IBCT’s Reconnaissance Squadron in Full-Spectrum Operations

I n October 2010, the 5th Squadron, 73d Cavalry (Airborne-Reconnaissance) deployed to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) as part of 3d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82d Airborne Division, to participate in a full-spectrum operations (FSO) rotation, which served as a key milestone in the BCT’s trainup to assume the global response force (GRF) mission. This was the first FSO rotation in several years at JRTC; it was also the first time an infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) reconnaissance squadron participated in a rotation in the reconnaissance and security role envisioned in U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, rather than as a landowner in a counterinsurgency (COIN) rotation.1 Contrary to popular misconceptions, this rotation did not dispose of lessons learned during the past 9 years of COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; rather, it incorporates stability operations (of which COIN is a subset) into a scenario that places renewed emphasis on the offensive and defensive portions of the FSO paradigm.

The force-on-force scenario began with a forcible entry operation, via parachute assault into an area held by a “phase III” insurgency, and transitioned to a defense of the airhead line against a hybrid threat (insurgent remnants and their allies, including special purpose forces from a neighboring nation and a rogue host nation mechanized infantry battalion task force). After the defense of the airhead line against a mechanized attack, the BCT executed an offensive operation focused on retaking key terrain seized by the rogue mechanized battalion, and returning those areas to the control of legitimate host nation government. The operational methods, tactical observations, and modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) challenges experienced by the squadron are both informative and timely. A significant portion of the U. S. Army will soon begin to train for FSO as part of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) contingency expeditionary force (CEF) pool while senior Army leaders review the existing force structure and capabilities of various modular BCT designs.

Reconnaissance missions are an essential part of any FSO endeavor. BCT reconnaissance efforts are intended to answer the brigade commander’s priority information requirements (PIR) by employing varying intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets as an unblinking eye against specific named areas of interest (NAI). The intelligence derived from answering PIR provides the BCT commander with situational understanding and influences key decisions the commander anticipates making during the battle.2 The BCT reconnaissance effort involves multiple assets with varied command relationships to the brigade. The 3d BCT found that centralizing all reconnaissance efforts under the reconnaissance squadron — designated as the “chief of reconnaissance” — was invaluable in coordinating and synchronizing the BCT’s reconnaissance operations and the BCT’s deep fight. This achieved unity of effort in ISR employment to better answer the commander’s information requirements. As chief of reconnaissance, the squadron also provided reverse-targeting analysis to the BCT’s non-maneuver battalions, thus allowing them to better plan for security of the BCT’s high-value targets (HVT). Synchronizing the Brigade’s ISR Efforts As the chief of reconnaissance, the squadron was allotted the lion’s share of the BCT’s NAI to observe. Therefore, allocating organic, attached, and supporting ISR assets against the NAI set became the primary focus of the squadron’s targeting cycle. The ISR assets allocated to the squadron provided the capability to observe NAI through a combination of human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT). The first step of each targeting cycle required the S2 to identify and enumerate, for the upcoming period, the number of NAI the squadron was tasked to cover. The S3 then calculated the number of ISR assets available to the squadron for the upcoming period. For long-term NAI (requiring 24 to 72 hours of coverage), each organic or attached dismounted scout squad (to include snipers) and each organic mounted scout section counted as an asset; due to Army airspace command and control (A2C2) challenges that limit the flight time and range of Raven unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), troop Ravens were not counted as assets. The number of organic assets was then augmented by attached and supporting ISR assets, including low-level voice intercept (LLVI) teams, human intelligence collection teams (HCT), Shadow UAVs, Army aviation air weapons teams (AWT), divisional UAVs, and occasional MQ-1 Predator and video downlink (VDL)-capable close air support (CAS) sorties. The last step of the targeting process required the squadron fire support officer to align targets against the appropriate NAI, making target areas of interest (TAI) of the NAI that corresponded to known or suspected locations of enemy high payoff targets (HPT). By comparing NAI requirements against available assets and cross-referencing with the fire support officer’s target list, the squadron staff advised the commander on the capability of the squadron to cover its NAI requirements with observation as well as fires. They also provided recommendations on NAI potentially requiring pass-back due to a capability gap and/or areas in which the squadron could apply multiple ISR assets to achieve mixing, redundancy, and/or cueing effects of multiple intelligence products. The final step of the squadron targeting process was to graphically overlay each of the tasked NAI with the asset(s) assigned to observe them and the registered target locations to visually verify that the squadron was covering all of its requirements. As the chief of reconnaissance, the squadron was provided a seat at the ‘head table’ for BCT targeting workgroup meetings, joining the fires battalion commander is his role as BCT fire support coordinator (FSCOORD). The squadron’s ISR allocation plan became its key input to the BCT targeting workgroup meetings. The ISR allocation plan was instrumental in informing the de- “Reconnaissance missions are an essential part of any FSO endeavor. BCT reconnaissance efforts are intended to answer the brigade commander’s priority information requirements (PIR) by employing varying intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets as an unblinking eye against specific named areas of interest (NAI).” 28 cide-detect-deliver-assess (D3A) process as it identifies the sensor portion of each sensor-to-shooter arrangement for those NAI that correspond to designated targets for lethal or nonlethal effects as determined by the FSCOORD. Once the BCT executive officer (XO) approves the ISR plan recommended by the squadron, the squadron then proceeds with execution for the next time period. One key consideration that became evident during execution was the requirement to ensure that decisions on ISR allocation, made in the BCT targeting workgroup, were briefed to the BCT current operations (CUROPS) staff. This became a particularly important point of emphasis, as there remained some institutional tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) from COIN deployments that resulted in the brigade battle captain allocating ISR assets across the BCT in a fair share distribution system as the assets arrived on station. This particular TTP was not conducive to maintaining a focused ISR effort, and produced some friction points between the squadron staff and the BCT CUROPS staff until the various actors were educated on the newly created process. Task Organizing for Chief of Reconnaissance The BCT task organized several organic and supporting ISR assets under the reconnaissance squadron, essentially creating a reconnaissance task force. While this task organization technique was quite effective during the JRTC rotation, the attachment of infantry scout platoons, in particular, required a great deal of coordination between the squadron and the infantry battalions to ensure the maneuver battalions’ PIR were understood by the squadron and its respective NAI were included in the BCT ISR matrix. For the forcible entry phase, the squadron was assigned seven brigade NAI to observe; since some of these were quite extensive (approximately 2 square kilometers in the case of three NAI), squadron staff refinement resulted in a total of 13 NAI. The scout platoons from both infantry battalions (comprised of seven total dismounted scout squads), an LLVI team, and an HCT were task organized to the squadron; one supporting AH-64D AWT was placed in direct support of the squadron soon after the BCT executed its airborne assault. Since the squadron’s two mounted troops were allocated to the B-echelon air-land package and unavailable for the first several hours of the operation, the additional assets, in conjunction with the squadron’s dismounted recon troop, which arrived by airborne assault, provided the squadron with 15 organic or attached ISR assets and one reinforcing asset. This capacity enabled the squadron to observe all of its refined NAI as part of a 12 kilometer-wide screen line around the drop zone to eliminate enemy observers from calling for and correcting indirect fires against the airhead line. As the mission evolved into a deliberate defense of the airhead line, the reconnaissance squadron was tasked to screen in two noncontiguous security zones. The northern security zone was approximately 12 square kilometers in area, while the southern security zone was approximately 72 square kilometers in area, to include three small population centers. The squadron was tasked to cover 12 division and brigade NAI before adding eight additional NAI, which were created by the squadron based on its own micro intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) of the terrain and enemy, which resulted in a total