Reconnaissance Squadron Lacks a Role in Current Airborne Doctrine

You can never have too much reconnaissance. Use every means available before, during, and after battle. Reports must be facts, not opinions; negative as well as positive… Information is like eggs: the fresher the better. — General George S. Patton Letter of Instruction, 6 March 19441 Army Transformation Requires Updates To Doctrine The 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap highlights the need to increase the ability for maneuver forces to acquire the enemy, which supports creating reconnaissance squadrons organic to the new modular brigade combat team (BCT).2 In response to the new force structure and associated capabilities, the Army modified, developed, and updated its doctrine to incorporate these changes. However, U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 90-26, Airborne Operations, is 20 years old and requires updates to incorporate adding an organic reconnaissance squadron for more effective execution of reconnaissance and surveillance tasks during airborne operations.3 To better illustrate the concepts discussed in this article, the integration of the reconnaissance squadron focuses on the conduct of airfield seizures. Airborne operations encompass a wide array of missions, including the four doctrinal types of offensive operations; however, an airfield seizure is an integral portion of the airborne commander’s ground tactical plan and the portion initially requiring the employment of the reconnaissance squadron. Limitations of Airborne Operations The nature of airborne operations limits the capabilities of airborne forces and creates weaknesses exploitable by the enemy. One of the most significant limitations is the number of personnel that can participate in an airborne operation. The size of the airborne force is limited by the number of parachutes and aircraft available to support the operation. As a result, joint planners must balance the need for a uniquely equipped combined arms ground maneuver force with the avail-

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Sniper able airborne delivery assets. FM 90-26, highlights another limitation that “[a]ddi-tional target acquisition assets are needed to provide accurate and timely targeting information.”4 Tactical mobility is another limitation as airborne infantry companies were previously not allocated a significant amount of vehicles on their modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE) because of the emphasis on maneuvering by foot; the airborne force is also limited to the number of vehicles that can be delivered to the drop zone by additional aircraft.5 Thus, the previous task organization of airborne forces had room for improvement in multiple areas. Creating the Reconnaissance Squadron As a result of transformation, the infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) task organization changed significantly in two ways that are pertinent to this discussion. First, the number of infantry battalions decreased from three to two. However, transformation created a reconnaissance squadron, which includes a headquarters and headquarters troop, two mounted reconnaissance troops, and one dismounted reconnaissance troop. In the mounted reconnaissance troops, “reconnaissance platoons are organized with six wheeled scout vehicles” and “[t]he mortar section consists of two towed 120mm mortars and a fire direction center (FDC).”6 In the dismounted reconnaissance troop, “the reconnaissance platoons are organized into three sections with one Javelin in each platoon.”7 Thus, this unit provides the IBCT with additional mounted maneuver capabilities and increased firepower, as well as a dedicated reconnaissance and surveillance force manned with 19D cavalry scouts not previously organic to the IBCT. Ultimately, the reconnaissance squadron now “possesses the greatest amount of firepower, mobility, and protection within the IBCT.”8 Specialized equipment for reconnaissance and surveillance forces complements the increased firepower within the reconnaissance squadron. Both the improved target acquisition system (ITAS) and the long-range advanced scout surveillance system (LRAS3) enhance target acquisition capabilities and increase the effectiveness of employing the reconnaissance unit’s firepower. Additionally, the reconnaissance squadron receives a wide array of communications platforms, including high-frequency (HF) radios, standard FM radios, and vehicle-mounted FM radios with extended ranges allowing reconnaissance forces to push even further from the airhead. Personnel manning within the reconnaissance squadron also supports employment in the security force role. As outlined in Airborne Operations, the task organization of the security force incorporates various combined arms assets such as reconnaissance (scouts), light armor, and aviation.10 The 19D cavalry scout receives specific training for executing reconnaissance and surveillance tasks, and the 19C cavalry leader has training and experience with both reconnaissance and armor units as established by military occupational specialty (MOS). The reconnaissance squadron also includes a platoon each of forward observers and medics, which allows the unit to integrate into the overall ground tactical plan by occupying positions on the reconnaissance and security line forward of the assault and support elements at the airhead. With a designated organic reconnaissance and security force, the IBCT commander and his subordinate commanders, at all levels, can cater their mission essential task list (METL) to more specialized roles, such as assault versus security, instead of maintaining a broader METL that includes assault, reconnaissance, and security roles. By designating maneuver units to routine roles during airborne operations, commanders train fewer tasks more thoroughly and develop stronger unit standard operating procedures (SOP) and tactics, techniques, and procedures Figure 1. IBCT Reconnaissance Squadron Organization9 41 (TTP), which elevate unit effectiveness and boost the tactical confidence of the entire unit. Furthermore, training on fewer METL tasks expands limited