the weather is cold and wet. ARMOR-May-June, 1953 o5 Years Ago "A brigade marched one day from Beauvais to Gisors, took part in the capture of that place and returned to Beauvais in the afternoon, 38 miles; the next day it moved to Goumay and back, 31 miles; the fourth day it move.d to Bretevil, where some squadrons made several charges, and it then returned to Beauvais in the afternoon, 38 miles. "But how seldom we dared to demand such efforts. How many times we lost contact with the enemy. Why was he allowed to fall back upon Paris? Why did not swanns from our mass of cavalry envelope him and cut the railways in his rear? Why did we not scout thoroughly during the winter? "Had our leaders felt capable of covering 30 to 60 miles a day with sufficient masses, could the armies that were to deliver Paris have sprun from the earth and been upon us before we suspected their existence? "Icy roads! We have them at home; why have we not learned to move upon them? SEYDLITZ himself would have been helpless with cavalry horses that could not move on ice. "A few brigades who had learned this accomplishment did, however, scout on the ice and the others might have done as much." German Ideas on Cavalry 2ND LT. FRED'K s. FOLTZ 50 Years Ago The success was due to the celerity of our movements, causing surprise, and never for a moment letting up after the enemy were on the run, in spite of good defensive positions which, if they had been held by a small and determined force, would have seriously delayed the command. They learned to have a deadly fear of the quick moving cavalry, always on their heels, giving them no time to rest. In this campaign, as no flanker could be used, and the command marched in column of two's, Colonel Hayes directed, when an attack was made on one flank, all men on that flank should pass their reins to the man on the inner side, then dismount and form line toward the enemy either <m the flank, or form line to the front, if the attack was from the front. It required but a few seconds to have a well established line for attack. If it was necessary to reinforce it, half of the other troopers would link horses, and soon give a good supporting force. Our drill regulations were modified to suit the peculiar.conditions. The Cavalry in Southern Luzon CoL. J. A. AuGu R 25 Years Ago The Combat Power of Cavalry! How little understood by the people of the country and by even the majority of military men. When we speak of infantry or artillery we have a very definite idea in mind of the ARMOR-May-June, 1953 functions and even the power of these arms in battle. But few people indeed, unless they are not only students of the military art but experienced, progressive cavalrymen who have handled the two elements-fire and maneuver-of modem cavalry-understand or fully appreciate the true value of this cavalry.... Cavalry-the one swiftly moving ground force which can negotiate any form of terrain-increases in value as it makes usc of its principal assets by utilizing mechanized units of equal and greater mobility. Cavalry now has mny forms of its three types of action-dismounted, mounted and combined action. \iVhen restricted solely to maneuver elements, combat strength was dissipated by sacrificing maneuver power for fire power. One of the best ways to defeat maneuver elements is to pin them to the oround and, conversely, fire elements can best be defeated while they are mO\·ing. By adding fire elements to cavalry the maneuver elements are freed to make full use of the great power of maneuver. The value of cavalry in reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance is acknowledged, but its value as a fighting force in war is not fully understood. Fire and movement is the gospel of infantry and, though mounted cavalry may occasionally attack without fire, fire support is the basis of all attacks. Fire, Speed and Surprise is a good attack gospel for cavalry; for every moment's delay in the slow moving dismounted attack increases the loss of life and gives the enemy time to counter the attack. Adequate fire support is required by both infantry and cavalry. Cavalry Combat Packs LT. CoL ALBERT E. PHILLIPS 10 Years Ago In engagements of a maneuvering character, the mobility of cavalry must be exploited fully with a view to striking surprise blows at the most vulnerable spots. For instance, it always brings good results, after breaking off the battle suddenly in one sector, to regroup the cavalry under the cover of darkness in an area eight to ten miles away, and then strike quickly an unexpected blow on the enemy's flank from anew direction. Experience shows that the main forces of large cavalry formations should not become entangled in long drawn out engagements in the same sector, as this paralyzes its mobile power and dooms it to tactically passive actions. Security in general, and antiaircraft defense in particular, is of especial importance for cavalry. Its most dangerous enemy is hostile aviation, especially in an open country. Cavalry must be trained in the use of every possible method of concealment, and should be able to disperse quickly. \i\i'hen the enemy's aviation attacks cavalry on the march, all means of fire power, antiaircraft guns, antitank rifles and rifles must be used fully. Employment of Cavalry in Battle CoL. GEN. 0. GoRonounov Red Army 53