of 20 NAI requirements. Clearly, this area and NAI density exceeded the organic capacity of the squadron. As chief of reconnaissance, the squadron was provided with ISR attachments from the infantry battalions and the brigade special troops battalion (BSTB), which included two battalion scout platoons, one LLVI team, one HCT, and three M1200 Armored Knight fire support vehicles. All told, the squadron possessed 27 organic and attached ISR assets. The brigade’s Shadow UAV was placed in direct support of the squadron, as were echelons above brigade (EAB) assets, which included one AWT, one pair of VDL-capable F16s for nontraditional ISR (NTISR), and the Sky Warrior UAV (divisional asset). These supporting platforms added an additional four ISR assets to reinforce the squadron’s organic and attached capacity. After the enemy’s counterattack was defeated, the squadron was tasked to perform zone, route, and area reconnaissance in support of the BCT’s offensive operations to regain population centers seized during the enemy’s offensive. In total, the squadron was tasked with 34 NAI, spread over an area of approximately 110 square kilometers, for the offensive phase. As with previous phases, some of these NAI were extensive in dimensions — one route was 13 kilometers long and the NAI corresponding to the infantry battalion objectives were two to four square kilometers in area. To cover these NAI, the squadron had three organic troops and retained both attached infantry battalion scout platoons (one was to be detached back to its parent battalion after that battalion crossed the line of departure/line of contact (LD/LC) and approached its objective) for a total organic and attached capacity of 25 ISR assets. Supporting assets included one AWT, the Shadow UAV, one pair of NTISR F16s, Sky Warrior UAV, and one armed MQ-1 Predator, for a total of five reinforcing ISR assets (as with the defensive phase, not all of these supporting assets were airborne simultaneously throughout the offense). Mission Command Considerations for the Chief of Reconnaissance The role of chief of reconnaissance required the squadron to maintain a relatively closer relationship with the BCT commander and his staff, both in frequency of interaction and geographic proximity. Recognizing this requirement, the squadron “As the chief of reconnaissance, the squadron was allotted the lion’s share of the BCT’s NAI to observe. Therefore, allocating organic, attached, and supporting ISR assets against the NAI set became the primary focus of the squadron’s targeting cycle.” 29 positioned its tactical operations center (TOC) within walking distance of the brigade headquarters main TOC, but outside the templated bursting radius of the enemy’s indirect fire systems, which ensured two key brigade HVT would not experience effects from the same indirect fire event. The BCT fires battalion located its TOC in similar fashion. This geographic proximity facilitated daily face-to-face coordination between the squadron, fires battalion, and brigade primary staff representatives, specifically, the S3, S2, and fire support officer. It also enabled better parallel planning; for example, it allowed the squadron staff to participate in planning the offensive phase by leveraging the BCT’s ISR plan (from warning order (WARNO) 2) as its fragmentary order (FRAGO), and the organic reconnaissance troop leveraging the BCT’s ISR/fires rehearsal as its BCT-level rehearsal event. As a benefit of this parallel planning, all three organic troops had crossed the LD/LC and were in the process of gathering information to answer PIR when the BCT executed its combined arms rehearsal.3 During the defensive phase of the operation, the BCT and squadron commanders further identified the requirement to have an even more seamless interaction during critical events of the counterreconnaissance fight. To achieve better synergy, the squadron relocated its tactical command post (TAC) with the commander, S3, S2, fire support officer, and air liaison officer (ALO) inside the BCT’s TOC during hours of darkness when the enemy’s first echelon reconnaissance entered the BCT’s sector (particularly the security zone), and also during the next period of darkness when the enemy main body entered the security zone and passed through to the BCT’s close area. This temporary collocation of command and control (C2) nodes allowed the squadron commander to personally interface with the BCT commander, S3, and CUROPS staff to ensure both the squadron and the BCT were seeing the same indicators and making the same assessments of the enemy’s actions and intentions. It also increased the effective synchronization of various organic, attached, and supporting assets. Chief of Reconnaissance in the BCT Deep Fight The BCT commander structured his area of operations (AO) into three primary zones, as described in Chapter 3, FM 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team.4 The BCT rear area was essentially defined by the airhead line and included the brigade support area (BSA); the C2 nodes for the BCT headquarters, fires battalion, reconnaissance battalion, and BSTB; and the area around the field landing strip (FLS), which the BCT used as a continual aerial port of debarkation/embarkation (APOD/APOE) for personnel, equipment, and logistics. During the defense, the close area included terrain beyond the airhead line, controlled by the infantry battalions; during the offense, the infantry battalions conducted a battle handoff of their objectives from the reconnaissance squadron to create their respective close areas. The deep area (synonymous with the BCT security area) included the terrain within the BCT AO, beyond the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), out to the BCT’s boundaries.5 For all phases, the reconnaissance squadron operated in the BCT deep area as a shaping operation, while the squadron’s field trains and TOC remained in the BCT rear area, executing doctrinal logistics and C2 functions. The BCT commander also identified several BCT ‘fights’ that the BCT would closely synchronize in support of the maneuver battalions. The ISR/deep fires fight became the purview of the reconnaissance squadron and fires battalion (chief of reconnaissance and FSCOORD, respectively) to prosecute. As the BCT quickly discovered, the presence of supporting ISR and fires assets, such as CAS sorties, armed Predator sorties, and the M777 platoon from the 18th Fires Brigade, provided the BCT with the capability to identify targets and apply lethal effects far beyond the limits of the brigade’s organic MTOE assets.6 In fact, the brigade employed lethal precision munitions against enemy HPT (T-80s, ZSU 23-4s) located in and around the main offensive objective, which was an urban area located 15 kilometers away (straight-line distance) from the BCT rear area and about 12 kilometers from the forward line of troops (FLOT) when the offensive phase started. The destruction of key enemy forces as part of the deep fight resulted in a shaping effect in support of the BCT’s infantry battalions, as it prevented the enemy from using those assets against the infantry battalions’ latter assaults. The prosecution of the BCT deep fight was formulated in BCT targeting workgroup meetings, in coordination with the chief of recon, FSCOORD, and the BCT XO, which synchronized the ISR plan to the BCT’s high payoff target list (HPTL) and attack guidance matrix (AGM). The result was an integrated and centralized system-of-systems approach to the D3A process, which enabled the chief of recon to locate and destroy enemy HPT simultaneous to the conduct of reconnaissance operations focused “By comparing NAI requirements against available assets and cross-referencing with the fire support officer’s target list, the squadron staff advised the commander on the capability of the squadron to cover its NAI requirements with observation as well as fires. They also provided recommendations on NAI potentially requiring pass-back due to a capability gap and/or in which area the squadron could apply multiple ISR assets to achieve mixing, redundancy, and/or cueing effects of multiple intelligence products.” 30 on ground lines-of-communication conditions and enemy dispositions in and around the infantry battalions’ objectives. This combination of ground reconnaissance by organic and attached assets, in conjunction with squadron-controlled enablers, operating one phase line to the front of their forward trace to target enemy HPTs, created a capability and lethality far beyond the squadron’s MTOE design. In essence, it applied the precepts of pre-rotational troop-level joint fires integration live fire at a squadron level with similarly devastating effects. The benefit of enablers became painfully evident around midnight of the first period of darkness for the offensive phase. Around that time, for various reasons, the squadron’s supporting air assets were all grounded or off station. Almost immediately, the squadron’s ground reconnaissance elements began to take substantially heavier contact and increased casualties as the enemy regained his freedom of maneuver, owing to the suddenly 1-dimensional nature of the reconnaissance and targeting effort. By contrast, the enemy commander admitted, after the offensive phase, that one of his essential tasks communicated in his intent to his forces had been to destroy the BCT’s ground reconnaissance forces in his security zone to prevent them from identifying his HVT and providing information on the assault objectives to the BCT and the infantry battalions.7 In the BCT’s final after-action review (AAR), the enemy commander specified that the combination of enablers (UAVs, AWT, CAS, and precision 155mm munitions) in echelons forward of the ground reconnaissance elements was not only unforeseen, but significantly eroded his combat power. This caused the enemy commander to constantly reposition his HVT to replace losses in his security zone and avoid detection and destruction prior to eventual engagement with the BCT’s infantry companies.8 