Ten Tips for Tactical Commanders

ten tips that follow. 1

TIME MANAGEMENT

Reading, writing, and wrenches; there is never enough time, particularly while deployed, to read or write anything that is not urgent and directly related to deployment. The raft of professional development readings, language lessons, counterinsurgency readings, theater directives, lessons learned, post-operation reports, orders, and information packages, which will be pushed to commanders throughout deployment training, are valuable and should be read. However, commanders should make every effort to read and review these publications prior to arriving in theater; once in theater, leaders will be consumed by other things and these valuable resources will go unread. Commanders should commit as much time as possible to soldiers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and junior officers; share mealtime with soldiers, rather than the command crew. Making a conscious effort to focus on studying and reading during deployment training will free up time to focus on soldiering during deployment, which pays huge dividends. 2

DIVISION OF LABOR:

LET PEOPLE HELP

Our training system requires students, whether undergoing basic officer training or the combat team commander’s course, to physically conduct nearly every task, knowing and attending to every detail.

While this ensures candidates are familiar with all subordinate tasks and are capable of accomplishing them, it is an untenable methodology for sustained operations. A tactical commander simply cannot do everything. This causes commanders to burn out, become combat ineffective and fuzzy-minded, which is a disservice to soldiers. Commanders may want to track, manage, and coordinate every single detail, which is not conducive to commanding effectively. Commanders must use the skills, knowledge, and considerable ability of their people, such as the battle staff, to help command the organization. The commanding officer commands the company, battery, squadron, or combat team; however, supporting lieutenants, captains, and NCOs can run it from minute to minute, handle operational details, maintain the command post, and manage the myriad parts and lateral interactions required to keep the organization operating. The combat arms division of labor has evolved over many years and is proven to be effective across the spectrum of operations, from high-intensity combat to garrison training. Division of labor greatly assists commanders by freeing up the time and space to think and make the right decision at the right time. Delegating and leaning on others in the organization is neither a failure of the tactical commander nor a burden to subordinates, it is the best way to use collective knowledge and skills to accomplish the mission. 3

BATTLE PROCEDURES:

WHO DOES WHAT?

After receiving a warning order, commanders should provide the command support team early planning guidance based on a very general effect to be achieved and the timeline required. The command team should be given as much notice as possible, as early as possible, in as much detail as possible, and as far down the chain of command as possible, which is often accomplished through detailed radio warning orders and has always paid high dividends. During deployment to southern Kandahar Province, depending on time and distance, the captains on my combat team immediately started looking into planning and linking with the appropriate higher-level staff as required, while concurrently looking at resources. After conducting mission analysis, commanders clarify planning direction based on time, space, and effects, and sit down with the command support team, supporting arms/enabler advisors, and experts to plan collectively. Whenever possible, commanders should consult their sergeants major on sustainment and replenishment, see what is achievable, and offer a sober second look. Even on a small combat team, there are so many moving parts that the team commander has difficulty tracking vehicles or assessing maintenance status from minute to minute, which is why the staff and captains should step in. Once the estimate (usually done collectively) is completed, scheme of maneuver roughed out and planned, finish the written order (if time permits) or radio/overlay order if time is short. For written orders, the captains should assist in orders preparation by writing and verifying groupings and tasks, coordinating instructions, and most of command and signals. In Canada’s armor corps, the squadron sergeant major inputs most of the service support paragraph and critical coordinating instructions such as detainee handling details or actions on breakdown. For example, as the commander, I issue formal orders; one of the captains (normally the battle captain [S3]) issues the groupings and tasks, and most of the coordinating instructions; and the sergeant major issues service support instructions. I cannot overstress the need to lean on the team throughout the battle procedure and plan development, which will help ensure that leaders have the time and space to think, all appropriate lateral coordination is complete, and orders are reviewed before they are issued. To support this process, the higher headquarters must be a self-functioning organization with effective and detailed standard operating procedures and a strong battle rhythm that manages key staff time and tasks. If the combat team headquarters is not tight and well-managed, and everyone does not understand “who does what, when and where,” it will waste efforts and cause burn out, thus the entire small unit suffers. 4