training opportunities, resources, and time, which often result from the current operating tempo (OPTEMPO). Current Airfield Seizure Doctrine An airborne assault is one of many methods for arriving on the battlefield. However, airborne assaults are unique not only because paratroopers have special skill sets, but building and sustaining combat power relies on the airborne forces’ ability to deliver combat power almost exclusively through the air. To increase airborne forces’ ability to build and sustain combat power, one of the essential tasks typically incorporated into the ground tactical plan is the seizure of an airfield suitable for air-land operations. Air-land operations allow airborne forces to evacuate casualties and noncombatants, insert personnel and equipment that cannot be airdropped, and increase sustainment resources. For example, military units recently executed air-land operations successfully in the aftermath of the earthquake that struck Haiti in January 2010, providing significant amounts of humanitarian aid and necessary resources required by the military and other aid organizations. According to FM 90-26, Airborne Operations, “[s]ecurity in all directions is an overriding consideration early in any airborne operation, since an airhead is essentially a perimeter defense.”11 One of the critical security tasks is the immediate establishment of the remote spring launch (RSL). From the RSL, the security force’s mission is to:  Give the airhead early warning.  Develop intelligence, including the location, direction, and speed of an enemy attack.  Initially deny the enemy observation of direct and observed indirect fire on the airhead.  Deceive the enemy as to the actual location of the airhead.  Delay and disrupt the enemy.12 Early in the assault, FM 90-26 specifies that the security force serves in a screening role and may later transition to a guard or cover role.13 Additional tasks assigned to the security force may be completed prior to the insertion of the main body. When inserted ahead of the main body, the commander uses reconnaissance and security teams to assist in developing situational awareness during planning and movement phases, as well as set necessary conditions, such as destroying enemy air defenses and command and control (C2) nodes or verifying runway conditions to ensure necessary assets are available to make any required repairs, prior to air-land operations. Employing the Reconnaissance Squadron Given its task organization, capabilities, and training, as well as its reconnaissance and security tasks within current doctrine, the reconnaissance squadron is ideally suited for a security force role. In its execution of the security force role, the reconnaissance squadron may be employed using various methods of insertion and given a variety of primary tasks. The remainder of this article presents different considerations and options for airborne operations planners, as well as TTP and suggested topics to be included in an updated version of an airborne operations manual. Insertion Methods One of the primary considerations for employing the reconnaissance squadron is the method of insertion. Airborne insertion is the doctrinal method for obvious reasons; however, the location of the objective area relative to the departure airfield/home station and the nature of the battlefield environment may permit alternative methods of insertion. One alternative method is a ground assault using the reconnaissance squadron’s organic wheeled platforms. This method permits the airborne force to maximize its aerial delivery assets for the assault force and has multiple advantages with respect to the reconnaissance squadron and its likely tactical tasks. Ground assault provides amounted maneuver force that arrives on the battlefield as an organized element, which allows the unit to quickly move to the RSL and begin executing reconnaissance and security tasks for the airborne force. Depending on the time of its arrival, the ground assault element may still set necessary conditions for airborne insertion, answer any commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) for the airborne commander, and provide situational awareness of the drop zone and surrounding area to the airborne commander prior to the airborne assault. This is a viable option when the distance from departure airfield to the objective area can be driven in a reasonable amount of time, but sufficient vehicular platforms are not available to move the entire assault force on the ground or in a suitable amount of time. Ground assault should be considered early in the military decisionmaking process (MDMP), allowing the reconnaissance squadron to begin moving on receipt of warning order 2 and the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) annex. An air assault is another alternate method of insertion. Although planning for this method of insertion is detailed and often lengthy, an air assault maximizes the use of transportation assets available to the airborne force and provides the ability to insert into a larger selection of terrain. Alternate Drop Zones Another consideration for airborne planners with respect to the reconnaissance squadron is the possibility of an alternate drop zone (DZ). If the enemy situation permits, the airborne force inserts the security force into an alternate DZ along expected enemy counterattack or reinforcement routes. Using an alternate DZ “…the reconnaissance squadron receives a wide array of communications platforms, including high-frequency (HF) radios, standard FM radios, and vehicle-mounted FM radios with extended ranges allowing reconnaissance forces to push even further from the airhead.” 