As a final note on the prosecution of the BCT’s deep fight, the synergy achieved by synchronizing ISR assets with lethal fires in a D3A process, under the control of a single battalion-level commander operating within the intent of the brigade commander, could not have been achieved under the habitual COIN method of equal distribution of assets. Even with all assets under the squadron’s control, the process remained extremely dynamic and required frequent retasking of assets from their originally apportioned set of NAI to achieve the desired sensor-to-shooter linkage between unarmed platforms and armed platforms/precision cannon munitions, as well as the desired effects on the target; for example, destruction vs. disruption. Chief of Reconnaissance in Reverse Targeting In addition to its role in the BCT deep fight, the reconnaissance squadron provided valuable advice and information pertaining to the force protection of a BCT HVT located within the rear area. Specifically, the squadron applied a reverse targeting process to the BSA and the FLS. By analyzing each target and determining how the squadron would execute reconnaissance and target acquisition activities against them, the squadron staff developed a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) and recommended NAI overlay for each. These products were provided to the brigade support battalion (BSB) and BSTB staffs, respectively, to assist in security and counterreconnaissance plans. The 3d BCT, 82d Airborne Division, not only employed its reconnaissance squadron in accordance with FM 3-20.96, it also developed TTP for using the squadron command and staff as the BCT’s chief of recon.9 In this role, the squadron contributed to the BCT’s successful execution of combat operations against a hybrid threat by synchronizing the BCT commander’s ISR assets to achieve ISR unity of effort; coordinated with the fires battalion during the BCT’s deep fight against enemy reconnaissance forces and HPT; and conducted counterreconnaissance assessments of the BCT’s HVT. These functions are beyond the scope of current reconnaissance squadron doctrine, but speak to the vast untapped potential of these organizations as the U. S. Army explores the employment of modular BCTs during FSO.

Operational Overview Before discussing lessons learned, it is helpful to briefly review the missions the squadron executed by phase. During the initial (airborne assault/forcible entry) phase, the squadron was tasked with screening approximately 75 percent of the airhead line perimeter (or 12 kilometers of frontage to include 13 NAI) with four dismounted scout platoons (a total of 15 scout squads, based on personnel strengths at the time). The defensive phase had the squadron screening the BCT’s infantry battalions in two noncontiguous security zones. The northern security zone was approximately 12 square kilometers in size, while the southern security zone covered approximately 72 square kilometers. After refinement, the squadron had 20 NAI to observe. To perform this mission, the BCT commander task organized the squadron with its organic mounted troops and dismounted troop (18 scout squads or sections), two attached infantry battalion scout platoons (seven scout squads), and a handful of other supporting ISR assets from the BCT’s BSTB and EAB to provide depth of reconnaissance beyond the forward-most trace of scout teams and sections. The final offensive phase required the squadron to perform zone, route, and area reconnaissance throughout a 110- square-kilometer area in support of the infantry battalions’ follow-on assaults, with particular focus on a large urban area located 15 kilometers from the LD/LC, and a 13-kilometer-long route through several natural chokepoints. The squadron was tasked with 34 NAI for this phase. To conduct its offensive reconnaissance, the squadron had essentially the same assets as it did during the defensive phase. Doctrinal Overview The deactivation of armored cavalry regiments and division cavalry squadrons leaves the reconnaissance squadrons in the Army’s three BCT designs as the highest-echelon maneuver headquarters with a primary focus on performing reconnaissance and security operations for a higher headquarters.10 As explained in FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, the reconnaissance squadrons of modular BCTs provide a significant dismounted and mounted reconnaissance force; provide timely, accurate, and relevant combat information; and enable the [BCT] commander to decisively employ his maneuver battalions and joint fires at the time and place of his choosing.11 This is particularly essential during the conduct of FSO, in which commanders are expected to perform offensive, defensive, and stability operations in simultaneity.12 Fundamentals of Reconnaissance FM 3-20.96 lists seven fundamentals of reconnaissance, which must be adhered to during the conduct of reconnaissance operations:  Ensure continuous reconnaissance.  Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve.  Orient on the reconnaissance [or security] objective.  Report all information rapidly and accurately.  Retain freedom of maneuver.  Gain and maintain enemy contact with the smallest element possible.  Develop the situation.13 FM 3-20.96 also lists five fundamentals of security operations.14 However, since those fundamentals parallel and are essentially 31 inclusive to the fundamentals of reconnaissance, the latter framework will be used for discussion in relating the experiences of 5th Squadron, 73d Cavalry, at the JRTC and in providing proposed solutions to the situations it encountered. Ensure continuous reconnaissance. By comparing NAI requirements for the defensive and offensive phases of the JRTC experience, and assuming the size and scope of the squadron’s NAI responsibilities were typical for FSO, it is clear that the squadron’s organic assets are not sufficient to provide continuous reconnaissance, given the size of the defensive security zones and the extensive area in which the squadron conducts offensive operations. To further complicate matters, each NAI is not best observed with ground reconnaissance personnel. The solution to this dilemma is a combination of internal task organization (for the defense, each organic troop was task organized with both mounted and dismounted platoons), and the employment of significant ISR attachments, to include scout platoons from infantry battalions, LLVI teams, HCT, AWT, Shadow UAV, and NTISR in the form of VDL-equipped CAS sorties. This combination of assets provides for different means to observe NAI and lends itself to more effective mixing, redundancy, and cueing of ISR assets, as explained in FM 2-01, ISR Synchronization, and FM 3-20.96.15 Another way to ensure continual reconnaissance is to vary the means by which reconnaissance assets are inserted or infiltrated into the AO.16 If mounted or dismounted ground insertion from the vicinity of the LD/LC is the only technique used, the enemy can easily focus and mass his counterreconnaissance assets forward, which is analogous to “putting eight men in the box” in football parlance. However, air insertion of dismounted assets, either from the dismounted troop, attached infantry scout platoons, or even dismounted sections from the mounted troops, forces the enemy commander to disperse his counterreconnaissance forces and provides for a better chance of successful insertion (and thus observation of the assigned NAI) by ground reconnaissance elements. The employment of supporting aerial ISR assets is also a consideration for achieving and maintaining continual reconnaissance. Each air asset has different capabilities that must be understood by the squadron staff to optimize usage. The squadron considered the three key questions below to help optimize the employment of ISR assets during this operation:  Is the asset VDL capable to enable the squadron to observe feed and adjust its observation area if necessary?  What type of optics, such as day, infrared, and thermal, does the asset have?  Does the asset possess the capability to engage targets (within the proper engagement criteria and in accordance with the HPTL and AGM) or is it best used as a ‘hunter’ for a second armed asset? These considerations come into play during the reconnaissance/ counterreconnaissance mission and may require dynamic retasking of aerial assets to exploit each platform’s particular capabilities. For instance, if an unarmed UAV observes a stationary enemy reconnaissance vehicle, it can act as the ‘hunter’ for lethal artillery fires delivered by the fires battalion, to include global positioning system (GPS)-guided precision munitions from supporting 155mm howitzer units. However, if an unarmed UAV observes a moving enemy vehicle, it will likely require the squadron to retask an aerial asset, armed with laser-guided precision munitions, to which the target can then be handed off for lethal targeting and post-strike battle damage assessment. Once handoff occurs, the unarmed asset can then assume overwatch of the NAI that the armed asset was previously observing. This rapid D3A process was successful several times over a single period of darkness during reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance fights. Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve. Idle reconnaissance assets represent a poor employment plan, given the likely volume of NAI tasked to the squadron. The only exception to this is the likelihood of the squadron to maintain a reserve or quick “For the forcible entry phase, the squadron was assigned seven brigade NAI to observe; since some of these were quite extensive (approximately 2 square kilometers in the case of three NAI), squadron staff refinement resulted in a total of 13 NAI. The scout platoons from both infantry battalions (comprised of seven total dismounted scout squads), an LLVI team, and an HCT were task organized to the squadron; one supporting AH-64D AWT was placed in direct support of the squadron soon after the BCT executed its airborne assault.”

