Desert Storm – The First Firefight

(Reprinted from the March-April 1994 ARMOR ) The 3d Platoon, I Troop, 3d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3/3 ACR) made the first ground contact of Operation Desert Storm on 22 January 1991. It has been well over 3 years since then, and from after-action reviews, I realize that this was just the prelude to larger and more significant battles in the war. However, this was the first contact, and despite its small scale, it is interesting because of its relevance to combat on a larger scale. We received the mission to conduct a moving flank screen westward to an overnight observation post, and screen back the following day. We were clearing the sector to our west for the 24th Infantry Division to occupy on the regiment’s left flank. First platoon was following 4 to 6 hours later with a similar mission. Our final destination was more than 100 kilometers from the squadron assembly area, so logistics and communications were a major concern. Accordingly, we brought long-range antennas and formulated contingencies for resupply. Unfortunately, because of the distances involved, we left our habitually associated M106 4.2-inch mortar carrier behind. Later, we wished “blue 7” and Staff Sergeant James Kennedy’s indirect firepower had been available. We did have an unexpected “attachment” when Colonel Douglas Starr, the regimental commander, and his Bradley crew took this opportunity to conduct a leader’s reconnaissance with our platoon. We also had a ground surveillance radar track from the 66th Military Intelligence Company, with Sergeant Todd Morgan as the squad leader. The weather was clear and cool as we departed to the northwest over varying rocky, sandy, flat, and sloping terrain. Observation was outstanding everywhere as we paralleled the berm between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Along the way, we encountered a military police squad securing a main road northward to a town that recently had been under Iraqi mortar attack. This was a reminder that we were operating in unsecured terrain. Colonel Starr informed me that allied aircraft were scheduled to attack that evening to destroy the enemy mortars. We continued our mission westward without further contact. As we neared our objective, Corporal Alvin Gage, gunner for I32, detected something on the horizon about 5 kilometers to the west. I maneuvered the platoon from a staggered column to a scout platoon wedge (see Figure 1). We developed this formation for maneuvering toward targets of opportunity during a hasty attack, moving independently as a scout platoon, or platoon-sized raids, including situations such as we now faced. The formation enhances 360-degree security and flexibility, as well as provides good command and control. It also allows scout sections freedom to maneuver, of which I now took advantage. I notified Colonel Starr on my higher radio net that I was sending a section forward to investigate. The colonel also went forward. As Bravo section maneuvered forward, they reported the vehicle as an abandoned “low boy” trailer. However, from here, they identified some Saudi border guard vehicles on a ridge about 3 kilometers to the north, near the first vegetation we had seen all day. The platoon moved forward into its wedge and continued forward to the next ridge line. Colonel Starr was now in front and dismounted to talk with a Saudi captain. From here, we saw the faint outline of unidentifiable equipment in the dusky distance of the next ridge line. The equipment was on the enemy side of the berm, which now was clearly visible at the bottom of the slope to our front. Remarkably, there was also a large, two-story building in the valley below. It was the first structure we had seen in days. Colonel Starr quickly briefed us that there was a Saudi border patrol engaged in a firefight in and around the building to our front. The Saudi captain requested our assistance. How could we refuse? As we headed down the gradual slope, we could see the shallow valley, densely cov- 61 ered by scrub and scattered bushes, affording decent concealment and some cover. The far side of the valley rose to the limit of our observation about 10 kilometers distant. The sky was overcast and dim as Colonel Starr prepared us for what was about to unfold. He ordered me to have the platoon close all vehicle hatches, move on line, and prepare for contact as we descended to the berm. We readied our weapons and minds as we intently scanned the valley below. I glanced about at our formation and spacing. We pulled into hull-down positions along the berm with about 150 to 200 meters between vehicles. The berm was 5 to 6 feet tall, consisting of bulldozed dirt and rocks at a formidably steep angle on both sides. I sent my observers forward for local security and looked directly into Iraq for the first time. Scattered Saudi soldiers moved in and around the lone structure. Border guard trucks pulled out to the west as we arrived. We caught glimpses of the enemy as they ducked in and out of the vegetation to our front. The firefight that had been taking place took on a frightening new dimension with the arrival of the awesome firepower of a Bradley scout platoon. Soon, we all would learn exactly how effective the 25mm chain gun can be. The enemy could not have been ready for what was about to happen. We had already achieved surprise on the battlefield. Colonel Starr calmly directed us to scan for targets, but he ordered me to let him know before we engaged. After a few moments of scanning, I heard the report of a 25mm gun to my right. Colonel Starr was conducting reconnaissance by fire in the vegetation 1,000 meters to our front. I took this as a sign and commanded my platoon to engage any targets that presented themselves. Colonel Starr continued to engage at intervals and I began receiving reports from Alpha section. They were engaging troops and a bunker, 1,800- 3,000 meters distant, with high-explosive (HE) rounds. Colonel Starr told me to control my fires because he saw the rounds lofting high into