42 causes confusion among enemy forces, which results in the enemy diverting forces away from the primary DZ used by the assault force, similar to the allied use of dummy paratroopers during the invasion of Normandy in World War II. While the security force inserting into an alternate DZ secures its location without the assistance of the assault force, using an alternate DZ may increase the effectiveness of the security force in repelling an enemy counterattack and/or be an integral part of the airborne force’s deception plan. Chief of Reconnaissance Role Creating the reconnaissance squadron also provides the brigade combat team (BCT) with a commander and accompanying staff, which specialize in the conduct of reconnaissance, surveillance, and security operations. This allows the BCT commander and his staff to incorporate the reconnaissance squadron commander into the BCT MDMP to serve as chief of reconnaissance.14 Similar to the field artillery battalion commander, who serves as the BCT commander’s primary advisor and coordinator for fire support, the reconnaissance squadron commander is the ideal leader to serve as the BCT commander’s primary advisor and coordinator for reconnaissance, surveillance, and security operations. When incorporated into existing doctrine, the chief of reconnaissance serves as head of the BCT ISR working group.15 Serving as the chief of reconnaissance, the reconnaissance squadron commander has the appropriate maneuver elements in his command to execute reconnaissance tasks early in the BCT MDMP to answer necessary CCIR and set conditions for airborne operations. In the chief of reconnaissance role, the reconnaissance squadron would ideally have priority for use and tactical control of various unmanned aerial systems (UAS), reconnaissance aviation assets, long-range surveillance (LRS) units, manned and unmanned sensors, and any other reconnaissance assets available to the BCT. With a more direct and accurate knowledge and understanding of the reconnaissance squadron’s capabilities and mission readiness, incorporating the squadron commander and his staff into the BCT MDMP greatly aids in developing Annex L (ISR) and streamlining the processing and analysis of information received from reconnaissance and security forces. Likewise, incorporating the squadron commander and staff in the BCT MDMP maximizes planning time for the reconnaissance squadron, which is already limited if reconnaissance operations are required to begin prior to completing the BCT operations order. Global Response Force Task Organization Airborne forces are typically rotated through global response force (GRF) missions and given the task to alert, marshal, and deploy within 18 hours anywhere in the world.16 FM 90-26, Annex G, discusses the N-hour deployment sequence as it pertains to airborne operations.17 The N-hour deployment sequence, as it is currently written in FM 90-26, highlights the urgent need for doctrinal updates based on its outdated structure of three infantry battalions in former parachute/airborne infantry regiments. Moving the third infantry battalion to the new reconnaissance squadron reduced the IBCT’s third maneuver element to less than half the size of those of adjacent infantry battalions. This hinders the reconnaissance squadron’s ability to serve in this role as the “third battalion,” as shown in FM 90- 26, due to its limited manpower and different training and capabilities.18 The absence of a doctrinal example for how best to employ the IBCT in its GRF role creates a dilemma for the IBCT commander, which is being managed by current and future GRF BCTs. This dilemma is further complicated by the alert requirements inherent to the GRF’s responsibility. One approach is to treat the reconnaissance squadron as the third maneuver element in the IBCT and assume that its combat power, and that of any ready attachments, such as elements from the field artillery battalion, will be sufficient to accomplish the mission. This allows the IBCT to spread alert requirements across three maneuver elements and maintain the current doctrinal example in FM 90-26 as a basic planning guideline.19 However, the “three maneuver elements model” limits the initial combat power and reconnaissance/security capabilities of the first assault echelon because the reconnaissance squadron is on a lower alert posture and will not initially deploy until several hours or even days later. Another approach would adjust the N- hour deployment sequence and GRF alert requirements to a “two-battalion model.” In the two-battalion model, the two infantry battalions alternate between two alert postures with each battalion aug- “An airborne assault is one of many methods for arriving on the battlefield. However, airborne assaults are unique not only because paratroopers have special skill sets, but building and sustaining combat power relies on the airborne forces’ ability to deliver combat power almost exclusively through the air. To increase airborne forces’ ability to build and sustain combat power, one of the essential tasks typically incorporated into the ground tactical plan is the seizure of an airfield suitable for air-land operations.” 43 mented with amounted reconnaissance troop, dismounted reconnaissance platoon, field artillery battery, and additional sustainment and C2 units. This approach maximizes the use of the IBCT’s various organic combined-arms capabilities and creates routine working relationships between units across the IBCT. The two-battalion model does, however, keep the IBCT’s paratroopers at higher alert postures for longer periods and may require additional aerial delivery assets to employ the entire force during airborne insertions. While there are many factors to be considered in designing a GRF N-hour deployment sequence, the two models presented here serve as examples for what will hopefully result in an updated airborne operations manual. Altogether, there are many updates required for FM 90-26, Airborne Operations.20 The current version of the field manual includes several limitations, risks, and planning considerations that are no longer present and/or accurately reflected in current airborne operations doctrine. While field manuals may be out of date, the Army has essentially solved many of its old problems and limitations, inherent in existing airborne operations doctrine, with recent transformation efforts. There are still several elements of doctrine that require serious thought and consideration, but the continued efforts of airborne units to identify, adapt, and overcome outdated doctrine and its inherent problems will hopefully soon result in necessary changes.