reaction force (QRF), most likely in the form of amounted reconnaissance platoon, to reinforce reconnaissance efforts or provide a killer asset to reconnaissance elements that must remain otherwise static with strict direct-fire engagement criteria. The S2 and S3 must continually compare NAI requirements and available reconnaissance assets to ensure the squadron is optimizing its capacity. Any excess reconnaissance assets, beyond a 1:1 ratio (and the QRF requirement) should be employed to provide mixing, redundancy, and cueing of ISR assets of various types. Orient on the reconnaissance objective. The primary means to ensure organic and attached reconnaissance elements remain focused on the reconnaissance objective is for the squadron commander to provide clear reconnaissance or security guidance during the planning phase for a mission. Reconnaissance guidance should include reconnaissance focus, reconnaissance tempo (stealthy vs. forceful, deliberate vs. rapid), engagement criteria, and bypass criteria.17 Security operations (screen line) guidance is similar and should include security operations focus, tempo (time duration of the observations posts), engagement criteria, and bypass criteria.18 Detailed terrain analysis, performed by all levels of reconnaissance leaders, is another imperative for reconnaissance and security operation planning. Reconnaissance element leaders must analyze the terrain to determine where the enemy is most likely to acquire and destroy friendly units. Terrain analysis requires identifying natural or manmade obstacles, which create chokepoints for reconnaissance forces and require a deliberate process to clear or bypass. In the force-on-force scenario at JRTC, the enemy elected to strongpoint a series of natural chokepoints along the squadron’s long route. This route reconnaissance effort evolved into a series of intense meeting engagements between enemy mechanized forces and friendly HMMWV-mounted elements — an intuitively obvious combat power ratio mismatch, which resulted in significant friendly casualties and a slower than expected reconnaissance tempo. Had squadron and troop leaders performed a better terrain analysis, a good deal of the direct fire contacts between friendly and enemy ground elements may have been avoided. Habitual COIN methods of diverting ISR or AWT assets to emerging events (mortar points of origin or troops-in-contact situations) creates friction with the fundamental requirement to orient on the reconnaissance objective and should therefore be carefully considered during FSO. Since air assets often perform zone reconnaissance or screening operations in advance of ground elements, the reconnaissance or security effort tends to lose focus and tempo when those aerial assets are dynamically retasked away from the squadron. As a second-order effect, the tempo of reconnaissance slows as ground elements become more cautious in their technique, particularly when facing an enemy that has combat power overmatch against organic vehicles and weapons systems; for example, BMP-3s against HMMWVs. Current operations cells at BCT and squadron levels need to make a deliberate assessment of each indirect fire event or troops-in-contact situation to determine if the threat presented requires retasking high-demand/low-density assets, such as a UAV or AWT, away from the platform’s predetermined reconnaissance focus. One potential solution to this challenge is to specify which assets are in direct support (DS) of the squadron and which are in general support (GS) — with the latter being the primary assets to consider for reallocating support for events occurring outside the security area. Focusing ISR assets on friendly forces could be a security concern. It may be possible for anyone with a one-system remote video terminal (OSRVT), or similar capability, to view the feed of an ISR platform. During the final AAR, the enemy commander revealed that on more than one occasion, he tapped into the BCT’s ISR assets; when assets were focused on friendly force dispositions, it provided a great deal of valuable intelligence to the enemy commander.19 The possibility of a near-peer to view video feed is another reason to carefully evaluate the COIN TTP of diverting ISR assets to monitor friendly forces, but instead keep assets focused on their assigned NAI. Report all information rapidly and accurately. To develop the BCT commander’s situational understanding, the squadron must ensure that all information from the deep area is reported timely and accurately. Early in the defensive phase of the operation, the squadron recognized a gap in situational understanding by the BCT commander. Essentially, the common operating picture (COP), both friendly and enemy, of the security zone (deep area), as depicted by the brigade and squadron staffs in their respective TOCs, did not match. This knowledge gap also existed between the squadron, which was operating on digital systems such as command post of the future (CPOF), and its organic ground reconnaissance troops, which were operating primarily on blue force tracker (BFT). The largest friction point was not the actual reports troops sent to the squadron TOC, it was the translation of those reports, which primarily came across FM nets, along with some BFT reports (analog to digital reports), and the BCT TOC’s subsequent tracking of these reports. The squadron TOC created CPOF events for reports that troops rendered. Those CPOF events did not, however, auto-populate the CPOF COP maintained by the BCT TOC; instead, it required a dedicated individual in the BCT TOC to manually “drag” the squadron’s CPOF events into the BCT’s master CPOF COP. Therefore, the “The role of chief of reconnaissance required the squadron to maintain a relatively closer relationship with the BCT commander and his staff, both in frequency of interaction and geographic proximity. Recognizing this requirement, the squadron positioned its tactical operations center (TOC) within walking distance of the brigade headquarters main TOC, but outside of the templated bursting radius of the enemy’s indirect fire systems, which ensured two key brigade HVT would not experience effects from the same indirect fire event.” 33

BCT commander and his key staff did not “see” the same enemy disposition as the squadron. Likewise, not all CPOF events translated into BFT reports (the two systems do not auto-populate each other). Thus, if the squadron TOC did not create BFT reports from CPOF events of other battalions, troop commanders were unable to gain a full situational understanding by monitoring BFT systems. A three-part solution solves this reporting deficiency, which is created by a multitude of analog and digital systems at varied levels of command. First, ground troops must report all contact and observation reports over FM communications and digitally through BFT, if available; dismounted troops may not have BFT, depending on their tactical configuration for a specific mission. This ensures that digital COPs of higher headquarters immediately reflect the situation on the ground. Secondly, the squadron TOC must ensure that all monitored CPOF or FM-reported events from units other than ground troops (or organic elements without BFT) populate BFT, which may require the BFT operator in the TOC to manually create BFT events. Lastly, the squadron must continually synchronize its CPOF COP with the BCT COP, which is a duty suited for the squadron liaison officer (LNO) to brigade. As a means of fratricide prevention, the squadron must continually track, both digitally and analog, all friendly positions, particularly those in the deep area. The squadron experienced two fratricide incidents during the operation: the first involved an AH-64 engagement against a friendly gun truck and an M1200 vehicle; the second involved amounted platoon engagement against a dismounted element that was infiltrating into zone. Both incidents could have been averted by a combination of passive and active control measures. First, the squadron (and all BCT elements) must ensure that a common air-ground integration (AGI) vehicle marking system is in place; the markings must be visible by aircraft using day, infrared, or thermal optics. Secondly, all mounted elements must be equipped with BFT systems; for units not equipped with BFT and for dismounted elements, the troop command post must continually update its position on BFT by manually entering an icon. Lastly, graphic control measures (controlled fire lines, infiltration lines, and no-fire areas) must be disseminated to all elements over BFT to ensure proper synchronization and a clear COP. Retain freedom of maneuver. Ground troop command posts and troop trains must have the ability to self-secure during FSO. A ground troop cannot maximize its reconnaissance assets forward and maintain its freedom of maneuver if it “bleeds off” gun trucks to secure its C2 and/or logistics elements. To solve this dilemma, the troops collocated their C2 element, 120mm mortar section, and troop trains (to include attached medical and/ or maintenance assets) for mutual force protection. However, this method reinforces the requirement of the troop command team to properly position and camouflage key (and vulnerable) friendly positions to prevent compromise by the enemy. Ground troops require assistance for evacuating casualties and/ or recovering damaged vehicles from the deep area