the air. I explained to him that this was the trajectory of HE rounds at extended ranges. Staff Sergeant Terry Buchanan, commander of I32, said he actually saw enemy soldiers attempting to dodge incoming rounds they observed in flight. Alpha section thoroughly covered the bunker with suppressive fire. “It just lit up,” Sergeant Morgan later told me. The only enemy soldiers we now saw were fleeing out of our range into other bunkers. These targets easily would have been within 4.2-inch mortar range. Colonel Starr maneuvered his Bradley forward after he saturated an area to his front with 25mm armor-piercing rounds. He was advancing to flush out enemy soldiers we identified trying to hide in the vegetation to our front. Tracers sprayed all around him as he attacked. He reported that he had pinned down some enemy soldiers and requested that I dispatch a section to assist him. I decided to send Bravo section across the berm because they had no targets in their sector. The situation had developed into a hasty attack (see Figure 2). We had suppressed the enemy activity and it was time to assault. If we would have had mortars, we could have covered the entire area, including the dead space, and engaged the hazy targets on the horizon. Staff Sergeant Steve Ruch, in I35, initiated the assault by quickly crossing the berm and dashing to the enemy’s flank. Staff Sergeant Peter Baez, in I36, had trouble negotiating the berm. He moved 500 meters behind I35, but still covered his exposed flank. It was not a flawlessly initiated assault, but it was taking shape. After Bravo section deployed, I was concerned about my left flank, so I instructed my dismounted scouts to focus on that area. Bravo section searched for targets in the thick brush as they closed on the enemy. Alpha section continued to engage on the right. I cautioned the platoon to ensure they could positively identify both “Rifle 6” and Bravo section before they engaged. Strangely, safety was foremost on my mind at this point. If they could not see all the friendly elements, they were not to fire at all. Colonel Starr later said we were under small caliber mortar fire, but I barely noticed its presence. The assault developed rather slowly because of difficulty negotiating the berm. Since we appeared to have suppressed the enemy, I began to search for a spot to cross the berm and directed Alpha section to do the same. Alpha began to cross as I35 reached the objective. I told Alpha to hold in place and continue to scan, engage, and report. Suddenly, I35 came under fire! I saw the flash and smoke of projectiles impacting on I35 as it moved through the enemy position. Staff Sergeant Ruch’s voice came over the radio. “I’ve got casualties in the back! My track’s full of holes!” Welcome to war, lieutenant. The word “casualties” hits hard. God, let them live. My gunner and I hung our heads momentarily in disbelief. This was war. I told Staff Sergeant Ruch to return to the berm, treat his casualties, and report to me. I directed I36 to continue the assault. I informed Colonel Starr of the situation and he agreed with my decisions. Soon thereafter, Staff Sergeant Ruch reported that his vehicle was full of smoke and that both his scout observers had received leg wounds. One wound was minor, the second more serious. Private First Class Kelly Ocon, driver of 135, skillfully drove the Bradley back through a hail of enemy fire. It was an extremely deter-Figure 1 62 mined effort and a tribute to the teamwork and training of the crew of I35. Once back on our side of the berm, the slightly wounded soldier, Corporal Mark Valentine (a combat lifesaver), stabilized and controlled the bleeding of the other casualty, Specialist Trey Garrison. Later, we counted 15 holes of differing sizes in I35, the first Bradley tested in combat. The few penetrations were made by older model antitank weapons; we were lucky that most of these rounds either didn’t fully penetrate or passed harmlessly through the less vital areas of the Bradley. Meanwhile, I36 closed on the objective. The enemy seemed disheartened after subjecting a Bradley to such intense fire and watching it drive away, evidently undamaged. Those on the objective raised their arms in surrender. I36 stopped on the near side of the objective and dismounted three soldiers to collect the prisoners. Dismounts from Rifle 6 assisted. Sergeant Bryan Hunt, gunner of I36, identified an enemy heavy machine gun team preparing to engage our dismounted soldiers. Acting independently, he swiftly and accurately destroyed them with 25- mm fire. The enemy had seen enough and didn’t care to provoke any further attacks. The assault was complete, it was time to withdraw and reconsolidate. Staff Sergeant Baez loaded the prisoners on the trim vane of Rifle 6 and moved them back across the berm, where my platoon sergeant, Sergeant First Class Emilio Rios, took charge of them. We moved Figure 2 “Meanwhile, I36 closed on the objective. The enemy seemed disheartened after subjecting a Bradley to such intense fire and watching it drive away, evidently undamaged. Those on the objective raised their arms in surrender.” 63 back about 3,000 meters to evacuate our casualties and process the prisoners. We occupied a platoon assembly area and moved the casualties and prisoners to the center. Colonel Starr contacted Blackhawk helicopters from regiment to evacuate the wounded and prisoners. We systematically searched the prisoners. They were between the ages of 18 and 45, well armed, but otherwise poorly equipped. Some were frightened and others seemed to accept their fate. The war was over for them. Later, our squadron S2, Captain Paul Hovey, told me this had been a good drill for all allied echelons of enemy prisoners of war (EPW) processing. It validated the system that the allies already established. Once the Blackhawks departed, we displaced to the vegetation on top of the ridge where we had first made contact with the Saudi captain. Night fell as we secured our perimeter and Colonel Starr arranged for aerial resupply. I quickly assembled my Bradley