'·s;d.·three g-shrouded pe er IIese ont (Jis I lions. 'C<.rriect_ IJnition va.1\\':. S. 5 ot \De 1\d -:<.cve. O. tp-<.'6e,.e c-;:.o't; r:ar iron\r the ta;:e;:n(J t::. <tt::hes sai(J to 81Jch:o:e 11\u'L'Lre-a.:c;e-J cs"'·o.c:-<. Q.-<.\ C"-..,-1"--t.;":;q.. •o members bUt all -- el'Jre(J Ire Of e(J re the thtgu1\5: e5 er ot· '1."(\e.... -..w:; ':f.e'I. S eO. o... "(\ Q' t. s were kdllietY in oP o1\ \.\.5 lo &roonct their t CkJessJy Chi. Mor.c't\9-It-a.n\':. S 1rthe 1:?>1\0. \\ '\loc -a.1\0. \:,"(\\'I.e o" o? Q ers reache ·c en'"" -a.'6e<> w\-<.0:v.s 0DA tu, · 6 nk... he. r.ommt'n- offenslv' -:r. p-a. -a.n'f.s '0\e o\ "'' \t?;.e"' e \. e most fantast! \\n'6 \ \)-a.\\3, \.'3.-' Big tanks hugged the southernt. Heavy figh'c>01]4'e 1\s:<.u o-<.'1. '0\"(\\1\e<:J -,s\, rean war t-.%'ri en\.:<.1\\'3-1\\.:<.,e (. 1..,0:'l '1e and blasted the Reds at in other St' It- <"e " tL<> "' 1\ '1,"(\e'--<. -ne

• H'a·:J- ':1 o c '.... \1\e ''e 0. •... t'ne Ri·. ):\e-a.:<.1\ -a.n!'-\\\e e C·n' •.:i,":J. c>e p; · trooPs 1n \':. snort\Y •le-,.le"'te -a.':i· \)'3-t\.\ '\lo'..

".o Si 1)0 •\':. bC our n /Jort\l.'-\\9-e.\. 1\el'- "' "i":I)J; "?'o:\d or- 0.,.s'rte 0 or\:; -a.t)\'l:e..,<f·.e 'loi];IJ 1/o 8'he t,...,-a.1\\ -<.: I}Se t' t/1 ltq'Q "-',.-..., 'b--> O 'b-''U '0 0 (>..._.\ · objec e hi " ilt:t' fh ql" ( 1\e'i>• \,\.e'\. \1\e<:J 'r ttl}:li.st,: e/Je'Q (i,'(;>\e"'"" cPe-.c" 4p <>eO:ak-::Unist a:: the:e bttalion,'u.e a, -a.-<.o.\ c"(\ot"'e·. I}C/;;'eo!/ 1}, <I Y sror t;,e..:.. c:. O"'d·,...'l:-ed. tan\':.' Cchanged na ni;s. launcheY s Itu.ssiaPPortedilute.,..,'le "(\\'<.$-e..:,oeO. '/JrltiJ Yol} <re <"o '"''<iiJ "Qer..:?t.··"·I{arean-tna\e':l separt- ·n titnt>S as tiog t,.stonnin the attack r;;n:adelj.'\l\0 1\0. e"' v e..:.eO. rrtiiJ, trY, tt/Jg: "JQeC/.o-·soutn din tne va tne neigh-s. artmerY 'th n,. PO$ition g four [!nit rlday '-a.-<.ou c-<. q,'b--11:, ery JQ0, t euvere e trotn direc\.ing battle. 8 enern s. Earl ed:Na. u eO.#-) y.'i> "Qbb.. _ bltr_,._"ii]K' J]_tna wni.te l{Of--red_ <>.nd' iua_!!lrrfour, bu. Was dri,!... J'ester(Ja, A.-"\. Y\.\1\e '3-'(\ Reserve and Guard Units to Train at Hood Maj. Gen. L. L. Doan, CG of Fort Hood and the First Armored Division, rcce11tly announced that Fort Hood will be host to three National Guard and two Organized Reserve divisions this summer. These civilian components will be quartered at North Fort Hood for their two-week training period. The 90th Infantry Division and the ll2th Armored Cavalry Regiment (Texas National Guard) \vill lead off, arriving at North Fort Hood on May