TAKE TIME TO SOLDIER

Remember, leaders are soldiers first, who also happen to be officers; young soldiers will deploy without complaint and follow orders, so leaders need to demonstrate the same skills, abilities, determination, and endurance they do. This is a simple principle, often easily said, but difficult to do given the demands on time. Leaders should take time to deploy with different elements of the organization, particularly new attachments. Leaders need to sit down with soldiers and clean weapons, take the unit’s tactical movement group out as a fighting element and fulfill some of the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR), or complete other tactical tasks. Hands-on soldiering keeps leaders grounded, keeps leaders mindful of the difficulties and dangers of the environment “Commanders must use the skills, knowledge, and considerable ability of their people, such as the battle staff, to help command the organization. The commanding officer commands the company, battery, squadron, or combat team; however, supporting lieutenants, captains, and NCOs can run it from minute to minute, handle operational details, maintain the command post, and manage the myriad parts and lateral interactions required to keep the organization operating.” 24 March-April 2011 in which the team operates, and keeps leaders in touch with soldering and how it is done. Soldiering also ensures leaders make decisions from a position of credibility, knowledge, and experience, not from a command post divorced from the battle. 5

LEADER MOVEMENT

In Afghanistan, commanders cannot move within the battlespace at will. Every move is a deliberate operation that saps combat power from the rest of the team and places soldiers at risk. To support commanders forward, vehicle crews must be well-versed in all command post duties and be ready to conduct local defense, communications troubleshooting, map preparation, and other command support duties in austere forward locations from the back of their vehicles. They must also be capable of independent action, understanding the big picture and the next steps of ongoing operations, keeping the vehicle ready to move at a moment’s notice, and using their initiative to resolve uncertain situations when time and rest are at a premium. Try to plan moves well in advance and link them with sustainment missions, existing patrols, route clearance packages, combat logistics patrols, flanking subunit movements, or any other elements moving in the battlespace whenever possible. Yes, the team’s movement will be hampered without choice. If the team has to move, pull assets from the remainder of the team to support requirements to command forward, but be aware of the effect it will have. Ensure return moves are planned as detailed as movements out to prevent being stranded in a location with only one vehicle and unable to return to the remainder of your subunit timely. Maximizing the use of other moving parts in the battlespace is good, but having the combat team commander stuck in a forward location with no way to retrieve him is dreadful. 6

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

During deployed operations, the leave plan, which will periodically see large numbers of personnel unavailable for operations, causes such havoc that it may require assigning vehicles and crew members. Often in preparation for large scale, deliberate operations, the captains and sergeant major chess-piece out individual vehicle crewing and patrol makeup. While every attempt is made to give platoon-level leaders and NCOs maximum latitude, this planning often cannot be pushed to them because they would spend so much time gathering combat power, coordinating, planning, and linking laterally to exchange personnel and vehicles that they would have no time to lead troops. While planning in such detail, driven from the combat team headquarters, is painful and something never encountered during training, it is a reality that cannot be escaped. Egos must be set aside in this instance to permit the whole subunit to function effectively. All leaders must understand that combat team readiness takes precedence over platoon-level cohesion. In training, platoons must practice operating with each other and with sections from different platoons meshed together for taskings.

7 KNOW AND UNDERSTAND

ATTACHMENTS AND ENABLERS

In the modern battlespace, everything is a combined arms effort; however, the breadth of attachments and enablers used in practice far exceed those typically covered in training. B Squadron, The Royal Canadian Dragoons, deployed to Afghanistan in fall 2009 as a squadron of less than 100 personnel. However, for most of its deployment, it had more than 200 Canadian personnel, mostly comprised of attachments over and above those normally found in a combat team, such as engineers, artillery forward observation officer parties, and additional infantry. The B Squadron Combat Team attached civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) teams, construction management organization (CMO) teams, police-operational mentor liaison teams (P-OMLT), medics, a national support element logistics detachment, a number of civilian contracted K-9 patrol dog teams, and from time to time, psychological operations (PSYOPS) and explosive ordnance (EOD) teams. The combat team also worked closely with Whole of Government partners in the form of Canadian International Development Agency civilian stabilization officers and civilian police officers. For all deliberate and most routine operations, the team also partnered with an Afghan National Police element. We took time to sit down and learn what our partners, attachments, and enablers had to offer, how they worked, and addressed any restrictions they had regarding employment. Often, perceptions differ from reality on the ground; recognizing them early not only offers the best mutual understanding, it also makes the attachments aware that you have taken the time to understand their significance and see them as part of your team, not just resources to be exploited. Finally, attachments may be drawn from the air force or navy and may not understand combat arms operations; be prepared to educate them. 8

TACTICAL PATIENCE

During operations, things occur at a moment’s notice and will throw timing “In Afghanistan, commanders cannot move within the battlespace at will. Every move is a deliberate operation that saps combat power from the rest of the team and places soldiers at risk. To support commanders forward, vehicle crews must be well-versed in all command post duties and be ready to conduct local defense, communications troubleshooting, map preparation, and other command support duties in austere forward locations from the back of their vehicles.” Continued on Page 50 March-April 2011 25

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