commanders to issue orders and conduct a short after-action review. After night settled in, the ground surveillance radar reported activity in the valley below. We remained vigilant for a possible counterattack. Colonel Starr had called two OH-58D helicopters and an A-10 into the area. They verified that the enemy was evacuating bodies from the battlefield. The aircraft tried to identify further targets. We saw tracers fly through the air as the enemy unsuccessfully tried to shoot down the A-10 as it made its passes. Colonel Starr called off the close-air support and left to brief the corps commander. We girded in for a tense, yet uneventful, night. It was crisp and cool the next morning as we returned to the squadron assembly area. Everyone was excited about our return and immediately inundated us with questions. The squadron commander snatched me away to the squadron tactical operations center (TOC) to debrief the squadron and troop commanders and staff. Below are the lessons learned that I related to them, and some that I have reflected on since. Many confirm what I already have learned in my Army experiences and schooling.  The Army trained us well. The soldiers responded as they should have. The Army should continue to emphasize leadership development programs, such as primary leadership development course (PLDC) and basic and advanced noncommissioned officers courses. Cohesion, teamwork, and leadership allowed us to be a flexible and responsive unit, and rapidly and effectively react to any situation that presented itself.  Combat experience is exceptionally valuable. Colonel Starr set the tone for success with his calm, poised, and confident bearing. We should ensure that combat lessons learned are perpetuated and internalized through officer and enlisted professional-development programs.  Cover your wingman. Emphasize section-level gunnery and the wingman concept during tactical exercises. Section-level teamwork represents fire and maneuver at the lowest tactical level.  The 25mm chain gun is a devastating weapons system. Our engagement highlighted its impressive rate of fire and influential and lethal impact. Crews should have absolute confidence in this weapons system based on its effectiveness as demonstrated in combat. One minor improvement includes the necessity for a turret position indicator in the gunner’s sight margin.  Always retain some form of indirect-fire support. Our effectiveness would have been much improved if we had responsive indirect fires available. We could have inflicted much more shock at longer ranges and perhaps assaulted deeper into enemy territory under the cover of indirect fires. There is always dead space to cover. Even a 60mm mortar organic to the platoon would have been valuable. Indirect fires are most critical to scouts, not necessarily to kill, but to suppress the enemy and buy time to perform security and reconnaissance missions. Reconnaissance by fire is a useful technique when firing into a concealed area, if the ammunition is available. I would have preferred to execute reconnaissance by fire using indirect fires. Combined arms win.  Train to use the tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile on bunker targets. We could have imposed more damage on the enemy if we had used this technique, but it never entered my mind until later. We could integrate this into the UCOFT program and reinforce it by firing at bunkers at long range during TOW live-fire exercises. However, HE should be the primary ammunition against bunker targets, if within range.  Develop a method to communicate with your dismounts. Scout certification courses should incorporate dismounted engagements, requiring the vehicle commander to control his dismounts in a tactical scenario. Failure to maintain control of dismounted personnel can lead to mission failure, or worse — the dismounts actually hindering mission accomplishment. There are many techniques to maintain communications with dismounted personnel, which include employing radios, gunnery flags, vehicle horns, lights, or exhausts. We should ensure we develop and train these skills according to the unit’s standard operating procedures (SOP).

 In a strange way, even in combat, safety is paramount. Controlling fires and maneuvering elements are critical to mission accomplishment and preserving the force. At every level, fire plans and sound SOPs for engaging targets and identifying friendly and enemy forces are vital for success. We should continue to emphasize fire commands, fire plans, and vehicle identification in our gunnery programs, especially during live-fire exercises, including maneuver.  Corporal Valentine and Specialist Garrison received overwhelming medical attention as the first combat casualties in our sector. Valentine returned to us 4 days later and Garrison several weeks thereafter. Lieutenant General Luck, the XVIII Airborne Corps commander, flew to our location to award Valentine his Purple Heart in front of the troop. “This award sucks,” he said on a bleak, miserable Saudi afternoon. I agreed; the battlefield is a dangerous place. Fortunately, despite other combat operations, this was the last Purple Heart any of my troopers received. After the excitement, 3d platoon, I Troop, was famous in the regiment. I let my soldiers enjoy the attention, but thought ahead to the day when the real offensive would begin and reminded myself that glory is fleeting. I prayed we would fare as well in the battles to come and wished the same for all those wanting to know “what’sit like?” CAPTAIN JONATHAN J. NEGIN was commissioned in 1988 as a Distinguished Military Graduate from Fresno State University’s Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Scout Platoon Leader Course, Cavalry Leader Course, and Armor Officer Advance Course. He has served as a tank platoon leader, scout platoon leader, and troop XO, I Troop, 3d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3/3 ACR); and assistant S3, 3/3 ACR. He is currently assistant S3, 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, Fort Hood, TX. 64