31. The 49th Armored Division (Texas National Guard), the 36th Infantry Division (Texas National Guard), the 75th Infantry Division and the 45th Infantry Division (Oklahoma National Guard) will follow at two-week intervals. Initial Washington Chapter Meeting-A Huge Success The meeting in April, the first, of Officers interested in Mobile warfare, located in the Washington area was a huge success. Highlighted by short speeches by General Devers and General Crittenberger and a most infomla-tive talk by Lt. Col. George Peterson, Chief of Research and Development from the Detroit Tank Arsenal, plans were made for a second meeting to be held in June. Col. Peterson spoke on "Current Trends in Tank Research and Development." The next meeting is scheduled for 4 June 53 to be held in the Rose Room of the Naval Gun Factory. Maj. Gen.

R. W. Grow will be the principal speaker. Details can be obtained by contacting Captain C. R. McFadden, Jackson 7-9400, extension 409. Patton Memorial Stamp The Postmaster General has announced that a memorial stamp honoring General George S. Patton, Jr. will be issued some time this year. The date of issuance has not yet been determined. Sponsor of this memorial stamp issuance is the World War Tank Corps Association. 54 Mathew Brady Honored l\llathew B. Brady, famed Civil \Var photographer and the first American to prove the military value of photography, was honored recently by both the military and his profession at ceremonies at Carswell Air Force Base, Fort \Vorth, Texas. A Convair RB-36 reconnaissance long-range bomber of the Strategic Air Command was christened "Mathew B. Brady" and officials of the National Press Photographers Association participated in the ceremonies. Covering General Irvin McDowell's Anny of the Potomac, Brady and his assistant manned two photo darkroom wagons. The two-horse wagons, also equipped with chemicals, negative plates and cameras, were nicknamed "Whatizzits" by the Federal troops. Ninety-one years ago, during the Peninsular campaign (May, 1862) of the Civil War, Brady recorded for posterity the first experiment in aerial reconnaissance, Professor T. S. C., Lowe, first air chief, ascended in a balloon over Mechanicsville, Virginia, and reported troop movements of the Confederates around Richmond to General

G. B. McClellan, Union Commander. When Brady photographed the air· borne balloon, Confederate rifle and artillery fire opened on Lowe-the first "ack-ack" experienced by an American combat aviator. In 1951, a Convair RB-36 flew anon-stop mission for 51 hours and 20 minutes withou t refueling. It is equipped with 14 cameras and powered by 10 engines, 6 conventional and 4 jets. Like the B-36 atomic bomber, it has the greatest fire power of any known bomber yet developed, 16 20· millimeter cannon. One of the 14 cameras aboard the 45,000 horsepow-ered RB-36 was a 42-inch focal length lens. Brady, who spent over $100,000 photographing the Civil War, died penniless in New York City January 16,

1895. H e was 73 years old. He was buried in the Congressional Cemetery at Washington, D. C. OCS For National Guard In a move to increase development of officer personnel for the National Guard, a special Officer Candidate TOP COMMAND CHANGr------ Maj. Gen. Bruce C. Clarke To Commanding General, I Corps Maj. Gen. L. L. Doan To CG, 1st Armored Division ARMOR-May-June, 1953

School Course will be conducted this -summer at Fort Riley, Kansas, it was recently announced by the Department <>f Defense. The ten-week course will be offered at the Army General School at Fort Riley for specially selected noncommissioned officers and warrant officers from National Guard units in all the States, Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia. The purpose of the special summer <>fficer candidate course, according to Major General Earl T. Ricks, Acting Chief of the National Guard Bureau, is to provide a means for qualified Guardsmen, who are unable to attend Regular Army OCS courses because of educational or occupational commitments, to obtain officer candidate training. Graduates of the course will be awarded certificates of eligibility for appointment as second lieutenants to fill vacancies in National Guard units in the combat arms and services as they occur. Smoother Tank Operation Anew, sturdier and longer-lived shock absorber, which already has brought smoother, steadier riding to railway cars, has been adopted by the