to the rear area. As with security of C2 and logistics assets, the troop loses momentum of reconnaissance if it must generate sufficient combat power to evacuate casualties and vehicles located a significant distance rearward from the troop casualty collection point or unit maintenance collection point. To assist the troops, the squadron employed an armed escort element from the distribution platoon to link up with troop first sergeants at predetermined logistics resupply points to retrieve casualties and damaged vehicles for transport to the rear area. This method (and all logistics resupply missions) required the distribution platoon element to conduct forward and rearward passage of lines with the infantry battalions as they progressed from the rear area, through the close area, to the fringes of the deep area, and back. This also required the squadron to resource the distribution platoon with gun trucks, a common method in the COIN theaters, but one that is not enabled by the squadron’s organic MTOE. At the squadron level, sustaining organic and attached elements forward in the security zone or beyond the LD/LC in offensive operations, quickly overwhelmed organic capability and capacity. The squadron lacks the ability to rapidly and efficiently perform casualty evacuation, backhaul damaged vehicles, and resupply vital logistics (particularly Class I, III, and V). A great deal of planning and assistance from the BCT staff and supporting units (the BSB and potentially the Army aviation unit) is neces- “Current operations cells at BCT and squadron levels need to make a deliberate assessment of each indirect fire event or troops-in-contact situation to determine if the threat presented requires retasking high-demand/low-density assets, such as a UAV or AWT, away from the platform’s predetermined reconnaissance focus.”

sary to allow the squadron’s troops to operate at extended distances from the infantry battalions or brigade rear area without losing momentum. This planning and coordination must be solidly in place before the BCT publishes WARNO 2 and executes the ISR/fires rehearsal, which often serve as the squadron’s FRAGO and combined arms rehearsal, respectively. Gain and maintain contact with the smallest element possible. Despite previous doctrinal suggestions that reconnaissance elements can gain valuable information without making direct contact with the enemy, is not often the case when facing a determined hybrid threat such as the one encountered at JRTC. Ground reconnaissance elements, particularly those of mounted troops, must expect to make direct contact and tactically array themselves to do so with the smallest element possible. This often requires moving in multiple echelons, with UAV, AWT, or other assets conducting a zone reconnaissance ahead of ground reconnaissance assets who, in turn, move either with dismounts to the front of the mounted formation (if stealthy, deliberate reconnaissance is required) or, at a minimum, a travelling overwatch formation if a more aggressive tempo is demanded by the mission timeline. This same concept of echeloned reconnaissance applies to security (screen line) operations. Where feasible (by mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC)), array reconnaissance forces with air assets screening forward to provide early warning and detection of approaching enemy forces. Air assets then handoff approaching enemy forces to static and concealed dismounted teams. The dismounted elements, in turn, maintain contact until mounted reconnaissance forces can either observe or, if engagement criteria dictate, destroy the enemy. Develop the situation. Each reconnaissance element must continue to develop the situation on contact (visual or direct fire) with the enemy. Troop commanders must be knowledgeable in planning and employing joint fires to bring to bear CAS, AWT, and indirect fire assets (from the brigade’s fires battalion or troop organic mortars). Troop commanders must also be well versed on tactics, such as defile drills and obstacle breaching procedures, to apply when the unit encounters linear danger areas or manmade obstacles that cannot be bypassed. Lastly, troop commanders must continually update reports as they gain more information about a particular NAI or objective. The Reconnaissance Squadron in Stability Operations In Iraq and Afghanistan today, reconnaissance squadrons are employed in much the same fashion as infantry battalions; they are designated as “land owners” for the purposes of conducting COIN activities within a defined AO. In contrast, the 3d BCT conceptually developed several other potential mission sets for the reconnaissance squadron during stability operations that make better use of its capabilities to shape conditions in the BCT AO and improve the BCT commander’s situational awareness. Route security. With its two mounted troops and a habitual relationship with several forms of aerial ISR platforms, the reconnaissance squadron is ideally suited to perform continual route reconnaissance (and route clearance if enabled with attached engineer capabilities) within the BCT AO to ensure freedom of movement for BCT elements, host nation security forces, and host nation civilians. Operations within unassigned areas. As the brigade’s dedicated reconnaissance and security element, the squadron is capable of conducting shaping operations within an otherwise unassigned battlespace to provide the BCT commander with information about the enemy, terrain, or population, or achieve specific desired effects. If the BCT owns a substantially sized AO and elects to assign noncontiguous AOs to its infantry battalions, there remains a potentially large unassigned area that, by doctrine, is the responsibility of the brigade headquarters. As part of the targeting process, the squadron could be assigned the mission to perform reconnaissance of a specific NAI or set of NAI within the unassigned area. If provided with supporting assets, the squadron could then achieve lethal or nonlethal effects against a specified target within the unassigned area in support of the BCT’s concept of operations and campaign plan. Civil infrastructure reconnaissance and assessment. Properly trained reconnaissance elements are capable of conducting enemy, terrain, and populace-focused reconnaissance operations. If enabled with the appropriate civil affairs and engineer assets, the squadron is capable of ranging the BCT AO and conducting reconnaissance and assessments of critical civil infrastructure to support future improvement projects to improve the local populace’s quality of life. Host nation security force assistance. As a reconnaissance and security-focused organization, the squadron is capable of partnering with host nation forces — particularly reconnaissance and security forces, such as cavalry troops or border guards, to conduct security force assistance. This role also takes advantage of the squadron’s relatively smaller subordinate elements, which also have a lower soldier-to-leader ratio than most other maneuver units, to act as self-mobile, advise-and-assist teams to host nation units. Humanitarian assistance/disaster relief/zone reconnaissance. Reconnaissance units are particularly valuable during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. These missions often occur in an environment that has been ravaged by forces of nature and require careful consideration when focusing BCT assets where they will have the greatest effect on assisting the joint task force (JTF) commander, the lead federal agency, and local or host nation authorities. Recent examples of this include disaster relief efforts conducted by 82d Airborne Division units and other elements in New Orleans (2005) and Haiti (2009). The squadron can assist the BCT and JTF headquarters by performing its basic mission essential task list (METL) to answer PIR pertaining to the operational environment. Potential missions during humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operations include route reconnaissance from the air or sea port of entry to the most affected locations, area reconnaissance of potential bas- “Ground troop command posts and troop trains must have the ability to self-secure during FSO. A ground troop cannot maximize its reconnaissance assets forward and maintain its freedom of maneuver if it ‘bleeds off’ gun trucks to secure its C2 and/or logistics elements. To solve this dilemma, the troops collocated their C2 element, 120mm mortar section, and troop trains (to include attached medical and/or maintenance assets) for mutual force protection.” 35 ing or staging areas for relief forces, zone reconnaissance to locate displaced persons, and area security to assist local authorities in preventing criminal looting. The reconnaissance squadrons in the modular BCT designs have become the highest echelon maneuver headquarters with a primary focus on, and proponency for, reconnaissance and security operations. Understanding and adhering to the fundamentals of reconnaissance and fundamentals of security operations are absolutely essential to success during full spectrum reconnaissance and security operations. The lessons learned by leaders and paratroopers of Panther Recon, during its recent JRTC rotation, mandate that reconnaissance squadrons — particularly those in the CEF — incorporate and reinforce these fundamentals during tough, realistic home station training.

