Breakthrough to Bastogne

(Reprinted from the November-December 1981 ARMOR ) Into the Ardennes Bigonville was rough. With intelligence of advancing German armor, Reserve Command [Combat Command R] (CCR) had been committed on the right flank, as the other two combat commands of the American 4th Armored Division continued to slug north toward Bastogne and the beleaguered paratroopers of the 101st Airborne Division. Colonel Wendell Blanchard, commander of CCR, had the 37th Tank Battalion (37 Tank), 53d Armored Infantry Battalion (53 AIB), and 94th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (94 AFA), when the command jumped off on 23 December 1944. The reconnaissance platoon of the 37 Tank preceded the advanced guard — Team B (B/37 Tank and B/53 AIB) — as far as the 25th Cavalry’s outpost, where Lieutenant Marion Harris pulled the platoon aside and waved the column on. The approach march to contact along the sheer, ice-covered secondary road was difficult, and tanks and halftracks skidded out of control. Initially, Team B received no fire, nor observed any enemy, save an awesome pair of very large enemy tank tracks looming before it in the new-fallen snow. But as the team approached Flatzbour-hof — the Bigonville-Holts railroad station — it began to receive tank, antitank, and machine gun fire from the railroad building and adjacent woods. Captain Jimmie Leach, commander of B/37 Tank and of Team B, deployed his force along the railroad embankment, while the artillery pounded the nearby woods and German positions beyond the railroad station. As expected, the Germans were quick to counterattack with white-clad paratroopers, reinforced by two self-propelled guns and a captured M4 Sherman tank. Just as quickly, B/37 tanks, firing from their positions behind the railroad embankment, dispatched all three German vehicles, halting the counterattack. During the fight, it was Sherman against Sherman, with Captain Leach’s gunner, Corporal John Yarem-chuk, coming out a winner. As darkness fell, Team B was ordered to hold its position while Lieutenant Colonel Creighton W. Abrams Jr., commanding the 37 Tank, attempted to maintain the momentum of his attack by sending the tanks of A Company through Team Band those of C Company around its right flank. However, stubborn resistance by tank-reinforced troopers of the German 13th Parachute Regiment, mines and casualties brought the attack to a standstill a full mile away from Bigonville, the CCR objective. The A/37 Tank’s passage of B/37 Tank’s lines was aborted due to numerous vehicles lost to snow-covered mines, including Lieutenant John Whitehill’s command tank; and the C/37 Tank attack was likewise aborted because of the loss of nine tank commanders, including the commanding officer, Captain Charlie Trover, who was killed. During the cold, clear night with outposts alert, the CCR tankers, redlegs (artillerymen), and doughs (infantrymen) received some badly needed replacements. They repaired their vehicles and reorga- 36 nized their troops and crews for the next morning’s attack. On the 24th, Team B’s tanks and doughs attacked again, fighting their way into the very center of Bigonville, where the tough troopers of the German 5th Parachute Division had to be blasted out house by house. Small-arms and Panzerfaust fire continued to take its toll. Lieutenant Bob Cook, B/36 Tank’s executive officer and 3d platoon leader, went down with a rifle bullet in his chest. He was briefly captured by the Germans while he was attempting to find the accompanying medic jeep, but abandoned as the B Company doughs advanced. Captain Leach, who won a Distinguished Service Cross in this fight, was shot in the shoulder and head, but was able to maintain command of Team B. As the Bigonville battle continued, Colonel Abrams ordered a blocking and screening position, without its infantry, to the north of town. No sooner had its tanks moved into position, than a flight of four American P-47 “Thunderbolt” fighter-bombers, thinking them enemy, made two bombing and strafing attacks on these friendly forces. Captain Leach and his tank crews tossed out red smoke grenades and frantically attempted to uncover the red recognition panels for identification, while the battalion S3, Captain Bill Dwight, radioed Colonel Abrams to call off the “friendlies.” There were no casualties; luckily, the U. S. fliers had missed everyone and everything. When the mopping up was over, Bigonville, and the surrounding area, yielded some 400 prisoners of war (POW) and 100 enemy dead to the tenacious CCR attackers. With Bigonville secured, CCR looked forward to spending a restful Christmas Day, feasting on a turkey dinner. The battalions were much