U. S. Army Ordnance Department for its new Patton 48 tank. The tank shock absorber, or snubber as it is called, is a unit originally designed and developed by Chrysler Corporation engineers for the Chrysler-Design railroa.d freight car truck, adapted for mounting on tanks. It resembles the familiar tubular shock absorber used on most automobiles, although it is completely different in Driving home the pin connecting the snubber-results a smoother ride. principle of operation and, of course, much larger in size. The tank or railway car snubber depends upon friction of a brake lining type of material, pressing against the inside surfaces of its steel tube, to pro-. ARMOR-May-June, 1953 vide a constant snubbing action. This does away with the greater complication of hydraulic shock absorbers and the problem, when used in railway or tank service, of their varying rates of snubbing action. The success of the snubber was attested when the U. S. Navy recently put into service 880 special boxcars for carrying ammunition and fragile cargo at passenger train speeds. All of these cars were equipped with Chrysler-Design trucks and snubbers. "The characteristics which have made the snubber so successful under the severe test of railroad service attracted the attention of the Ordnance Development group and the Army Ordnance people with whom it works in the design of tanks. These engineers were lookin for a solution to the problem of failure in tank service of hydraulic shock absorbers, and they found it in our railway truck snubber, which they adapted for installation on the Patton 48 tank." Mr. C. C. Utz, chief engineer, ordnance, of the Chrysler Engineering Division, who heads the Ordnance Development Department, said that the new snubber provides greater stability for the tank. "In a tank, which is essentially an armored, mobile firing platform for a gun," i\1r. Utz pointed out, "a stable firing platform is important. The new snubber reduces the pitch of the tank under gun firing recoil to a greater extent than any hydraulic type. This insures greater accuracy and requires less re-aiming of the gun during firing." Mr. R. N. Janeway, head of the Dynamics Research Department of the Engineering Division, which developed the snubber, pointed out that shock absorbers do not actually absorb shock. That, he said, is the function of the springs of the vehicle. "The shock absorber or snubber converts the energy absorbed by the sprinas into heat," he explained, "and this he tis then gotten rid of by dissipating it into the air." Some idea of the work the new tank snubbers do in converting the energy in the springs into heat can be realized by a simple comparison. "For instance," i\lr. Janeway stated, "operating under maximum capacity conditions, and making 60 up-and-down cycles a minute, the snubbers of a large tank could change spring energy into enough heat in one minute to raise two and a half gallons of water from 70 degrees to the boiling point." The longer life of the snubbers is demonstrated, Chrysler ordnance eni neers point out, by the fact that tanKs equipped with them normally go at least 2000 miles without maintenance. Ordnance experts consider 2000 miles of trouble-free field operation in a tank exceptional performance. Hydraulic units, on the other hand, under the severe requirements of tank service, frequently have to be replaced after only 300 to 400 miles of operation.

On April 30, 1953, Lieutenant General Edward Hale Brooks retired from the Army. Receiving the Distinguished Service Cross in World War I, two Distinguished Service Medals, two Legion of Merit Awards and two Silver Stars in World War II, General Brooks leaves behind him a most colorful and outstanding military career. He received a Bachelor of Science degree from Norwich University in 1916. General Brooks was commissioned in the Cavalry in 1917, fought in three major engagements during World War I, later served in the Army of Occupation. Transferring to the Artillery in 1920, he served with various Artillery units until 1932 when he attended the Command and General Staff School. Upon graduation he was assigned as Professor of Military Science and Tactics at Harvard University. I le attended the 'iVar College in 1936, after which he was assigned as an instructor at Fort Leavenworth. In 1941 he be-carne Artillery Officer of the Armored Force at Fort Knox and was instrumental in the development of mobile Field Artillery in support of Armor. After commanding the 11th Armored Division, he was assigned to the 2d Armored Division in Europe. The following October, General Brooks assumed command of the VI Corps. Following the war he was assigned to the Fourth Service Command, later as Deputy Commander of the Third Army. Subsequent to a tour of duty in the Antilles, which included Commandin General of the U. S. Army in the aribbean, he became Director of Personnel and Administration of the Department of the Army. After reorganization of the Army headquarters he was assigned as Commanding General of the Second Army which post he held at the time of his retirement. General Brooks has been quite active in the affairs of the United States Arm Association. l-Ie is presently an honorary Vice-President of the Association. 55