Organization Challenges and Recommendations Unity of command for BCT reconnaissance assets and elements. During the JRTC rotation, the brigade elected to centralize all reconnaissance efforts under the reconnaissance squadron. This method was invaluable in coordinating and synchronizing the BCT’s reconnaissance operations and its deep fight. This achieved unity of effort in ISR employment to better answer the brigade commander’s PIR. While this mission command method was effective, the squadron commander and staff experienced some friction in integrating and directing attached ISR assets belonging to the BSTB, which was largely due to the attached assets not having a clear understanding of the squadron’s tactical standards of operation and the commander’s command style. By contrast, the Stryker BCT (SBCT) MTOE organizes all BCT ISR assets under the reconnaissance squadron in a surveillance troop with HUMINT personnel integrated directly into the squadron’s organic reconnaissance troops. This type of organization, where the majority of ISR assets are organized in garrison and during training, facilitates coordination, synchronization, and standardization of reconnaissance operations, which creates ISR unity of command in addition to temporal unity of effort during specified missions. The continued centralization of all reconnaissance efforts, under the reconnaissance squadron in the chief of reconnaissance role to achieve better unity of effort for BCT ISR assets, is highly recommended. This mission command model should be incorporated into reconnaissance and security doctrine, particularly field manuals covering the BCT (FM 3-90.6, FM 3-20.96, and FM 2-01).20 It is further recommended that the Army re-examine the factors that led to assigning ISR assets to the BSTB in the IBCT and heavy BCT (HBCT) designs, in stark contrast to the SBCT design’s organization of ISR assets within the reconnaissance squadron. The forthcoming redesign of the BSTB into the brigade engineer battalion (BEB) also reinforces the requirement to relook the command structure of ISR assets in IBCTs and HBCTs. Squadron-level mortars. The FSO experience at JRTC demonstrates the need for a responsive and reliable fire support capability at the squadron level, in addition to the capability resident at the troop level. The mounted troops are currently each authorized a troop mortar section, equipped with two towed 120mm mortar systems, while the dismounted troop is authorized a mortar section, equipped with two 60mm mortar systems. Unlike infantry battalions (which have a four-gun platoon of towed 120mm mortars) or the legacy light armored cavalry squadron design (a six-gun battery of towed 105mm howitzers) the reconnaissance squadron retains no organic indirect fires capability at the squadron level. The squadron, as currently designed, depends on brigade assets acting in a direct support role, such as the field artillery battalion, attack aviation, and close air support, to provide any required fires assets beyond the capability of the troops’ organic mortars. By design during FSO, the reconnaissance squadron operates forward of the infantry battalions across the brigade’s entire AO to answer the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR). While the BCT may allocate fire support assets and supporting aircraft to reinforce the squadron, artillery assets can easily be redirected using brigade and air assets, which are specifically subject to the effects of weather and other factors that decrease reliability and may hinder responsiveness. A mortar platoon at the squadron level allows the commander to better reinforce and assign priorities of fire for internal assets; provides a squadron-level, large-caliber indirect fire system to support dismounted troops and the forward support company (FSC); and standardizes 11C military occupational specialty (MOS) training across the organization. Allocating a dedicated mortar platoon at the squadron level is recommended to provide the commander the necessary flexibility to position fire support assets, as required, depending on the tactical situation while allowing the recon troops to maintain control of troop-level mortars and eliminating the need to task troop-level fire support assets with squadron missions. Manning Challenges and Recommendations 18-man mounted platoons. With the current reconnaissance squadron’s MTOE strength of 18 personnel, organized into six 3-man crews, mounted recon platoons are severely limited and challenged in terms of conducting the most basic reconnaissance tasks such as local security, dismounted observation posts (OPs), or clearance of intervisibility lines. The designed manning effects the duration of NAI coverage with troop commanders electing to run with four-vehicle platoons instead of six as designed. Immediately resourcing six additional personnel (per mounted platoon), which is authorized in the FY2012 “R” series MTOE, enhances the capabilities of the mounted platoon while adding a much needed dismounted capability. Troop-level intelligence analyst. During the squadron’s JRTC rotation, the absence of an intelligence analyst at the troop level, combined with the severely degraded nature of personnel familiar with company intelligence support team (CoIST) operations was readily apparent to the squadron battle staff. A trained analyst at the troop level provides much needed support to the troop commander who often is conducting operations well forward of the squadron TOC. This addition also benefits the squadron by providing bottom-up analysis and refining the squadron intelligence section. Analysts collocated forward with recon troops provide the capability to analyze and exploit time-sensitive information and material collected by the troops’ platoons. The analyst assists the troop command post in verifying reports and correcting errors prior to the reports being sent to higher headquarters. Adding a troop-level intelligence analyst to each reconnaissance troop dramatically improves analysis and understanding at lower levels while allowing the squadron to better integrate and synchronize ISR assets with increased situational awareness. All-source intel tech (MOS 350F). The squadron’s role as chief of reconnaissance for the brigade creates a requirement for an 36 increased intelligence analysis capability at the squadron level. Similar to the initial MTOE for the reconnaissance squadron in the SBCT, the presence of an all-source intelligence warrant officer (MOS 350F) provides a tremendous analysis tool for the squadron commander. Adding an all-source intelligence technician to the squadron intelligence section provides invaluable assistance in analyzing volumes of information in an FSO environment, as well as assists in managing multiple ISR assets provided in support of reconnaissance missions. Staff engineer officer. Currently, there is no authorization for a dedicated staff engineer representative on the reconnaissance squadron staff. However, our experience at JRTC demonstrates there is a valid requirement for an engineer to assist in planning and executing reconnaissance and security operations. Our squadron was fortunate to receive an engineer officer to support its FSO rotation; he assisted in obstacle and survivability position planning in support of screening operations during the defensive phase, provided recommendations for mobility efforts during the offensive phase, and participated as a subject-matter expert in IPB for all phases. Adding a dedicated engineer officer to the squadron staff provides advantageous expertise in planning and executing mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks. We also recommend reviewing the potential to add a third sapper platoon to the BCT to provide mobility and countermobility support to the squadron during reconnaissance and security operations. “Ranger Coded” Billets. The “G-series” MTOE is completely void of ranger-coded noncommissioned officer (NCO) billets in the squadron, at all pay grades. All reconnaissance platoon leaders, both dismounted and mounted, are coded ranger qualified, but subordinate platoon sergeants and section leaders are not identified as ranger qualified on the MTOE. This is a disservice to the NCO Corps and the BCT commander. Reconnaissance operations, by nature, particularly those performed in IBCTs, benefit from being led by ranger-qualified NCOs; in fact, NCOs in