understrength, and the 37 Tank in particular had just completed a 160-mile road march up from Lorraine and the Saarland, where it had been supporting the newly arrived 87th “Golden Acorn” Infantry Division in the Westwall fighting. Bastogne “Fire Call” When alerted for the “fire call” run to the Ardennes, the 4th Armored Division had just been pulled out of line in Lorraine after a month of slugging from the Seille Valley to the German border. Mud and mines had restricted the tanks, overcast had grounded the tactical air support, and the revitalized German defense had skillfully parried every thrust — all of which combined to deny Patton a breakthrough. Having achieved a brilliant reputation as it slashed across France after the Normandy breakout, the 4th Armored was bitter about the casualties it had suffered in the November offensive. Knocked-out tanks were strewn along the way in what was considered an atrocious misuse of armor, and after a shouting match with his corps commander, Major General John S. Wood, the 4th Armored’s beloved commanding general, was relieved by Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr., the 3d Army commander. But Patton gave the 4th his own chief of staff, Major General Hugh Gaffey, who had commanded the 2d Armored in Sicily. “Gimlet-eyed Gaffey,” the laconic Texan with immaculate riding breeches and “boots you could use as a mirror,” had a style completely unlike the bluff, good natured “P” Wood. But he was coolly efficient and the 4th was an experienced war machine. Said Patton, “There has never 37 been such a superb fighting organization as the 4th Armored Division.” On 22 December 1944, the 4th Armored, under Milliken’s new III Corps in Belgium, jumped off to drive on Bastogne where the 101st “Screaming Eagles” Airborne Division was surrounded by the German offensive of the Battle of the Bulge. The counterattack cut into the still expanding torrent of the German offensive and resistance stiffened north of the Sure River. Patton, who had promised to reach Bastogne “by Christmas,” found his advance stalling. On the 24th, Milliken decided to regroup his forces to concentrate more power for the relief of Bastogne. Two battalions of the 80th “Blue Ridge” Infantry Division were trucked over to reinforce the armor, and the boundary of the 26th “Yankee” Division was extended to include the Bigonville area, thereby releasing CCR to the 4th Armored Division. By doctrine and practice, CCR was not employed tactically. Its table of organization and equipment (T/O&E) headquarters was much smaller than those of Combat Commands A and B (CCA and CCB) and was only intended to administratively control units not in the line. But Gaffey tactically employed the reserve to meet the threat to the right flank at Bigonville and he now intended to shift it around to the left to seek a weak spot in the German front. Night Road March CCR had just turned in on Christmas Eve when it received orders for a 27-mile night road march from Bigonville around to Neufchateau highway, leading to Bastogne. Attended by appropriate griping, the column crossed the initial point an hour after midnight under radio listening silence, with the reconnaissance platoon’s peeps and light tanks of the 37 Tank Battalion leading as the point. Then came the advance guard, comprising the light tank company (D/37 Tank (-)), B/53 AIB mounted in halftracks, and a squad from C Company, 24th Engineer Battalion (Armored) to clear obstacles. Five minutes back came the main body of the combat command, with the rest of Lieutenant Colonel Creighton W. (Abe) Abrams’ 37 Tank and Lieutenant Colonel George Jaques’ 53 AIB; the M7 105mm “Priest” self-propelled Howitzers of Lieutenant Colonel Robert Parker’s 94 AFA with C Battery of 155mm towed howitzers attached from the 177th Field Artillery (FA); two gun companies, of the 704th Tank Destroyer (TD) Battalion; and other attachments. Service and supply elements came separately, under CCR trains command. The Christmas Eve night was clear and cold, lit by a nearly full moon, while flares and explosions illuminated the northern horizon at Bastogne. As the column twisted through the dark forest areas, bleary-eyed drivers tried to focus on the cat-eye blackout markers of the vehicle ahead. In the open halftracks, armored doughs dozed fitfully and stomped their frozen feet to regain circulation. There were some 400 vehicles in the column that stretched more than 16 miles of road space. Standing operating procedures called for an 8 mph rate of march at a 50-yard closed interval at night (15 mph at a 100 yards open interval by day), with a 1-minute interval between company march units and 5 minutes between battalion march groups (serials), giving a time length of about 2 hours. Thus, the vanguard of the column had already pulled into its assembly area south of Vaux while the rest of the column was still closing on the release point at Molinfaing. Tactical Organization and Commanders As the troops topped off their vehicles and got a catnap, their commanders attended a conference for planning the Christmas Day attack. If there were prayers, they were silent and individual. CCR’s mission was flank protection, with the main drive still to be mounted by CCB, in the center. The three combat commands were deployed abreast, each comprising a tank battalion, an armored infantry battalion, a direct-support armored field artillery battalion, and the normal attachments. The combat commands also had a company each from the tank destroyer, engineer, medical, ordnance-maintenance, and antiaircraft artillery battalions, as well as a troop from the cavalry/reconnaissance squadron and the military police platoon, along with supporting III Corps artillery. In Lorraine, each combat command had operated with two battalion-sized task forces, the tank and armored infantry battalions cross-reinforcing each other. But because of the constricted terrain in the Ardennes, there was only one ridge-running road on the axis of advance of each combat command: the Arlon-Martelange highway for CCA; a secondary road through Chaumont for CCB, bounded by the Strainchamps and Burnon Creeks; and the Neufchateau highway for CCR — a zone of advance 8 miles wide. Thus, the tank and armored infantry companies were paired as teams to leapfrog from village to village, with the infantry and tank battalion commanders working closely together. Normal practice for the three company teams was to leapfrog from assault to reserve, to support, with a team’s turn to lead coming up every third turn. The 37 Tank had three medium tank companies and one light tank company, supported by the M4 105mm assault gun and 81mm mortar platoons of headquarters company. Since each of the 37th’s three medium companies were down to 9 or 10 tanks, instead of 17, they often maneuvered as one unit (rather than in three platoons), deploying from column into line, wedge, echelon, or line of sections formation, depending on terrain. If serious resistance was expected, the armored doughs left their thin-skinned halftracks and “married up” with the tanks in the attack position just short of the line of departure, mounting a squad on the rear deck of each tank. The platoon leaders mount- 38 ed their counterparts’ tanks to facilitate control by using the tank company radio frequency. The tank company commanding officer commanded the team’s assault until the infantrymen dropped off and went into action on their own. Each team advance would be preceded by direct fire from the supporting team, a sharp artillery concentration on call by the forward observer in his tank, and tactical air support by P-47 fighter planes, if available. The few air controllers were normally at combat command headquarters. The commander of the 37 Tank was chunky, 29-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Creighton W. (Abe) Abrams, who was already making a fighting name for himself. In 1944 campaigns, Abrams’ aggressive leadership of the 37 Tank, under the skillful direction of Colonel Bruce C. Clarke of CCA, did much to establish “P” Wood’s 4th Armored as Patton’s favorite division. (When the German Ardennes offensive began, Clarke had gone to CCB of the 7th Armored with a brigadier general’s star and was blunting the German drive in the St. Vith sector as the 4th fought toward Bastogne.) Abe’s combat philosophy was simple, “Our operations are all based on violence,” and “Go East, it’s the quickest way home.” Abrams had developed the 37 Tank as a finely honed fighting unit. His staff not only functioned well as such, but he often used his staff officers to direct his attacks. They would monitor both battalion and company radio frequencies, leaving company commanders free to handle their units, yet the battalion commanding officer kept in close touch with the situation. As the 105mm assault gun tank of each company was frequently grouped with the battalion assault gun platoon, so too did Abe take the seventeenth tank from each of the medium companies and give them to his S2, S3, and liaison officer (LNO). These headquarters tanks, with those of the commanding officer and the executive officer, received names beginning with “T,” just as the company tank name began with the company letter. Thus, Abe rode in “Thunderbolt VI” (he would wear out seven M4s during the war), with its name painted on its flanks in 8-inch letters on a background of billowing white clouds