Details of the Centurion were recently released by the British Information Services. The unique feature of the 52-ton tank is its stabilizer. This consists of two electric-magnetic servo-mechanisms which operate both vertically and horizontally and keep the 20-pounder gun and 7.92mm Besa machine gun-the two co-axially mounted in its turret-trained on the target despite irregularities of terrain. This is done by means of rate measuring gyroscopes. Described by the British as the only tank now in production equipped with a stabilizer, the Centurion can fire accurately and quickly. The ability of the Centurion to fire without slowing down means that in tank-versus-tank warfare it possesses a great advantage. Aimed, rapid and very accurate fire can be returned to any attack instantaneously, while the heavy armor protecting the Centurion has been proved able to withstand even 85mm gunfire, the standard weapon of the Russian T-34 tank. Another factor in the Centurion's popularity, according to the British report, is its price of around $2,800 a ton, which is unmatched by any other tank now in production. This, combined with its other advantages, has brought orders from several overseas countries. Britain is producing Centurions for the Dutch and Danish armies under a $90 million U. S. offshore contract. The Canadians and Australians have ordered Centurions for their armored forces in Germany and Korea. It will climb gradients of 35 degrees, and is often jocularly called "the Alpine tank." It can travel approximately 3,100 miles before overhaul. The armor is hand-welded. The Centurion has a Rolls-Royce Merlin engine which develops 635 brake horsepower. 1 & 1A Tracks. Key to Draw ing 1 7 Ca ole reel. 32 Smoke grenade discharger. 3 3 Besa machine gun. 2 Drivin Sprocket. 3 Small hrst aid box. 4 Infantry telephone. 5 Towing ropes. 6 & 6A Exhaust pipes. 7 Engine. 8 Charging set. 9 Dynamo. 10 Fan. 11 Air cleaner. 12 Gearbox, clutch, etc. 13 Right-hand fuel tank. 14 Cover plates. 1 5 Oil cooler. 16 'iVater container. 18 Three whip aerials. 19 Box with turret cover, lifting jack, etc. 20 Box with camouHage net. 21 Box with net groundsheets. 22 Ammunition for 20-pounder gun. 23 Loader. 24 Tank Commander. 25 Head-lamp. 26 Machine gun ammunition. 27 Gun breech. 28 Periscope. 29 Gunner. 30 Elevation control. 31 Power traverse. 34 Turret am1or. 35 Box with portable cooker, etc. 35A Box for rations. 36 Box for spares, tools and tent. 3 7 Box for tools. 38 Driver. 39 Driver's periscopes. 40 Spare track links. 41 20-pounder guns. 42 Wings or skirtin plates. 4 3 Front idler sprocKet. 44 Bogie wheels. 45 Shovels, etc.

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LET. By S. L. A. Marshall. 385 pp. William Morrow & Company, New York, N. Y. $5.00. Reviewed by

Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall has produced the best portrait of our time of what war against the Reds is factually like at the squad, platoon, battalion, regiment and division levels. His book The River and the Gauntlet describes the Eighth Army's retreat in 1950 before the Chinese Communist assault. It reconstructs the major engagements of those who bore the brunt of the battle in terms of the true experiences of the individual soldiers involved. So this book answers with magnificent authenticity the question of many Americans: "What was it really like over there in Korea?" It is an important question because it reflects the desire to bridge the gap hetween those on the side lines and those who have stood the test of battle. If only for the sake of knowing the worth of the enemy we are up against, it is good that this gap should be bridged. The author has clearly aimed his book for those with special interests in the art of war and soldiering. Because of the number of abbreviations and technical terms, it would probably not sustain the interest of the ARMOR-May-June, 1953 average layman all the way through. Even so, to any average citizen, be it advertising executive or wife and mother, I'd recommend reading into The River and the Gauntlet if they are in the slightest interested in a grasp of the phenomenon that affects so much of their lives-war in the mid-twentieth century. Any combat correspondent worth his dispatches knows that the emotions of war-the fear, the inexplicable bursts of courage, the recklessness born of super tension, etc.-can be comprehended only by being on the scene. But combat correspondents know equally well that the best de- -----The Author·-----