the scout platoons of the infantry battalions are in ranger-coded billets on the MTOE. The ranger qualified designator (“V” for airborne-ranger billets) should be applied to section leader and platoon sergeant billets within the reconnaissance troops. Equipping Challenges and Recommendations Improved C2 on-the-move (OTM) vehicle. The squadron’s FSO rotation demonstrated the need for a C2 vehicle outfitted with a communications package that includes FM, satellite communications (SATCOM) on-the-move (OTM), and BFT capabilities. These assets would enable control of squadron elements located forward, throughout the brigade’s AO. The squadron was unable to maintain a fully capable mobile C2 element (TAC) using MTOE vehicles and equipment while conducting operations in the offensive phase, and squadron elements were spread over 110 square kilometers throughout the brigade’s AO. The TAC personnel could not monitor the multiple required nets, maintain noise and light discipline, and effectively synchronize maneuver, intelligence, and fires while spread between three or four tactically positioned gun trucks. The squadron also experienced challenges in viewing ISR feed. The solution is to develop and add an air-droppable C2 vehicle, which is outfitted with a communications package and VDL capability, and designed to provide C2 forward in an expeditionary role prior to establishing the TOC during forcible entry operations and subsequently positioned forward as required. Improved long-range communications capability. The lack of mobile, beyond line of sight communications directly impacted the squadron’s ability to C2 elements exceeding internal FM capabilities. Currently, the squadron is only authorized seven SATCOM radios, which includes two in the headquarters troop and five in the dismounted troop, leaving no allocation for mounted troops. The authorized equipment consists of the radio systems without a vehicle-mounting capability. To overcome this current lack of mobile SATCOM capability and mitigate the lack of SIPRnet connectivity below the squadron level during expeditionary FSO, procure the Harris RF-7800M-AD250 and AN/ PRC-117G, or similar systems with similar capabilities. This particular system is a vehicle-mounted, 50-watt, multiband radio, which enables both voice and mobile data communications. A distribution of two per platoon, two per troop headquarters, and five at the squadron headquarters (a total of 27 systems) is a good quantity. Troop- and squadron-level OSRVT capability. The squadron and its reconnaissance troops have no organic capability, by MTOE, to view the full-motion video (FMV) of aerial ISR platforms such as UAVs and VDL-equipped fixed wing aircraft. This capability deficit hinders situational awareness and the ability to manage ISR assets, particularly when the squadron is employed as the BCT’s chief of recon. The current IBCT MTOE provides this capability only to military intelligence units. The OSRVT is used to receive ISR feeds, but is bulky, heavy, and not ideal for use during forcible entry operations. OSRVTs also have a limited battery life, normally 4 hours, which requires a form of power generation to recharge the system. In addition, the current BCT MTOE lacks a system from which to broadcast organic ISR feeds across the SIPRnet to subordinate elements. The inability to view and share ISR feeds across the BCT creates an unnecessary time delay and affects the squadron’s situational awareness, the brigade’s common operational picture, and inhibits ISR handoff to other units within the brigade. To overcome this current shortfall within the squadron, one ISR viewing system (preferably lighter and more durable than the OSRVT) should be authorized for each reconnaissance platoon and each troop headquarters, which allows platoon leaders and troop commanders to view the feed of aerial ISR assets operating in their immediate vicinity. We also recommend an additional four systems be authorized for the squadron headquarters to provide the battlestaff with an ability to view and manage multiple assets while maintaining its ability to establish both a TOC and TAC. An allocation of 15 total OSRVT-like systems enables platoons and troops to view both RQ-11 (Raven) and RQ-7 (Shadow) feeds while the squadron headquarters maintains its ability to feed up to four ISR systems into the network. For the squadron headquarters to achieve the ability to stream multiple ISR feeds across the SIPRnet, the headquarters also requires the acquisition of an internet protocol (IP)-based media package such as VBrick’s Streaming Gateway and Office Communicator. Forcible entry/FSO vehicle platform for the IBCT recon squadron. The current standard issue, forcible entry, mounted platoon vehicle platform (M1151/M1167 variant HMMWV) in the reconnaissance squadron is incompatible with the long-range advance scout surveillance system (LRAS3) and improved target acquisition system (ITAS). The turret on both HMMWV variants and the mine resistant, ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle are not designed to accommodate the above-mentioned systems without modification, which requires considerable investment of unit operational and maintenance funds. Also, the HMMWV may be vulnerable to certain types of explosive devices, which is particularly noteworthy to the reconnaissance squadron as its vehicles may travel roads that have not been cleared by specialized engineer resources. We recommend conducting a review of available forced entry reconnaissance platform options to ensure 37 selected vehicles can be transported on a C-130, are compatible with modern surveillance and antiarmor systems, and provide sufficient force protection to the crew. “Ultra” lightweight laser/target designator. Based on the nature of forced entry operations in a FSO, there is a need for a lightweight laser/target designator specifically for the dismounted troop of the reconnaissance squadron. The current system, the AN/PED-1 lightweight laser designator rangefinder (LLDR), weighs approximately 35 pounds and is not suited for forced entry operations or dismounted movements over extended distances. We recommend adding the AN/PEQ-1B ground laser target designator II (GLTD II), also known as the “special operations forces laser marker (SOFLAM),” for the dismounted recon troop as it has all the capabilities of the LLDR with a total weight of 12 pounds. Platoon-level unmanned aircraft system (UAS). The current reconnaissance squadron MTOE allows one RQ-11 (Raven) per line troop, for a total of three systems. Considering the extended distances the reconnaissance squadron is expected to operate, with most operations conducted at the platoon level and below, the current number of Ravens is insufficient to provide NAI coverage within the squadron’s AO. We recommend increasing the Raven system’s authorization to provide UAS capability at the platoon level for a total of eleven systems (one per recon troop and one per recon platoon) in the squadron. Note: along with any increase in UAS within the brigade, there will be a corresponding increase in spectrum management and A2C2 measures. Additional gun trucks for headquarters and headquarters troop (HHT) and FSC. The JRTC FSO rotation highlights the requirement for additional gun trucks to secure the squadron TAC while operating in forward areas. The FSC also has a requirement to self-secure resupply operations for the distribution platoon, which will traverse long distances to reach mounted and dismounted troop trains. Currently, the squadron is internally resourcing the TAC’s security vehicles (four gun trucks pulled from the mounted troops) to maximize reconnaissance units forward in accordance with the fundamentals of reconnaissance. This is only possible at current manning levels since, as mentioned above, the troops typically man four vehicles (of six) per platoon to generate a dismounted capability. We recommend the HHT gun truck allocation be increased by an additional four trucks (the current MTOE authorizes gun trucks for the squadron commander and S3) to provide a security element for the TAC. This allows reconnaissance troop assets to remain focused on reconnaissance tasks. The personnel to man these trucks can continue to be an internal bill to the squadron. The squadron is currently using other undermanned gun trucks to resource a security platform for the FSC, which is also possible due to current recon platoon manning levels. However, manning the gun trucks and resupply vehicles exceeds the manpower authorized for the reconnaissance squadron’s distribution platoon, which is the smallest distribution platoon in the BCT, despite having arguably the greatest distance to travel. We “The current standard issue, forcible entry, mounted platoon vehicle platform (M1151/M1167 variant HMMWV) in the reconnaissance squadron is incompatible with the long-range advance scout surveillance system (LRAS3) and improved target acquisition system (ITAS). The turret on both HMMWV variants and the mine resistant, ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle are not designed to accommodate the above-mentioned systems without modification, which requires considerable investment of unit operational and maintenance funds.” 