punctured by jagged red streaks of lightning. ‘‘We can always spot his tank,” said A/37’s commander, Lieutenant John Whitehill, “because it doesn’t roll ahead like others. It gallops.” And in the hatch was Abe, his long, black un-lighted cigar clenched in his teeth, aggressively jutting forward, looking like “just another gun.” He led by courageous example and the 37th’s motto was “Courage Conquers.” The 53 AIB was still absorbing replacements from the Lorraine fighting. The armored infantry had long since discarded their 57mm antitank (AT) guns as useless against German panzers, and the AT platoon of each of the three rifle companies was used as a fourth rifle platoon or as replacements. Though badly under their TO&E strength of 10 men (excluding the halftrack driver), the three rifle squads of each platoon augmented their firepower by mounting an additional machine gun on their halftrack, and by trading tanker jackets for Browning automatic rifles (BAR) and Thompson submachine guns (Tommy guns). The rifle platoon leaders each had a 60mm mortar squad and alight machine gun (LMG) with two.30- caliber LMGs to provide fire support, backed up by the battalion assault gun, mortar, and machine gun platoons. The commander of the 53 AIB was Lieutenant Colonel George L. Jaques, “Jigger Jakes,” whom his fellow Bay Stater, Abrams, addressed over the radio as “Sad-sack.” In fast-moving armored combat, nicknames were preferred to the daily changing signal operating instructions (SOI) call signs, and voice recognition as authentication. More orthodox than the tanker “going by the book,” Jaques was ably seconded by his battalion executive officer, Major Henry A. Crosby. The 53 AIB was an experienced outfit. Both battalion commanders had more tactical experience and expertise than their CCR commander and it was Abe who headed the final drive to Bastogne. Armored Assault At 1100 hours on Christmas Day, the drive began. The German combat outpost line was quickly scattered as CCR tanks roared down the highway, firing as they went. In fact, the only obstacles encountered were those emplaced earlier by American engineers withdrawing from the onslaught of the German offensive. The 37th’s S3, Captain Bill Dwight, had hit a mine on the night road march in his tank “Tonto.” It was an American mine, “fortunately,” and only broke a track block, which was soon replaced. While returning to his command post the next day, Abe hit another mine that tossed him out of his peep — unscratched — but totaled the peep and crippled his driver. “Another lesson about marking minefields,” wryly observed the 37 Tank XO, Major Ed Bautz. As Baker Company of the 53 AIB cleaned out Vaux-les-Rosieres, the armored spearhead continued up the highway toward Bastogne, 10 miles ahead. The German main line of resistance was probably astride the highway itself, covering the primary armor approach. But the available intelligence, such as it was, was not of much help. Red penciled enemy symbols cluttered the situation maps, many with question marks. (It is now known that it was the 5th Parachute Division that had responsibility for protecting the German southern flank, while the 26th Volksgrenadier Division invested Bastogne, launching attacks in conjunction with the 15th Panzergrenadier and Panzer Lehr Divisions.) To avoid possible minefields astride the highway, the armored attack swung off the hardtop beyond Vaux into a secondary road that might be less defended. The terrain was fairly open — snow-covered fields, patches of dark woods, and stone-built farm villages dotted the countryside. D Company’slight tanks and M18 Hellcat TDs outposted the flank beyond Petite Rosiers, while C Troop, 25th (C/ 25) Cavalry Squadron screened the open flank to the west. Now, the main attack began to pick up momentum. Team A tanks and infantry drove into Nives, supported by Team C, and then Team C passed through the town before it was cleared on its way to Cobreville. Radio contact with battalion was lost, but C/37 Tank’s commander, Lieutenant Charles Boggess, who had taken over the tank company only 2 days before, acted on his own initiative and continued the attack. While his team cleared the town, Boggess dismounted from his tank around 1400 hours to reconnoiter an area where the road crossed a small creek, and found the bridge had just been blown. Colonel Abrams called up his tank bulldozer, which crumbled a 39 Continued on Page 42 To avoid possible minefields astride the highway, the armored attack swung off the hardtop beyond Vaux into a secondary road that might be less defended. The terrain was fairly open — snow-covered fields, patches of dark woods, and stone-built farm villages dotted the countryside.