S. L. A. Marshall served a s chie f Historian for the ETO during World War II and is presently a consultant for the Operations Research Office at Johns Hopkins University. He w a s Infantry Operations Analyst for the Eighth Army in Korea at the time of the Chinese attack described in this, his latest, book. He is Military Editor of The Detroit News. scriptive stories are obtained by piecing together, after the battle, the ebb and Bow as told by the soldiers involved. For during the actual course of battle-if it's a rough one-the correspondent, like the soldier, passes most of his time with his nose to the dust, dodging bullets. Being engaged in keeping his head down, his perspective is limited. The only way he can be sure of what the other fellow did is by asking him-when time and circumstance permit. One is impressed by the amount of detailed questioning and hunting up of records that has obviously gone into this book. But the real satisfac- -----The Reviewer·----- Margue rite Higgins, author of War in Korea, is foreign correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune. A Pulitze r Prize winner, she recently launched anew series of well timed articles on the cold war which are appearing in more than fifty newspapers throughout the world. Landing with the Marines a t Inchon she covered all aspects of the fighting. 57 tion is that the detail is fashioned so as to give drive to the narrative. The author does not delve into the emotions of the men he describes except as represented by their actual comments. He doesn't need to. The hour by hour account of the fate of squads, platoons, battalions in peril of extinction builds its own terrible suspense. There is no spuriousness here. One watches the corporal and lieutenant, sergeant and colonel make their human judgments in awful realization that the sudden death or miraculous escape that follows is happening to one of our own. Marshall poses some value judgments with which this correspondent disagrees. The entire question of the merits or demerits of starting the controversial Eighth Army offensive to the Yalu is inextricably tied in to the question of the Free World's knowledge of Chinese Communist intentions. If the Chinese stayed out, the offensive was a sure thing. If they came in only halfheartedly, it still was a good risk. No one- and particularly not General Douglas i\Iac-Arthur-would have ordered the offensive if it had been known that the Chinese armies were to come in full scale and that furthermore our capacity for retaliation by air and sea would be limited, thus giving the enemy double advantage. ( Washington did not prohibit MacArthur's right of retaliation until the Chinese Communist intervention was a fait accompli. MacArthur learned of vVashington's attitude when his order to blow up the Yalu bridges was countermanded.) Marshall seems to blame General MacArthur for not knowing the Communist intentions. But Communist intentions are decided in Peking and Moscow, and none of the leaders of the Free World including President Truman knew whether the Chinese armies in Manchuria were being readied as defensive warning or an assault group. A graphic spectacle of the Free World's chronic inability to guess Communist intentions is being afforded currently by high level speculation as to what the so-called Malen-kov peace offensive really means. It is a rueful tribute to the Russians that President Eisenhower tacitly admits in public speeches that he knows nothing more about what the Kremlin is up to than does any reader of Moscow's communiques. And as great a man as is General MacArthur, it seems unfair in the case of the events of Fall 1950 to expect afield commander to know more than our highest governmental au - thorities in Washington, including incidentally, the Central Intelligence Agency, which was sure the Chinese would stay conveniently home. "It was but one incident among hundreds, each h·aving its own special torment." 58 But fortunatelv, in this reviewer's: opinion, General Marshall's critique of top level military policy is only incidentaL He documents beautifully his main purpose described as follows in the opening chapters: "The explanation of how the Eighth Army was deceived by its enemy is hardly separable from the story of its reaction to the unexpected situation.... All Americans had some share in the mistakes which precipitated the winter battle with the Chinese. On the other hand it fell to but a few of our countrymen to redeem with the sweat, courage and lives the situation thus made. The story lies in whether they did meanly or nobly." General Marsh all is admirably equipped to tell this story. He is a noted writer on military affairs. His impressive background includes the post of Chief Historian for the European Theater of Operations during World War II. At the time of the historic Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, the