38 recommend the FSC be outfitted with six gun trucks and authorized an additional 18 88M MOS personnel to self-secure FSC missions. These additional internal security platforms and personnel allow the FSC the flexibility and freedom of maneuver to perform two simultaneous sustainment missions to different troop areas of operation. Additional distribution platoon assets in the FSC. Sustainment operations identify the requirement for additional assets to support resupply operations. The FSC is currently not authorized palletized loading systems/load handling systems (PLS/LHS) platforms, despite having the ammunition resupply mission. These platforms provide flexibility for ammunition transport, recovery platforms for vehicles and other equipment, and water resupply when using water blivets. The current MTOE only authorizes the use of light medium tactical vehicles/medium tactical vehicles (LMTV/MTVs), which have significantly less cargo space and cannot be used for recovery missions. We recommend authorizing two additional PLS/LHS with trailers for the recon squadron FSC. Summary of MTOE Observations The IBCT reconnaissance squadrons, while capable, are in need of additional organizational, manpower, and equipment modifications to realize their full potential. Organizing the IBCT’s ISR assets under one headquarters provides unity of command in addition to unity of effort, achieved through the chief of reconnaissance employment technique. Providing the squadron with additional ground reconnaissance personnel, intelligence analysts, and an engineer subject-matter expert increases the capability of the squadron and troop command posts to support subordinate elements’ reconnaissance efforts. Equipping the squadron with additional C2, communications, intelligence, force protection, fires, and fires support capabilities greatly enhances its ability to act as the BCT commander’s “eyes and ears” for the reconnaissance, security, and deep targeting functions inherent to all FSO. The Army, particularly units assigned to the ARFORGEN CEF pool, is renewing its emphasis on full-spectrum operations, which includes offensive, defensive, and stability missions conducted simultaneously across the BCT’s operational environment. The experience of 3d BCT, 82d Airborne Division, and 5th Squadron, 73d Cavalry, “Panther Recon,” during the recent FSO rotation at JRTC highlights particular operational methods, tactical observations, and MTOE challenges that inform the ongoing FSO discussion. While the TTP developed by 5th Squadron, 73d Cavalry, at JRTC may not fit every FSO scenario, it should serve as a start point for consideration as units train for FSO, and the institutional Army revises its doctrine. Notes 1Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D. C., 12 March 2010. 2HQDA, U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team, U. S. GPO, Washington, D. C., 14 September 2010, Chapter 6. 3The technique of employing assets in advance of the BCT main body to answer PIR that validate the BCT’s tactical plan is commonly referred to as “recon push.” 4FM 3-90.6, pp. 3-6 thru 3-11. 5Ibid., p. 3-7. 6Author’s note: Unlike the HBCT and SBCT, the IBCT has no organic 155mm cannon assets with which to employ precision artillery munitions. 7Comments by LTC Anthony Judge, battalion commander, 1st Battalion, 509th Infantry (ABN), Intelligence War Fighting Function AAR, 27 October 2010. 8Comments made by LTC Judge at the BCT’s final AARon 28 October 2010. 9FM 3-20.96. 10Author’s Note: Although the battlefield surveillance brigades (BfSB) are intended to conduct reconnaissance and security operations in support of a corps headquarters, their current design does not lend itself to label them as “maneuver” units. 11FM 3-20.96, p. 1-1. 12HQDA, FM 3-0, Operations, GPO, Washington, D. C., 27 February 2008, Chapter 2. 13FM 3-20.96, p. 3-2. 14Ibid, p. 4-2. 15FM 2-01, Initial Draft, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Synchronization, GPO, Washington, D. C., 15 March 2009, pp. 3-14 to 3-15; and FM 3-20.96, p. 3-5. 16FM 3-20.96, pp. 3-12 thru 3-18. 17Ibid, pp. 2-5 thru 2-9. 18Ibid, pp. 2-9 thru 2-11. 19Comments, LTC Judge, 28 October 2010. 20FM 3-90.6; FM 3-20.96; and FM 2-01, Initial Draft. Lieutenant Colonel Brian K. Flood is currently the commander, 5th Squadron, 73d Cavalry (Airborne-Reconnaissance), 3d Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy, an M. P. A. from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, and an M. A. from the U. S. Naval War College. His military education includes the Infantry Officer Basic Course, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, and the College of Naval Command and Staff. He has served in various command and staff positions to include deputy chief of operations and operations planner, Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg; battalion executive officer, 2d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment (2-505 PIR), Samarra, Iraq; battalion operations officer, 2-505 PIR, Fort Bragg; strategic plans officer, Headquarters, Department of the Army G3/5/7, the Pentagon; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 6th Ranger Training Battalion, Camp James E. Rudder, Florida; commander, Alpha Company, 5th Battalion, 87th Infantry (Light), Fort Kobbe, Panama; S3 air, scout platoon leader, and rifle platoon leader, 1st Battalion, 509th Infantry (Airborne), Fort Polk, LA; and platoon leader, M Company, 3d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk, LA. Major James A. Hayes is currently the squadron executive officer, 5th Squadron, 73d Cavalry (Airborne-Reconnaissance), 3d Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC. He received a B. A. from Pacific Lutheran University and a M. A. from Webster University. His military education includes the Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Captain Career Course, and the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions to include battalion operations officer and battalion executive officer, 2d Battalion, 358th Armor, Fort Lewis, WA; commander, C Troop, 2d Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment (SBCT), Fort Lewis, WA; S4, S3 plans, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop (HHT), 2d Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment (SBCT), Fort Lewis; S3 air, 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment, Camp Garry Owen, Republic of Korea; and executive officer, scout platoon leader, and tank platoon leader, 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Carson, CO. Major Forrest V. “Chip” Cook is currently the operations officer, 5th Squadron, 73d Cavalry (Airborne-Reconnaissance), 3d Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy and an M. A. from Stanford University. His military education includes the Infantry Officer Basic Course, Infantry Captain Career Course, and the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions to include assistant professor, Department of Foreign Languages, U. S. Military Academy; commander, A Company, 3d Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment (AIR), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC; brigade assistant operations officer, 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg; executive officer, E Company, 1st Battalion, 25th Military Intelligence Battalion, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, HI; aide-de-camp, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks; and rifle platoon leader and support platoon leader, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks. 39