nearby stone wall and pushed it into the gap so the drive would continue — it was moving again by 1530 hours. Since the Cobreville Bridge had been prepared for demolition, it was likely that Remoiville would be defended. Four artillery battalions pounded the town for 10 minutes, while the supporting Shermans blasted the stone buildings: “Gunner! Kraut Bazooka! Barn! H-E! Traverse Right! Steady! … On! Eight hundred! Fire!” Then, Team A charged into the dust and rubble, with the tanks firing high-explosive rounds and spraying machine gun fire everywhere. B/53 AIB came in to help during the house-to-house fighting — it was “toss a grenade through a window, kick open the door, leap in and to the side, and spray the room with Tommy gun fire!” High-velocity tank shells screamed through the upper floors, sending plaster dust flying. By 1800 hours, 327 POWs had been rounded up from the 3d Battalion, 14th Parachute Regiment. The advance had already rolled through Remoiville, but leading elements encountered a crater in the road as dusk fell. B/37 Tank worked around to the left and took up positions in and around Remoiville, overlooking Remichampagne, while infantry screened the woods to the west. CCR was now abreast of CCB, which was in sight across the gorge of Burnon Creek, after having finally driven the German paratroopers out of Chaumont. CCA had likewise slugged ahead up the Arlon highway, but now the Germans were reinforcing their front to stop 4th Armored. Change in Mission On Christmas night, the infantry line companies dug in fronting on the Bois de Cohet and Remichampagne, 6 miles from Bastogne. The 94 AFA displaced, by battery, up from Juseret to just south of Sure, from where its 105mm self-propelled howitzers could range to 12,000 yards or almost to the outpost lines of the 101st Airborne Division. During the evening, a German counterattack came down the highway from Sibret, but was warded off by tank destroyer and artillery barrages. The 37 Tank and 53 AIB command posts moved into Cobreville, and the command post of CCR relocated to Vaux. The command posts were set up in towns, with the stone buildings providing both warmth and protection from shell fragments, and the radios from the headquarters tracks were remoted inside. Colonel Blanchard came forward to meet with Abrams, Jaques, and Crosby. CCB was still slated to flank onto the Arlon highway and enter Bastogne. Accompanying CCB was a fretting Major General Maxwell Taylor, who had been on leave in the States when his 101st Airborne en-trucked for the Ardennes. Now, he was impatient to rejoin his command. CCR was to cover the left flank, advancing through Remichampagne and Clochimont and then turning left toward Sibret, which was held in strength. The battalion commanders were vehemently opposed to attacking Sibret. Instead, they urged a drive directly to Bastogne. Blanchard was concerned about the left flank thus being exposed, but finally gave in at about 0300 hours, stating, recalls Major Crosby, “that if we failed it was on our heads and not his as he was refusing to take any responsibility.” The battalion commanders then issued oral attack orders to their company commanders — armored units didn’t take time to draw up five paragraph field orders. As dawn broke on December 26, CCR moved over frozen ground with Team B, under Captain Jimmie Leach in “Blockbuster III,” in the lead. Teams A and C laid down a base of fire into the Bois de Cohet and Remichampagne. Lieutenant Don Guild, in his FO [forward observer] tank, prepared to lift fires as the attack went in. Suddenly, P-47 fighters, probably from the 362d Fighter Group, appeared overhead. They had not been called in and there was no forward air controller to coordinate their actions, but they flew in, bombing and strafing only a few hundred yards ahead of the tanks, and sent the Germans diving for cover. Nonetheless, house-to-house fighting gave Team B a 2-hour fight before the town was secured at 1055 hours. Meanwhile, the armored column passed through Remichampagne and, finding the Burnon Creek Bridge intact, continued up the road to the crossroads to Clochimont. There, Lieutenant Guild dismounted from his FO tank, and personally captured about a dozen Germans, who were cowering in their slit trenches from the fierce assault. Moments after joining Leach at the crossroads and reviewing the situation, Colonel Abrams ordered A/37 Tank to seize the high ground to the left of Clochimont. But as A/37 arrived on position, its tanks received several rounds of AT fire from a position down the road to the right front of Abrams in “Thunderbolt.” “Gunner! Steady … On! Twelve hundred! Fire!” Once again, Abrams proved he had the best tank crew in the 37th. “Target! Cease fire!” By now, the 37 Tank was down to 20 of its 53 T/O&E medium tanks, and the 53 AIB was short 230 riflemen. While Abrams and Jaques were coordinating their planning, hundreds of C-47 transport planes thundered low over them, heading for Bastogne like flocks of fat geese. Red, yellow, and blue parachutes with supplies began blossoming out over the town. But so did ugly bursts of German flak, and several planes arched down, streaming flames. Since Leach’s Team B had gotten this far rather easily, Abrams was ready to drive for Bastogne and radioed the division commander directly. The oth-Bastogne continued from Page 39 er two combat commands had made less than a mile each on the 26th. At 1400 hours, Gaffey telephoned Patton, who quickly gave approval for Abrams to move on Bastogne. CCR artillery prepared to fire on Assenois. A and C Batteries, which had displaced forward to Nives, would fire on the woods north of the town; B Battery on the south edge of the town and the 155s of C/177 FA on the center. Additionally, Abe called Major Ray Mason, S3, 22d AFA, who tied three artillery battalions to a neighboring CCB, which gave a total of 13 batteries to annihilate any enemy force in Assenois. D/37 and A/37 Tank were to overwatch the Sibret road on the left flank and give warning of any German tank movements. Abrams then called his S3, Captain Bill Dwight, to bring up Team C from reserve. Lieutenant Boggess mounted the battalion commander’s tank for a briefing at the Clochimont crossroads. There had been no reconnaissance up the road, but the area was known to be strongly defended. Abe told him simply, “Get to those men in Bastogne.” The Charlie Company commander called his eight tank commanders together and told them he would lead and set the speed of the attack. “You all know we’ve got to get to those men in the town. All you’ve got to do is keep ’em rollin’ and follow me. It won’t be any picnic, but we’ll make it.” Final Breakthrough At 1620 hours, Abe gave the familiar hand signal, “Let ’er roll,” and the tanks moved out. Boggess picked up speed, tracks squealing, and charged right through Clochimont toward Assenois, guns firing. Three miles to go. Boggess in C-8, “Cobra King,” fired straight ahead, Lieutenant Walter Wrolson in the second tank fired to the right, the third tank to the left.* The Shermans pumped fire in all directions, firing on the move, with their gy-rostabilizers enabling them to maintain the momentum of the attack. “I used the 75 like a machine gun,” said “Cobra King’s” gunner, Corporal Milton Dickerman. Boggess had instructed him to choose his own targets. “Murphy was plenty busy throwing in the shells. We shot 21 rounds in a few minutes and I don’t know how much machine gun stuff.” As soon as he had cleared Clochimont, Boggess called Abe for artillery fire on Assenois. Abrams radioed, “Concentration Number Nine, play it soft and sweet.” Almost immediately, the town seemed to erupt in a chaos of explosions. At the edge of the town, Boggess called for the artillery to lift 200 yards and barreled on in without pausing. But there was German fire, even if erratic; Lieutenant Chamber-lin’s FO peep was hit and he went into a ditch, and it was Lieutenant Billy Wood in a Cub plane overhead who finally got the fire lifted. Leaning into friendly artillery fire cut losses from enemy resistance, but Assenois was a murky haze of shell bursts and the dust of collapsing houses. Tank commanders in combat usually rode with head and shoulders out of the hatch because visibility through the periscope was too limited; but Boggess had to pull his hatch down to 3 or 4 inches above the turret roof because shell splinters were singing off the armor. Dirt from an earlier enemy shell burst had smeared the driver’s periscope, and Hubert Smith “sort’a guessed at the road.” In addition, the left brake locked and the “Cobra King” swerved up aside street. Two other tanks also took wrong turns. Walt Green’s C Company infantrymen had been following in their halftracks, but artillery fire was still coming in and they piled out of their open-topped, thin-skinned vehicles to seek any shelter they could find in the town. Simultaneously, the defenders emerged fighting from the cellars and the armored doughs mixed it up with the German paratroopers and Volksgrenadiers well into the night. Nineteen year-old Private Jimmy Hendrix went swinging into two 88mm gun crews with his M1 rifle, forcing them to surrender. He then silenced two machine guns and dragged a dying GI from a burning halftrack, all of which earned him the Congressional Medal of Honor. Abrams followed into the confusion that was Assenois, and even dismounted his tank to help wrestle a fallen telephone pole off a tank to keep the attack moving. Boggess cleared Assenois with three tanks as dusk fell. A gap in the column had opened that gave the Germans a chance to throw some Teller mines onto the roadway from a dark tree line and blow up a following halftrack. Dwight was right behind in his Sherman, “Tonto,” and helped clear the wreckage and toss the mines aside. The column moved forward again, running a gauntlet of Panzerfausts, mines, and small-arms fire. Four more halftracks were lost. Dwight was simultaneously trying to raise Brigadier General Anthony McAuliffe and the 101st Airborne; “Tony, this is one of Hugh’s boys, over,” on channel 20 assigned the command, but to no avail. Up ahead, “Cobra King” led the spearhead. Dickerman slammed three main gun rounds into an old camouflaged concrete pillbox and the bow gunner, Harold Hafner, traversed his machine gun through a chow line of appalled German soldiers standing under the snow-covered fir trees, knocking them over like dominoes. Suddenly, the tanks debouched from the woods into an open field where multicol-ored supply parachutes dotted the snow. Boggess slowed as he approached aline of foxholes, and called, “Come on out, this is the Fourth Armored.” No answer from the wary GIs. Finally, a khaki-clad figure emerged to shake his hand. “I’m Lieutenant Webster of the 326th Engineers, 101st Airborne Division. Glad to see you.” At 1645 hours, CCR logged in its journal: “Hole opened to surrounded forces at Bastogne…” “Tonto” was the fourth tank to arrive, followed by more halftracks and the other tanks, as paratroopers gathered around, beginning to realize the siege was finally over. Noting the clean-shaven faces, Dwight muttered, “Well, things don’t look so goddamn rough around here to me.” The airborne felt that discipline and morale were closely related. One of the paratroopers asked the veteran tank battalion S3 if all tanks were commanded by officers, rather like the Air Corps, as there were three officers in the first four tanks. Dwight said “no,” but it was a significant observation; leadership in the 4th Armored was up front. Dwight then met McAuliffe who had come up to the perimeter. To his salute, the general replied, “Gee, I am mighty glad to see you.” Abrams joined them shortly thereafter. Back at Assenois, B/53 AIB, under Lieutenant Robert “Potsi” Everson, was committed to help clean out the town, some 500 POWs and heavy artillery pieces, including four 88mm guns and a battery of 105mm howitzers, finally were taken. A/53 AIB passed through to clear the dense woods northeast of the town. Lieutenant Frank Kutak, though wounded in both legs, nonetheless, directed the company from his peep as the armored doughs worked through the fir trees. Tankers of A and B Companies, 37 Tank, defended the left flank of the corridor. That same night, the division G4, Lieutenant Colonel Knestrick, led a column of supply trucks and ambulances through to Bastogne, escorted by D/37 Tank light tanks. Wrote Patton happily — if with hyperbole — to his wife, Beatrice, “The relief of Bastogne is the most brilliant operation we have thus far performed and is in my opinion the outstanding achievement of this war.” CCB widened the corridor on 27 December, even as CCA of the 9th Armored came up on the left flank, and the 35th 43

Infantry Division came up on the right. The Germans had already called off their Ardennes offensive. The high drama of the breakthrough to Bastogne had passed into a bitter struggle of attrition in the winter snows. Critique of Operations The breakthrough to Bastogne vividly demonstrated what an elite armored unit in action can do:  Though understrength and fighting under less than favorable conditions of terrain and weather, the 4th Armored Division brought overwhelming force to bear at the decisive point.  The battalion task force organization was modified to one of joint infantry-tank company teams that leapfrogged one another in a column of companies to maintain the momentum of the attack.  The reserve company passed through to attack the next objective even before the first objective had been secured, keeping the enemy off guard.  The tanks’ gyrostabilizers enabled them to smother the defense with fire while moving across the battle area, and leaning into friendly artillery fire gave the defenders no chance to recover.  Preplanned and hip-shoot artillery concentrations, air strikes, and organic supporting bases of fire further overwhelmed the defenders. True, such cavalier tactics would be less successful against a well-prepared defense; but in this instance, the Germans were not given time to prepare. Nonetheless, the principle of bringing the full force of infantry, armor, artillery, and airpower to bear at the point of the main effort remains valid today, and is exemplified by the combined arms team. Of particular note is the quality of personal leadership, both in direction and by example. The company, and even battalion, commanders were well forward or leading in their combat vehicles, providing leadership up front at the decisive point. Orders were oral, simple, and of the general “mission type.” This encouraged initiative on the part of junior officers, who knew where to go and were confident their commanders were with or right behind them. Lastly, at a time when many were be-wailing the inferiority of the American Sherman tank, the 4th Armored maintained unbounded confidence in themselves and their equipment. For “armor” was a concept, of a combined arms team, and when all elements were brought to bear, they were bound to prevail. Notes The 4th Armored Division Operations are based on unit diaries, journals, and after-action reports, U. S. Army Armor School special studies, Military History Institute oral history projects, and published sources. Research in these materials was supported, in part, by an Ohio State University, Newark Campus, research grant. Dr. John Slonaker, Dr. Richard Sommers, and Ms. Phyllis Cassler of the U. S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, were very helpful, as was Mr. William Hansen, U. S. Army Armor School librarian, Fort Knox, Kentucky. Interviews with veterans were facilitated by Samuel Schenker and the late Frank Paskvan of the 4th Armored Division Association. Correspondents include Major Generals Edward Bautz Jr. (37 Tank) and DeWitt C. Smith Jr. (B/53 AIB); Colonels (Retired) Robert Connolly (4th Division adjutant and G1), William Dwight (37 Tank), H. Ashton Crosby (53 AIB); and Charles Boggess (C/37 Tank); and especially Colonel (Retired) James H. Leach (B/37 Tank), who helped revise the manuscript. * The Cobra King is currently under restoration at the Patton Museum, Fort Knox, Kentucky.

A. HARDING GANZ graduated from Wittenberg University in 1961 with a B. A. degree and was awarded an M. A. degree from Columbia University in 1963. From 1963 to 1966, he served as a first lieutenant, Armor, with the 4th Armored Division in Germany. He joined the Ohio State University staff in 1967 and is now an associate professor on the University’s Newark, Ohio campus. His fields of specialization are modern Germany and military history. The C-8 “Cobra King” crew — First Lieutenant Charles Boggess, Corporal Milton Dickerman, Private James G. Murphy, Private Hubert S. Smith, and Private Harold Hafner — pose for a celebratory photo in the vicinity of Bastogne shortly after the tankers led the armor and infantry column that liberated the city. 44