author was infantry operations analyst. The blurb on the book jacket says "General Marshall has developed a unique method of battle reporting... his technique is based on exhaustive interviews of participants in battle from infantry squad to generaL" In this reader's opinion the most compelling passage-and the one intended as the climax-was the description of the ordeal of the Second Infantry Division as it sought to escape through the Kunuri pass. The exit began without our top leadership realizing that the Chinese had infiltrated rearward. The result was that the convoys were not combat loaded and thus not prepared for the battle in the trap so carefully and devastatingly prepared by the enemy. For stark honest reporting of both the "mean and noble," consider this passage describing the arrival of Major General Lawrence B. Keiser, division commander, at the pass: "General Keiser had been phenomenally lucky in his jeep run through the greater part of the gauntlet (the pass). After leaving his command post in the bivouac area at about I:30 p.m. he doubled along the stalled part of the division column almost without stopping and got to the final ridge at about 3: 15 p.m. This placed him in the pass approximately twenty ARMOR-May-June, 1953 rl r British Tanks moving into Seoul to take up new positions in late December 1950. minutes after the column had wedged there. He personally witnessed the atrophy of our troops who had closed jn just prior to his arrival. "The dead lay in the ditches and sprawled across the roadway. Most of the living-even those still unwounded-were in such a state of shock that they responded to nothing, saw nothing, seemingly heard nothing. The Chinese fire beat like hail among the rocks and against the vehicles. But the soldiers neither cried out nor sought better cover. Their facial expressions remained set, appearing almost masklike because of the heavy coating of dust and the distortion from the dropping of the jaws. They were saying nothing and doing nothing except that a few shuffled about aimlessly seeming to reel in their tracks. General Keiser walked among them moving from group to group barking questions trying to startle them back to consciousness. 'Who'sin command here?' '\iVho are you?' 'Can any of you do anything?' He got not a single response.... "One thing made his heart leap up. A sergeant from the 9th Infantry had taken an 8lmm mortar from a ¥! ton truck, set it up in the middle of the roadway and 'vvas now single-handedly firing the piece on line of sight against the Chinese posttiOns atop the south ridge. It was the only fire Keiser saw being delivered by an American. But he saw a few other self-possessed individuals most of whom were trying to help th e wounded." There you have it. The "mean and the noble." The truth. One of the refreshing rings of honesty in this book as distinguished from the war novels is the lack of the grand gesture, consciously made and consciously noted. As anyone who has been ncar war can testify, there is no time for histrionics because the sheer urgency of the crises provides no audience. The very unreality of war is the casualness of death: when a young soldier rushes on the spur of the moment to rescue a wounded buddy and is instantly killed himself there is not even time to bow to this noble moment of heroism gone wrong. There are instead the more pressing problems of killing or evading the enemy before he gets you. In reporting, in coherent human detail, the Eighth Army's retreat before the Yalu, General Marshall has discharged for history and for the present record some of this country's obligation to make known the courage and judgment of those who did nobly. By telling the truth about our failings General Marshall has given us the chance to profit from the mistakes of those who- too often by force of overwhelming circumstance, lack of training rather than individual lack, fell into the category of those who did not measure up.

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.. Choice of profession... A difficult decision! Upon completion of a formal education, be it school, college, or university, one again may decide to specialize. Once this is determined there should be no turning back, no vacillating of purpose. As a future commander in the Army, the student of the military art must decide on the branch of service which he feels he is best qualified in to better serve his country and himself Regardless of choice, regardless of branch, whether arm or service, all mold to form the greatest team on earth. If the military student leans toward the mobile-mindedness of some of our past greats such as Wesley Merritt, John Pershing, or George Patton, then his position is the one that denotes mobility-firepower-shock action and decision... Armor-the Arm of Decision ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare